





















# All Together



**In Spirit, in Purpose,  
And in Action**



THE STORY  
OF THE  
MASSACHUSETTS COMMITTEE  
ON PUBLIC SAFETY

February 10, 1917 — November 21, 1918



By  
GEORGE HINCKLEY LYMAN

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*ADVERSIS MAJOR PAR SECUNDIS*

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FOR  
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## PREFACE

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The accompanying synopsis of the part taken in the Great War by the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, written at the request of His Excellency Governor McCall and members of the Executive Committee, aims merely to present a general chronicle of its activities and the relation of its undertaking to the State and to the people.

With the very large number of subjects involved, to attempt a full and elaborated account of its work would not only fill volumes, but be quite sure to exhaust the patience of the reader. Nor could any single person, however well equipped with a general knowledge of what the Committee brought about, adequately portray the ideals and accomplishments of those sub-committees of which he was not himself a directing influence, and give proper credit to their individual members. Accordingly, it has been attempted to present a résumé of the conditions obtaining at the time the Committee came into being, and which made the demand for its formation, together with a general outline of the work done. It has also been found necessary, especially in treating of the larger functions of the Committee, to append certain tabulations rather than to include them in the body of the text. The chairmen of the sub-committees undertook to be responsible for results, and both chairmen and personnel are entitled to full praise for the successful outcome of their Committee's work; yet the amount of credit due to any one committee has in most cases to be gathered from its own records as the chief dependable statement of its contributions to the general result. The privilege has, therefore, been assumed, without acknowledgment to the original sources, of borrowing the ideas and even the wording as contained in reports submitted by chairmen of sub-com-

mittees. The same is true as regards the press and other outside agencies, thus making this story to a certain degree composite in its relation.

To present a mere stilted record of the activities of the Committee on Public Safety would strangle all imagination. Likewise any effort accurately to portray so vital a part of the Commonwealth's history during those wonderful, stirring times would be adjudged unseasonable. Nor is a literary effort asked for or warranted. It is, therefore, assumed that a simple, unvarnished tale as gathered from reports and the personal observation of those intimately associated with the work will best meet every requirement.

GEORGE HINCKLEY LYMAN.

JULY, 1919.

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# THE STORY

OF

## THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY

FEBRUARY 10, 1917

NOVEMBER 20, 1918

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### PART I

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#### CHAPTER I

#### GENERAL CONDITIONS

When on August 3, 1914, the Old World began the greatest conflict in the history of mankind, finally embracing nearly every nation and dependency from East to West, the average citizen of Massachusetts, many thousand miles distant from the seat of war, failed to connect the devastation raging so far away with any immediate or ultimate harm coming to his country, his State or himself.

It was not so much optimism as a lack of appreciation that prompted this almost universal sense of security. Yet a very few, with a clearer and more prophetic understanding of the conditions that brought about the war, were constantly insistent that the United States would sooner or later inevitably be involved, and that it was incumbent on her people to make every preparation, take the initiative, and join the cause of the Allies. To them the danger was imminent, and the cause of freedom and humanity directly imperiled. They realized that the world was facing a mighty power, now fully arrived at an acme of leadership, organization and armament, all servile to an irresponsible, ruthless oligarchy bent at any cost on the domination of the world;

that "Kultur," so called, was a mockery, its very name misleading; while the most vicious and insidious propaganda was being ruthlessly directed against the integrity of our national life.

The philosophy of this inertia on the part of a liberty-loving people — who for three years had witnessed humanity degraded, the rights of freedom trodden under foot, its country's flag insulted, and its citizens murdered on the high seas without a blow being struck in return — is more properly material for the psychologist.

It was the conditions as they obtained, and not their cause, with which we had to reckon when our Republic finally declared war against Germany and joined the Allies, then sorely pressed, and who, though far from beaten, stood with their backs to the wall.

A mighty problem confronted us. Our energies had been absorbed in the attainment of national prosperity. For years we had been negligent of every warning, and despite our opportunities and immeasurable resources had finally entered the greatest conflict in history totally deficient in armament, equipment or material; with an army small and scattered; a transportation service inexcusably faulty; and our suddenly awakened people dazed by the realization of its desperate unpreparedness. Across the seas a relentless foe met our challenge with open ridicule and contempt, boasting that the war would be over and the Teuton victorious long before the United States could marshal its armies on the field of battle.

But they forgot our birthright, so nobly conceived in the love of liberty. They did not recall our infancy and its baptism of patriotic self-sacrifice. They failed to appreciate that the divine heritage bequeathed to us was not dead, but remained a vital and controlling element in our character, and that we were still loyal to the ideals of our forefathers and the force of their great example. They did not know that beneath the surface lay the quickening, unconquerable soul of the American people.

It was the recognition of this spirit, and the anticipation of the United States' immediate entry into the war, which prompted His Excellency Governor McCall, as spokesman for the people of Massachusetts, and at the immediate suggestion of Mr. James J. Storrow, and Mr. Charles F. Weed, President of the Chamber of Commerce, to name on February 9, 1917, the following one hundred citizens, chosen from every section of the Commonwealth, as a Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety:—

James J. Storrow, *Chairman.*

Henry Abrahams.  
 Charles H. Allen.  
 Hon. Butler Ames.  
 Charles S. Baxter.  
 Frank P. Bennett.  
 Col. Everett C. Benton.  
 Charles S. Bird.  
 Spencer Borden, Jr.  
 Charles W. Bosworth.  
 Roland W. Boyden.  
 Dr. L. Vernon Briggs.  
 George E. Brock.  
 Dr. William A. Brooks.  
 William M. Butler.  
 Charles F. Choate, Jr.  
 A. H. Christie.  
 Charles H. Cole.  
 Hon. Calvin Coolidge.  
 Hon. Louis A. Coolidge.  
 Hon. Channing H. Cox.  
 Hon. W. Murray Crane.  
 Henry H. Crapo.  
 Alvah T. Crocker.  
 John W. Cummings.  
 Hon. James M. Curley.  
 Hon. Edwin U. Curtis.  
 Hon. Grafton D. Cushing.  
 Harvey Cushing.  
 Henry S. Dennison.  
 George A. Draper.  
 Albert Greene Duncan.

Arthur W. Eaton.  
 John W. Farley.  
 Walter C. Fish.  
 Hon. John F. Fitzgerald.  
 Archie N. Frost.  
 Louis A. Frothingham.  
 Harry W. Garfield.  
 William A. Gaston.  
 Edward W. Glines.  
 Levi H. Greenwood.  
 Edwin Farnham Greene.  
 Walton A. Greene.  
 Edwin A. Grozier.  
 John W. Haigis.  
 Matthew Hale.  
 Charles H. Hayden.  
 Robert F. Herrick.  
 Henry L. Higginson.  
 Richard C. Hooker.  
 James H. Hustis.  
 George N. Jeppson.  
 J. Lovell Johnson.  
 Benjamin Joy.  
 Eben S. S. Keith.  
 Louis E. Kirstein.  
 George E. Kunhardt.  
 Louis K. Liggett.  
 Edmund W. Longley.  
 A. Lawrence Lowell.  
 Frank J. Ludwig.  
 Hon. George H. Lyman.

Richard C. Maclaurin.  
 Frederick W. Mansfield.  
 Robert E. Marden.  
 Frederic C. McDuffie.  
 J. Franklin McElwain.  
 Grenville S. McFarland.  
 Alexander Meiklejohn.  
 Guy Murchie.  
 Robert L. O'Brien.  
 Joseph H. O'Neil.  
 Eugene W. Ong.  
 James J. Phelan.  
 William B. Plunkett.  
 J. W. Powell.  
 Oliver Prescott.  
 Frederick H. Prince.  
 A. C. Ratschesky.  
 Russell Robb.  
 Bernard J. Rothwell.

John L. Saltonstall.  
 Edward F. Searles.  
 Joseph A. Skinner.  
 Frederic S. Snyder.  
 Philip L. Spalding.  
 Godfrey de la Tannancour.  
 Charles H. Taylor.  
 Thomas W. Thatcher.  
 Hon. David I. Walsh.  
 Charles G. Washburn.  
 Charles F. Weed.  
 Henry G. Wells.  
 George R. White.  
 E. Marston Whitin.  
 Sherman L. Whipple.  
 James T. Williams, Jr.  
 Butler R. Wilson.  
 Daniel G. Wing.  
 Robert Winsor.

Subsequently the Governor added the following names: —

W. A. L. Bazeley.  
 Edmund Billings.  
 H. F. Brock.  
 Charles C. Doten.  
 Mark Temple Dowling.  
 Henry B. Endicott.  
 William F. Fitzgerald.  
 Alvan T. Fuller.  
 John L. Hall.  
 Ira N. Hollis.  
 Stillman F. Kelley.

Arthur A. Kidder.  
 Walter L. McMenimen.  
 George von L. Meyer.  
 Charles A. Pastene.  
 Gardner W. Pearson (*ex officio*).  
 Robert L. Raymond.  
 Milton F. Reed.  
 Simon Vorenberg.  
 Frank W. Whitcher.  
 Roger Wolcott.

Massachusetts had ever been a practical State. Her industries and institutions were her life. At the same time, she never abandoned her ideals, which at once quickened with threatened danger. She now recognized what was expected of her, and that it was a people's war, at home as well as in the field, and in the cause of Liberty. Of the Committee so appointed more than one-half became personally active in its labors, with very few holidays to break the



strain during the twenty-one months their services were called for.

The Governor's selection was made without regard to creed, political affiliation, social or racial distinction. With a single aim, Republican and Democrat, Gentile and Jew, Catholic and Protestant toiled shoulder to shoulder, — their strength in unity. Their example was closely followed by many hundreds eventually enrolled in different branches of the work. Distinguished scholars, college presidents, clergymen, philanthropists, professors, doctors, lawyers, business men and labor leaders met in daily conclave. Women and men, the elder and the younger, all volunteers in a great cause, toiled patriotically, cheerfully, and in perfect harmony during the long summer heat and the cold winters that they might do their share in going over the home top.

## CHAPTER II

### ORGANIZATION OF PROVISIONAL AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES

A Provisional Executive Committee of seven, appointed by His Excellency to act until such time as the whole Committee could be brought together, met the next day, February 10, 1917, at the Governor's office to discuss and lay plans for the complete co-ordination of the resources of the State. The Governor advised in substance that the purpose of the Committee was to consider the problems growing out of our international relations, in order that the Commonwealth might have the benefit of its advice and action; that he believed our citizens ready to respond in the emergency that presented itself; and that his choice of names had been solely influenced by his determination to have all the different elements of our citizenship represented, and thus the opinion of the Commonwealth as a whole obtained.

Meetings of the Provisional Committee were held regularly every day for five days thereafter, the sessions extending sometimes well into the night. During this period the contemplated scope of the Committee's work was outlined as far as at that time possible; the formation of sub-committees was suggested and approved, and reports of conditions here and abroad were gathered from a vast number of agencies, all with a view to the complete co-ordination of the resources of the Commonwealth and the fullest co-operation with sister States and the national government.

On February 14, 1917, the first meeting of the Committee of One Hundred was called together by the Governor in the East Wing Committee Room at the State House, where His Excellency, on bringing the meeting to order, addressed them in part as follows:—

My difficulty in selecting this Committee was rather one of exclusion than of selection, because in considering the make-up of such a citizens

committee in the Commonwealth one finds a splendid wealth of material. What I tried to do was to get one hundred of the best men in the State, with a special idea of their fitness for the work, and representative as a body of the different interests, the different lines of industry, and the different elements of our citizenship, so that it would stand as representative of the whole Commonwealth.

I had an idea that it was well to have a committee of this character consider those problems that grow out of our present delicate international relations, and give to the Commonwealth, and through it to the country, the benefit of its advice, and, if necessary, of its action. I did not appoint the Committee with the idea that war was probable. I am expressing no opinion upon that point. But I think we will all agree that war is at least possible; and as it is possible it behooves us to do what we can to get the Commonwealth of Massachusetts where it may, as it always has in time of national crises, respond very quickly to any call from the Nation. But whatever our faults of preparation may be, the American people has such a comprehensive genius, such a facility of invention, that there is no nation in the world that can take liberties with it or that can provoke it, at any rate, without considering the consequences. We have not been permitted to grow up a big and great nation simply because of the toleration of other powers; but we have the elements in ourselves, in our government, that will make us a formidable foe to any other nation in the world before we finally get through a war, and I believe the other nations all recognize it.

Gentlemen, we are not trying to get in advance of the men who are controlling the administration of our national government. I believe those men are actuated only by patriotic motives. I believe they thoroughly understand the situation, and I believe when the test shall come it will be found that they have made preparations and have taken thought of things of which most of us did not happen to have any knowledge. It is my idea that we should support the administration.

At the conclusion of the Governor's address the Committee proceeded to form its permanent organization, the officers elected within the immediately succeeding days, together with the Executive Committee, being —

James J. Storrow, *Chairman*.

C. F. Weed, *Vice-Chairman*.

Guy Murchie, *Secretary*.

Edmund W. Longley, *Treasurer*.

Henry B. Endicott.

Walton A. Green.

Benjamin Joy.

James J. Phelan.

A. C. Ratschesky.

Adj.-Gen. Pearson (*ex officio*).

Substantial powers were at the same time given to the Executive Committee to appoint sub-committees, officers and agents, to fill vacancies and to add to their own number as might from time to time seem to them desirable.

On February 15, 1917, Mr. Henry B. Endicott was elected executive manager, an event the value of which, not only to the Committee itself but likewise to the broader and more comprehensive interests of the State and Nation, will be appreciated more and more as this story progresses. Only those who served under him, and particularly the fortunate few who for twenty-one months lived daily in the atmosphere and partnership of the inner office, can justly estimate his ability, force and character, or realize the strength of his unselfish patriotism.

Pursuant to the authority given, on March 15 Mr. John F. Stevens and Mr. Frank H. McCarthy, and on March 29 Mr. George H. Lyman and Mr. J. Frank O'Hare, the latter in place of Mr. McCarthy resigned, were elected members of the Executive Committee, and after a lapse of four months, from time to time, still further additions were made, as will appear later.

It was —

*Resolved*, That the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety pledges its loyal support to the State and national government in all measures for the defence of our country and the preservation of the right of its people on land and sea.

From this time on the Executive Committee directed and controlled the entire work of the organization in all its branches, the only meetings thereafter of the Committee of One Hundred taking place on March 17, 1917, December 6, 1917, and finally on November 20, 1918, at which time the organization was dissolved.

The Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety was thus formally instituted, being the first organization of its kind established in the United States. Moreover, the model of its organization and the plan for its development were in a



large measure followed in many parts of the country as well as by the Council of National Defense. Its primal and declared object—for we were not yet at war—was to secure protection from foreign aggression and insure against treachery and violence within the State. As a corollary thereof it was pledged to co-operate with the administration at Washington in all matters relating to the public weal, so far as affected by the war cloud then enveloping Europe and threatening to burst upon our land at any moment.

Nevertheless, Massachusetts was totally unprepared for any such emergency. She had no foundation on which to build except her own resources, courage and persistent energy. The same condition existed in every State of the Union.

The last Congress, possibly lulled by a false sense of security, had declined by a considerable majority to make proper appropriations for national equipment or defence, thereby forgetting that “when a strong man armed keepeth his palace his goods are in peace.” Many, though falsely, challenged its patriotism. The root of the difficulty was that the dormant soul of the American people required awakening. There were many striking exceptions, however, to this inertia on the part of men in public life, foremost among which was the example given by a Representative from Massachusetts, Maj. Augustus P. Gardner, who later resigned from Congress and forfeited his life in behalf of the principles for which he had contended.

We were, therefore, left at a critical time in our history to cope as best we might with a gigantic military machine bred through two generations to a vicious lust for conquest, false to its word, brutal in its methods, and composed of veterans of more than two years’ standing. It would be unfair to charge the truly critical position in which we found ourselves to any one political party. The trouble lay with the people as a whole,—with our antecedents covering a period of many years. Circumstances and longitude had made us a peaceful, commercial, yet in many respects an

inconsequent people. What we most desired in our relations to other nations was to be let alone, — a vital background of the Monroe Doctrine. We were willing to let other nations settle their own particular difficulties. We were not out for glory, nor did we want anybody else's territory, while distance made us feel secure in our own possessions. In short, we did not realize how the world had changed.

One might recall the poet's version of the time when, many years ago, French privateers appeared in the offing, threatening "to ravish with fire and steel our helpless Boston town," and how the parson stood with his congregation in the Old South Church —

Saying humbly: Let us pray:  
Oh Lord, we would not advise,  
But if in Thy providence  
A tempest should arise,  
To drive the French fleet hence,  
And scatter it far and wide,  
Or sink it in the sea,  
We should be satisfied,  
And Thine the glory be.

Such were the trying and uncertain conditions pervading State and Nation when the advent of spring, 1917, brought with it a declaration of war and the demand for a vast host of combatants, to be gathered from every State in the Union, who should defend our cause on land and sea; and for a still greater army to recruit the man power and preserve its efficiency in equipment, material and supplies. Our Nation, aroused from its apathy, began to systematize its vast resources of men, material and food with a patriotism which challenged all rivalry, and an ability which more and more won the admiration and astonishment of the world. It was at this juncture that the citizens of Massachusetts created the Committee on Public Safety, the keystone of an arch which was eventually to form a new memorial of Yankee pluck, patriotism and devotion to duty.

### CHAPTER III

## ANTICIPATING WAR

In the interim, covering about seven weeks, during which our participation in the war hung in the balance, the Committee laid the foundations of its work, and, despite every discouragement, entered upon a task unique in character, exhaustless in opportunity, and testing every patriotic impulse; yet splendid in the fruition and the final accomplishment of a great endeavor.

The most pressing necessity demanding the attention of the Executive Committee was to perfect our local defence. This was embraced under the following heads: the militia, National Guard and State Guard and their equipment; the medical preparation necessary to meet any emergency; existing transportation facilities and the improvement thereof; the State Police; Home Guard; and the protection of munition plants, bridges, waterways and other danger points. On motion of Mr. Phelan the initial vote of the Provisional Committee, recorded on February 10, declared —

That the Committee considers it its first duty to see that the existing official military organizations of the State are fully equipped to the last detail for a possible call for service; to find out how they are now equipped on a peace basis, and how they should be equipped in the event of war.

There was little doubt in any one's mind that we were really on the brink of war, and also that the Committee, although a voluntary association, virtually represented the State, was for the time being its right arm, and must act independently as well as in co-operation with the national government.

At once, on passage of the foregoing resolution, personal representation was sent to Washington, and detailed information covering the general question of local defence was dili-

gently collected from every available source. Pending the result of these inquiries, the following Preparatory Committees were appointed: —

Finance.	Publicity.
Co-ordination of Aid Societies.	Land Forces.
Industrial Survey.	State Protection.
Transportation.	Naval Forces.
Hygiene, Medicine and Sanitation.	Military Equipment and Supplies.
Federal and State Legislation.	Emergency Help and Equipment.
Food Production and Conservation.	

Further, and to co-operate with the Committee on Land Forces, and in some respects with the Committee on Naval Forces, the following additional committees were appointed: —

Mobilization and Concentration	Trucks and Motor Cars.
Camps.	Recruiting.
Horses.	Home Guards.

The personnel of these Preparatory Committees was not confined to membership in the Committee of One Hundred, but included names added from time to time as the work progressed. (See Appendix, page 537 *et seq.*)

It might be well to emphasize at this point how each of these Preparatory Committees was created, primarily to meet exigencies arising during the interval between peace and anticipated war. Although one or two of them were later discontinued, as overlapping or unnecessary to the general plan, the demands on others after the United States became an active belligerent often changed materially in character from their original purpose, or were absorbed in the broader activities and functions of the State or Nation. Nevertheless, as the result of their early painstaking and efficient labors a potent organization was gradually perfected, its tentacles radiating from a common center into nearly every corner of the Commonwealth, and with each auxiliary ready and anxious at all times to help the Executive Committee in working out the vexatious problems



rapidly accumulating. They also greatly assisted in concluding satisfactory and co-operating relations with the rest of New England and with sister States, and eventually with the Council of National Defense at Washington. Each unit, though formed on the same pattern, was independent in itself, working in conformity with the requirements of its local conditions, yet always within the scope of the general scheme. Together they constituted a powerful aggregate, striving in patriotic accord to do their full share towards the attainment of a single generic purpose.

### **State Organization and Preparatory Committees**

It was evident that the assistance and co-operation of every city and town within the Commonwealth was imperatively needed, and on March 21 the specific task of forming local committees on Public Safety was assigned to Mr. Ratshesky and Mr. Lyman.

Out of a total number of 295 towns in the State, 251 towns formed sub-committees under the general plan and in full co-operation with the aims of the Executive Committee. From 38 cities in the State, every city — with the sole exception of Springfield — answered to the call of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, or acted in full accord, sympathy and co-operation with its purposes and requests.

Thus, before our entry into the war became a fact, a widespread and perfected working body of interested patriotic citizens were banded together with the sole object of doing their utmost towards the winning of the war.

The few towns that did not register as requested were so small in population that by mutual consent it was deemed inadvisable for them to form separate organizations; yet in many instances a scantily populated town combined its efforts with a neighboring town so as to be represented on the membership of the latter's Committee. On the basis of population, 95.8 per cent of the entire citizenship of the

State became formally represented as part of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, or working in full co-operation with its purposes.

It will now be attempted to give the more specific reasons for which these Preparatory Committees were formed, with a somewhat detailed account of the activities in which each was engaged. An exception, however, will be made in the case of the Committee on Food Production and Conservation, whose activities, July, 1917, were transferred to the Board of Food Administration authorized by both Federal and State authority, and whose work continued until the end of the war. This Preparatory Committee will therefore, for the sake of continuity, be discussed later in Part V, together with the other projects of the Food Administration.

#### COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

A first and vital consideration involving the entire scope of the proposed work was the question of finance. No better proof of the temper, supreme confidence and patriotism of our wealthier citizenship could have been offered than the successful results obtained by the Committee on Finance, who, within a few days, received subscriptions aggregating over \$101,022.85, the expenditure of which was authorized to be used as a special fund solely within the discretion of the Executive Committee, and independent of any outside approval. This amount constituted a revolving fund, and was more than sufficient to meet every present demand. Many of the drafts originally made thereon were later charged to an appropriation of \$1,000,000 allowed by the Legislature to defray war expenditures, and which was recognized as the main source from which the general expenses of the Committee on Public Safety were to be paid. These rebates, with the balance over, left the special fund sufficiently ample to provide for all such future payments as might not properly come within the terms of the

State's gift. Thus all anxiety in regard to financing the Committee on Public Safety was at once removed.

On March 19, 1917, in less than two hours after receiving a message from Governor McCall, the Legislature by special act, chapter 202, made the appropriation of \$1,000,000 above referred to, to be paid out of the treasury of the Commonwealth from the general revenue; and to be expended under the direction of the Governor as Commander-in-Chief, subject to the approval of the Council, "in defraying the military, naval and other expenses which the emergency arising out of existing conditions, and the exigencies of possible war, might in his judgment render requisite and proper." The act was construed to include the general requirements of the Committee on Public Safety, and from this appropriation the allowed expenditures of the Committee were paid and charged to the general revenue.

Again, on May 25, 1917, under the provisions of chapter 324, the United States having in the meantime declared war with Germany, a further appropriation of \$1,000,000 was made to cover any emergency which might arise during the recess of the General Court by reason of the then existing state of war. This was to be bonded for a term not exceeding ten years, and to be used only in case the million dollars taken from the general revenue became exhausted. No bonds were issued, however, under this act, although a note was given for \$97,000, the money to be used for requirements of the State Guard. This was later repaid out of the general funds of the Commonwealth.

In 1918 the money thus appropriated for use during the year 1917, under chapter 202, was recognized by the Auditor's office as being still available for the Committee on Public Safety, notwithstanding the absence of any special provision in the act for extension of time. What really happened was that the expenditures made in 1917 were chiefly for the needs of our military and naval forces in the way of equipment, the major part of which outlay—as will be seen in the discussion of Equipment and Supplies,

Chapter VI — was later paid by the United States government, leaving the bulk of the one million dollar appropriation of March 19, 1917, still available for use in 1918.

#### COMMITTEE ON CO-ORDINATION OF AID SOCIETIES

The purpose of this Committee was to amalgamate all societies of similar character throughout the State, to the end that the sum total of their combined efforts should constitute one well-balanced and productive whole, without either duplication or overlapping.

The origin of the Committee on Public Safety was the visible sign of a patriotic desire on the part of the men of Massachusetts to meet the necessities of a situation fraught with perils and with opportunity. The same incentive obtained equally among the women of the State, who from the first wished to do their full share, and whose organizations commenced work, or strengthened that in which they were already engaged, to meet war needs. It became at once evident that to secure effective results this work should be interrelated, co-operative and thoroughly organized, and to attain that end the above Committee was appointed.

The heads of the various women's organizations were therefore immediately called in conference, where two facts became apparent. Every woman was more than anxious to work for a common result, and to have her organization take such part as would best help to bring about this purpose. At the same time, it was apparent that the problem of organization involved was an unusual one. The national government had not yet acted in any comprehensive way, nor was it at all certain what form its activities would take.

Several organizations of a nation-wide scope desired to extend their spheres of influence into Massachusetts; new organizations were being formed inside the State, with branches in many towns and cities; and those already in the State, at first local, were continuously forming new branches, some of which were made up exclusively of women, while others included both men and women. In this some-



what mixed situation the more pertinent questions resolved themselves as follows:—

How should activities entering the State from without be related to those within?

Should the State organization proceed on the theory that the best interests of the larger agencies, such as the Red Cross, the Special Aid Society, the Civic Federation, Federated Women's Clubs and others, demanded a central bureau for each, with its organization lines running to all the cities and towns, and acting independently in those cities and towns; or should there be a centralized bureau containing representatives of the major activities, which should endeavor to group each city and town, and thus secure harmonious action? Also was it best that the work of the women and that of the men should go on together, or ought a sharp and separating line be drawn between them?

A number of conferences were held and many views were expressed, the conclusions finally reached being that the work of the men and the women was of like importance, though different in kind, and that a full and equal partnership basis would give the best results.

It was further determined that the only authority which could be recognized as superior to that of the State was the United States government; that in every way the women's organizations should co-operate with the government to the extent of their ability; and in case of any civilian activities coming from outside the State, these must abide by the general policy of the United Aid Societies of Massachusetts.

It was also decided that there should be a central conference, consisting of representatives from all the women's organizations, which should make every effort to group in each city and town the local chapters of these organizations, and to secure harmony if any friction existed.

These simple principles of organization, animated throughout by a spirit of the finest patriotism, soon brought harmony and effective results.



Another and special effort made from the very first was to form an organization which should be ready and able to fit as far as possible into that eventually decided on by the national government.

The Red Cross took a very prominent and useful part in the whole scheme of organizing aid societies, as did the Special Aid Society. Though many more might be mentioned, especial reference is made to these two because the first had a nation-wide, and the second a valuable though local, existence. It is equally to the credit of both these organizations that the Red Cross, having the wider scope, was allowed to act as a clearing house for information in greater Boston, a plan which was carried through without any friction whatever. Notwithstanding that there were many problems in the general scheme requiring adjustment, no serious difficulties developed.

The Committee on Co-ordination of Aid Societies had a work to do which, though entirely preparatory, was essential; but it never became burdensome because of the splendid patriotism evidenced by Massachusetts women. The principle of working with the women as equal partners was fully maintained in every activity of the Committee on Public Safety and that of the Food Administration, and endured until the war ended. Certainly the results proved its wisdom.

Mr. B. Preston Clark, chairman of this Committee, continued from the first to be its directing influence, giving unstintedly of his time and effort in guiding the co-ordinate and partnership work of the women's and men's activities in their relations to the Committee on Public Safety and to the Food Administration.

#### COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL SURVEY

It was at first intended to have this Committee make a survey of the manufacturing facilities of the State, and its work began on that line. Thereafter it became apparent that any demand likely to be made on these utilities would

naturally come from the Federal authorities, and not from the State. For this reason, and because by that time the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense — a Federal function, established shortly after the organization of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety — had for some months been making an industrial survey of the whole country, it was deemed advisable to abandon the original scheme and work with the National Commission when so requested, and under its general direction. The Committee found that about 2,400 Massachusetts manufacturing concerns were already listed by the Washington Commission; that the majority of them had filed complete returns; and that the others had been turned over to Mr. C. L. Edgar, who was taking care of the industrial survey work in Massachusetts in behalf of the Naval Consulting Board and the Council of National Defense. Meetings were held with the Washington Commission looking to a survey of Massachusetts plants capable of filling experimental orders for ammunition. But when it transpired that the Ordnance Department did not possess adequate specifications and drawings, and also that if any such orders should be placed it was more than likely they would be given to plants in inland States, the subject was dropped, except that recommendations based on investigations already made by the Committee on Industrial Survey were forwarded to the Commission in Washington. Conferences were likewise held with local Ordnance Department officials, to the end that they might be fully acquainted with the facilities existing in Massachusetts. The Committee, therefore, having outlived the purpose for which it was created, discontinued further work.

#### COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION

The Transportation Committee's particular function was to arrange for the rapid, unimpeded transportation of troops when summoned in case of riot or other emergency; to protect critical points throughout the State, such as

power houses, sources of power, bridges, munitions, water-supply plants, conduits, etc.; or to meet any danger threatening the public safety and demanding the presence of armed forces.

A card index list was made by the Committee and submitted to the chairman of the Committee on State Protection, together with the best information obtainable as to the particular street railway officials to be notified in case of a given emergency. The Committee also prepared a topographical drawing giving the electric lines in the State with their relation to armories, manufacturing industries, connections between steam and electric railways, docks, power sources, spur tracks, etc. This map also showed all emergency connections between steam and electric railways, and between these and such manufacturing and industrial plants as would best facilitate the movement of troops and material. A significant fact shown by this drawing was that a physical connection could be made between the Springfield Street Railway and the Berkshire Street Railway at Huntington, Mass., thereby furnishing a through electric route from western to eastern Massachusetts. An inventory was prepared giving accurately the location of all materials, such as rails, copper, ties, spikes, etc., that they might be quickly requisitioned; and still another compiled of all passenger, freight and material cars. A pocket map showing the different street railway lines was made ready for the use of government officials in charge of routing material. It was in accordance with the recommendations of this Committee that manufacturing concerns readjusted their opening and closing hours so as best to spread the traffic handled by the street railways, and that steps were taken, in the event of a military draft, to have employees of important transportation and manufacturing industries exempted from military service. Legislation was also urged, the effect of which would be to waive some of the hide-bound restrictions binding the street railways in time of peace, and permit them to place their services, material

and men more effectually at the disposal of the government.

When the men of the 2d, 6th and 9th Regiments were doing guard duty, the Transportation Committee arranged for their free transportation to and from the armories. Early in April the American Railway Association, representing all the railroads in the United States, formed a special Committee on National Defense, its efforts to be divided among the committees located in the four divisions of the country as laid out by the War Department; and in May Mr. James H. Hustis, chairman of the Transportation Committee, was selected as chairman of the Northeastern Division. The Committee kept in touch with the Secretary of War and the President of the War College; also with the assistant quartermaster-general and assistant surgeon-general, through whom all information involving transportation and protection of railways and railroads was regularly furnished to the War Department. In general, the scope of the Committee's work included the furnishing of data similar to that furnished by the Committee on Transportation to the Executive Committee on Public Safety.

#### COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION

This Committee was made up of a number of prominent lawyers. Its functions were to draft emergency legislation; to advise as to existing laws, State and national; to supply precedents for war legislation from the statutes of Great Britain on any subject regarding which the Executive Committee desired such information, and to suggest whatever further legislation might appear to be necessary. In short, the Committee was to act as the legal adviser of the Executive Committee. It also drafted bills relating to the following functions, and obtained their favorable consideration by the Legislature: —

Home Guard.  
Dependent aid.  
State pay for soldiers.



\$1,000,000 special appropriation.

Empowering the Governor to appoint 300 temporary members of the State Police.

That the Executive Committee and officers of sub-committees might have prompt assistance on all matters requiring legal advice, it was sought to have some one member of the Legislation Committee always available at the State House. Legal advice was given gratis in answer to innumerable queries, among which the following subjects may be classed as the more important:—

War risks in insurance policies.

Aviation field.

Transportation of explosives on street railways.

Insults to the flag.

Mobilization of schoolboys by municipalities for farm work.

Free preparation of private and park lands by municipal teams and men.

Plans for carrying out the Federal Draft Law in Massachusetts.

But by far the most important State law enacted, as affecting the interests of the Committee on Public Safety, was the Commonwealth Defence Act. The birth of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety was the result of a universal feeling among our citizens that the times demanded an entirely new order of defense, and the growth of the Committee's work was supported by patriotic enthusiasm. At the beginning, however, its scope was strictly limited to such action as our anti-war laws permitted. It therefore became at once of the utmost importance to procure legislation as free as possible from red tape, and broader in conception than the laws under which we had been living through a long era of peace; otherwise the results the Committee afterwards obtained, and for which it was created, could never have been gained in strict accordance with either our statute or common law. To meet this necessity which the war had brought about, and to strengthen the hands of the Committee, the Commonwealth Defence Act was passed on May 26, 1917. This act contained the



express provision that it was to remain in force only for the duration of the war. It will readily be appreciated how impossible it was at this time to forecast the future. Our country had suddenly become plunged into a chaos of strange conditions which destroyed the conventional rut of thought and aspiration in which we had lived so long, and molded the souls of all men into a grim determination to win the war. It was, therefore, with an assured confidence that the people were asked to surrender their democratic power and establish a condition fundamentally foreign to their ideas of democracy, in order that a wider range might be permitted to every project involving the safety of the State. Probably so drastic, so daring, and, as afterwards proved, so vitally important a law for the protection and safety of the Commonwealth was never before entertained by a Massachusetts Legislature. Its character was not only without precedent in Massachusetts, but it was the first law of its kind enacted by any State in the Union. Yet it met with such country-wide recommendation that the Judge Advocate of the United States endorsed it, form and substance, as an excellent example of legislation for other States to follow and put on their own statute books, — a recommendation which was very generally followed.

Details of the bill covered many pages. Among the principal subjects treated were the registration of aliens over eighteen years of age and the imposition of additional restrictions upon this class of citizens, with a punitive clause added for any violation of the provisions of the act. The Governor was empowered to take property, real and personal, and to give compensation for the same; to appoint special officers, and to co-operate with the Council of National Defense. In addition, he was authorized to delegate to others some of the powers given to him by the bill, the later exercise of which right proved the base and bulwark of a greater part of the activities of the Committee on Public Safety. It contained provisions, also, for the transfer of real estate located within the Commonwealth to

persons outside of the State, and to a certain degree relaxed the rigor of the law in cases of absentee defendants who were in the military or naval service. It established the right of courts to refuse bail to defendants when their liberty involved a menace to the public safety. The construction of explosives, bomb or shell, was made subject to fine and imprisonment. The act also gave the Governor the right to survey the amount of food in the Commonwealth, as well as the land and labor available for its production; to collect all such other data as would help strengthen the food situation, with forcible attendance of witnesses and the co-operation of State departments in gathering such information; and the power to regulate the use of fireworks and firecrackers. It provided, further, for the appointment of a committee for regulating and licensing the hours of labor during the period of the war. Autocratic as these provisions were, contrary and opposed as they appear to our Declaration of Rights and our established theories of personal liberty and protection, they were both accepted and endorsed by a sane, patriotic people as a strictly temporary measure to meet a crying need in a time of great emergency.

#### COMMITTEE ON MOBILIZATION AND CONCENTRATION CAMPS

A careful study was made by this Committee of available camp sites and their condition as to roads, kitchens, mess shelters, latrines, bath houses and storehouses; and in regard to the installation of water and sewer systems. Conferences were held with Adjutant-General Sweetser and the Senior Inspector Instructor of the United States Army, that the Committee might become better acquainted with the needs of the National Guard and the United States Army in case of troop mobilization. Framingham was the only available mobilization camp in Massachusetts at this time, — a location which had practically outlived its usefulness. Numerous offers of land to the government to be used for

camp purposes were received by the Committee, some of which were accepted.

At the request of the Navy Department the Committee assisted in the selection of sites for temporary camps for members of the Naval Reserve.

### COMMITTEE ON HORSES

The Committee on Horses made a survey of horses for military use, getting in touch with New England and western export dealers in order to list all horses available for purchase. Specific assistance was given by the Committee to the 9th Regiment early in April, 1917, in an examination of horses and mules shipped from the southwest.

### COMMITTEE ON TRUCKS AND MOTOR CARS

The Committee on Trucks and Motor Cars endeavored to secure enrollments of motor cars and trucks wherever the owners would agree to hold them subject to the disposal of the State in case of military emergency. Local committees were organized throughout the State, and approximately 50,000 enrollment cards were distributed. In all, about 5,000 enrollments were secured, of which approximately two-thirds were motor cars and the balance trucks. It was estimated that the cars had a carrying capacity, including drivers, of 16,670 persons, and the trucks of 4,164 tons. Each car owner was given a circular form of decalcomania seal, about two and one-half inches in diameter, containing the words, "Enrolled for Service — Committee on Public Safety," and was allowed the privilege of attaching this seal to his car immediately upon acceptance of his enrollment.

The New England Telephone and Telegraph Company formulated a plan of notification by telephone to those enrolled, which they agreed to put in operation whenever called upon by the Committee. Fortunately, no military emergency arose to properly test the results obtained by this Committee, but the mere fact that so many Massa-

chusetts people gratuitously offered their cars was evidence of their desire to help win the war, and a source of encouragement to all others working for that general end.

### COMMITTEE ON PUBLICITY

The name of this Committee at once brings a vivid sense of the obligation owed to the Massachusetts press, one not likely to be forgotten by any one connected with the work of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety.

One of the first acts of Mr. Storrow was to summon for consultation with the Executive Committee representatives from leading newspapers in the city. The general scope of the work contemplated was laid before them, and their advice and assistance, locally and throughout the State, earnestly requested. This they immediately offered, and without any hesitation. From the birth of the Committee on Public Safety, when its functions were relatively limited, continuously through the twenty-one months of its diverse and greatly widening activities and up to the last day of its existence, the press of Massachusetts gave to the Committee its honest support, its time and its columns, and, above all, its good will, with loyal fealty to its original promise.

The Publicity Committee did a very general, valuable and helpful work. It was, in fact, an authorized bureau for public information; a medium between the Committee and the press, relieving them both from unnecessary interviews and duplication. It kept in touch with the activities of the Executive Committee, and daily assisted in supervising advertisements and press notices, at the same time arranging for their distribution and insertion in the newspapers. Specifically, it reported the meetings of the Executive Committee when the same were of public interest, and gave particular attention to the work of any sub-committee needing its help. At the request of the Committee on Recruiting, it prepared at short notice 500,000 four-page leaflets with information as to how to enlist. In this connec-

tion 25,000 posters were also distributed, and a two-column advertisement was inserted in every daily newspaper in the State. When the Harvard Medical Unit was suddenly summoned for service abroad, and needed cooks and other assistants, an advertisement was put on the front page of every Boston newspaper, whereby the urgency demanded was spread broadcast. As a result, in one day the unit obtained its full complement of assistants. In addition to the space courteously offered by the press in behalf of the Committee on Food Production, two columns of matter, in plate form, were sent regularly for three weeks to 170 daily and weekly newspapers. Another lot of 25,000 posters was prepared, which were used chiefly on the dashers of trolley cars. Picture slides encouraging home gardens were sent to 400 picture theatres, where they were displayed without charge. The Committee was fortunately able to secure for a portion of the time during the first few months the services of Mr. Thomas J. Feeney, publicity director for the New England Telephone and Telegraph Company. Later Mr. John F. O'Connell, Publicity Director for the United Shoe Machinery Company, was delegated to represent the Committee in all matters. When the Food Administration was organized early in July, 1917, very extensive publicity was given by Mr. O'Connell to its multitudinous activities; and in the long list of labor troubles which were settled by Mr. Endicott his services again proved of great value. He always exercised that tactful discretion necessary to establish a happy medium between talking too little and acquiring the unenviable reputation of giving the press more than they were ready to print.



## CHAPTER IV

### LOCAL DEFENSE

The fundamental principle controlling the purpose of the Committee on Public Safety during the first period of its work aimed at perfecting the local defense. As already stated, and with this purpose in view, the Committee by its initial vote declared it of paramount importance that the existing military organizations in the State be fully equipped to the minutest detail; and that their present peace basis of equipment, as well as what might be demanded in case the United States entered the war, should be rigorously inquired into. The first step towards this end was the forming of the Preparatory Committees, some of which have already been described; others, whose functions were more distinctly military or naval in their character, follow.

#### **Committee on Land Forces**

The duties of the Committee on Land Forces embraced all matters involving the local defense, including the additional requirements of existing military bodies in the State, and what might be necessary for any units thereafter formed, especial attention being given to all matters relating to equipment and supplies. The Committee was short-lived, practically going out of existence at about the time our troops embarked for the front. In the interim, however, besides acting in an advisory capacity, for which its personnel was peculiarly adapted, it made a very thorough investigation of equipment conditions, both as to what was needed and what could be procured at home, and also what would be furnished by the authorities at Washington. The results obtained may best be gathered from the account of the Committee on Mobilization and Concentration of Camps, Home Guards, Horses, Recruiting, Trucks and

Motor Cars, and, particularly, of the Committee on Equipment and Supplies. It would be well, however, to bear in mind that the Committee on Public Safety's work in its relation to the land forces of the Commonwealth was in no sense confined to the Committee on Land Forces, though greatly indebted for its valuable assistance and advice, but that this subject was included to a greater or less degree in the activities of all the Preparatory Committees.

### **Committee on State Protection**

The Committee on State Protection, after an exhaustive study of existing conditions and points of danger, presented their final recommendations to the Executive Committee, together with a list of certain centers where the needs were most pressing, including vital points along the lines of our principal railroads, viaducts, ferries, etc., and with special emphasis on the need of guarding the railroad bridges. They reported, moreover, that the necessity of protecting power, ammunition and similar privately owned plants was not so immediate. At first there were but two sources of supply from which legally authorized man power could be obtained to guard these localities, — viz., the local police and the District Police, and the State National Guard, formerly the Massachusetts Volunteer Militia. Thereupon, the chairman, with the support of a very able committee, made an exhaustive study and compilation of all existing State laws dealing with crime, police forces and their organization, and the registration of aliens. As a result, tentative laws were presented to the Executive Committee recommending certain legislation.

On March 2, 1917, the Legislature, under General Acts, chapter 43, in partial accordance with the recommendation of the Committee, authorized the Governor within his discretion to appoint special District Police officers, the number not to exceed 300. All officers so appointed were to have the same power as that held by the District Police, — including the authority to bear arms, — their organization,

discipline, equipment, etc., to be subject to rules and regulations issued by the Chief of the District Police.

On March 12, pursuant to this bill, 96 special police officers were appointed by His Excellency for the more definite purpose of covering the eight or ten bridges over the Cape Cod Canal and the two tunnels at North Adams, as advised by the Committee on State Protection.

In the meantime representatives of the Committee visited the various cities of the State, interviewing their mayors and outlining and explaining the general work of the Committee on Public Safety. Likewise they urged the officials of each city to prepare plans for the protection of life and property within their boundaries, in anticipation of war being declared.

The State Protection Committee also analyzed carefully all laws relating to explosives, — the detective and fire inspection department of the District Police having the power to regulate the keeping, storage, use, manufacture, sale, handling, transportation and general disposition of all combustible explosives, — in order to ensure that the old and newly formed bodies of police should be fully instructed in their duties, and that they might be able to tell at a moment's notice where a given amount of dangerous or destructive material was stored.

It quickly became evident that, in the appointment of an additional number to the existing force of the District Police, enough men could not be secured who through experience and natural qualifications combined were efficient to perform a policeman's job. The whole scheme was then submitted by the Executive Committee to the Adjutant-General's office, representing the military forces of the State. This department, as then constituted, took the position that any plan to utilize the military forces of the Commonwealth for police purposes in time of peace was misconceived. It was argued as unfair to force such service upon a body who had not enlisted with that understanding, and that a soldier's business was neither to discover crime nor

to make arrests. Moreover, an enlisted man, acting as policeman, received but half the pay he was entitled to as a soldier. In short, the whole problem of guarding was peculiarly a police job and not a soldier's job. It was also further pointed out that the expenses of wage and equipment, where private enterprises were involved, ought properly to be borne by those receiving the direct benefit of such protection. An exception was offered to this last position, however, in the case of railroads, whose safeguarding, as public utilities, might fairly be judged to come within the obligation of the State, though in many cases this in turn might properly be considered as matter for the attention of the Federal government.

All special guarding during the early days of March, 1917, was attempted by local volunteers. On March 25 and 30 details from the 2d and 9th Regiments of Infantry, and on the 30th details from the 6th Regiment Infantry, were ordered on guard duty, as was likewise Company B of the 101st Engineers, 1st Corps Cadets, later sent to Camp Devens.

The organizations, therefore, approaching a military character, established by law and authorized at this time to contribute to our local defense in the way of land forces, were, as we have seen, a part of the State National Guard and an enlarged police force. The Massachusetts Volunteer Militia had been merged into the State National Guard on October 12, 1907, and on July 28, 1917, three and one-half months after we entered the war, its members, then National Guardsmen, were enrolled into the Federal service. This would have left the Commonwealth without organized military defense but for the fact that the Legislature, at the instance of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, by act passed April 5, 1917, chapter 148 of the General Acts, authorized the Governor as a war measure to establish a Home Guard. This body is now very generally spoken of as the "State Guard," but is not to be confounded with the disbanded Volunteer Militia or with the State National Guard.



The indeterminate use of the word "Guard" has often led to misunderstanding. The organization at first known as "Home Guard" was purely a makeshift creation of the Committee on Public Safety, and was composed of volunteers from the different cities and towns. Its scattered units had no State recognition, were responsible only to local authority, were self-supporting and without any unification whatever. The purpose for which they were brought together was solely to have something to fall back on until such time as a better and legally constituted military contingent, State or Federal, could be perfected. This, as already pointed out, took place at the time of the organization of the State Guard under chapter 148, the act being known as the "Home Guard bill." This, with certain limitations as to age and physical condition, authorized a voluntary enlistment of men who, when called for service were bound to perform, under the direction of the Governor as Commander-in-Chief, all the powers of constables, police officers and watchmen, except in civil process. The intent of the bill was to create a body which should defend the homes in place of the National Guard thereafter enrolled by, and subject to the orders of, the Federal government.

To summarize, we had in Massachusetts on April 6, 1917, legally authorized to bear arms, but two land forces: —

*First.* — The Massachusetts National Guard, remaining under State control until July 28, 1917, when it became part of the National Army and was ordered to rendezvous, the mustering-in being completed by August 1.

*Second.* — A newly organized State Guard to consist of inhabitants of the Commonwealth, over thirty-five years of age, "or married men under that age with dependents, or physically disqualified from service in the National Guard." This unit was only in embryo at the time we became participants in the war, and it had practically no membership, unless a few of the so-called local and home guards from the small towns, which were used as a nucleus, might be so considered. The State Guard, though in no respect a crea-



tion of the Committee on Public Safety, received at the time of its formation every assistance possible from that body, and was entirely dependent upon it for its equipment.

### **State Guard**

The Massachusetts State Guard was authorized April 5, 1917, under General Acts, chapter 148. To carry out its provisions the Governor in an official order dated April 11, 1917, appointed a State Guard Board, consisting of Hon. Butler Ames, Brigadier-General, commanding; Samuel D. Parker, Brigadier-General; John J. Sullivan, Brigadier-General; Elmore D. Locke, Lieutenant-Colonel; Stephen W. Sleeper, Lieutenant-Colonel; and Philip S. Sears, Major, as military secretary. This Board, in compliance with the order, at once began to organize the new force, and a sum of \$200,000 was appropriated under General Acts, chapter 331, for the Guard's maintenance. Most of this money was expended for rifles and equipment, although several of the companies supplied their own equipment without cost to the State. General Ames and his staff spent several weeks perfecting the organization, using to a very great extent the local Committees on Public Safety for that purpose. A report made by the Board under date of July 27, 1917, certified the State Guard's enrollment to be 9,000 men. By January 1, 1918, the organization reached a total strength of about 725 officers and 10,900 enlisted men, composed of three brigades with eleven regiments of infantry, or approximately 145 companies. To four of these regiments machine-gun companies were attached. In addition, were the 1st Motor Corps, — an independent battalion of four companies with one hundred cars, — the 1st Troop of Cavalry and a medical department. Enlistments were for two years, unless sooner discharged on declaration of peace. Before being mustered into service all applicants were compelled to undergo a thorough physical examination, conducted by the Guard's medical staff, and 11,000 examinations of enlisted officers and men were thus made. These services

were gratuitously given by the physicians, often to the detriment of their private practice. The personnel of the officers was of high order, each candidate being obliged to secure, before appointment, a recommendation from the local Committee on Public Safety in his district, as well as one from the mayor or board of selectmen of his city or town. In the old militia the 9th Regiment was the highest recorded regimental number, and to avoid confusion the new formation began with the number 10. The Guard's uniform was similar to that worn by United States Regulars, although the insignia and brassards were distinctive and plainly indicated the arm of service.

On December 6, 1917, the Governor was importuned by the United States Marshal for the Massachusetts District to supply troops to guard the barred zones created by a proclamation issued by President Wilson. In compliance therewith, and to meet the emergency, Governor McCall ordered the State Guard to perform this duty, but at the same time made the stipulation to the Marshal, in writing, that, this being an expense properly chargeable to the Federal government, such services would be terminated after January 1, 1918. Two companies of the Guard, each man having passed a physical examination by the medical advisor, reported for duty Friday, December 4, 1917. These companies were relieved by other detachments on December 14, and again on December 21. On this latter date notification was received from the Federal government that the last detachment would be supplanted by troops now doing duty at the fortifications in the harbor.

The State supplied a medical officer, always on call; and quarters, food, clothing and equipment were kept thoroughly inspected. This emergency duty performed by the State Guard, often under specially trying conditions of weather, was met with a zeal reflecting great credit on both officers and men.

The Guard drilled steadily and faithfully, with particular attention to close order drill, guard duty, and the use of the

rifle in target practice. Each company was ordered to drill once a week, though many of them doubled this requirement. Commissioned and non-commissioned officers held informal meetings looking to the attainment of the highest military efficiency for the unit. During September and October, 1917, four regimental drills were held in different parts of the State, to which transportation to and fro was provided by the Commonwealth. These drills were voluntary, but the men showed great enthusiasm, and attended in large numbers. The officers also offered instruction in military tactics to drafted men several weeks prior to their being sent to concentration camps, and several hundreds of those conscripted, before their actual induction into the service, availed themselves of the opportunity. To this cause is attributed the rapid promotions many of them later received to commissions in the National Army.

When the second Liberty Loan was being floated Mr. Endicott suggested to General Ames that valuable help could be given by his command; and through the great energy which the State Guard developed in getting subscriptions listed, many thousand dollars' worth of bonds were subscribed for by his men.

How the Committee on Public Safety was instrumental in equipping the State Guard through its Committee on Equipment and Supplies, and the relations the organization bore to the work of the Committee on Public Safety at the time of the Halifax disaster and of the Emergency Hospital venture, will be described later when those subjects are more particularly considered.

Hon. Butler Ames, a graduate of West Point, who had seen service with the 6th Massachusetts Regiment in the Spanish War with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, was appointed by the Governor brigadier-general in command of the State Guard, and was later promoted to the rank of major-general. His staff consisted of the following officers:—

Maj. Paul R. Hawkins.  
Maj. Clifford S. Anderson.  
Maj. Joseph A. Legare.  
Maj. M. J. Splaine.  
Maj. M. J. Smart.

Maj. Samuel H. Wolcott.  
Maj. Stephen V. R. Crosby.  
Maj. John S. Lawrence.  
Capt. Charles H. Parker.

Lieut.-Col. William A. Brooks, Acting Surgeon-General of the Commonwealth, headed the medical staff. Other officers were as follows:—

10th Regiment, Col. Thomas F. Sullivan.  
11th Regiment, Brig.-Gen. Charles Pfaff, retired Colonel.  
12th Regiment, Col. H. F. Ballard.  
13th Regiment, Col. Louis A. Frothingham.  
14th Regiment, Col. Henry L. Kincaide.  
15th Regiment, Col. E. H. Eldridge.  
16th Regiment, Col. Louis S. Cox.  
17th Regiment, Col. William H. Beatty.  
18th Regiment, Col. John F. Hurley.  
19th Regiment, Col. Harry C. Young.  
20th Regiment, Col. W. S. Warriner.  
1st Motor Corps, Lieut.-Col. John W. Decrow.  
1st Troop Cavalry, Capt. Charles E. Reed.

### **Committee on Naval Forces**

*Naval Militia.*—On January 1, 1917, the State naval militia consisted of 64 officers and 778 enlisted men, under the orders of the Governor as Commander-in-Chief, but subject to the call of the President of the United States.

The Committee on Naval Forces was appointed to strengthen the work of the naval militia, and at the same time to arrange for the more effective protection of our coast defenses. The scope of its activities included all branches of the United States naval service in the First Naval District, extending from Chatham, Mass., to Eastport, Me., and embraced:—

- (a) Enrollment of the Coast Defense Reserve.
- (b) Enrollment of vessels suitable for a patrol fleet.
- (c) Arrangements for bases, arms and ammunition; also for supply vessels and repair yards in connection therewith.

(d) Means of communication; arrangements for transportation, and special necessary equipment.

(e) Co-operation with the naval militia, and assistance in commissioning the existing Naval Flying Corps Unit (a part of the naval militia), and in the enrollment of additional flying units.

(f) Co-operation with all special aid societies, the Red Cross, and all activities having for their stated object the welfare of the navy and naval forces.

(g) Directing all naval activities pertaining to the above in that part of Massachusetts not in the First Naval District into proper channels of the Second Naval District.

*Enrollment.* — One of the first things done by the Committee was to go over the subject of the naval militia with its commodore, James P. Parker, in order to assist him in recruiting the organization up to its full complement. The sum of \$200 was appropriated for this work by the Committee on Public Safety.

Among the many results obtained by the Committee, the following appear to have been the more important: —

Arrangements were made to have the enrolling officers for all classes of reserves located in one and the same place. Every opportunity was taken by the Committee to stimulate enlistment in the regular navy and the naval militia, and particular emphasis was placed upon the need of men for the naval coast defense patrol. In this work great assistance was given by the Naval Training Association, which published information by pamphlets, for circulation not only in Massachusetts, but likewise in Maine, Vermont and New York. Enrolling parties were sent to Provincetown, Duxbury, Scituate, Cohasset, Plymouth, Hingham, Brockton, Salem, Gloucester and to various points along the Maine coast, to canvass the district as far as possible and stimulate interest in enrollment.

*Patrol Boats.* — Enrolling blanks were issued covering all boats in the First Naval District suitable for a patrol fleet. The data so collected showed over one hundred steam yachts and motor boats ready for service in case of war, and arrangements were made by the Committee to put the best



of these immediately into commission if the demand arose. Moreover, in order that the Committee might keep in full touch with the needs of the Commandant at the Navy Yard, three of its members were enrolled on his staff as civilian aids.

*School for Ensigns.* — Through the efforts of the Committee, the Navy Department was materially aided in the establishment at the Corinthian Yacht Club, Marblehead, of a School for Ensigns; and also in housing 5,000 regular seamen about to be quartered in the Marblehead District. Early in April a considerable number of machine guns were obtained from the Navy Department to be placed on board the various patrol boats that were taken by the government.

*Squantum.* — About five hundred candidates for the Massachusetts School for Naval Air Service were interviewed by the Committee, and on its recommendation were afterwards examined at the Navy Yard. As a result of a visit to the Navy Department at Washington, two aeroplanes were secured for the district, with the promise of two additional ones. The Committee erected and equipped, at an expense of \$32,998, the necessary buildings and hangars for the Massachusetts School for Naval Air Service at Squantum, in which classes of thirty men at a time, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, were given the preliminary training in flying requisite for a commission in the Naval Reserve Flying Corps. The sum of \$1,500 was secured from the city of Quincy, of which Squantum is a part, to meet the expense of equipping the field with water. The city of Quincy also arranged for placing guards around the grounds, the guarding on the water side being done by the navy. The organization was formally taken over by the Department of the Navy May 11, 1917.

According to a ruling of the Navy Department, the moment a unit of the naval militia reported at the armory it came *de facto* under the control of the United States. This at once severed its relations with the State, and all

further activities in its behalf on the part of the Committee on Public Safety became unnecessary. On the other hand, if any of the National Guard mobilized, the War Department did not necessarily take them over immediately, and the Committee's services were still required during the interim awaiting action by the government, as will be shown later.

## CHAPTER V

### LOCAL DEFENSE — Continued

To return to the land forces. Between April 6 and July 28, at which time the government formally took over the National Guard, the labor of seeing to its proper equipment and recruiting it to war strength became the special care of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety.

This task was beset with many difficulties and constant discouragement. To begin with, there was a great scarcity of man power. Many of the Guard came back from the Texan Border discouraged and disillusioned, realizing that playing at war at home and the real business of war were entirely different propositions. Others felt that as National Guards they had been discriminated against, and this they strongly resented. The result was that drills were not attended, men and officers wanted to resign, and the force was threatened with demoralization. Our total United States National Guard numbered but 150,000 men available for field service at short notice. Still further, the United States Army was said to be unable to put more than 50,000 men into the field, so many of the Regular Troops were with the coast defenses, and in the Philippines, Alaska and Hawaii. The Secretary of War had given his estimate for equipping the National Guard, but there appeared to be no money obtainable for that purpose, nor was it known how soon the government could or would furnish the necessary means. It appeared, therefore, to the Executive Committee advisable to find out at once from manufacturers, and others capable of furnishing overcoats, shoes, gloves, underwear, etc., what standard equipment was available in the country, and what could be supplied at short notice, so as to collect the necessary furnishings either through State agencies or private sources. The status of enlistment also

was at that time far below the required standard. The preceding January there were but 54 enlistments in Massachusetts, when 200 a month were thought to be necessary to maintain our peace strength; while to make up the complement of men necessary to full war strength would require 6,000 or 7,000 more men than we had.

If, under orders from Washington, our National Guard units should be called upon to protect the State, they would thereby become *de facto* Federal troops. If the Governor, however, took the initiative, they would remain State troops and receive State pay. In the former case they received 50 cents a day. As militia men they received \$1.50 with subsistence.

When our troops were on the Mexican Border the government added \$10 a month to the soldier's pay, and under certain restrictions helped the dependents at home. Here, again, although the government had appropriated \$2,000,000 for the relief of dependents of these soldiers, the plan did not work very well. The chief difficulty was that a majority of dependents did not, or would not, accept any help except in cases where direct need existed. It seemed impossible for them, with their American notions of independence, to construe such relief as not making them objects of charity. This honorable sensitiveness seemed inborn in our communities. The preceding year the same objection had at first seriously interfered with the efforts of the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Association, an organization appointed by the Governor for the express purpose of relieving the families of the soldiers at the Border, and supported by popular subscription. In both cases it proved most difficult to convince many dependents, no matter in what form the assistance might be offered, that they were not being pauperized. In this general connection, also, a Federal soldier's pay could not possibly support his family unless he was willing to be helped, and he was thus prevented from enlisting unless he had other means of subsistence; nor did the recommendation of the Secretary of War that the pay

be raised to \$30 a month remove the difficulty, as that amount would not make a soldier's total receipts sufficient to maintain an average family. Such bodies of troops as had been in Texas were, under the new call, authorized to maintain war strength; but others, called out at the same time, were refused that right, and had been unable to get the order rescinded. It appeared, also, in the opinion of the Judge Advocate-General of the army, that the State could not itself maintain an organized militia outside of the National Guard and before the latter was taken into the National Army. The final outcome of this complicated situation resulted in the morale of the National Guard being seriously threatened.

It was fifty-two years since we had been engaged in a formidable war, and the early spring of 1917 found the United States totally unprepared by land, and with a sea strength less than two-thirds that of Germany. We were also 25,000 men short of the complement necessary to man such fleet as we had. Our Regular Army was not up to the authorized standard of its strength by many thousands. What ordnance we possessed was limited in quantity, poor in quality and out of date. We had a few badly constructed and useless types of machine guns, besides a negligible number of English make and design. There was not at this time within the whole breadth of the United States a single heavy field gun, one fighting airship, any aviators or schools for their instruction. Thus Massachusetts, on April 6, 1917, with war declared, had no defense, naval or military, State or national, on which she could properly rely. Naked of equipment and man power, she was helpless to oppose the Hun, who might land anywhere on our coast, from Chatham, Mass., to Eastport, Me., and eventually march up and down State Street to his heart's content.

The foregoing conditions brought forcibly to the attention of the Committee on Public Safety the pressing need of strengthening our military efficiency so far as possible with the limited material on hand.



## **Committee on Military Equipment and Supplies**

The Executive Committee had already formally affirmed that the obvious function and obligation of the Committee on Military Equipment and Supplies was to keep in touch with the Adjutant-General's office, and to ascertain what material was readily obtainable through official channels; and that whenever the Federal government should take over the National Guard of Massachusetts in its entirety, then the duties and activities of the Committee should cease, or be turned into some other useful channel.

Accordingly, the Committee began its work by taking an inventory of existing supplies throughout the Commonwealth, and this listing was kept fully up to date. But on July 28, 1917, the Massachusetts National Guard was merged into the National Army, and henceforth the duties of the Equipment and Supplies Committee were directed solely towards equipping and supplying the newly formed State Guard, the Committee ceasing to have further official connection with any other military unit.

As illustrations of the Committee's general promptitude and efficiency, a few interesting examples might be given of assistance rendered the National Guard before the State Guard was established.

For instance, on April 9, three days after our declaration of war, an application was made to the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety by Gen. E. Leroy Sweetser, then Adjutant-General, for 1,350 pairs of rubbers for the 2d, 6th and 9th Regiments. These units were performing arduous guard duty throughout the State, which exposed them to trying and severe vicissitudes of weather, and more particularly at this special time to dangers arising from a late heavy fall of snow. The necessity was imperative, and permitted no opportunity for bids. The Committee managed to procure the required goods and deliver them to the regiments on the afternoon of the same day.

Again, on April 13, at the request of the authorities at Washington, 1,000 pairs of woolen gloves were supplied to

the 6th Regiment. This requisition was received at 12.30 P.M., but the gloves were ready for delivery on the same afternoon.

On April 5 and 16 aid was requested in furnishing medical supplies for the 9th Regiment, including practically everything required to fill the medicine chest of that unit, and covering a long line of articles. It is interesting in this connection to note that, although the 9th Regiment's store of medical supplies had become exhausted during its service on the Mexican Border, yet, notwithstanding repeated requisitions had subsequently been made on Washington to replenish the same, no results had been obtained after a lapse of many months. The Committee, however, on demand, supplied the requirements within thirty-six hours.

Also, at the request of the Committee on Naval Affairs, the Committee made a contract for 10,000 pea-jackets. The chairman of the Naval Committee reported to the Equipment Committee on Friday afternoon, April 13, that the Navy Department asserted they were unable to furnish pea-jackets to protect the men who were being enrolled, the market being entirely out of regulation 30-ounce cloth. At the same time, however, the Navy Department agreed to make up these garments at a cost not exceeding \$4.50 apiece, — the actual expense to the government, — provided it could be furnished with the cloth. Mr. Preston's Committee quickly put itself in touch with woolen manufacturers handling this grade of cloth, and after scouring the country ascertained that the New York representative of the American Woolen Company having special charge of the Uniform Department was expected in Boston the following day, Saturday, to attend a wedding. The wedding festivities were broken in upon to the extent of an interview with this representative, who after his return to New York telephoned the Committee at 11 o'clock on Monday morning that he had unearthed 30,000 yards of the required cloth of a quality which would pass government inspection. The result was, that after a further conference of the two Com-

mittees and the Boston representative of the manufacturer, within an hour, at 12 o'clock, a contract was closed for the entire amount of goods on the basis of \$13.50 per garment. The regular cost to the government of these pea-jackets had heretofore been between \$14.26 and \$14.75 per garment.

*Outfitting State Guard.* — In the equipment of the State Guard, because of the delays incident to the organization of that body, ample opportunity was given to provide every necessity, and on a strictly competitive basis. The prices then paid were at least as low as it was possible to obtain goods of similar quality at the time the purchases were made. It should be remembered that the movement of prices during this period was very rapid, and the difficulties of obtaining material of good quality multiplied. Inasmuch, also, as it was not practical to forecast the entire needs of the State Guard in relation to their various kinds of equipment, some of the later purchases of the Committee were necessarily made at a higher figure.

In illustration of this increase in price, the Committee had an option on a bid for 7,479 Springfield rifles (45.70) at \$5.75 apiece; but when, after a long wait, requisitions were finally received, it was found impossible to purchase them for less than \$7.75 per weapon. This delay was partly due to an unsuccessful effort in the meantime to obtain "Krag" rifles from the government free of charge. In respect to all the difficulties and disappointments incurred in obtaining equipment for the State Guard, the authorities in charge were obliged to feel their way cautiously in the organization of that body, and could hardly be expected to anticipate its full requirements very far ahead.

The expenditure of the Committee in the matter of equipping the State Guard, numbering 8,500 men, was \$38.50 per man, and embraced the following articles: —

Coats, . . . . .	9,500	Slings, . . . . .	5,844
Hats, . . . . .	9,500	Bayonets, . . . . .	5,844
Breeches, . . . . .	9,500	Bayonet scabbards, . . . . .	6,000
Leggins, . . . . .	9,500	Cartridge belts, . . . . .	7,750
Shirts, . . . . .	8,750	Infantry figures, . . . . .	24,083
Overcoats, . . . . .	10,468	Collar and shirt brassards, . . . . .	28,929
Hat cords, . . . . .	11,382	Chevrons, . . . . .	10,693
Rifles, . . . . .	5,844	Arm brassards, . . . . .	23,846

In addition to the above, 915 ponchos, 300 army rifles for target practice at armories, officers' chevrons and medical supplies were purchased. The expense incurred for the entire outfitting amounted to the sum of \$357,565.58.

The 1st Motor Corps and the 1st Troop of Cavalry were equipped by private subscription with everything except overcoats and brassards.

*Commonwealth Pier.* — Many complaints had been coming in regarding the unhealthy conditions of the Commonwealth Pier and its use for Naval Reserves. This situation finally became serious. Inquiry revealed that the trouble was due to the dust-laden atmosphere of the buildings, brought about by the constant tramping of the sailors over the rough concrete floors. The Committee obviated this difficulty by having the floors coated with a cement filler paint. The expense of this work, however, was assumed by the Navy Department.

*Aviation Field.* — The Aviation Field at Squantum, a creation as we have seen of the Committee on Public Safety, and established in March, was also entirely equipped by the Committee, with the sole exception of the airships themselves. This required 36 tents accommodating 57 cots, together with all the furnishings for the comfort of the men, and in addition a full line of medical supplies. This was done at the request of the Committee on Naval Affairs. The Aviation Field was later, May 11, 1917, taken over by the government.

*Emergency Hospital.* — A detailed account of the work of the Commonwealth Military Emergency Hospital and of

the Emergency Health Committee will be given later, but it would perhaps be well at this stage to relate their obligations to the Committee on Equipment and Supplies.

In equipping the Emergency Hospital the Committee eventually expended the sum of \$18,674.71 for hospital needs alone. This included iron bedsteads, mattresses, pillows, bed linens and medical supplies, etc. The Prison Commission endeavored, under chapter 414, General Acts of 1910, to have the Committee purchase from them, wherever possible, supplies that were manufactured at the State Prison, including mattresses, pillows, blankets, tables, etc. The Committee, however, taking into consideration prices and quality, did not consider themselves bound so to do, reasoning that the law had not contemplated any restraint on their freedom of action in case of an emergency such as then presented itself. The Prison Commission was consequently placed on exactly the same footing as any other competitor.

*Influenza Epidemic.* — During the influenza epidemic, the Committee, at the request of the Emergency Health Committee, purchased supplies for the latter, with a total expenditure of \$5,734.74. This covered everything, including cots, mattresses and bed linens; and in addition a long line of paper goods, such as napkins, plates, drinking cups, and containers of various kinds, besides other equipment necessary for hospital uses.

### **Relations with Washington on Equipment**

In the summer of 1916, when the Massachusetts contingent of the National Guard was at the Border, all equipment and supplies were furnished from Washington. This practice was supposed to continue after the troops came back, yet it did not always run as smoothly as might have been expected. The Executive Committee, therefore, found that it was necessary to assist, if not to prompt, the authorities at Washington, in order to hasten fitting out the Massachusetts troops preparatory to their being called into



the Federal service. An investigation disclosed that our contingent in the National Guard was short some \$600,000 worth of equipment necessary to meet the authorized peace strength, and substantially much more than that amount for authorized war strength, and, accordingly, Mr. W. B. Donham and Mr. Benjamin Joy were sent to Washington as representatives of the Committee on Public Safety to discuss the whole subject of equipment. A partial success followed their efforts, in so far as they succeeded in acquiring some of the furnishing through the Militia Bureau of the War Department. But the available funds under the existing government appropriations were small, and the authorities distinctly took the position that, wherever it was legally possible, they desired to give to the Regular Army the preference in supplying both funds and equipment. The difficulty at the War Department seemed to be that they were not executing contracts at that time, but were waiting for congressional action, with the result that the shortage of equipment of the National Guard appeared likely to be a serious factor, affecting its future usefulness.

After many unsuccessful efforts to persuade the government to order equipment directly for the Massachusetts National Guard, arrangements were finally concluded under which contracts were to be placed with the War Department to the account of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, but only provided the Commonwealth would make itself responsible for the expenditures.

Accordingly, at the recommendation of the Executive Committee, the Governor and Council, on March 28, 1917, permitted the necessary equipment for the Massachusetts National Guard troops to be acquired out of the \$1,000,000 appropriation for emergency purposes authorized by the Legislature, with the express stipulation that the total amounts so expended should not exceed the sum of \$750,000.

Acting under this authority, contracts were placed in Washington by the War Department to the account of the

Commonwealth for a large amount of equipment, which was later delivered to the Massachusetts National Guard.

The results, as far as obtained, were in a great measure due to the valuable assistance of the officers of the Militia Bureau in Washington, who, together with the Committee's representatives, worked out the plan. Subsequently, through Mr. Donham's efforts, the Committee was enabled to arrange so that the actual payment of the bills for the equipment as above ordered was made directly by the War Department, and the State was consequently never called upon to pay any part of the \$750,000 authorized by the Governor and Council.

Largely as a result of this action by the Committee, the Massachusetts National Guard entered the Federal service quite as fully equipped as, and probably far better in most respects than, any other National Guard unit. The scheme was well conceived, ably carried out, and bore splendid fruit. To it must be attributed the prompt readiness for service of the 26th Division, into which our Massachusetts troops were subsequently merged; and also the fact that this Division was the first National Guard Division in the field, the first to go across seas, and the first over the top.

### **Committee on Emergency Help and Equipment**

Yet in the judgment of the Executive Committee, an efficient local defense called not only for properly equipped Guards to prevent or repel attack, but that the resultant evil incident to any such misadventure might be quickly remedied. With this in view, and in order to have men, material and equipment ready for reconstruction work, a Committee on Emergency Help and Equipment was formed. Beginning February 24 this Committee organized the construction and material men of the State, so that all building agencies throughout the Commonwealth might be available for immediate service. A sub-committee was appointed, with Mr. Gow as chairman, and an executive board, who divided the State into five geographical sections,

each under its own district chairman. Mr. E. S. Larned, a well-known civil engineer, was employed, at the personal expense of members of the sub-committee, to act as secretary and organizer, and he gave his entire time for several months to the duties involved. Through his efforts and those of the district chairmen, every contractor and supplier of building material in the Commonwealth signed a pledge to furnish labor, materials and equipment, without profit, at the call of his district chairman. Local chairmen were designated for each city and larger town, in order that a responsible officer might be quickly available in localities where trouble arose. In addition, instructions were given to the local authorities, railroad companies and heads of commissions as to the course of procedure when action on their part became necessary. An example of the effectiveness of this plan of organization took place on Saturday, April 21, 1917, when the discovery was made at the Springfield Armory that emery had been introduced through one of the grease cups on the main bearing of its chief power unit, with the evident purpose of ruining its mechanism. The officials in charge called upon the chairman of the Springfield District for help, who within an hour had a force of men on hand, with blocking and hydraulic jacks, ready to jack up the flywheel and shaft and make all necessary repairs, with the result that the engine began running as usual on Monday morning and no time was lost.

Fortunately, no serious emergency arose to test the full capacity of this organization, but the mere fact that a body of this character existed with an ability to quickly mobilize, was in itself a distinct element strengthening our defense, and undoubtedly acted as a check to those very evils taking place which the Committee was fully equipped to prevent or repair. The Committee, however, did much positive and helpful work. It supplied tent floors and walls, with other emergency housing, for a detachment of the 9th Regiment stationed at the Watertown Arsenal; and working through the Aberthaw Construction Company — who for the pur-

pose took away a crew from one of its other jobs — completed the undertaking in two days. The actual cost only was charged for this service, while the Watertown Lumber Company supplied the required lumber at a price \$4 per M below the market price. The John Cavanaugh Building Moving Company hauled four city of Boston voting booths, at the actual expense of men and teams, from the yards of the Boston election board — which loaned the property to the State — to Watertown, where they were used to protect the detachment stationed there against unreasonably cold and stormy weather.

When it was decided to erect buildings at Squantum for an aviation school, the Committee arranged with the J. W. Bishop Company of Boston to construct the plant without profit or overhead charges. The firm of J. R. Worcester & Co. supplied the required engineering, also free of charge. Altogether, about \$30,000 was expended in the construction of this school; and when a little later the government took over the site for the erection of the Victory Destroyer Plant, the sub-committee succeeded in obtaining a salvage payment of \$20,000. In the summer of 1917 the 9th Regiment was encamped at South Framingham, and being without proper sanitary arrangements or shelter in inclement weather, it was determined by the State authorities to supply these deficiencies. Accordingly, an appropriation of \$20,000 was given the Emergency Help and Equipment Committee with which to install the requisite accommodations. Complete sewerage and water systems were put in, with latrines, showers, cook houses and mess hall, the finished work costing approximately \$16,000. The John F. Griffin Company erected the buildings. P. W. Donoghue installed the plumbing, charging only the expense involved, and Mr. James E. McLaughlin supplied all the plans and supervised the work without charge to the State. Among a few minor matters also handled by the Emergency Committee was the salvage of a State-owned floating hangar, which had gone adrift in Boston Harbor during a storm, and had partially sunk.

## Committee on Recruiting

In the organization of this Committee the exercise of sound judgment with the utmost possible care was required. In all matters of recruiting it was essential that neither the birth, character nor antecedents of the would-be soldier should be open to the slightest suspicion. Pacifists, anarchists, slackers and hyphenated Americans were not only ever present as bogies in the imagination of timid citizens, but hard-headed, practical and intelligent men were unhappily only too well assured of the insidious propaganda, disloyalty and treachery that had already been unearthed; while the history of Von Papen's activities, the affair of the Welland Canal, that of McAdam Junction, and the bomb exploded in the Court House, Boston, together with many other deviltries prompted by the "kultur" of the ubiquitous Hun, were still fresh in every one's mind.

As a first step, about two hundred public-spirited men were chosen from all sections of the State, and from this number a chairman, three vice-chairmen, a secretary and an executive board were selected. Sub-committees, by counties, were appointed, each having its separate chairman, as follows:—

Barnstable, Dukes, Nantucket, . . . . .	Capt. C. Lawrence Barry.
Berkshire, . . . . .	John Nicholson.
Bristol, . . . . .	R. C. Davis.
Essex, . . . . .	{ James P. Phelan.
	{ Joseph Monette.
Franklin, . . . . .	John W. Haigis.
Hampden, . . . . .	Col. Jenness K. Dexter.
Hampshire, . . . . .	W. H. Feiker.
Middlesex, . . . . .	Robert O. Dalton.
	{ Perry D. Thompson.
Norfolk, . . . . .	George E. Adams.
Plymouth, . . . . .	Charles Williamson.
Suffolk, . . . . .	Judge Michael J. Murray.
Worcester, . . . . .	{ Herbert E. Jennison.
	{ Harry W. Smith.



This office carried with it membership on the executive board. The duty of the county chairmen was to strengthen the recruiting campaign, and produce results in each county by forming sub-committees in its cities and towns. Such appointees, however, before final installation in office, were required to submit their names to the Executive Committee on Recruiting, and by it in turn to the Executive Committee of the Committee on Public Safety.

The personnel of the Executive Committee as finally established contained one hundred and seventy-five names. Mr. P. A. O'Connell, the chairman, and Mr. E. J. Sampson, the secretary, gave practically their entire time from 9 A.M. to 5.30 P.M. every day, attending to the details of the work, answering correspondence, and meeting the numberless visitors applying for information.

On March 17, 1917, a meeting of the full committee was held at the State House, at which Gen. Leonard Wood addressed the members. Colonel McCoy, who was in charge of recruiting for the Regular Army, was also present and gave his views. Judge Murray and Brigadier-General Cole likewise spoke. The original scheme of organization was outlined and accepted as the most effective means of getting recruits. County chairmen especially, and, in fact, all members of the Recruiting Committee, were urged to acquaint themselves with the various branches of service desired by the government, so as to be prepared in a general way to answer questions or offer suggestions.

*Meetings.* — Meetings of the executive board were held three times every week, the county chairmen coming from the various counties of the Commonwealth for the purpose of discussing the mixed problems constantly arising in each section, and to determine the most effective methods of obtaining recruits. Three meetings becoming unnecessary, only one a week was held; and after the organization became fully efficient, regular meetings were suspended, and bi-weekly reports from each county chairman were furnished to the state chairman. A maximum effort was made to

encourage favorable publicity, and to this end proprietors of the various newspapers were approached, who at once responded to the requests of the Committee.

*Hotels and Theatres.* — It would seem that many hotels, restaurants and other places of public resort had a prejudice against admitting soldiers and sailors. This gave rise to much adverse criticism and occasional disorder. Thereupon proprietors of hotels and theatrical managers were interviewed, and impressed with the necessity of placing the soldier and sailor in a more favorable light before the public, and many of them gave their immediate and loyal co-operation towards a better understanding. Mr. Edward Smith, manager of several theatres in Boston, agreed to give preference in choice of seats to men in uniform, and a certain number of exceptionally well-located seats were held by him on reserve, at every performance, for men in the uniform of the army or navy.

*Advertising.* — Many of the different schemes employed for advertising throughout the Commonwealth proved very successful, while public speaking at patriotic meetings and flag raisings, where young men were urged to join the colors, was directed through a Speakers' Bureau. Recruiting tents were erected at chosen localities, where addresses were made daily and regimental bands furnished concerts to attract an audience. Many parades were held during the day and torchlight processions by night, accompanied by martial music. Moving-picture theatres presented on their screens "America is Ready," "Boston Tea Party," "Massachusetts" and various other sketches to stimulate enlistment. A group of uniformed National Guardsmen were secured to travel through the Commonwealth, doing a sketch called "A Day in Camp." This last attracted a great deal of attention, as it was sometimes held in public parks or squares, and resulted in a very large number of recruits. In cities and towns, during a recruiting rally, a roll of honor board was set up giving the names of those volunteering. After the meeting a permanent board with

the recruits listed was at once located in some prominent part of the city. These methods were found to be most productive in inducing young men to volunteer.

Posters reading "Men wanted for the National Guard between the ages of 18 and 30, with no dependents," were placed upon the dashers of all the street railway cars in the Commonwealth, and likewise liberally placarded in every section of the State, without any attendant cost. Over a million four-page circulars explaining the heading, "Men wanted to join the colors," were printed and distributed by merchants and county chairmen. The New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, also, sent out about one-quarter of a million of these circulars with their monthly bills. Thirty-five hundred dollars was expended for an advertisement on the front page of nearly all the daily papers, entitled, "Red-blooded men wanted to serve their country." In some cities whole pages were inserted in the home papers and paid for by local committees. Church organizations, from one end of the Commonwealth to the other, willingly gave the use of their pulpits to accommodate speakers discussing the general features of recruiting. In the smaller towns addresses were made from automobiles equipped for the purpose, and the young men of the locality urged to join the National Guard. Often men anxious to enlist were rejected as physically unfit for service, and they had nothing to show in evidence of their willingness and patriotism. In consequence, for these men, and for them only, the Committee designed a "Willing and ready" button, both purchasing and distributing thousands thereof, their use being sanctioned by legislative enactment. The standing of the National Guard companies in the Commonwealth was daily forwarded by telegram to the Adjutant-General's office at the State House, and whenever a unit showed weakness, the Committee concentrated its forces to strengthen recruiting in that particular locality. Moreover, the Committee, meeting a general demand, deemed it wise to advocate universal compulsory training and service, and a vote was

passed calling upon every Chamber of Commerce or Board of Trade in the Commonwealth to urge their Representative in Congress to forward such legislation.

*Term of Service.* — In the early part of the recruiting campaign a very serious difficulty was encountered. Men enlisting in the National Guard were obliged to sign for a six-year term, — three years in active service and three years in the reserve. This requirement frightened away valuable material to such an extent that the Committee made it its business, in conjunction with the Governor and the Executive Committee, to do what it could in effecting a change, and to limit the time of enlistments to the period of war emergency. The result sought, though somewhat delayed, was finally obtained.

*Transportation.* — When in the latter part of March, 1917, the State National Guard was called out for guard duty at the railroad bridges, canals, etc., the soldiers were entitled to 40 cents a day per man for food; but inasmuch as warm food was to be had at the armories, the Recruiting Committee, co-operating with the Transportation Committee, arranged for more or less free transportation for the soldiers to and from their armories. It should be mentioned here that the Boston Elevated Railway Company and the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad showed great willingness and an exceptionally fine spirit in helping this project through.

Within a short time enlistments exceeded in number the supply of uniforms ready at hand; yet, and mainly through the efforts of the Committee, this difficulty was quickly removed.

*Recruiting for Regular Army.* — It was not long before the recruiting officers for the Regular Army asked the Committee's assistance. An investigation of the methods in vogue by the Regular Army disclosed the fact that its recruiting stations were in somewhat isolated places, and often difficult to find. In response to the Committee's request some of these were transferred to more convenient and prominent



localities, the first and distinctly most important change being that made to the recruiting tent on Boston Common.

Notwithstanding much assistance was at this time given to the National Guard, very little was being done by Massachusetts for the Regular Army. It must be borne in mind that there were two different classes of recruiting stations in the Commonwealth,—one for the Regulars, and another for the State National Guard. Complaints began to come in from the War Department that recruiting for the Federal Army was not showing the activity that it ought to. It was found that this condition was due to the fact that the National Guard of Massachusetts was very generally considered one of the finest in the Union, and that many young men had a decided predilection to join its ranks as against enlistment in the Regular Army. So strong was this feeling that when the former attained its full peace strength and enlistments were stopped, many anxious to join the colors hung back, in order to take their chance of enlisting as Massachusetts National Guardsmen whenever the government permitted that body to be recruited to full war strength, rather than to enlist without further delay in the Regular Army. After the recruiting of the National Guard to peace strength had been carried through, the executive board issued general instructions to the members of the Committee to hold themselves in readiness for whatever service their State or the Nation might call upon them to perform.

During this period of waiting the Committee used its organization to assist recruiting in the Regular Army. A meeting was held by the members of the various Committees on Recruiting and Regular Army Recruiting Officers, where a plan of action was inaugurated and an extensive campaign started. Every method found successful in the drive for the National Guard volunteers was put into operation over again, and from the Cape to the Berkshires the slogan was, "Join the Regular Army." Arrangements were made with Adjutant-General McCain at Washington to establish a



reliable record as to how the campaign was progressing, and he advised the Committee daily by telegraph of the number of men actually volunteering and accepted.

President Wilson issued a proclamation naming the week of June 23 to 30, 1917, "recruiting week," and called upon all men between the ages of eighteen and forty, unmarried, without dependents, and not engaged in work necessary to the successful prosecution of the war, to join the colors.

*Civilian Help.* — The Quartermaster's Reserve Corps of the United States Army sought to obtain at short notice high-grade civilian help, such as chauffeurs, mechanics, clerks, stenographers, overseers, cooks, teamsters, etc., and permission was asked of the Committee on Public Safety to grant the Department the privilege of working through its Recruiting Committee. This was given, and in two weeks' time sufficient numbers of men were obtained to fill all units asked for.

*First Liberty Loan.* — Just before the First Liberty Loan drive the Committee felt that it could be of service to the Treasury Department in helping the drive. Accordingly, a meeting was called at the State House, attended by three or four hundred members of the Committee, and to whom an address was delivered by Mr. A. L. Aiken, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank. Plans were made to assist in floating the loan, and every member of the Committee throughout the Commonwealth strove to make it a success. A very high grade of work in this connection was done by the county chairmen, and always with a willing spirit.

*Recruiting National Guard to Peace Strength.* — The most exacting effort required of the Committee was to build up the National Guard. On March 1, 1916, the total number of men in the State available for military service was 607,466. By this is meant those men in the Commonwealth between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and of this number 7,271 were mustered into the Volunteer Militia in response to the call of the President, June 18, 1916, for service on the Mexican Border. Massachusetts

was at that time asked to furnish an organization, the strength of which was to be 9,647 men. Of this number only 8,457 were secured. Among them were 1,444 who had dependents and who should never have been accepted. Such was the situation prior to the formation of the Committee on Public Safety's Recruiting Committee, the National Guard remaining at the Border from the latter part of June to the early part of November, 1916.

The first big recruiting drive started March 24, 1917, when the National Guard showed a strength of 9,171. At that time various National Guard units were called into the Federal service to guard public utilities, such as bridges, railways, terminals and industrial plants. The strength of all organizations was authorized to be increased from the original peace strength of the National Guard organization to the war strength prescribed by the National Defense Act, enlarging infantry companies from 65 to 100, and other branches correspondingly.

In the first six days of the drive 1,191 men were enlisted and hundreds were placed on waiting lists. On June 30, 1917, the enlisted strength of the Massachusetts National Guard was 15,749 men, so that from March 24 to June 30, 6,578 men had volunteered and been examined and accepted for service.

*Recruiting National Guard to War Strength.* — The Massachusetts National Guard lacked 500 men to bring it up to peace strength, and 6,000 to war strength. At the time we entered the war the War Department at Washington declared its intention to recruit the National Guard in every State to war strength, so that in case of emergency 500,000 men would be available for duty. How quickly the Commonwealth responded to the call is a matter of just pride on her part. Under the Committee's very efficient chairman, Mr. P. A. O'Connell, the Massachusetts National Guard, in less than three days, was brought up to peace strength. The task then remained of recruiting to the complement necessary for war strength.

To accomplish this, sub-committees were rapidly organized in practically every city and town. Their specific duty was to hold rallies, to arouse interest in recruiting, to advertise and to canvass the State. So well was this obligation performed that in one day over 900 men for the Massachusetts National Guard were enlisted and sworn in. At the time the Massachusetts National Guard became federalized, July 28, 1917, practically the entire quota necessary to bring it up to war strength had been obtained, 502 officers and 15,908 enlisted men being available for induction into the Federal service as against 305 officers and 10,362 men on March 30, 1917. This was due almost entirely to the splendid efforts which were put forth by the Recruiting Committee and its various sub-committees, and was the more creditable on account of the position taken by the authorities at Washington. On March 30, 1917, a telegram was sent to the chief of the Militia Bureau, requesting authority to recruit all units of the Massachusetts National Guard to war strength. The reply coming from the Secretary of War advised the suspension of all recruiting until Congress had perfected certain changes in the law, and giving in excuse a shortage of equipment. This news was so discouraging that not a few men already enlisted applied for their discharge in order to recruit in the Regular Army or the Navy, causing many first-rate soldiers to be lost to the National Guard.

Notwithstanding every drawback and vicissitude, and greatly to the credit of the Commonwealth, a wonderful result followed. The following figures were furnished, corrected to August 1, 1917, or to just before the first call under the Selective Draft Act: —

<i>Regular Army Volunteers in New England</i>	
Maine, . . . . .	801
New Hampshire, . . . . .	474
Vermont, . . . . .	109
Rhode Island, . . . . .	761
<hr/>	
Total, . . . . .	2,145

Massachusetts obtained during the same period 8,335 volunteers for the Regular Army, or about four times as many as all the other New England States combined.

*Other Comparisons.*

STATE.	Population.	Recruits obtained.
Ohio, . . . . .	5,150,356	8,022
Texas, . . . . .	4,429,566	5,882
Missouri, . . . . .	3,410,692	7,194
Massachusetts, . . . . .	3,719,156	8,335

Massachusetts was one of seventeen of the forty-eight States in the Union to enlist its Regular Army quota before August 31, 1917, or, in other words, before the Selective Draft went into effect. Of the thirty-one States that did not so obtain their quota, fourteen were south of Mason and Dixon's Line. No southern State east of the Mississippi obtained its quota by August 1. There were but four other States in the Union that secured a greater number of Regular Army volunteer recruits than Massachusetts. These States were New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Indiana. Indiana received but 500 more than Massachusetts, and it must be borne in mind, in comparing Indiana with Massachusetts, that the National Guard of Indiana was less than one-quarter of the size of the National Guard of Massachusetts. Therefore, if we were to add the National Guard recruits to the Regular Army recruits, Massachusetts would have a very much larger number of recruits than Indiana, thereby placing Massachusetts fourth, — in fact, very close to Illinois with a population nearly double.

## CHAPTER VI

### COMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF SOCIAL EVILS SURROUNDING MILITARY CAMPS

In addition to the Preparatory Committees, other committees were subsequently formed directly or indirectly affecting military preparation and efficiency, which in the aggregate did much towards raising the standard of the Massachusetts troops and making them the first to be ready for active service. Among these was the Committee on Prevention of Social Evils Surrounding Military Camps: —

P. A. O'Connell, *Chairman*.

George H. Lyman, *Vice-Chairman*.

W. A. L. Bazeley, *Secretary*.

Walter C. Baylies.

Allison G. Catheron.

J. Randolph Coolidge, Jr.

Dr. W. R. Ellis.

George T. Keyes.

E. W. Longley.

Levi H. Greenwood.

Judge M. J. Murray.

James J. Phelan.

A. C. Ratshesky.

Philip Stockton.

Ferdinand Strauss.

Harry K. White.

Edward J. Sampson.

Philip W. Wrenn.

It was some months before the members of the Executive Committee were ready to admit how dangerous and threatening to the public safety was the social evil, not only as a chief demoralizing agency, but as directly undermining the efficiency of the soldier. A general opinion seemed to prevail that consideration of such matters was solely within the province of the moralist, and should be regulated either by recognized State bodies or by private associations organized for the purpose.

On the journal of the nineteenth century, the credit page of the American people is overwritten with a truly wonderful record of national development. Our growth and great-



ness as a Nation of power, of wealth, of accomplishment beyond dispute, no man may deny. Although our revered ancestors who founded the Republic strove to stamp upon our national character the force of their moral and religious conviction, they never forgot that the public weal and the practical side of life were closely allied.

The professed ethics of the Pilgrim Fathers, of the Puritans, Scotch Presbyterians, French refugees and others — God-fearing men, who, in part altruists, and in part shrewd, keen observers of human nature, gave the incentive to the ideal American spirit — championed to the utmost every moral principle. Yet these forefathers likewise recognized how immorality had sapped the life-blood of dynasties and been the scourge of enduring success. They knew full well that in the battle of morality against vice the supporting influence of practical laws was vital, and that a law not enforced was worse than futile; but also that it was far better to forestall the commission of crime than to await the necessity of punishing it.

The manifest duty, therefore, of the preventive Committee was to remove, as far as lay within its power, this pervading evil — with its ofttimes precursor, drink — so supremely dangerous to our military efficiency and to the public welfare; and to maintain and advance the soldiers' physical vigor and effectiveness wherever possible. The restraining influences to be attained by moral and religious instruction and propaganda, absolutely essential as supporting agencies, were held to be more particularly the province of organizations formed for the purpose, and not directly functions for which the Committee on Prevention of Social Evils Surrounding Military Camps was primarily formed September 19, 1917.

During the first eighteen months of the war one of the armies engaged had more soldiers in its hospitals incapacitated by venereal disease than from all battlefield injuries. Besides the loss in man power from such disability there is always the specter of the dreadful harm that such soldiers

are capable of inflicting on their return to civil life. Every home for feeble-minded children, every insane asylum, every hospital and almshouse, bears testimony to the awful toll of mental and bodily health that is exacted by venereal disease. From this cause spring one-third to one-half of the cases of insanity; all cases of paresis, and probably nearly all of locomotor ataxia; many apoplexies, paralytic strokes, and a large proportion of all diseases of the heart, blood vessels and other vital organs.

Army authorities estimated that of young men applying for enlistment prior to the war one-fifth were syphilitic. A foreign commission, which spent a year studying the question, gave as its opinion that at least one-tenth of its country's population was infected. In the United States, official estimates taken of the normal percentage of the whole population suffering from disease due directly or indirectly to this specific cause ranged from 8 to 16 per cent.

The experience of our troops on the Mexican Border brought to the attention of hygienists and physicians with added emphasis the gravity of the problem and the dangers involved. The Committee therefore realized that a far-reaching obligation rested upon the State to return the soldiers to civil life uncontaminated with any disease that would make them for years afterwards unfit members of the community. They also felt it to be of equal importance that the womanhood of the State should be protected in this respect.

The first step taken by the Committee was to establish its own police force for active duty at Ayer, and in the towns and cities in the vicinity of Camp Devens. This was decided upon after it was proved that sufficient police protection could not otherwise be secured. Therefore eleven men, in the service and pay of the Committee, with a chief in charge, were organized as a vice squad to safeguard the morals and health not only of the contingent at Camp Devens, but also of the civilian population with whom the soldiers were in more or less daily contact.

It being found that there were no adequate quarters to be hired in Ayer, the town authorities allowed the Committee to make use of a section of the ground floor in the Town Hall as a detention room for women, and this courtesy was extended until the end of the war. Here the Committee immediately proceeded to build necessary partitions, to install cots, and to furnish the required bed clothing, toilet articles, etc., for the abandoned women visiting Camp Devens and the surrounding towns, who, when taken into custody by the Committee's officers, were placed in charge of the matron, Mrs. Sugrue, pending trial or such other disposition of the charges against them as was deemed most advisable.

Before any of the draft army arrived at Camp Devens the Committee had its headquarters well established at the Vicarage, and from that time on its agents were unremittingly at work either arresting or warning abandoned women out of the town, besides seeing to it that no disorderly houses were maintained in any locality adjacent to the encampment. But as the camp grew in numbers, so the problems of the Committee became more complex, and other quarters became necessary. Thereupon the Committee obtained from the War Camp Community permission to build on a piece of land where the Soldiers' Club was already located, and erected a portable building consisting of an enclosed porch 6 by 12 feet, an office 12 by 12, bathroom, passageway, and a 12 by 12 bedroom. This was done at a cost of \$1,567.78.

For the first several months the Committee's agents were appointed as constables in the various cities and towns surrounding the camp. This was found not to work satisfactorily, as it was necessary they should have much wider powers, so an effort was made to have them commissioned as State Police. This matter was taken up with Governor McCall, and after a conference between him, Chief Plunkett of the State Police, and members of the Committee, the Committee's agents were appointed as State Police

and vested with practically State-wide authority. In order to create still more efficient means of handling the situation, on June 10, 1918, Inspector Edward P. O'Halloran of the Newton Police Department, by which body he was loaned and very highly recommended, was placed by the Committee in charge of its agents at Ayer, his service terminating with the war. Under his supervision a very much greater efficiency in handling the situation was quickly brought about.

On October 3, 1917, at the request of the Committee, the Governor's Council made an appropriation of \$10,000 for the purpose of keeping the environment of Camp Devens free from immoral women and houses. This was charged to the emergency appropriation of \$1,000,000.

Yet there existed no well-established body in the United States experienced in such matters, and to whom the Committee could apply either for information or advice. Consequently, on September 18, Messrs. O'Connell and Bazeley, in behalf of the Committee, visited four of the Canadian cantonments, where they obtained most valuable information regarding the best methods to be adopted in military camps.

Arriving in Ottawa they met Lieutenant-General, the Hon. Sir Sam Hughes, who became greatly interested in the purpose of their visit, as the subject was one which confronted him during his term of office as Minister of War. He stated as his firm conviction, and this seemed to be the prevailing opinion among military men in Canada, that venereal disease was probably the greatest remaining cause of military ineffectiveness due to sickness, and should be rigidly controlled both in the interests of the troops and the public; that the question was very largely one of discipline, not only on the part of the officers commanding, but of the civil authorities, and that vigorous police measures were absolutely necessary if the soldiers were to be kept effective for the work they were called upon to perform; also that no amount of argument or preaching could or



would take the place of strict police supervision. He likewise submitted the substance of a report which gave the very grave conditions in this respect existing overseas, omitting, however, the names of cities, towns, units and officers.

The first of the camps visited was a small location called Rockville, just outside of Ottawa. This camp, impossible to enter without a permit, had about 600 men training for the Signal Corps, and the entire neighborhood was patrolled by guards. The number of men infected were comparatively few.

The next place called at was Camp Pettawawa, about one hundred and twenty-five miles from Ottawa. This location was about one hundred square miles in area, with its only approach over a bridge on which a guard was posted who let no one pass without a permit. Here the number of infected men was something less than 50 out of a grand total of 3,000. Substantially all of these infections were the result of leaves of absence spent in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto and other large cities. The nearest town, Pembroke, about thirteen and one-half miles away and not easily reached, was reasonably clear of prostitutes and houses of ill fame.

The conditions at Camp Borden, Ontario, located about seventy miles from Toronto, were next examined. This camp, like Camp Pettawawa, was isolated, the nearest town being about eight miles distant and having a population of somewhat less than 5,000. At this cantonment the Committee's representatives met General Logge who was in command, the various officers of his staff, and also the assistant director of the medical staff. Here, again, a permit was necessary for admission, and, moreover, there was no local problem to deal with.

In no Canadian camp were men allowed to leave at night without showing a pass, and this was seldom given; but a very serious danger developed in all these camps through the leaves of absence granted to about 10 per cent of the soldiers at a time, generally beginning at the week end and



covering a period of two or three days. When these men visited Toronto or the other large cities very many of them returned infected. It was said that, at the Military Base Hospital stationed in Toronto, the average number of soldiers under treatment as a result of venereal disease was about 150.

The Committee next went to Camp Valcartier, situated about seventeen miles from Quebec. This was isolated somewhat in the same way as the other camps, with no means of reaching it except by a single sentry-guarded highway. This cantonment covered about thirty-five square miles and was reasonably free from outside influences. Out of a contingent of about 3,000 men there were but 48 in the hospital who were infected. The problem here was exactly like that of the other camps visited, the infection being almost universally brought back by men who had visited cities on leave of absence.

General Logge stated that nothing but strong police measures would ever be effective in preventing the evil in question, and that a provost guard, co-operating with the civil authorities, who would not permit any one to enter a given zone as established by the military and civil authorities, was absolutely essential if camp visitors were to be kept away. This, of course, could be done very easily at the more segregated Canadian camps, — as was also the case at Westfield, Mass., — but the problem at Ayer was much more difficult, owing to the fact that the public highway passed directly along side of the camp, and it was doubtful if it could be legally closed to travel.

The problem of Canada was so different from what confronted Massachusetts that it was not easy to apply a comparison. What our interests demanded was, first, more stringent laws, and then the co-operation of the civil authorities with the officers in command at the camps in enforcing them. When, as at Camp Devens, soldiers were permitted to leave the cantonment every night, and visitors to enter during the daytime, Sundays included, and up to 10 P.M.,

it would always remain extremely difficult to handle the situation. The Committee also judged it absolutely necessary that a provost guard of sufficient strength be established outside of all camps, which should work in conjunction with local and District Police; and in the case of Ayer as many as 100 men, preferably non-commissioned officers, would be necessary. The experience of the military authorities in Canada proved that the non-com. was more effective in handling the situation than the commissioned officer. He was less apt to make allowances or to accept excuses, and therefore held the soldier right up to the letter of the law. He took nothing whatsoever for granted.

When Secretary of War Baker visited Boston, October 4, 1917, the Committee had a conference with him respecting its work and its needs, and at the Secretary's suggestion, Mr. O'Connell, on October 18, went to Washington and conferred with Mr. Fosdick, chairman of the Committee on Training Camp Activities, and with the Surgeon-General's office, rehearsing suggestions he had made to the Secretary. Several of these were adopted and put into effect, including especially:—

1. Provision for a provost guard around Camp Devens.
2. Compulsory prophylactic treatment, with established and well-equipped stations therefor in Ayer.
3. Examinations of privates for venereal diseases every two weeks.
4. Limiting passes from the camp.
5. Forbidding women to enter the camp after sundown.

This last was most important, as women in large numbers were being permitted to enter the camp at practically all hours of the night, some remaining all night.

6. A social case sheet, in the interest of the military and local authorities and the Committee.

This sheet, or questionnaire, registered the patient's name, rank, regimental number, unit, date of exposure, source of infection, woman's name and address where

possible, and whether the use of liquor entered into the matter in any way. It proved a decided help to both the military and local authorities as well as to the Committee.

After these steps had been taken, the next was to locate the contaminating woman who had caused the mischief, and see what could be done to remove her to some place where she might receive treatment. This had to be brought about entirely by moral suasion, as there was no law to warrant an arrest in such cases. It was soon found, however, that the women, mostly young girls, were generally amenable to reason, and perfectly willing to submit to medical treatment. The Committee had many cases of this character, where the woman was induced to take the prescribed treatment and to that end visit a doctor every week. In the very few instances where she failed so to do the Committee was advised of the fact by the physician in attendance, and she was immediately sought for.

The first duty of the Committee, and the real purpose of its formation, was held to be the prevention of crime. Punishment was only an incident thereto. In order to systematically police the district, special and constant attention was necessary in the vicinity of the railroad stations, together with a patrol of the squares and other places of gathering; in short, a maximum effort was expended in establishing methods which made plain to undesirables that their presence in the locality of a camp would not be tolerated. The hotels, also, within a large radius, were regularly visited, and the guest records inspected to ascertain whether or no people not married had registered as man and wife. By this means many couples, soldiers with women, were arrested at the various hotels, and from thence taken to court and tried, a large number of the women being sent away and their companions summoned before military tribunals.

At the time the 76th Division was awaiting orders to move, relatives and friends of the soldiers crowded to the camp to bid them good-by. Hotels were taxed to their

capacity, and accommodations for transients became a serious problem. Landlords reaped an enormous harvest, and, as the demand for rooms increased, they raised their prices in some instances to four times the normal figure. This made it more difficult to control the situation in and about Ayer, and the outlook became for a while very serious. August and September brought a still further increase of camp visitors, thereby necessitating additional men on the Committee's force. Moreover, the authorities in neighboring districts, began to apply to the Committee for help in enforcing the law in their respective localities. It therefore became more than ever necessary to institute prosecutions that order might be preserved, and in no instance did the lawbreaker escape punishment when brought before the courts.

Train inspection was another arduous and exacting function of the Committee, but resulted in the apprehension of many undesirable men and women in addition to runaway boys and girls. In cases affecting these last, the parents were in every instance notified and the children returned to their homes, in some instances hundreds of miles distant.

In November, 1917, a stereomotorgraph machine was purchased for use at Camp Devens, which the Committee loaned from time to time to the different Y. M. C. A. huts. A lecturer in charge explained and supplemented the pictures, which illustrated more particularly the evils resulting from drink and immoral women. Officials, both military and civilian, constantly witnessed these exhibitions and were invariably enthusiastic in their praise.

Because of reports of women soliciting on the streets in cities near to military posts, investigations were made to learn the true status of affairs. By this means strong co-operating evidence was secured. The attention of the local authorities was then called to the existing conditions and remedial measures proposed to suppress the nuisance, all of which were carried out very successfully.

Motion-picture performances within easy access to the



camp were censored, and a thorough inspection made of amusement parks. It sometimes became necessary to entirely suppress certain of these shows and theatrical performances.

Appreciation of the fact that the spread of venereal disease was not only impairing the efficiency of the soldier but was of real assistance to the enemy made the men in the service of the Committee very vigilant. Nor was the habitat of the women involved in any wise confined to Massachusetts, New England or the East. Women from twenty-six States of the Union, and from almost every Province of Canada, were included in the list of the many unfortunate ones who flocked to the camp zone and were investigated by the agents. Each case was carefully examined, and the various reasons noted that the offender offered in excuse. The predominating influences which led to the fall of these women were found to be either lack of education, poor home surroundings, the lure of the uniform, the effects of divorce, or a combination of one or more of these causes. None of the women dealt with proved to be feeble-minded; two stated that they were victims of white slavers, though investigation showed their claim to be groundless. Many hundreds of cases were investigated and the delinquents cared for without any publicity being given.

Imnumerable illustrations of specific cases, many of them inexplicable, repulsive and often heartrending, might be given were it considered advisable to do so. Although, as a general rule, the women investigated comprehended every grade, they belonged mostly to an amateur or clandestine rather than to a professional class of prostitutes, and on that account were the more difficult to apprehend or deal with. Most of them were mere girls; some under fifteen years of age, many of them under twenty, and few reaching thirty. Camp Devens suffered a temporary visitation of moral obliquity similar in character to what has always been noticeable in periods of continued public excitement, and especially in time of war.



A large percentage of the women arrested were sent to Sherborn Prison; others were given from three to six months in the county jail. Still others, when proved to be infected with venereal disease, were ordered to some institution for a fixed period of time, or until they were cured. Many cases were disposed of without prosecution, some of the younger girls being sent to the House of the Good Shepherd, an institution always willing to take charge of wayward girls. Some were returned to their parents, and others ordered out of town and told that if they returned they would be arrested and put away. An army officer of high rank, who had officially inspected all the major cantonments in the United States and Canada, after a thorough observation of the conditions surrounding Camp Devens, stated that it was positively the cleanest camp on the continent.

The experience of all nations, at all times, has proved that venereal disease inevitably follows in the wake of immorality, and that drink is more often than not the initial cause of both. The Committee's squad of officers, co-operating with the provost guard, State Police, Federal authorities, mayors and selectmen of cities and towns, and sub-committees on Public Safety in localities surrounding Camp Devens, did yeoman service in suppressing the sale of liquor to soldiers.

On January 31, 1918, the Committee began a vigorous campaign in Ayer against issuing licenses, and a letter was written to the pastors of all the churches asking them to read the same from their pulpits. In this letter it was pointed out how a successful termination of the war was vastly important to every American citizen; that there was no man or woman in the United States — whether father, mother, brother, sister, wife or sweetheart — who was not vitally interested in the well-being of the young American then training at Camp Devens; and that it was unthinkable for any citizen to carelessly allow temptation to be strewn in their paths. It was explained how Camp Devens

had the distinction of being the cleanest cantonment, morally, in the country, and that it behooved every patriotic citizen to see to it that the observance of law and order was strictly maintained there at its present high standard; also that assistance be given to the police in the prevention of those evils which invariably gather about concentration and mobilization camps when liquor is sold in the vicinity.

It was further pointed out that seldom did an environment have so serious a responsibility put upon its shoulders, and that it was a matter most vitally related to military efficiency, and ultimately to the cause of Democracy, to have all communities in the neighborhood of the cantonment made safe for the soldier.

It was also shown how, in Europe, the authorities had delayed so long before making any real attempt to solve this problem in its relation to their soldiers that by the end of the first year and a half of the war they found the strength and efficiency of their armies undermined and in danger of wasting away as a result of intemperance and its inevitable drift to social evil. The result was that Ayer went no license, as did also Pepperell, which previously had issued licenses to sell liquor, and where a similar campaign had been started by the Committee.

In October, 1917, prompted by reports continually coming in that soldiers returning to camp were under the influence of liquor purchased by them in Lowell, the Committee visited that city for the first time, and after investigation called the attention of its police to certain men who were engaged in the business of either directly or indirectly procuring liquor for soldiers. Three of these men were arrested and turned over to the city police. A few days later Mayor O'Donnell appointed the Committee's agents as special police officers in Lowell, who visited the city regularly every week thereafter and secured the arrest and conviction of a large number of men engaged in the illegal sale of liquor. They also unearthed a certain pernicious resort where drugged liquor was sold to soldiers, who when

under its influence were robbed of their possessions. The proprietor was tried, found guilty and sentenced.

The Lowell police were also given the names of a large number of women who were in the habit of frequenting Camp Devens. Some of these were arrested and convicted; some were driven out of town; others were warned to keep off the streets.

All offenders arrested for aiding and abetting the sale of liquor to soldiers were brought to trial before the Federal court, Boston, where most of them were convicted and sentenced to six months' hard labor; others were given suspended sentences.

Inasmuch as the Committee had no official status within the boundaries of the cantonment, the attention of the military authorities was directed to places where the camp was left unguarded, and where it was possible for unscrupulous men and women to enter and ply their respective trades. All such suggestions were courteously received and almost invariably acted upon by the provost guard, who materially assisted in taking liquor away from the soldiers. For example, one Saturday night over forty pints were confiscated at the camp gate. Pint flasks were frequently found slipped down the back of a man's neck hung by a cord, and all manner of ingenious devices were employed to conceal the liquor and smuggle it into camp. Again, a portion of the cantonment not far from Shirley was left unprotected, where soldiers under the influence of drink were in the habit of getting back to camp. It was found that they procured liquor in Clinton. Accompanied by four men of the provost guard, the Committee's agents went to Clinton and arrested seven soldiers and three civilians. The latter were each of them fined. The soldiers were brought back to camp, and there tried by court martial. A large quantity of liquor secured in this town was turned over to the Ordnance Department. The chief of police and the citizens of Clinton showed a deep appreciation for this and other assistance given them in cleaning

up the town. They even went so far as to arrange quarters in the armory, in order that the Committee's agents might have an assured place where they could remain over night if they so desired.

In the zone surrounding Camp Devens the use of alcohol was by itself, and independent of the social question, a most dangerous evil. The Committee, however, with the assistance of the provost guard, maintained such an effective watch for signs of illegal liquor traffic that "boot-leggers" and "pocket peddlers" were unable to ply even their normal trade in the vicinity.

On November 11 the notorious Parmenter resort, at Lunenburg, was raided. Here the proprietor had been illegally selling liquor for over sixteen years, and during all that time had been arrested and fined but once. He carried on an extensive trade, selling intoxicants to both soldiers and civilians. The agents raided his place, arrested him, and brought him into the Fitchburg court, where he was sentenced to the house of correction and fined \$100. The Committee had his wife and three children also brought into Court and placed under the care of the State Board of Charity. Complaints covering Townsend, Shirley, Leominster, Fitchburg, Harvard, Littleton and Westborough were likewise investigated by the Committee.

To give one instance of the variety of functions the Committee was called upon to perform, the military authorities at Camp Devens asked an investigation to be made regarding the loss of thirteen hundred pounds of sugar and five tubs of butter which had mysteriously disappeared from the quartermaster's stores. The butter and sugar were traced to a baker in Ayer, to whom they had been sold. After working on the case for more than a week, the agents discovered that the thief was connected with the Quartermaster's Department, and was identified by the purchaser of the goods as the man who sold them. On the evidence obtained the military authorities placed him under arrest.

One of the more difficult problems to contend against was



the sale of drugs to the soldiers. The use of drugs was not only in itself detrimental to safety and efficiency, but was often the forerunner and inciting cause of immorality. Information came that some of the soldiers at Camp Devens were addicted to this habit, and it was found that much of the dope was being sent from Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont. An investigation disclosed that a Maine doctor was selling such drugs in very large quantities, and after careful investigation evidence positively incriminating was found against him. This doctor had sold, in Haverhill, to one man alone, 3,390 grains of morphine. His case, however, comprehended so many ramifications beyond the scope of the Committee's powers, extending even to China and India, that the whole subject was finally submitted to the Federal authorities. Others plying a dope trade at Devens were arrested, convicted and sentenced. A drug addict from Camp Devens told the agents that his mother kept a house of prostitution, giving them the street and number in Albany, N. Y., where she also sold and administered dope to men and women. This case was also turned over to the Federal authorities, who eventually had the house closed up.

One of the dope addicts conferred with at Camp Devens, who admitted having used drugs for about four years, stated that after the Harrison law went into effect he and a number of his friends went to the State hospital for treatment, but after staying there some time left the institution without being cured. They were then informed that a certain physician in New Haven was authorized as a Federal official to give prescriptions for a certain amount of dope, and that the patient by using thereafter a regularly diminishing quantity would eventually be cured of the habit. Accordingly, they put themselves under his care, receiving at first 8 to 10 grains a day. This was gradually diminished until the dose was supposed to be reduced to about 2 grains. When this point was reached the amount was generally increased up to 10 grains. By this method the doctor



slyly cultivated the appetites of nearly a hundred men and from thirty to forty girls, — a vicious, if unfortunate, gang, who were known to their neighborhood as the “coke fiends.” This fakir was supposed to have had at one time fifty such patients under his charge. The disposal of his case was also put into the hands of the Federal authorities.

In the early stages of the Committee’s activities at Ayer a great deal of anxiety arose when it was discovered that rural perverts were having access to the camp. These were tracked, ordered out of town, and told they would be arrested if they ever put in an appearance again. That was the last heard of them.

Keepers of lodging houses in Ayer were notified regarding the character of some of their lodgers, and the street cars and all jitneys were carefully watched to see if any undesirables were coming into town by these methods of conveyance.

The Anderson Show Company came to Ayer with its outfit. In the opinion of the Committee the performance given was very undesirable, and constituted a menace to the morals not only of the soldiers but of the community. Two of the young women who were connected with the concern were arrested and brought to the detention room. One of them was a girl sixteen years of age, a runaway from her home in Lowell. The Lowell police were telephoned to, who found there was no court record against her, and the next day she was returned to her parents. The other woman was married, was from New York, and had two children. She was given permission to return to her home, which she did.

When the proprietor of the show company was informed that such a performance as he offered would not be tolerated in the neighborhood of the camp, he packed up and quietly stole away, although given permission by the board of selectmen to remain for a period of two weeks.

During the Committee’s activities it felt itself especially indebted to the clergymen of every denomination with

whom its agents came in contact and to whom they appealed, whether civic or military; to the commanding officers of divisions and regiments; and to the United States and Massachusetts health authorities. One and all proved their interest by a ready and hearty co-operation in the work.

Between June 8 and October 25, 1918, the Committee brought a total of fifty cases before the courts, including the following charges: neglect of children, drunkenness, adultery, idle and disorderly, fornication, lewdness, furnishing liquor to soldiers, and polygamy. In addition, a total of seventy-five cases against delinquent women were disposed of, without prosecution, covering similar charges to the above, and others relating to lost persons, runaways, wanderers, destitutes and illegitimate children.

## CHAPTER VII

### INTELLIGENCE WORK AND GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

In March, 1917, Mr. Storrow appointed Mr. Lyman, of the Executive Committee, to act as its representative in dealing with all communications coming within the general scope of secret service work. Some eighty odd cases were looked into, investigations being in the main conducted through officers of the Federal and civil government legally appointed for such purposes, the Committee's representative acting chiefly as a medium through which complaints were transferred to the proper authorities. The inadvisability of relieving the monotony of this chronicle, despite the temptation to do so, by relating the outcome of these investigations and the many adventurous details connected therewith, however regrettable, will be readily appreciated. It must be borne in mind that many of the cases which were taken up may not be closed for a long time to come; that most of them dealt with treacherous doings subversive to the public weal; that practically all of them were traceable directly or indirectly to German sources; and that the threads of one case were often closely interwoven with those of another. To publish the details of an investigation already completed might be distinctly undesirable, as well likely to imperil the secrecy necessary to be observed in cases as yet unfinished.

The inquiries made were supported by special appropriations to different organizations, and, in part, also by private subscription. In this connection it might be stated that the general term "secret service," in its relation to investigations of espionage, treason, slackers, bombers, etc., was not a single organization under one controlling influence, nor was it confined to any State, city or other given locality. It comprehended army, navy, United States Treas-

ury, Department of Justice, and other Federal as well as various State bureaus. In fact, there were said to be nine national besides innumerable city and town organizations, without including volunteers and self-appointed sleuths acting independently, — each agency more mysterious than the other, and all engaged in a field of work where distrust was necessary to competence, and rivalry a prevailing stimulant.

In the spring of 1918 the Treasury Department at Washington urged the Committee on Public Safety to organize a special branch of the American Protective League in Massachusetts. This the Executive Committee, on motion of Mr. Endicott, authorized under the title of the Massachusetts Auxiliary of the Department of Justice, and the following Committee was appointed, with power to add additional names: —

C. F. Choate, Jr.  
S. H. Wolcott.  
W. R. Peabody.  
Hugh Bancroft.

George H. Lyman.  
C. G. Bancroft.  
John F. Perkins.  
J. H. Beal, Jr.

This organization, extending throughout the whole State and with an enrollment of nearly six hundred members, commenced its work about May 1, 1918, closing February 1, 1919. In the neighborhood of 5,000 cases were investigated, besides 4,000 relating especially to slackers, — a total of 9,000. In addition, 600 draft evaders were inducted into the army between July 1, 1918, and the signing of the armistice. There were also twenty-five convictions obtained for filing false answers to questionnaires, and seventy-five under the Webb-Kenyon Act.

The activities of the Committee involved an expenditure of \$11,000. Of this amount \$10,000 was appropriated by the Committee on Public Safety, and the balance raised by private subscription.

In the summer of 1918 it became evident that German propaganda was moving in a new direction. The end of the

war was nearer than any one anticipated. It was apparent that Germany could not possibly win, and that she was beginning to make approaches for a negotiated peace. Word was received from secret service sources that German money was being used determinedly among religious organizations and women's clubs. The object in view was very evident: it was to work on people's sentiment, and to suggest the uselessness of continued fighting. The sympathies were appealed to, and the whole effort appeared to be gathering considerable headway.

To offset this pernicious propaganda the Rev. Paul Revere Frothingham was requested by Mr. Endicott to get in touch, so far as possible, with various organizations throughout the State and warn them of what was going on; to put them in possession of the facts, and to urge them to secure speakers who would take the opposite point of view. This was done with marked success. Mr. Frothingham wrote to hundreds of organizations which were accustomed to hold regular meetings in the course of their season's work, and also to the secretaries of lodges and fraternal organizations. The forums in various centers were also approached, and the promise given of cordial co-operation. A great meeting was organized on Boston Common, where Ex-President Taft spoke most forcibly to about 10,000 people on the need of "fighting to a finish." This work covered a great deal of ground and was carried through successfully by Mr. Frothingham alone.



## CHAPTER VIII

### SPECIAL COMMITTEE WORK

#### Military Organization Schools

The Committee also materially assisted in organizing a school for trench warfare at Framingham. This was the first institution of its kind installed in the United States, and was conducted by specially selected officers who had seen service in the British Army. The course of instruction included lessons in trench warfare, real trenches being dug and genuine hand grenades used. Courses also were given in the theory and practice of gas, attacking defense, the use of the machine gun, bayonet attack and the defense of trench, and every officer was ordered to report at the school for one week's continuous service night and day. When our government refused to ask the Canadian authorities to furnish instruction for our training camps, Adjutant-General Sweetser went to Canada and secured the services of several experienced teachers, who later, the Canadian government following our example, were summoned back to conduct similar schools at home. Again, another school was established at the Wakefield Rifle Range, to give to departmental, infantry, cavalry and staff corps officers instruction in target practice.

#### Liberty Bonds

In the first Liberty Loan Campaign Adjutant-General Sweetser, at the instigation of the Committee on Public Safety, organized a drive among the Massachusetts National Guard for subscriptions, with the slogan, "A gun and a bond." On June 11 circulars were sent to all Massachusetts National Guard organizations, and posters were adopted and distributed to every company armory. The response to this appeal was prompt and most encouraging. On July 3 the report rendered by the Old Colony Trust

Company — who immediately on request had undertaken to underwrite all subscriptions made to the loan by the National Guard — gave the total number of bonds subscribed for as 8,779, their face value amounting to \$438,950. This sum was accredited to the different Massachusetts National Guard organizations, as follows: —

	Bonds	Amount
Massachusetts Coast Artillery, . . . . .	1,100	\$55,000
2d Regiment Infantry, . . . . .	347	17,350
5th Regiment Infantry, . . . . .	999	49,950
6th Regiment Infantry, . . . . .	1,297	64,850
8th Regiment Infantry, . . . . .	1,232	61,600
9th Regiment Infantry, . . . . .	710	35,500
1st Corps Cadets, . . . . .	834	41,700
1st Regiment Field Artillery, . . . . .	867	43,350
2d Regiment Field Artillery, . . . . .	591	29,550
1st Separate Squadron Cavalry, . . . . .	163	8,150
1st Battalion Signal Troops, . . . . .	251	12,550
1st Field Hospital Company, . . . . .	116	5,800
2d Field Hospital Company, . . . . .	74	3,700
1st Ambulance Company, . . . . .	93	4,650
2d Ambulance Company, . . . . .	105	5,250
	8,779	\$438,950

It would seem very significant that on the second issue of Liberty Bonds the United States government, following closely the lead of Massachusetts, sought to interest the soldier here and abroad in their purchase.

### Volunteer Dental Committee

The Committee on Public Safety was in receipt of data from England, showing that dental troubles were the forerunners of a great deal of sickness among the Allied troops, and that much time was lost to the service through illness directly traceable to impaired teeth. A dental examination made at Framingham, prior to the Massachusetts

troops being sent to the Mexican Border, established the fact that, collectively, the soldiers' teeth were in poor shape. It was apparent, therefore, that if a like condition still prevailed and was not attended to, the general health of the men, and in consequence their military efficiency, would be seriously affected. Therefore the Executive Committee promptly organized a volunteer Dental Committee, headed by Dr. George H. Payne, secretary of the State Board of Dental Examiners, which eventually mobilized a force of volunteer dentists throughout the State.

In the meantime, April 1, 1917, the Governor and Council authorized the purchase of \$9,000 worth of dental apparatus. By this means a dental chair, instruments and medicines were supplied to every armory in the Commonwealth, the end sought being to put the teeth of all Massachusetts National Guardsmen in such good repair that none of them would require further dentistry for a period of two years.

How wide was the scope of this plan is shown by the fact that in Boston alone — where the work was done at the Harvard and Tufts Dental schools, the Forsyth Dental Infirmary, and a number of private offices — a total of 3,000 operations were performed on the teeth of members of the Massachusetts National Guard. It was estimated that the cost of these services, if paid for by the soldiers themselves, would have reached approximately \$100,000, and yet the Committee calculated that only about one-tenth of the work necessary to be done on the teeth of the Massachusetts National Guard had been attended to. Subsequently, and before that body became federalized, practically 60 per cent of the dentistry required was accomplished through the efforts of the Committee.

### **Chiropodist Preparedness Committee**

At a meeting of the Massachusetts Chiropodist Association held February 13, 1917, a resolution was passed offering "the services of its members for the gratuitous treat-

ment of such foot troubles as come within the scope of chiropody" to the National Guard of Massachusetts in the event of its mobilization. Copies of this resolution were sent to the Governor and to the Adjutant-General, and upon April 2, 1917, the organization of the Chiropodist Preparedness Committee was effected. Within a few days its services were offered to the Committee on Public Safety and accepted.

Plans already formulated were promptly carried out, and the various National Guard units were visited by representatives of the Committee. The feet of all the guardsmen were examined, and each man given a card stating the name and address of a chiropodist who would treat the holder upon a date stated. From that time on until the end of the war all enlisted men in uniform received on application free treatment at the offices of members of the Committee. Upon completion of each treatment a record card was filled out stating diagnosis, the service rendered, etc., and forwarded to the secretary of the Committee. Of these cards 1,468 were returned to the secretary, and at least that number of men were taken care of, many receiving several treatments. Owing to the fact that some chiropodists neglected to return their cards, the full list of men treated must have been considerably in excess of the above figures. Moreover, whenever it was difficult for the guardsmen to report at the offices of the chiropodists the latter visited the camps, where the necessary service was rendered and no record kept.

The Middlesex College of Chiropody in East Cambridge co-operated with the Committee by offering its staff of clinicians with full equipment to give free treatment, especially for men in the different branches of the navy. A large number from the Naval Radio School at Harvard were thus taken care of.

Members of the Committee visited Camp Devens on several occasions immediately following the arrival of the first draftees, and treated over 1,600 men. This service

was discontinued only when camp routine made it impracticable to arrange for the work at mutually convenient times.

At the request of Brigadier-General Dickson, members of the Committee visited the Watertown Arsenal four separate times, where they examined the feet of the men belonging to the Ordnance Department and to the two companies of artillery there stationed as guards, giving their services gratuitously to over 200 men.

General expenses incident to the organization and operation of the Committee were met by contributions from its members. Expenses of the actual work, including material, traveling charges, etc., were borne in every case by the individual chiropodist performing the service.

The experience of the Committee emphasized strongly the absolute need of a chiropodist in all military organizations, a necessity which is recognized in the armies of other nations and provided for, but which has yet to be met by the United States authorities. The Marine Corps, however, showed its foresightedness in providing its contingents with chiropodists having the highest non-commissioned rating.

The work of this Committee was of very great importance, as the condition of the soldiers' feet proved a vital element in their efficiency for service.

### **Peter Bent Brigham Hospital Unit**

Early in May the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, having been urged to send a hospital unit to France, asked the Committee on Public Safety for its assistance in getting the unit ready. This call was wholly unexpected, and required the most prompt action in order to assemble the men and the required outfit in time. By vote of the Committee \$5,000 was placed at the disposal of the unit, to be expended on its equipment and to meet other incidental expenses connected with its departure from Boston. In addition to this financial help the Committee furnished motor cars to



assist the contingent while preparing to sail, and for several days fed and lodged the thirty-seven men forming its personnel. This made it possible for all arrangements to be completed within a week's time, and in consequence the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital Unit was the first body of medical men from Massachusetts to go overseas after our entrance into the war.

### Radio School

When the United States became a combatant, Mr. Arthur Batcheller, United States Radio Inspector in charge of the New England District, with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, undertook the instruction of a class of forty men — the full capacity of his quarters at the Boston Custom House — for a course in code and theory in radio-telegraphy, from June 21 to December 31, 1917. Early in 1918 it became evident that thousands of radio operators would be required for the military and naval service, and schools were established throughout the country to meet the urgent demand for men sufficiently qualified in radio code to answer the immediate purpose, even if they lacked full technical training. It was therefore suggested that the school at the Custom House be conducted elsewhere and on a larger basis, provided suitable quarters could be secured. By this means it was hoped hundreds could be trained at one time..

There being no appropriation by the Department of Commerce for the purpose, Hon. Edmund Billings, collector of the port of Boston, recommended the project to the Committee on Public Safety. Through the co-operation of Mr. Ratshesky and Mr. Lyman, a self-constituted committee, the use of the headquarters of the Massachusetts Naval Militia Armory, in the Mechanics Building, 96 Huntington Avenue, Boston, — unoccupied by reason of absence of members in service, — was tendered by Adjutant-General Stevens, free of any charge for rent or heating. These quarters accommodated 275 pupils, and were ideal



Interior of Radio School



for the purpose sought. Requisition was then made on the Department of Commerce for the apparatus and equipment necessary for instruction. The Committee on Public Safety furnished the lumber needed for tables and seats, and guaranteed the payment of a janitor's services, — as well as the expense of lighting for a period of six months, with the understanding that these allowances be renewed at the end of the prescribed time should a state of war and the necessity for such instruction still exist.

The school opened on January 21, 1918, with an enrollment of 262 men. Sessions were held regularly thereafter on Monday, Wednesday and Friday of each week until after the signing of the armistice, November 11, 1918. The instruction was under the direct supervision of Mr. Batcheller, who brought to his assistance other qualified code instructors. The entire service given was voluntary. Preference in enrollment was extended in the following order: —

1. Men subject to Selective Service Law, Class 1A.
2. Men enlisted in army or navy awaiting call to active service.
3. Young men eighteen years or over desiring to make advance preparation for registration or voluntary enlistment.

The results of the work may roughly be summarized as follows: —

Total number of applications filed from January 21 to November 25, 1918, when the school closed, . . . . .	1,214
Disqualified by lack of citizenship, physical or educational requirements, . . . . .	133
Discontinued for irregular attendance or voluntary withdrawal, . . . . .	297
	— 430
Students remaining in good standing, receiving instruction for varying periods, . . . . .	784
Entered military and naval service well qualified, . . . . .	530
Sufficiently equipped for practice in service, . . . . .	254
	— 784
Total unit attendance for entire period of school, . . . . .	12,985
Hours of instruction represented, . . . . .	25,970

Cost to Department of Commerce for equipment used, re- turned and still serviceable, . . . . .	\$600 00
Cost to Committee on Public Safety for expenses of mainte- nance, . . . . .	1,041 31
<hr/>	
Total cost for the period January 21 to November 28, inclusive, . . . . .	\$1,641 31

The radio code forms one of the most vital channels of communication, and the training given at this school contributed to the safety of life and vessel in military and naval operations, an element of value not to be considered commercially and which cannot be overestimated.

The Committee on Public Safety assisted and made possible this help in the successful prosecution of the war, but the conception and its accomplishment must be credited to Mr. Batcheller and his associates.

### Speakers' Bureau

The Speakers' Bureau, in charge of Mr. A. A. Kidder, was one of the first departments organized by the Committee on Public Safety. During April and May, 1917, speakers were supplied for meetings all over the State at the rate of eight or ten a day, in the endeavor to acquaint the people with the aims of the Committee and to impress upon them the urgency demanded by the situation. Speakers were furnished for nearly 1,000 meetings, ranging in attendance from 25 to 5,000.

When, later, the Food Administration was organized, the Bureau was enlarged, and thereafter the chief effort of the Committee was centered in stimulating interest in food production and conservation.

The Bureau also was at all times in close co-operation with the managers of the Liberty Loan, Red Cross and other patriotic drives, and at the time of the first Liberty Loan devoted its entire list of speakers to assist in that campaign. To this end speakers were placed in high schools, at Chambers of Commerce and many other organization meetings, while from time to time distinguished French and



English officers, as well as American soldiers back from the front, were added to the force.

Another important branch of the work was to arrange for and conduct meetings at various munition plants; and from reports received there is every reason to believe that a decided stimulus was thus given to war production.

Unlike many speakers' bureaus throughout the country, the Massachusetts organization was made up entirely of volunteers, including several hundred of the ablest and most popular speakers in the State, men and women, who responded to the Committee's call whenever time and circumstances permitted them to do so.

### **Four-minute Men**

Connected with the Speakers' Bureau were the Four-minute Men, suggested by the Council of National Defense in Washington. In June, 1918, Mr. Atherton D. Converse was appointed by the Executive Committee to act as chairman of an organization to conduct four-minute speeches throughout the State, the object of which was to place quickly before the people authentic facts about our military and financial preparations towards carrying on the war. This organization, as later perfected, consisted of seventy-one chairmen and four hundred and fifty speakers. In addition, one hundred and fifty theatres, scattered through every section of the Commonwealth, agreed to allow the use of their platforms for just four minutes at a time in vaudeville and moving-picture performances.

Massachusetts was the first State in the Union to inaugurate such a plan, and did it so quickly and efficiently that the Washington authorities requested the Committee on Public Safety to assist in forming similar bodies in other New England States. In response to this demand the chairman assisted in organizing Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and Rhode Island.

On September 13, 1918, other duties required Mr. Converse to drop the work, and Mr. Arthur J. Crockett was appointed in his place.

## CHAPTER IX

### ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEES

A very interesting and instructive phase of this story should be the hearty and never-failing encouragement given at all times to the Executive Committee by every one connected with the organization, and their ever ready desire from first to last to meet its needs.

The immediate problem confronting the Committee in the early stages of its existence was to build up a thoroughly efficient working organization; and later, to preserve, as well as to improve upon, the standard attained, while adapting it to the widening scope of the Committee's activities.

No stronger evidence could be offered of the far-reaching extent of the Committee's activities, multiplying more and more as the work progressed, than the increasing number of listed workers. The volunteer personnel included two different types: the first embraced many who had been successful in business affairs, and who, from long habit, at first wanted to have their own way in everything and proposed to get it; the second was made up of those who had no business experience, but were tempted to act as free lances, endeavoring to follow out their own methods and ideas. Naturally all this soon happily regulated itself.

Still another class embraced the paid working force, who entered the service as they would any other business employment. This made a combination of personnel requiring a distinct settling-down process before it could develop into a smoothly working machine. Yet, impelled by the patriotic impulses of the hour, it was remarkable how quickly such a result was accomplished. It is also a noteworthy fact to how great an extent many of the employees, to whom the amount of salary was a very vital matter, loyally stayed with the organization, often working over-

time, rather than reap the advantage offered by the continually rising wages paid by the Federal government. For the first six weeks the pay roll at headquarters averaged no more than \$50 a week. But after April 6, 1917, the organization being well established and on definite lines, with a foundation that assured success, and with the United States actually at war, the functions of the Committee became vastly extended, requiring a corresponding increase in the force. By November, 1918, the Committee employed at the State House alone 188 paid and 55 volunteer workers. These, with the Executive Committee, the Food and Fuel Administrations, and the various sub-committees daily in session, totaled a present working force of about 300, calling for a payroll of \$4,722.58 a week.

Eventually the workers for all activities were taken solely on the basis of individual qualification, either through previous training and experience, or from special adaptability to the particular function for which they were wanted, due consideration being also given to the time at their disposal, and to the distance from residence or place of business to the State House.

One thing remains an undoubted fact, that however great the merits of civil service under peace conditions, its regulations would have been a serious encumbrance in such an emergency as confronted the Committee; and it was truly fortunate that the Council of National Defense, with whom all Committees on Public Safety were suppositiously more or less affiliated, was exempt from this handicap.

It must be remembered that the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety was an emergency organization quickly gotten together for an immediate and extraordinary purpose, where time was an element of vital importance and delay fatal. It was therefore natural that the Committee should be confronted with innumerable obstacles in getting down to business; but its work proved so in harmony with the spirit of the time that it was not long before a plan of organization was carried through and the work in full operation.

The administration of the business end of the Committee presented an exceedingly exacting and difficult job, due principally to the make-up of the personnel and the ever shifting requirements. But all this was ably and satisfactorily handled by the assistant executive managers: Mr. Levi H. Greenwood, February 16, 1917, to February 15, 1918, when he was made chief of the Federal Ordnance Office, Boston District; Mr. W. A. L. Bazeley, February 15, 1918, to October 17, 1918, at which date he entered the army as an officer in the Sanitary Corps; Mr. Arthur A. Kidder, October 17, 1918, to November 20, 1918, when the Committee was dissolved.

The stand taken by Governor McCall, Lieutenant-Governor Coolidge and the Council in always unhesitatingly supporting the best interests of the Committee was a fine example of the general spirit of determination that everywhere obtained. Lieutenant-Governor Coolidge at one time remarked that, if necessary, he would give up his private office and "sit on the steps of the State House rather than see the Committee want for necessary room."

The same backing was shown by State officials and commissions with offices at the State House, to which they had a legal right, unselfishly submitting to much discomfort and annoyance from the constant shifting of their well-ordered establishments to less desirable and more crowded quarters, in order to make way for the Committee on Public Safety.

Yet this generous regard for the Committee and its work, however well implanted, would never have materialized as it did but for the kindly consideration of Sergeant-at-Arms Thomas F. Pedrick, for twenty-three years managing custodian of the State House and its properties. From first to last, he strove to comfortably house the Committee, and in many other ways to advance its interests whenever and wherever such voluntary service did not conflict with his official duties. He accepted the welfare of the Committee as in all respects his especial charge, and so interested was he in the success of this grasping encroachment on his well-



ordered domain that he made it part of his daily routine to visit the Committee rooms, dressed as usual in the full regalia of his office. His long black coat, silk cockade hat and genial smile will always remain a grateful memory.

### Office Rooms

It may be interesting to interpolate here a word in regard to the office organization of the Committee, as it developed. Co-extensive with the rapid and unforeseen expansion of its undertaking came an increasing demand for office space. From a two-room activity early in March, 1917, the tax upon the Committee's resources as soon as war was declared grew to such proportions that by April practically the whole first floor of the west wing of the State House, comprising twenty-five rooms, were required for its use. In July, owing to the further crowding entailed by the food and coal problems, even this extra space proved totally inadequate, and about a dozen other rooms scattered through the building were made available for committee meetings at stated times of the day. In addition, a number of outside offices were rented in different localities of the city. Mrs. Thayer generously gave, rent free, the entire building at 20 Ashburton Place, to be used by the Women's Conservation Division and similar functions connected therewith. The floor space occupied at the State House measured 17,020 square feet; yet during the greater part of each day the Committee was severely taxed for room, desks being crowded together with only narrow passageways left open to serve the constant stream of people coming and going. Some reference might here be made to the private office of the executive manager. Mr. Endicott, whose leadership carried with it so large a share of the burden and responsibilities of the Committee, occupied a small room of approximately four hundred and eighty square feet. This was chosen for him as a private office, but he insisted on four of his assistants, Messrs. Ratshesky, Phelan, Clark and Lyman, sharing these quarters, with the



result that his "private" office contained not only these "partners," as he termed them, but also his secretary, Mr. Thomas J. Moore, four clerks and half a dozen telephones, with telephone booth and switchboard. Yet with all the busy life going on about him he daily managed both to receive and to consult with anywhere from twenty-five to fifty people, exclusive of the numerous labor delegations and Committee meetings requiring his presence in other parts of the building.

The purpose of the Committee involved problems new in character and means of fulfillment, and different from anything our citizens had ever had occasion to deal with. Vexatious questions at home, or a change of base at Washington, continually taxed to the utmost the patience and resources of the inner office, which was the main center of inspiration and advice to the sub-committees working at the State House or throughout the Commonwealth. Finally, committee meetings, correspondence and the constant strain of callers crowding the office so hampered his time that Mr. Endicott found it impossible to confer in private with his assistants, and hence, following in the footsteps of a distinguished national character, an "amen corner" was arranged for as a place for rest and recreation at luncheon time, where who should be host was determined strictly by mathematical process.

## PART II

### LABOR CONTROVERSIES AND ARBITRATIONS

The story of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety during the two final years of the Great War is an integral part of the history of the Commonwealth in a time of crisis. If her quota of splendid service proved foremost at the front, the triumph of her home armies is likewise a matter of record.

A member of this rear guard, and on whose shoulders was placed a great and most serious responsibility, was the executive manager of the Committee on Public Safety. What his popular administration accomplished in behalf of the country's interests and in service to the State may, in part at least, be gathered from this story. Mr. Endicott's leadership may well recall to his associates the words of a great philosopher of more than three centuries ago: —

#### A GREAT PLACE.

Preserve the right of thy place, but stir not questions of jurisdiction; and rather assume thy right in silence, and *de facto*, than voice it with claims and challenges. Preserve likewise the rights of inferior places; and think it more honor to direct in chief than to be busy at all. Embrace and invite helps and advices touching the execution of thy place; and do not drive away such as bring thee information, as meddlers, but accept of them in good part.

The general method of procedure on Mr. Endicott's part, when a labor difficulty was brought to him by either the employer or employee, was to take the position that he would not arbitrate unless at the request of both parties. He next tried to have both sides agree to a settlement without arbitration. Another initial condition was, in case arbitration was agreed to and the men had already gone out, that they should return to work immediately while

awaiting the result of the arbitrator's findings, further pledging themselves to abide by whatever decision was eventually rendered. It might be added, also, that there were never but two attempts to override his findings. Both of these failed, and the men in each case went back to work. In many of the differences he was called upon to settle he acted not only at the request of all parties in interest, but also in response to an urgent and personal appeal from the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, or both. About one hundred and fifty strikes, involving large numbers of employees and very vital interests, and an equal number of smaller ones, were adjusted; some never reaching the point of formal arbitration, but being settled by bringing the parties together and giving advice, which was accepted in good part and eventually followed.

The evidence of the deep-seated respect entertained for his decrees was shown by the continually multiplying demands for his services. Most of the cases adjudicated appear to have been brought primarily at the instance of the employer, while both the records of the Committee and Mr. Endicott's private correspondence contain many letters of appreciation from parties in interest whose claims he had disallowed in favor of their opponents.

Although Mr. Endicott personally conducted the arbitrations, studying the evidence and rendering the final decision of adjustment, he had habitually with him as advisors one or more members of the Executive Committee, being especially dependent in this regard on the assistance of Mr. John F. Stevens, Mr. B. Preston Clark and Mr. W. R. Peabody.

The following, listed in the chronological order of their occurrence, comprehend the more important controversies: —

Gloucester fishermen.

Boston market-garden teamsters.

Dock freight handlers connected with Locals No. 809 and No. 882 of the International Longshoremen's Association.

Maintenance-of-way employees of the Boston & Albany Railroad.  
 Plumbers' controversy at the cantonment at Ayer, Mass.  
 Threatened strike at General Electric Company Works at Pittsfield,  
 Mass.  
 Stationary firemen, Massachusetts Chocolate Company.  
 Firemen and oilers on Floating Hospital.  
 Work on government appraisers' stores, Northern Avenue, Boston.  
 New England Fuel and Transportation Company — firemen and oilers.  
 S. A. Woods Machine Company — machinists, etc.  
 Coal teamsters of Boston and vicinity.  
 Boston & Maine Railroad car cleaners.  
 Boston market-garden teamsters (second arbitration).  
 Petticoat workers at shops of Superior Petticoat Company.  
 Aberthaw Construction Company trouble at Squantum.  
 Boston Automobile Mechanics.  
 Boston & Maine machinists and helpers, boiler makers and helpers,  
 blacksmiths and helpers, railway carmen and helpers, sheet-metal  
 workers, pipe fitters and helpers, and electrical workers.  
 Fore River machinists, bolters and reamers, helpers and crane men.  
 Lynn shoe controversy.  
 Boston & Maine station employees, freight and office clerks, baggage  
 men and crossing tenders.  
 The Western Electric Company, Inc. — miscellaneous employees.  
 Bakers' strike at plants of Fox and Ferguson companies.  
 Lamplighters of Boston.  
 Stationary engineers and firemen at plant of Loose-Wiles Biscuit Com-  
 pany.  
 Stove mounters of Boston.  
 Haverhill coal teamsters, chauffeurs, stable men and helpers.  
 Coal teamsters, chauffeurs and helpers of Newton, Watertown, Waltham  
 and vicinity.  
 Sole cutters at factory of Gutterman, Strauss Company.  
 Building workers at Watertown Arsenal.  
 Building workers at appraisers' stores.  
 Lynn coal teamsters.  
 Overcoat workers at plant of Leopold Morse Company.  
 New England Telephone operators.  
 Boston Elevated carmen.  
 Telephone operators outside metropolitan Boston.  
 Munition workers at plant of Albert & J. M. Anderson Manufacturing  
 Company, South Boston.  
 Fall River mill firemen.  
 Condit Electrical Manufacturing Company — assemblers and machinists.  
 Metal polishers at Wireless Specialty Apparatus Company.

Carriage, wagon and automobile workers of Boston.  
 Carlin Construction Company — work on appraisers' stores.  
 American Rubber Works employees.  
 Boston market-garden teamsters (third arbitration).  
 Steam shovel and dredgemen at quartermaster's stores, South Boston.  
 Scrub women at State House.  
 New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company — freight handlers.  
 City Foundry Company — foundrymen.  
 Jewish bakers.  
 Coal teamsters, chauffeurs and wharf men of Boston (second arbitration).  
 Weavers and spinners at West Boylston Manufacturing Company.  
 Operators and linemen at Edison Electric Illuminating Company.  
 Controversy *re* dumping of ashes on fishing vessels.  
 Stationery firemen, boiler and engine men of Taunton.  
 Fish handlers at Boston Fish Pier.  
 Clothing workers at plant of L. F. Brundage Company, Chelsea, Mass.  
 Carmen on railways operated in Worcester, Springfield, Attleboro and surrounding towns.  
 North Adams Manufacturing Company — spinners.  
 Carpet layers, Jordan, Marsh Company.  
 Arbitration proceedings regarding wage scale between Electrical Union No. 103, I. B. E. W., and Contractors' Association.  
 Berkshire Street Railway Company — carmen.  
 Loomfixers and other operatives at Lowell Textile Mills.  
 Loomfixers and other operatives at Manchester, N. H., Textile Mills.  
 Loomfixers and other operatives at Lancaster Mills, Clinton, Mass.  
 Weavers at American Woolen Company Mills, Lawrence, Mass.  
 American Steam Gauge and Valve Company — tool and die makers.  
 Coal hoisting engineers, Local No. 74.  
 Weavers at the Clover Worsted Mills at Franklin, Mass.  
 The Middlebrook Wool Combing Company — wool scourers and sorters.  
 Coal trimmers employed by the Maritime Coal Company.  
 Upholsterers employed by Metz Company at Waltham, Mass.  
 Waiters and cooks at Exchange Club, Boston.  
 Cold-storage workers at plant of Quincy Market Cold Storage Company, Boston.  
 Ship carpenters at several shipbuilding plants at East Boston, Mass.  
 Gas distributors of the Boston Consolidated Gas Company.  
 Gloucester fish cutters.  
 Edwin A. Benchley Company, Cambridge, Mass. — workers on life rafts.  
 Uswoco Mills, Lawrence, Mass. — weavers.  
 Middlesex & Boston Street Railway — carmen.



A few only of the foregoing, each representative of its special class, and embodying the general principles involved in all, will now be discussed.

## **Specific Arbitrations and Settlements**

### **I. GLOUCESTER FISHERMEN**

Shortly after the Committee on Public Safety came into being, the attention of the authorities was called to the labor troubles prevailing in the Commonwealth, many of which affected matters of vital interest to the government, and threatened very seriously to impair the efficiency of the home army.

The first request coming to Mr. Endicott to act as arbitrator was on April 19, 1917, in connection with the Gloucester fishermen's strike. In this controversy there were three interests involved,—the ship owners, the captains, and the fishermen or employees. About 3,000 men were engaged in an effort to change working conditions that had been in vogue on fishing vessels for many years. In the neighborhood of 375 vessels, including 10 steam trawlers, or about the entire fishing fleet at Gloucester, were tied up, shutting off Massachusetts from at least one-fifth of her food production. The State Board of Arbitration and officials from the United States Department of Labor had for eight weeks previously endeavored to bring about an adjustment, but failed. The strike was not altogether a peaceful one, and at one time it developed into a small riot.

The fishermen wrote a letter to the Governor deploring the existence of the strike, as well as the necessity, in order to keep up the food supply of the country, of their agreeing to arbitration. Moreover, although still setting forth the justice of their original claims, they agreed to an arbitration, "because we want to act not less but more patriotically than any body of citizens in the Commonwealth."

The masters and owners also wrote to His Excellency explaining their difficulties, and expressing the desire to

assure their fair share of the burdens of the war notwithstanding their belief in the full justice of their claims.

Governor McCall took the matter up with Mr. Endicott, who, accompanied by Mr. J. Frank O'Hare and Mr. John F. Stevens, labor representatives, and Mr. Charles S. Baxter, went to Gloucester as His Excellency's representatives. All sides to the controversy immediately went into continuous session for two days and two nights, adjourning the meetings one day at 3 A.M., and the final day at 4.30 A.M. The strike was successfully settled by an agreement on both sides, to last for the duration of the war.

This agreement was followed to the letter, and not a strike or lockout occurred in this industry during the entire period of the war. Many adjustments had to be made relating to different vessels, use of gears and the payment for the same, general wages, working conditions, etc.; yet notwithstanding that three separate interests were involved, as above stated, the settlement entered into at that time worked satisfactorily during the life of the agreement.

The arbitrator's decisions on certain minor points which came up later were also followed without relapse.

The conditions previous to this settlement were more far-reaching than may appear. An ultimatum had been served by the Union on the captains and shippers, who were in a manner of partnership, that unless the demands of the fishermen were satisfactorily met on April 9, the strike would be extended to other fishing ports, at Boston as well as at Gloucester.

## II. MARKET-GARDEN TEAMSTERS

The market-garden teamsters, about 300 in number, whose business it was to transport fruits, vegetables and similar products from the receiving stations to the Quincy, Faneuil Hall and adjacent markets, and from thence to different points of distribution, threatened to strike. If this had taken place, a serious curtailment of a class

of food essential to the health of the city would have resulted.

About the 1st of May, 1917, the teamsters, having asked for an increase in wages of \$4 per week with an extra 50 cents an hour for overtime, declared they were going on strike within forty-eight hours. Later the teamsters accepted 40 cents an hour for overtime, and the controversy centered on the \$4 extra a week.

At the request of Governor McCall the strike was held up for twenty-four hours, during which interval His Excellency called the matter to the attention of Mr. Endicott, who, with others of the Committee on Public Safety, went into conference with the strikers and the team owners. Finally a settlement was reached between them and a new weekly wage scale established, as follows: drivers of heavy wagons, \$16.50; two-horse teams, \$18.50; four-horse teams, \$20.50; chauffeurs and lumpers, \$18.50. Slight changes were also made in regard to hours and working conditions, with an agreement that any future differences between the parties should be settled by arbitration.

The agreement of the market-garden teamsters made in May, 1917, was to continue for a year. In October, 1917, a request was made upon the team owners by the teamsters for a raise in wages, the latter saying that, although they had signed for one year, the steadily rising increase in the cost of living warranted their asking for more money regardless of the agreement. They claimed, besides, that teamsters in other lines of work had recently had their pay increased voluntarily by the team owners, and were receiving \$2 a week more than the market-garden teamsters. The matter was brought to Mr. Endicott's attention, who, after hearing both sides, recommended that the men be given an increase of \$2 a week in their respective classes. This recommendation met with the approval of the Team Owner's Association, and the wages were raised accordingly.

Six months later, on April 4, 1918, the controversy was renewed, the teamsters demanding a still further increase

in pay. After several conferences had been held, Mr. Endicott, on April 30, sent a communication to Mr. William Mehegan representing the teamsters, setting forth that it should be considered by them a patriotic duty to do everything in their power to prevent, during the war emergency, anything adversely affecting food supply. This letter was read to the members of the Teamsters' Union. A similar letter was also sent to the Team Owners' Association. Apparently the suggestions in these communications were followed out, for no further effort was made on the part of the men to strike.

If these controversies had not been settled, it is more than probable that all produce coming from Texas and other points in the South would have gone to New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore for a market, and that it would have taken the better part of a year to restore normal conditions for exports and imports of produce at the port of Boston.

### III. DOCK FREIGHT HANDLERS CONNECTED WITH LOCALS 809 AND 822 OF THE INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION

On Monday night, May 14, 1917, the above dock freight handlers voted to go on strike the following Tuesday morning, thereby threatening a serious tie-up on the whole water front. Through the energetic efforts of Mr. William F. Dempsey, national organizer of the International Longshoremen's Association, the strike was held in abeyance until he could communicate with the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, before whom he later appeared and stated his case. The outcome was a conference at the Committee's rooms between the men, the contractors and the railroads, with the result that the strike was called off until Monday night, May 21. No satisfactory agreement having been reached by that time, it went into effect on Tuesday, May 22.

On Wednesday, May 23, the Committee called the parties in interest together, including the representatives of the men, of the Boston & Maine and Boston & Albany Railroads, and of the contractors. A plan was adopted to suspend the strike for a fortnight, during which time the Committee on Public Safety was to investigate the claims of both sides. On submitting this plan to the East Boston Freight Handlers' Union No. 822 it was accepted, although the men did not return to work immediately. On the other hand, it was flatly rejected by the Charlestown Longshoremen's Union No. 809 at a special meeting, and by a vote of 79 to 59. Following this action the general freight handlers at Charlestown immediately struck in sympathy, as did likewise the longshoremen. If this condition had continued the result would have been a general tying up of the whole water front, completely paralyzing all avenues of commerce at the port of Boston.

Nevertheless, on Saturday, May 26, Union No. 809 at Charlestown reconsidered their former action and unanimously voted to accept the plan of the Committee on Public Safety, as already agreed to by Union No. 822. Under this arrangement all the dock freight handlers went back to work without prejudice and under the same conditions existing before they struck, but with the express stipulation that they should be given an opportunity to present their case to Mr. Endicott and the following Committee: James J. Phelan, John F. Stevens, J. Frank O'Hare and Charles S. Baxter.

At the same time the general freight handlers and longshoremen, who were out on a sympathetic strike, likewise returned to work.

The decision of the Committee above named was rendered on June 5, 1917, to the effect that the wages of the men should be increased 20 cents per day from May 28, to November 28, 1917, and that thereafter, from November 28, 1917, to May 28, 1918, they should receive 5 cents a day additional, making the increase for the latter six months



25 cents a day above their present wages. At first there was some hesitation on the part of a few of the men about accepting this award, but the matter was finally adjusted, and the men went back to work as before.

If this controversy had not been settled it was likely, through sympathy, that a strike of all dock freight handlers, loading and unloading freight for other railroads on the Atlantic seaboard, as well as of general freight handlers and longshoremen, would also have taken place, thereby involving nearly 10,000 men.

Four months later, on October 1, 1917, the Charlestown and East Boston dock freight handlers demanded approximately \$3.50 a day, a nine-hour day, and double pay for overtime. These demands were not acceded to by the railroads, and all the men, for the second time, went on strike.

The Secretary of War, realizing that interruption through this work meant serious delay in the whole army program, sent his representative, Mr. Stanley King, on from Washington. After consulting Mr. Endicott, Mr. King had an interview with the leader of the strikers and arranged that the case should be left to arbitration, three men being agreed upon to act as arbitrators, namely, Mr. King as chairman, Dean Edwin F. Gay of Harvard University, and Mr. Martin T. Joyce representing the American Federation of Labor. The men promised to go back to work pending the arbitration, which agreement they kept. This commission had several hearings, and on October 16, 1917, rendered a decision allowing the men an increase of 25 cents a day over their present wage of \$2.75. Slight changes were also made in the hours and working conditions.

Upon the receipt of the award, however, the men refused to accept its terms, and, contrary to their promise, left work for the third time.

Once more the Secretary of War was compelled to appeal to Mr. Endicott, who, on October 17, calling the strikers together, set forth the seriousness of the emergency, impress-

ing upon the men how directly the safety of our boys fighting at the front was involved, bringing to their attention that they had previously agreed to abide by the decision of the Commission appointed by the Secretary of War, and ending with an urgent appeal to their patriotism to stand by their given word. It was also pointed out to them that by not living up to their agreement they were seriously damaging their organization. After this conference they held a meeting, and all voted to accept the award and went back to work.

#### IV. BOSTON & MAINE MACHINISTS

In the early part of September, 1917, about 3,500 employees of the Boston & Maine System Federation of Railroad Employees, Department of the American Federation of Labor, composed of machinists and helpers, boiler makers and helpers, blacksmiths and helpers, railway carmen, — all affiliated with the Federation, — together with non-affiliated sheet-metal workers, pipe fitters and helpers and electrical workers, were on strike, demanding a flat increase in wages of 8 cents per hour, thus crippling the road and threatening to bring transportation to a standstill throughout the entire system. The receiver, under the court's instruction, was authorized to submit the dispute to an arbitrator to be chosen by the Council of National Defense.

On September 5 Mr. Endicott received a telegram from the Secretary of War, requesting him to do everything in his power to settle the strike. Immediately following this came a letter from the Department of Labor requesting him "to use your good offices, in conjunction with the efforts of the Federal authorities, to bring about, if possible, an immediate settlement of this difficulty," and further stating that it was deemed of the utmost public importance, in the interest of all concerned, that "this labor" should be undertaken.

In response to these requests Mr. Endicott called the parties in interest together, asking both sides to submit a succinct statement of their case, and to give the gist of the evidence substantiating their respective contentions. After a hearing he recommended to Mr. J. H. Hustis, the receiver, that, pending a final decision, the wages be raised at once 5 cents per hour, on condition that the men return immediately to work. This they did, and both sides agreed to leave their remaining claims to him as arbitrator.

In the final arbitration the agreement for an advance of 5 cents was extended also to the apprentices.

The main question for decision was as to what part, if any, of the 3 cents per hour additional the men were reasonably entitled to, taking into consideration the advanced cost of living and the maintenance of good living standards, as well as the figures presented showing the rates of pay and the recent advances on most of the railroads of the United States. There was no material disagreement between the parties as to the evidence, and the case as presented to Mr. Endicott was on an undisputed statement of facts.

In his decision he refused to entertain the position that the poor financial condition of the railroad — so distressingly bad as to call for material relief at the hands of the Federal authorities — made it reasonable to ask the men to work for less than fair wages. He then goes on to say: —

It appeared that the present rates of pay of corresponding men on the great majority of all the other railroads in the United States had only *recently* been fixed, in most part by agreement with the federations or (in some cases) by arbitration.

It also appeared that rates of pay were now, and have been for an indefinite past, fixed and paid on different bases in the East and in the West, and on a number of long lines there are two or three rates of pay to the same class of men, lowest in the East, and "increasing as you go West."

It appeared that union scale wages, not only for railroad men but for various other artisans, were generally and materially lower in the East than in the West.

There also appeared, even in schedules recently agreed upon by the men in different sections of the United States, numerous apparent dis-

parities, as, for example, on one road the boiler maker gets a higher rate per hour than the machinist or the blacksmith; on another road the blacksmith gets the highest; while on others all three get the same.

All that (whether meritorious or not, and whatever the historic or other reasons for the disparities may be) would involve standardizing the rates through the railroads of the country, and any such matter as that is clearly beyond the scope of this reference to me.

The men on the Boston & Maine system had a flat 2 cents per hour advance in April, retroactive to January, 1917. The 5 cent advance of September 8 made the total advance for 1917, 7 cents per hour, or about 26 per cent advance on the average of the prior wages.

Considering the present and recently agreed rates on nearly all the roads in the country, and particularly on the roads east of the Mississippi River, I am absolutely clear that the 5 cents per hour advance made to the Boston & Maine men on September 8 was a proper advance, fairly called for, but I am equally clear, on all the evidence, that that advance put the men on at least as high a wage basis as the average in the entire eastern half of the country.

I find that the 7-cent Boston & Maine advance, in 1917, corresponds very closely indeed with the average percentage of all the similar railroad advances made and accepted by the federations in 1917 throughout the United States, so far, at least, as disclosed by all the evidence before me.

From the tables furnished me (particularly those of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics) I feel that the 7-cent wage advance of 1917 (roughly, 26 per cent of the former wage) fairly corresponds, on the whole, with the simultaneous advance in the cost of living, but whether this be strictly true or not, I also feel that the recent advance in living costs is a war result of uncertain duration, and that no man can fairly claim (and certainly no worker involved in this case would claim) that he was to be so paid or otherwise taken care of that he would bear no part of the burden of the war, or that he would want to escape doing his fair share towards accomplishing its speedy and successful termination.

It is my best judgment, arrived at after long hours of study, that the recent 5-cent advance made the wages, on the whole, as fair and reasonable as I could make them, and I, therefore, award nothing more.

The settlement of this strike was most fortunate, inasmuch as the whole Boston & Maine system would have been paralyzed if there had been a failure to bring together both sides in the dispute.

Notwithstanding that the arbitrament was directly contrary to the demands, if not expectations, of the wage



earners, Mr. Robert Fechner, who represented the employees in the many conferences held, wrote a very courteous letter to Mr. Endicott, thanking him for the interest he had shown, and giving his assurance that the working men would abide by the terms of the arbitration. This they did.

## V. FORE RIVER MACHINISTS, REAMERS AND BOLTERS

About the 1st of November, 1917, between 8,000 and 9,000 men, workers at the Fore River Shipbuilding Plant, and comprising machinists, bolters and reamers, helpers, drillers and crane men, were on strike. On November 4 Mr. Endicott received a telegram from the United States Shipping Board, Washington, requesting him to consider the situation as it existed at Fore River, and further stating that the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, operating under an agreement — a copy of which was forwarded later — between the government and officials of the American Federation of Labor, was at that time on the Pacific coast, and so not available to entertain the proposition at Fore River; and that those now working in the interest of mediation at Quincy were unable to bring the contending parties together. The telegram likewise expressed the desire that Mr. Endicott should act as mediator.

On the same day a conference was held between the officials of the company, Mr. Robert Fechner representing the men, and Mr. Endicott, the result of which was an agreement appointing the latter as arbitrator. This agreement provided that the men should at once return to work at the same scale of wages prevailing at the Charlestown Navy Yard, which had gone into effect on November 1, 1917, and that the question of classification of the employees should be left to arbitration. Still further, it was stipulated that during the continuance of the war, and for such time as government work was being done at the Fore River Yard, the government wage under the agreement should remain in force unless altered by mutual consent.



A telegram was also received by Mr. Endicott from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, offering the suggestion that the scale of wages established November 1 at the Navy Yard, which had proved acceptable to both labor and the government, as well as all questions involving the details of putting these wages into force at the Fore River Works in the same spirit in which they were in operation at the Charlestown Navy Yard, should be left to the arbitrator's determination.

At once a series of conferences was held between the officials of the company and the representatives of the men, where the whole subject of classification was thoroughly gone into, and on November 28 Mr. Endicott rendered his decision, in substance as follows: —

#### *Bolters and Reamers*

The bolters and reamers who had previously been rated on a classification of 32 per cent first class and 68 per cent second class were, under the new arrangement, to be rated in the proportion of 51 per cent first class and 49 per cent second class. By this finding the wages of 50 men were immediately advanced.

#### *First and Second Class Helpers*

In regard to these men, inasmuch as the proportion of first-class helpers at the Navy Yard was higher than at the Fore River Yard, it was only reasonable that the Fore River Works, under the existing conditions, should raise the proportion of first-class helpers to 55 per cent, and second-class helpers to 45 per cent, classification. These proportions had formerly been 5 per cent for first-class helpers, and 95 per cent for second-class helpers. In consequence, by this finding the rating of 260 men was immediately raised.

#### *Drillers*

In the matter of drillers, it was found that the existing wage classification for first and second class drillers at the Fore River Works was identical with that in force on November 1 at the Charlestown Navy Yard, making no further change necessary or advisable.

As to third-class drillers, those employed by the Fore River Company had been receiving a rating between the first and second class helpers' ratings, and as no such distinction existed at the Navy Yard, it followed that there was no argument for changing the existing classification.

### *Crane Men*

In regard to the crane men, the arbitrator found that those operating overhead electric cranes, or electrically operated shipbuilding cranes, should be classified as crane men, with the same rating and with the same pay as crane men received at the Navy Yard.

All crane men operating locomotive cranes, track cranes and floating cranes were given a special classification and rating as first-class engineers.

Crane men operating floating cranes of 10 tons or less were classified and rated as first, second or third class engineers, according to the tonnage of the cranes.

An operator of the floating crane with an electric drive was given a rating similar to the operator at the Navy Yard in charge of the 150-ton floating cranes.

### *Machinists*

It was decided that 19 per cent of the machinists employed should be rated as first class, 58 per cent second class, and 23 per cent third class, these rates of payment for the respective classes being on the same basis as those prevailing at the Navy Yard. The proportions previously existing for machinists at Fore River were 12 per cent first class, 20 per cent second class and 68 per cent third class.

This last finding resulted in an advance in rating of over 400 machinists, and was based upon information which the machinists themselves furnished on blanks supplied by Mr. E. R. Thayer, master mechanic at the Navy Yard. It was also a part of the finding on the rating of machinists that promotions in the three classes should be made in accordance with the Navy Yard system, but only after probationary periods. Moreover, it was provided that demotions and discharges should be made in individual cases where cause warranted it.

Finally, all the classifications and reratings in connection with any of the above classes were to be retroactive from the date the men returned to work, namely, November 5.

This decision met, in general, with the approbation of the contending parties. Protests, however, were made to the Navy Department by the machinists, alleging that certain instructions in the award were not definite enough to absolutely ensure, in their judgment, fair classification. But the Department refused to interfere, on the ground that it was committed to the principle of arbitration, and would not consider in any way reopening the matter. Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, apparently judging that con-

ditions were still critical at the Fore River Works, and on the assumption that the men were restless and likely to stop work at any moment, communicated the substance of these protests to Mr. Endicott, who, in reply, said in part: —

In every labor trouble where I have had occasion to take part I have felt it wise to keep in touch as far as possible with conditions after the men had gone back to work on my recommendation, and the exact conditions at Fore River were as follows: while there was some dissatisfaction amongst the crane men (which has been easily adjusted), and there was some criticism as to the strictness of the yardstick, and a natural feeling that each man would like to know just where he was going to come out, there was no thought on the part of the men to take part again in an open break.

The resultant effect of this arbitration was that where 9,000 men walked out, and the building of our so badly needed destroyers was threatened with indefinite delay, all of the men went back to work awaiting the decision of the arbitrator, by which they abided when it was given. Thus a serious setback to our efficiency was avoided.

## VI. LYNN SHOE CONTROVERSY

Discontent on the question of wages among the shoe makers operating in twenty-six shoe factories in Lynn culminated on April 18, 1917, when the employees struck and the doors were closed, every factory completely shutting down, and the workmen remaining on strike for over five months. Government mediators from the Department of Labor at Washington, as well as from the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, being the same agencies that had taken a hand previously in the hope of settling the Gloucester fishermen's strike, endeavored to bring about a settlement between the parties in interest, but without result.

A resolution was drawn up by the Joint Committee of the United Shoe Workers of America and the Allied Shoe Makers' Union, recommending that Mr. Endicott should act as arbitrator in the dispute. To this, however, the

employers refused to assent, contending that if the wages demanded by the workmen were paid, it would be impossible for them to make shoes at a profit. This was one of the two cases — the other being the Middlesex & Boston Street Railway controversy — in which Mr. Endicott interposed to settle a strike without first awaiting the request of both parties. But considering the matter of such vital and immediate importance, he felt justified in calling a meeting at the mayor's office, in Lynn, on the morning of September 19; and in notifying both parties added: —

It is my judgment that if either side fails to be at this meeting it will be a serious mistake on its part.

Both parties met at the time appointed, and in less than twenty minutes an agreement was reached, the essential terms of which were as follows: —

1. Employees to resume work September 24, 1917.
2. To receive same wages (and bonus) as paid April 18.
3. No lockout or strike for three years from September 19, 1917. Differences during the life of the agreement to be considered by a committee representing the manufacturers and the unions. Failing an agreement, all matters to be submitted to the State Board, whose decision should be final.
4. "Pending prices" submitted to Mr. Endicott as arbitrator, his decision to be "final," and "to be retroactive to the date the men return to work," *i.e.*, September 24, 1917.

This agreement was signed by both parties, as well as by Mr. Endicott. In accordance with its terms the decision when made was to be final and retroactive to September 24, 1917, the date on which the men returned to work.

Immediately after this agreement was decided upon the Lynn Shoe Manufacturers' Association wrote to Mr. Endicott, saying: —

It has been a most remarkable controversy, and it is our belief that the settlement just reached through you will ensure permanent and prosperous peace to the Lynn shoe industry.

Again, a large shoe manufacturer, and one of the representatives of the manufacturers in the controversy, wrote to him, in part, as follows: —

You approached the situation in a fair and diplomatic way, and I believe you have left a feeling of co-operation between the union leaders and the manufacturers that we have not had here for many years, and which in my opinion means much to the future of our industry in this city.

Mr. Endicott also received the following letter from Mayor George H. Newhall of Lynn: —

I again want to thank you for the most valuable service that you rendered to the citizens of Lynn in the matter of settling our labor troubles.

We shall always think of you as a most valuable friend to our city. You could not have done better. You were "the right man in the right place." What you accomplished will go down in history as one of the most important events for the industrial peace and prosperity of our citizens.

The following is an extract from a letter written to him by the President of the Lynn Chamber of Commerce: —

I am writing to you both as President of the Lynn Chamber of Commerce and as a private citizen, — who has contributed as a volunteer effort hundreds of hours during the past twenty years for public welfare and public improvement purposes, — to tender to you the gratitude and appreciation of the business men of Lynn for the great public service you rendered to this city in your recent arbitration effort.

Also I desire to express through you to Governor McCall the same appreciation. The satisfaction of achievement in matters of this kind is not only the greatest reward for an effort that helps a whole community, but it is generally sufficient to a man of your ideals for the work that has been done for this purpose.

On September 22, in his report to the Governor, at whose request he had taken the matter up, after mentioning the assistance given him by Mr. Ratschesky, Mr. Endicott said: —

I cannot claim any great credit in the adjustment of this matter, as I feel I only carried out your original suggestion that both sides be brought



together to counsel, with a guide to smooth the rougher edges of controversy, find the essential differences, and by suggesting the way out, to start immediately the wheels of industry in the great common cause of the Nation and the State. I was enabled to do exactly these things through the good sense, the mutual toleration and the generous spirit of concession shown by both sides.

I must say to you that both workers and manufacturers, as represented at the conference, deserve from you as Governor, and from the people of their city and State, hearty congratulations because of the result obtained.

I had every reason to expect at times evidence of feeling on both sides, but I am delighted to say that, notwithstanding the fact that, at your suggestion, I have presided at numerous conferences between workers and their employers in order that the industrial progress of the country should not be hindered, never have I seen better feeling than that which prevailed at the Lynn conference. The Lynn shoe shops will reopen Monday.

I am only giving to the members of your Committee on Public Safety the credit I think is due them when I say that since their appointment by you they have backed me in every one of the big tasks undertaken.

In replying, the Governor said in part as follows:—

I most heartily thank you, and through you the members of the Committee on Public Safety, for the excellent work you have done in bringing the employers and employees in the Lynn factories together so that work is to be resumed. The keeping of our railroads and of our industries in motion has so important a relation to our efficiency at war that I have regarded it, as you know, as one of the prime subjects of the jurisdiction of your committee, and I have, therefore, called upon you, when industrial difficulties arose, to attempt to compose them. This work alone, not to mention the other most excellent work that has been done, vindicates the appointment of the Public Safety Committee.

The arbitration being agreed upon, both sides were given ample opportunity to present all the facts and to argue their claims. These were submitted in voluminous and detailed form on behalf of the employees by Mr. Stephen M. Walsh, general secretary, United Shoe Workers of America; Mr. Benjamin Fish of the Lasters' Local Union No. 1; Mr. George W. Savage of Lasting Machine Operators' Local Union No. 5; Mr. David G. Numan of the

McKay Sewers' Local Union No. 17; Mr. G. Frank Newhall of Packing Room Local No. 8; Mr. Charles A. Wilson of Bottomers' Local No. 21; Mr. Charles C. Whidden of the Button Hole Operators' Local No. 38; Mr. Henry Dinan of Mixed Local No. 54; Mr. William O. Atwell of Stitchers' Union 57; Mr. W. S. Blaisdell of the Lining and Trimming Cutters' Local No. 62; and by Mr. Joseph F. Parks of Stockfitters' Local 68. The manufacturers were represented by Mr. Harry M. Read, president, and Mr. George W. Gage, secretary, of the Lynn Shoe Manufacturers' Association, and by several individual manufacturing concerns. When the testimony was all in the arbitrator took several months to study the evidence, as well as the conditions existing in other shoe centers, and on February 6, 1918, rendered his decision.

He called attention to the demoralized and unfortunate condition into which Lynn had fallen, bad alike for the employers and the employees, with special emphasis on the fact that the work of the different factories was neither graded nor steady, with piece prices hopelessly at variance in the different plants and without consideration of the grades of shoes or the sizes made; that the required skill of experienced workers was not properly recognized in the wages paid, and that the pay was often disproportionate to the work done; that no uniformity existed in the payments for "extras;" and that women's and girls' jobs were wrongly held by men.

In regard to time, he said: —

The shoe business cannot be successfully run on the plan of working the factories part time, by paying for that time such high wages as will make up for long periods of "lay-offs" and no work. The employee wants a year's earnings, of course, but the manufacturers cannot pay a full year's wage for eight months' work and continue long in the business.

After stating that he would not take into consideration rules and shop conditions, — as this phase of the controversy was not left for him to arbitrate under the terms of a written agreement which involved only pending prices, — he takes

up the latter question as the precise issue involved for arbitration:—

The various "locals" have submitted to me, very long, elaborate and detailed lists of prices now in force, covering hundreds of various operations and "extras," with requests and arguments for the increase of these various items, or most of them, by from 10 to (in some cases) 40 to 50 per cent. If by granting such requests I could fill the Lynn shops with steady work, I would gladly do anything in my power in this direction. Such would, however, be impossible.

I am fully satisfied, after careful study, that the great body of the present wage bases could not, in any fairness whatever, be now raised.

The operators in Lynn are now being paid the list prices plus 10 per cent, this percentage increase having gone into effect by agreement between the parties as of January 15, 1917.

The list prices, without the 10 per cent, are many of them higher than prevail in other shoe manufacturing centers, and even in some in which higher grade shoes are made than are made in Lynn generally. I am now asked to raise many prices at which very high weekly earnings are being made in Lynn shops.

I believe many of the individual prices in Lynn are now higher than the shoe trade there can possibly stand, in the competitive race, on standard work, for any length of time. At the present piece prices (particularly with the present 10 per cent bonus) many of the workers are getting good, and, in some cases, high earnings. With anything like steady work and good efforts, I am satisfied that the present prices (plus bonus) would yield good wages to all.

To raise such prices would simply be making conditions worse for all concerned.

It must be borne in mind that Lynn is only one of many shoe manufacturing centers in the country. If the manufacture of a particular shoe costs \$5 in Lynn, and only \$4.50 or less in other places, Lynn will be "shut down." The other places will get the work.

The case before me shows many instances of employees, in operations requiring no great training or skill, drawing wages (on the basis of present list prices) at rates of from \$140 to \$200 a month. No manufacturer in the world can keep his factory going "steady" under any such conditions, which are demoralizing to the employee who receives a wage he does not merit; to the more skilled employee whose real merit is not correspondingly compensated; and to the employer who has to compete with other shoe manufacturers.

It is true that there are cases where the earnings, through a period of months, or for the year, are not really adequate; but these result not

from the rates, but from slack work or "lay-offs." Raising the rates would simply add to the trouble and make the "lay-offs" more frequent, because it would make it, by just so much, harder, even than now, for the manufacturer to get the orders.

I think that the female operatives in the packing room are perhaps receiving a low wage, at least proportionately, and I think the same may be said of the "table work," so called, in the stitching room. I award to such female packing room employees and to the female table work employees another 10 per cent of their respective list prices and weekly wages.

I award no other advances.

. . . . .

I have taken time in this matter and examined into conditions in other shoe centers.

I want the Lynn shoe employees generally to realize that they are now, to-day, on an average, paid at the highest rates of wages of any shoe employees in the United States. This appears from all the evidence I have had.

To raise these rates at this time means, in my judgment, a sure ruin to the Lynn industry as a whole. In fact, with the present wage lists it is only when the demand throughout the country is largely on the so-called "millinery" lines that Lynn can hope to get business.

I should not be true to the trust which has been so loyally given to me by both the employees and the employers if I did not state the fact as plainly shown by all the evidence.

Therefore, as the "pending prices," and pending prices alone, were submitted to me, I decide that, with the exceptions above stated, I cannot change the prices (with the bonus) now in effect. Such is my award.

During the time pending, while the employees were awaiting the decision of the arbitrator, they continued to work under the original agreement, and kept this up during the war; and although two judges were appealed to to modify the agreement, both of them sustained the original document.

Indicative of the harmonious relation established, notwithstanding that this decision was in direct contradiction to the claims of the employees, is the following statement issued by Mr. Stephen M. Walsh, general secretary-treasurer of the United Shoe Workers of America:—



The decision of Henry B. Endicott on what has been generally known as the "pending prices" controversy is disappointing, but Lynn shoe makers generally will accept the decision with patience and philosophy, feeling that ultimately some relief may be afforded them through the agreement that they have entered into with the Lynn Shoe Manufacturers' Association.

The statement of Mr. Endicott accompanying the decision is a general denunciation of the chaotic conditions existing in the industry, and is a confirmation of the claims of the workers.

We have at all times been ready to co-operate with representatives of the manufacturers in an attempt to remedy these conditions, and if the shoe industry is to grow and thrive in Lynn these conditions must be changed. Shoe workers of Lynn will abide by the decision, but will not cease any legitimate effort to better the conditions of labor and to increase the earnings of shoe workers.

Mr. Endicott has been courteous, painstaking and accommodating in his treatment of our representatives. We regret his findings but bow to his decision.

At the same time he sent the following letter to Mr. Endicott: —

FEBRUARY 7, 1918.

DEAR MR. ENDICOTT: — Please find attached to this note, statement issued by me to the press *in re* your decision on the "pending prices" controversy. I have nothing to add to this statement except that I wish to extend to you my personal appreciation for the many kindnesses you have extended during the period of controversy. I have at all times found you willing and anxious to be of service to us in our extremity.

You have my best wishes for your success in anything you undertake.

The importance of this settlement, and the assistance given thereby to so essential an industry in a period of great emergency, cannot be overstated.

The loyalty with which both sides always upheld the decisions of Mr. Endicott, when chosen arbitrator, was never more pointedly shown than in the Lynn shoe strike, when, after careful and insistent hearing of testimony, lasting for days, he found that the laborers — 15,000 of whom were awaiting his decision — received higher wages than paid elsewhere for the same work, and therefore gave only 10 per cent increase to the women, and to the men



nothing. Notwithstanding this defeat of the workmen and their leaders, they made the statement to him, verbally and in writing, that they were satisfied with the fairness of his decision. This showed, on their part, a nice perception of just treatment which no one could fail to appreciate.

## VII. BOSTON ELEVATED CARMEN

In February, 1917, a certain measure of financial relief had been granted by a special commission appointed by the Legislature in 1916 to consider the financial condition of the Boston Elevated Railway Company. On May 21, 1917, His Excellency the Governor sent a communication to the Legislature in which he stated:—

It was undoubtedly a grave condition (the condition of the Elevated Road) which led to the appointment of the commission a year ago, and it was a grave condition which led to the action which the commission has recommended. The substantial elements in the cost of transportation upon this system can be quickly determined. There is no necessity for an inquiry long drawn out to determine the cost to the minute fraction of a mill, and if the commission is equipped with full authority in the premises I believe they will take seasonable action, and action which will receive the public approval. The maintenance of this system is of very great public importance. It has a body of highly trained employees led by a man who is recognized throughout the country as one of the foremost men in his calling. It gives very good service now; it should be enabled to give even better service in the future, and I believe that it will be able to do that under the efficient management which it now has and the full regulation of the Public Service Commission.

The gravity of the predicament in which the Elevated Road found itself, and which led to the appointment of the commission and to the recommendations it gave, together with the Governor's letter, prompted the Public Service Commission, June 15, 1917, to make an expert investigation, whose subsequent report, February, 1918, found the property to be properly managed.

Also, previously, in 1914, a board of arbitration composed of Messrs. James J. Storrow, James H. Vahey and James

L. Richards fixed the wages of the employees until 1916, when the new agreement was made, and after calling attention to the great increase in invested capital as compared with gross earnings, said: —

This policy, if continued, is going to send the company to the poor-house, and it is also going to render it impossible for the company to obtain each year the additional capital which it must have in order to supply the transportation service needed by the people of this community. . . . It will be unutterably foolish and not tend to better traffic conditions, but lead to almost irretrievable injury, if this process of overloading the company is not stopped, so as to give the gross earnings of the company a chance to catch up with its capitalization. Thereafter, the additional yearly burden placed upon the company should proceed at a rate measured in proportion to the possibilities of the situation.

Still further, on April 15, 1917, the President of the United States stated: —

To the men who run the railways of the country, whether they be managers or operative employees, let me say that the railways are the arteries of the Nation's life, and that upon them rests the immense responsibility of seeing to it that those arteries suffer no obstruction of any kind, no inefficiency or slackened power.

On February 24, 1918, about 8,000 carmen employed by the Boston Elevated Railway Company threatened to strike at midnight, February 25. If this danger had not been averted the entire system of the road would have been tied up and the general business of Massachusetts menaced. The demand was for a flat increase in wages of 4 cents an hour. The men were already working under an agreement made on May 1, 1916, to extend to May 1, 1919, and it was easily recognized that on its face this contract was not to be modified or disregarded in any part. The men requested, however, that due to the extraordinary changes in existing conditions, especially the difficulty of meeting the high cost of living, they should be allowed a special extra compensation of 4 cents. After a conference between the representatives of the men and the president of the com-

pany, the latter suggested that he would be willing to put out the demand to arbitration. This the carmen would not at first agree to. Finally, the situation became so acute that a Federal mediator was sent on from Washington to see what could be done, but this also failed to bring about any settlement between the parties.

On February 25, 1918, the situation became so serious that Governor McCall was appealed to, and at his suggestion the men agreed to postpone the strike for seventy-two hours.

His Excellency wrote to both employer and employees, suggesting the advisability of consulting Mr. Endicott in the premises. As a result, the parties in dispute met in conference with Mr. Endicott, and the demands of the workmen and the interests of the road were fully discussed. It was realized on both sides that in regard to the carmen's request for an increase in wages, the directors had no inherent right to add anything to their present expenses; nor, on the other hand, under the existing agreement, did the men have the right to demand additional compensation any more than the road had to grant it. But both parties, recognizing the fact that the present conditions neither existed nor were anticipated in 1916, when the agreement was made, and that everything ought to be done to ensure the best possible service to the public, agreed to place their respective claims in the hands of Mr. Endicott, with a request that he make a recommendation, which they promised to carry out if within their power to do so.

With a full appreciation of the financial condition of the road, Mr. Endicott believed it both just and imperatively demanded in the interest of the service that some recognition should be made of the increased cost of living, and recommended that the men be paid a special extra compensation during the life of the existing agreement, that is, until May 1, 1919, at a rate of 2 cents per hour flat increase over their present wage. This was much less than their demands.

At the same time he expressed the further opinion that

the expenses of the road other than wages having increased out of all proportion to its income, it was unable to earn a fair return on its investment, or even to cover its fixed charges, and therefore it was imperative that the company should have immediate financial relief in order to render to the public that character of service to which it was entitled. In his findings Mr. Endicott said:—

In the course of the conference it appeared that under the present 9-in-11 law the agreement of the men restricts the company from putting more than 30 per cent of its schedule runs outside of the eleven outside hours; that is, that the company is restricted from laying out more than 30 per cent of the schedule runs in such a way as to cover the two rush-hour periods. The question of modifying this in order that the company might have available during the morning rush hours and the afternoon rush hours, but not for a platform period of longer than nine hours, substantially all the regular men on the road, was thoroughly discussed, and it was admitted by the union officials that there was much merit in the request of the company in this respect, due to the fact that there is absolutely no question that it is difficult to-day to get the proper type of men in sufficient numbers to perform duties of street railway employees and to maintain the high standard which has always existed on the road. The union officials felt, however, that it would be unwise to endeavor to modify the terms of the agreement in this regard, but stated to me, without any reservation whatever, that in their full appreciation of this condition they intended, both through their international organization and local organization, to call strongly to the attention of their membership the necessity of accepting work at such time in order to provide the necessary service for the public, and so that the men may do their share towards helping bear the unusual burdens incurred. I am satisfied that the company in its endeavor to secure sufficient help to furnish the necessary service to the public has gone as far as is consistent or wise in removing the restrictions and reducing the qualifications necessary for employment, and I am convinced in my own mind that the condition which prevails elsewhere in this country and abroad, due to the tremendous demand for efficient men directly or indirectly involved in war activities, will, unless the present employees of the company endeavor to cover the two rush-hour periods, make it necessary to employ women as conductors and in other capacities.

At a mass meeting of the carmen held in Tremont Temple on February 28, the general officers and members of the



executive board of Division No. 589, Boston Carmen's Union, — having already signed a statement expressing their readiness to preserve without change the agreement made in 1916, — recommended in a written statement that the men accept 2 cents an hour flat increase over their present wages for time allowed, until May 1, 1919, at which date the three years would have elapsed, saying in part: —

It is our unanimous judgment that our duty to our country as well as to our members requires us to tell our membership that it is the patriotic duty of us all to accept Mr. Endicott's recommendation.

President Brush has shown a commendable spirit of fairness and courtesy in his dealings with us, and we hope our members will appreciate the attitude of both President Brush and the company.

We want to express our deep sense of gratitude to the Governor, Mr. Endicott and Mr. Stevens for the splendid service they have rendered in this crisis.

This recommendation was accepted by the employees by a unanimous vote, and the threatened strike, which, if it had taken place, would have thrown 8,500 carmen out of employment, was entirely averted without a single employee leaving his post.

#### VIII. STREET RAILWAYS OPERATED IN WORCESTER, SPRINGFIELD, ATTLEBORO AND SURROUNDING TOWNS

On May 21, 1918, the two-year agreement between the Springfield Street Railway Company, the Worcester Consolidated Street Railway, the Milford, Attleboro & Woonsocket Street Railway Company, the Interstate Consolidated Street Railway, and the Attleboro Branch Railway and their employees terminated, and both parties desired to extend it for the term of one year with certain modifications. Conferences were held between the officials of the companies and the representatives of the men, and no decision being arrived at, Mr. Endicott at their joint request consented to arbitrate the dispute. During the hearings before the arbitrator, both sides agreed to certain proposi-



tions involving payments to extra and spare conductors and motormen with limited hours of labor, which were later confirmed in the decision.

Among other matters adjudicated, the arbitrator, in a long and technical decision, made the following specific points:—

1. That conductors should be compensated for extra work in making out reports of zone fare collections, with special conditions and limitations, wherever there was no time to do so within the nine hours of the working day. This was coupled with the understanding that where tickets were issued, simplifying or reducing the work of conductors on certain divisions, such reduction should be a basis for reducing the allowance given, proportionally to the reduction of the conductor's work on such division.

2. In consideration of the constant increase in the cost of living, and the pay of men in similar industries in Massachusetts, 43 cents per hour was held to be a fair rate, and should be the rate of wages for the fourth and subsequent year of employment after June 1, 1918, for the employees of the Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Company.

	Cents.
The rate for the third year of employment, . . . . .	41
The rate for the second year of employment, . . . . .	40
The rate for the second six months of employment, . . . . .	38½
The rate for the first six months of employment, . . . . .	37

3. As for the employees of the Springfield Street Railway, for the fourth and subsequent year, \$3.87 per day was held to be a fair daily wage; and at the same rate for the junior grades, the increase would be as follows:—

For the third year, . . . . .	\$3 69
For the second year, . . . . .	3 60
For the second six months, . . . . .	3 46
For the first six months, . . . . .	3 33

Also that the hourly wage for the Milford, Attleboro and Woonsocket Street Railway Company, the Interstate Consolidated Street Railway Company, and the Attleboro Branch Railway Company should be the same as that fixed for the Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Company.

4. That the overtime paid for extra work to conductors, messengers and motormen should not be changed on any of the roads.

5. Requests that every car should be operated by a crew consisting of

a conductor, motorman and messenger, and that all transportation of mail be confined to mail cars exclusively, were both refused.

6. That the allowance for meal tickets be raised from 50 to 60 cents.

7. That a change from a nine-hour day to an eight-hour day was at that time inadvisable, inasmuch as it would necessitate a complete reorganization of the street railway's business, and, coming at a critical moment in its financial affairs, involve a burden not justified in the interest of either the company or the public.

8. That a definite zone should be established by which traveling time should be allowed to trackmen whose work was more than one mile distant from the car barn.

9. The demand that seven-day men should be paid time and one-half for Sunday and holiday work, instead of straight time, was refused, on the ground that the demand was really one for additional pay and not for shorter hours, their established wage being on the proposition that they work seven days a week and share with the other employees in a general advance in wages under the award. A further reason was that it would necessitate a complete reorganization of the company's business, and involve a burden not justifiable to either the company or the public. When employees were called upon to do emergency work on Sundays and holidays, a minimum of one day's pay was allowed if the hours computed on Sunday and holiday rates did not amount to one day.

10. No preference should be given on seniority basis in the track department.

11. The demand that if during the period covered by the award a shorter working day was granted to men in any department, this allowance should apply to all men working at the same kind of work in such department, was refused on the ground that this was not a time to attempt readjusting the working hours; that the scarcity of men might require a general nine-hour day in certain departments, and that it was not wise to discourage uniformity where that was practicable; in short, that the whole question was one that ought to be worked out between the men and the company, and not a matter in which the arbitrator's award could be helpful.

12. It appearing from the evidence that the wages of the miscellaneous employees had been based on no uniform system, they should receive an advance in pay of  $24\frac{1}{2}$  per cent over their present wage.

13. The demand that if during the period covered by the award a higher wage is paid to new men entering any department, or a voluntary increase granted, the same should apply to men in the same department doing the same kind of work, was refused on the ground that in order to secure temporary help it was often necessary in an emergency to pay a higher rate than that received by permanent men.

14. The demand that the five minutes allowed to shop men and barn

men to wash before going to meals and before their relieving time at the end of the day's work be increased to ten minutes was refused.

15. The demand that the present system respecting the transportation of employees in Springfield should apply to all roads mentioned was refused.

16. The demand that when an employee was required to make out an accident report on his own time he should be paid 10 cents for each report was refused.

17. The request of ten minutes' time allowance to car crews for taking out and putting up cars, and that the schedules be arranged so that the full running time should be allowed the first trips in the morning and the last trips at night, was refused on the ground that in consideration of the advance in wages this demand if granted would work an undue hardship upon the company.

18. The demand that Sunday and holiday runs should be scheduled so that the maximum for a day's work be completed inside of ten consecutive hours, and that night cars operating between midnight and 6 A.M. should receive one day's pay, were both refused as at present unwise and involving readjustment of service and wages.

Subject to the modifications above given, the original agreement was extended until June 1, 1919.

It is unnecessary to point out how serious a menace to the transportation interests of the State, and all thereby involved, was removed by this arbitration.

## IX. TELEPHONE OPERATORS OUTSIDE METROPOLITAN BOSTON

On March 2, 1918, a strike was threatened by the telephone operators in different cities throughout the New England States, the result of which, if it had taken place, would have paralyzed the whole system of telephone communication and most seriously interfered not only with regular business, but with all the war work in which the State of Massachusetts was engaged.

The question in dispute was the classification of the exchanges in some fourteen cities outside of metropolitan Boston, together with the subject of wage increase in all other exchanges, not only in Massachusetts but in Maine,

New Hampshire and Vermont, and involved from 4,000 to 5,000 employees, mostly women. Added to this was the reclassification of the exchanges in Fitchburg and Taunton, Mass., and of those in Bangor and Lewiston, Me. A compromise had been offered by the company, but rejected. A poll of the operators had also been taken, and about 3,500 votes were cast in favor of a strike. The situation had been brought to the attention of the State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration by a committee appointed to represent seventeen locals of the Telephone Operators' Unions throughout New England, without any immediate result being accomplished.

On March 5 a telegram was received from the Navy Department requesting Mr. Endicott to use his good offices in ending the disagreement, on the especial ground that the "transaction of navy work in many localities requires continuous service of telephones." On the same day a similar telegram was received by him from the Secretary of War, stating that "any interruption of telephone service would result in a most serious consequence in the execution of this Department's war program," and requesting him to take such steps as he deemed appropriate to bring about an immediate adjustment.

Several conferences were held at Mr. Endicott's office between the officials of the company and the representatives of the Telephone Operators' Union. On March 6 an agreement was reached establishing the following schedules of wages, which were to remain in effect for at least a year, with the added provision that during the continuance of the war all further questions of wage differences which could not be settled between the parties should be adjusted by arbitration:—

*Schedule AA.* — During training period, \$5; on assignment as operator, \$6; at end of three months, \$7; six months, \$8; nine months, \$9; one year, \$10; one and one-half years, \$10.50; two years, \$11; three years, \$12; four years, \$13; five years, \$14; six years, \$15; seven years, \$16.

*Schedule A.* — During training period, \$5; on assignment as operator,



\$6; at end of three months, \$7; six months, \$8; nine months, \$8.50; one year, \$9; one and one-half years, \$9.50; two years, \$10; two and one-half years, \$10.50; three years, \$11; three and one-half years, \$11.50; four years, \$12; five years, \$12.50; six years, \$13.50; seven years, \$14.50.

*Schedule B.* — During training period, \$4; on assignment as operator, \$6; at end of three months, \$7; end of six months, \$8; nine months, \$8.50; one year, \$9; two years, \$10; three years, \$11; four years, \$12; five years, \$12.50; six years, \$13; seven years, \$13.75.

*Schedule C.* — During training period, \$4; on assignment as operator, \$6; end of three months, \$6.50; six months, \$7.50; nine months, \$8; one year, \$8.50; one and one-half years, \$9; two years, \$10; three years, \$11; four years, \$11.50; five years, \$12; six years, \$13.

*Schedule D.* — During training period, \$4; assignment as operator, \$6; end of three months, \$6.50; end of six months, \$7.50; nine months, \$8; one year, \$8.50; two years, \$9.50; three years, \$10; four years, \$10.50; five years, \$11; six years, \$12.

*Schedule E.* — During training period, \$4; on assignment as operator, \$6; end of three months, \$6.50; six months, \$7; nine months, \$8; one year, \$8.50; two years, \$9; three years, \$9.50; four years, \$10; five years, \$11.

Schedules AA and A to be effective from the first day of the first week of February, 1918; other schedules to be effective from the first day of the first week in March, 1918.

Both parties, in a statement signed by their representatives, expressed their appreciation of the services rendered, recognizing them as prompted by a spirit of patriotic public interest and conducted in a manner requiring public acknowledgment.

On the question of classification the existing conditions were allowed to remain.

In this connection it might be said that two or three months previously a somewhat similar controversy between the New England Telephone and Telegraph Company and its Boston operators was settled in conference, in accordance with the suggestions offered by Mr. Endicott, satisfactorily to both sides, although as in previous cases a mediator had previously been sent by the government to look into the situation, but without avail.



## X. COAL TEAMSTERS OF BOSTON AND VICINITY

About the 1st of October, 1917, members of the Coal Teamsters, Chauffeurs' and Wharfmen's Union presented new demands to certain coal dealers in Boston and vicinity, in substance calling for an increase of \$3 a week in wages, a nine-hour working day, double time on Sundays and holidays, with Saturday afternoon off from April 1 to October 1. The question being left to Mr. Endicott, after a conference of both sides he awarded the men an increase of \$2 per week.

On May 15, 1918, the matter again came up, and after certain issues between the parties had been settled by agreement, Mr. Endicott, having been appointed arbitrator by both sides, rendered a decision, the chief points of which were as follows:—

That the work of teamsters, chauffeurs and wharfmen in the coal business did not require the steady application usually found in trades which are limited to an eight-hour day; nor did such work make a constant, unremitting demand upon either the minds or the bodies of the men; and, taking into consideration the condition of the industrial world and the withdrawal from it of so many men for military service, it was not advisable to shorten the nine-hour day at that time existing.

That overtime should begin at 5.30 P.M. instead of 5.45 P.M.

The rate of wages in force, that offered by the coal dealers, and that requested by the men, as well as the rate established by Mr. Endicott, are shown in the following table:—

OCCUPATION	Rate now in Force (Per Week)	Offered by Employers (Per Week)	Demanded by Men (Per Week)	Established by Mr. Endicott (Per Week)
One-horse teamsters, . . . . .	\$18	\$20	\$21	\$21
Two-horse teamsters, . . . . .	19	21	22	22
Three-horse teamsters, . . . . .	21	23	24	24
Wharfmen, . . . . .	18	20	22	21
Electric truck chauffeurs, . . . . .	20	22	25	23
Gas truck chauffeurs, . . . . .	22	24	25	24

This scale was established by a comparison of wages existing in like employment.

The demand that the existing half holiday, during the six months from April 1 to October 1, be changed to 12 o'clock at noon on Saturday throughout the year was denied.

Employees when called upon to work on a holiday should receive double their regular pay.

It was further decided that the new wage should not be retroactive, beginning May 1, 1918, as demanded by the men, but should take effect at the time when the new agreement embodying this scale should be in force, viz., from May 15, 1918, and be operative until May 1, 1919.

The issues involved in this strike were very far-reaching. Given the severest winter in the history of the Nation, with the urgent demands of the navy and government ships, together with the requirements of the ammunition plants and factories engaged in war work, a few days' delay would have paralyzed the efficiency necessary in a great emergency. It is vastly to the credit of our working men and the dealers that in the movement and transportation of coal during the whole period of the war emergency not one day's time was lost on account of labor troubles.

## XI. LOWELL TEXTILE MILLS

On May 28, 1918, the employees in the Merrimac, Boott, Massachusetts, Hamilton, Appleton, Tremont and Suffolk mills in Lowell, through their representatives, made a demand on the owners for an increase in wages of 15 per cent, said increase to go into effect on June 17, 1918. The Manchester, N. H., and the Pawtucket, R. I., mills also were indirectly involved. In response to this request a general increase in wages was made of 10 per cent, and this not being satisfactory to the employees, a strike followed. This strike involved about 15,000 hands, composed principally of loomfixers and slasher tenders, and indirectly their going out affected the whole mill industry in Massachusetts, comprising about 350,000 hands. The result was an immediate

and serious menace to the government, which was in great need of cloth for our soldiers and sailors, and largely dependent on the ability of these manufacturers to supply the same.

On July 3 Mr. Endicott received a telegram from Mr. Baker, Secretary of War, asking him to use his good offices towards reconciling the contentions in these mills, "in order that the soldiers who are so rapidly being sent to France shall be adequately equipped. It is vital that maximum production in New England textile mills be resumed at the earliest possible date."

In pursuance of a request from both the parties in interest, Mr. Endicott consented to arbitrate the contention between them, each side agreeing to abide by whatever decision he made. After a conference called in Lowell on July 5, which lasted several hours, an award was rendered that, considering the cost of living, it was only reasonable that the wages of the employees in these mills should be fixed at an amount equal to 15 per cent above that which they had been paid prior to June 17, 1918. In his opinion, Mr. Endicott said: —

What is of far greater importance in this critical moment of the history of our country than any exact determination of a wage scale is the assurance that in the future there shall be absolutely no interruption in the production of the textile mills of Lowell as long as the war shall last. This is of equal and fundamental importance both to the mill owners and to their employees. It is also vital in order that the men who are fighting for our safety may be properly clothed and equipped.

Therefore it is with the deepest satisfaction that I here record the solemn agreement entered into to-night before witnesses by all parties at the hearing, on behalf of themselves and of all persons and organizations whom they represent, that they and their respective organizations and associates, in order to ensure continuity of production to the capacity of the mills throughout the war, will submit any future questions or issue between the mills, or any of them, and their employees to the United States War Labor Board, and if that body is not in existence to some equally responsible tribunal to be agreed upon between them at the time; and that in no event shall there be cessation of work either pending the decision of that Board or as the result of its action. In other words, it is now impossible that hereafter, as long as the war shall last, there shall be a lockout or strike in any textile mill in Lowell.

After the decision was read a unanimous vote was passed by both parties thanking Mr. Endicott for his services, and in accordance with the original agreement the men went at once to work the next morning.

## XII. AMERICAN WOOLEN COMPANY MILLS

About the first of July, 1918, the Wood, Washington and Ayer mills of the American Woollen Company, employing about 15,000 hands and turning out daily approximately 50,000 yards of cloth for the government, were involved in a controversy affecting the weavers, in number about 1,800, and the latter went on strike, thus directly involving the labor of all the remaining employees.

The weavers sought the abolition of the premium system in force at the mills, and the substitution therefor of a percentage of the standard wage sufficient to put their regular weekly wage on a par with what they were already receiving with the premium; that is, the elimination of the previous system, and in its place an increase of 55 per cent in wage. The company took the position that the weavers, in addition to their regular weekly wage, were receiving under the premium system a bonus which averaged about 44 per cent. On the other hand, the men contended that the premium system caused much friction, and that the way it worked out was not satisfactory from the standpoint of either employer or employees; moreover, that the latter in many instances felt that they received much less in their envelopes on Saturday night than they had a right to expect and were entitled to. The weavers also demanded that when weaving on 82 and 72 inch looms, the prices paid them for the cloth woven on the smaller looms should be the same as for that woven on the larger looms.

On July 8 Mr. Endicott received the following telegram: —

H. B. ENDICOTT, *Executive Manager, Committee of Public Safety, State House, Boston, Mass.*

Cessation of production in mills of American Woolen Company at Lawrence of serious import to program for furnishing supplies to troops. May I request you to take such steps as seem to you desirable looking toward the earliest possible return to work on the part of strikers and the settlement of the dispute on the most permanent basis possible.

NEWTON D. BAKER,  
*Secretary of War.*

At the request of both parties Mr. Endicott went to Lawrence, where the questions at issue were exhaustively gone into; and on July 9 the following agreement, drafted by Mr. Endicott, was signed by Mr. Wood as president of the company, and a committee of fourteen in behalf of the men: —

*First.* — The company shall forthwith abolish the system of payment by premium which has heretofore been in force in the weaving department of the three mills above named.

*Second.* — The company shall forthwith pay to its weavers, in addition to the price list now in force, a further wage equal to 50 per cent on the present price list.

*Third.* — When government work of the same class is being woven on 82-inch and 72-inch looms, both of which are tended by the same man, the price for the cloth woven on the small loom shall be the same as the price paid for the cloth woven on the large loom.

*Fourth.* — The weavers shall return to work immediately, or not later than Thursday morning, July 11, at the usual opening hour of the mills, and shall use their best effort to serve the company loyally and maintain continuity of production to the capacity of the mills.

*Fifth.* — The company shall receive all weavers of the mills above named without any discrimination because of any absence from work during the past week or service on any committee.

*Sixth.* — All future issues between the company and the weavers at the mills above named which may occur during the continuance of the war shall be referred for settlement to the Secretary of War of the United States, and no lockout and no strike shall be declared by the company or by any weavers pending the decision, or as the result of his action.



This award might have given rise to captious criticism, on the ground that under its ruling the inefficient workmen received the same pay as the efficient men, and that thus the incentive was removed to do good work and to increase the production. But it must be remembered that the entire work done at Lawrence was on a piece basis, and that this was the only real question in the entire controversy. This so-called premium or bonus system had been the cause of friction for several years. It might be well, therefore, to explain the arbitrator's reasoning on so technical a question. As gathered from letters and statements made by him at the time and since, investigations showed that the working of the premium system was unsatisfactory to both employer and employee, and that time and time again it happened that the employee, according to his way of figuring, believed that he was entitled to considerable more compensation than his envelope showed on Saturday night. Moreover, to figure the correct bonus in any given case and obtain an accurate result required something more than average intelligence. If the employee did not find in his envelope what in his judgment was his due, he became dissatisfied. It therefore appeared wiser that all premiums and bonuses should be abolished, and that a man should know accurately what he was to receive on Saturday night, provided he had done a full week's work.

Moreover, the premium system might easily work a distinct injustice to the weaver, who considered it as part of his regular wage, since, should he be injured, his compensation was based on the regular scale of wages without the premium, and the accident insurance which he received was adjusted on the basic wage and not on the total amount which he earned.

Again, a first-class weaver might work industriously the greater part of the week, and yet, because of a break in his machine, not due to any fault of his own, the output from his loom might be insufficient to entitle him to any premium. He would therefore lose not only the time that his machine

was idle, but also the bonus which he had deserved for steady work throughout the remainder of the week.

Under Mr. Endicott's award the weavers received a definite wage per yard for every yard woven. This at once naturally gave every incentive for a man to weave the last yard possible, and it was to be expected that the production of a mill would be greatly stimulated under the straight piece-price proposition. The mills would know their exact cost of production, and the men would know perfectly what was coming to them, and the amount thereof would be dependent entirely on their own industry and efficiency.

It was somewhat ludicrous to hear intelligent men say that anybody could settle the differences between capital and labor if the employer was bound in advance to accept the award and labor was then granted all that it asked. In this connection it must be remembered that the employers have generally realized the necessity of meeting the high cost of living with increased wages, and that in all the strikes with which Mr. Endicott had anything to do, he made it an absolute rule — departed from in but two cases of great exigency — never to enter into a labor dispute except on the joint application of both parties, or on the specific request of the United States government. As a matter of fact, in 99 per cent of the cases adjusted by him both sides requested him to act.

In no case did the employees receive all that they requested. In certain cases involving a very large number of hands, where the wage scale had recently been advanced and where it was found that the rate of pay was as high as that given by competitors, Mr. Endicott refused absolutely every demand made by the men. For example, in the Lynn strike 1,000 girls, out of 15,000 hands, were the only ones to receive an advance.

Still further, in only two cases did either side attempt to break the preliminary agreement to abide by the arbitrator's decision, and in each of these the attempt received so little support that it fell flat.

Mr. William M. Wood, president of the American Woolen Company, in a statement given out by him shortly after Mr. Endicott had rendered his decision, said:—

The settlement of the Lawrence strike by Mr. Endicott was such as to be perfectly satisfactory to both sides. The premium system was a source of irritation to the weavers and no great benefit to us. We have had a splendid opportunity to compare figures on efficiency between our mills in which the premium system was used and our other mills, and have arrived at the conclusion that it did not promote efficiency. It was, therefore, to the best interests of all that it should be abolished. The weavers have been compensated for the loss of the premium by a 50 per cent advance in the weaving schedule, the average rate of wages thus having been maintained at approximately the same level.

It was the conviction of both Mr. Endicott and those associated with him that at least 75 per cent of the difficulties between labor and capital which came under his arbitration would easily have been avoided if both sides could have had that confidence in each other that is necessary between employer and employee to ensure uninterrupted work and steady production. It was Mr. Endicott's earnest endeavor to eradicate the existing distrust as far as possible, believing that by so doing the danger of interruption of business would be very much minimized. He had always in his own business been governed by the principle that the difference in quality and amount produced by satisfied labor over that produced by dissatisfied labor would yield all the profit needed.

It was also found, in all these troubles, that it was not the intent of the employer to be unreasonable, and that this was likewise the attitude of the representatives of organized and unorganized labor. Both sides, their loyalty once appealed to, responded promptly, realizing that it was their duty as far as in them lay to arrive at a satisfactory understanding. The resultant fact, that in all the labor difficulties brought to Mr. Endicott for arbitration and in which he took a hand there was not a single failure to bring about a satisfactory ending, seems to prove that when in a

labor difficulty the right principle is pointed out, both sides to the controversy will generally follow it, whether it is a question of time, duties or wages.

Computed conservatively, the amount of saving to Massachusetts and the Nation by avoiding through these arbitrations an interruption of work must have reached a sum between forty and fifty millions of dollars, at least. At the same time, between 300,000 and 500,000 men and women — during a time of great labor unrest and of national emergency and excitement, and when the cost of living was unprecedented — were fairly paid for their labor, and, working under a mutual agreement between themselves and their employers, remained contented and cheerful.

## PART III

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### MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES

Part I has dealt more particularly with organization and the results obtained by preparatory and certain special committees; in general with activities of the Committee on Public Safety either finished or in process of completion prior to our entering the war, April 6, 1917; the federalization of our troops, July 28; and their departure, September 7 of the same year.

Part II has covered the Committee's relation to labor controversies and arbitrations.

The activities of the Committee (Part III) admit of no dividing line concisely drawn, the general character of work having continued much the same from the Committee's formation to the time it was dissolved. But it should be borne in mind that in July and October, 1917, two important changes took place in its scope and management. In the first place, a new and exacting line of work devolved upon the Committee through Mr. Hoover's appointment on July 11 of Mr. Endicott to be Federal Food Administrator for New England, — confirmed by the President August 14, — and the establishment of Food Conservation Committees throughout the State as functionaries of the Committee. On the same date, July 11, Mr. Endicott was appointed by Governor McCall to be State Food Administrator for Massachusetts.

It automatically followed that the work of the already existing Preparatory Committee on Food Production and Conservation was at once merged in the larger responsibility imposed by State and Nation. As Mr. Endicott already possessed in the Committee on Public Safety an organiza-



tion with a personnel on which he could rely, the Food Administration was carried on by him in conjunction with the Committee on Public Safety.

Secondly, in the early autumn, another and far-reaching change took place in the Committee's affairs. For several months previous Mr. Storrow had found himself obliged to devote his main efforts to dangers involved by the threatening deficit in coal. As chairman of the Committee on Public Safety he had directed its course from the beginning, and guided it through many a dangerous pathway with conspicuous ability and success, when, on October 3, 1917, he took, as will appear later, the entire charge of the Fuel Administration throughout New England by virtue of both Federal and State appointments. A complete overturn was thus brought about in the conduct of the Committee, as Mr. Storrow was forced to give his undivided attention to the new duties to which he was committed, and to place upon other shoulders the burdens he had so long borne in behalf of the general work of the Committee. The Fuel Committee thereafter, with Mr. Storrow as its chairman, although germane to the general purposes of the Committee on Public Safety, was carried on independently of the latter in separate though connecting rooms, with a newly appointed personnel of paid and volunteer workers. Mr. Storrow continued to retain the chairmanship of the Committee he had done so much to create and build up, was consulted on important matters, and, on the few occasions when he could make it possible, presided at meetings of the Executive Committee.

Mr. Endicott, who from the beginning had been the executive manager of the Committee, now took the entire guidance of its activities in addition to his Food Administration duties. Indeed, so closely did the general work of the Committee become interrelated with that of the Food Administration that their separation would have been well-nigh impossible. On the other hand, the program as laid out by the Fuel Committee involved distinct functions, in

no way connected with those heretofore carried on by the Committee on Public Safety.

With this explanation in regard to the administrative conditions governing its work, certain miscellaneous activities of the Committee on Public Safety will now be related.

## CHAPTER I

### COMMITTEE ON THE SOLICITATION OF FUNDS FOR PATRIOTIC PURPOSES

The Committee on the Solicitation of Funds for Patriotic Purposes was appointed on March 4, 1918, as follows: —

George H. Lyman, *Chairman*.

George A. Rich, *Vice-Chairman*.

Joseph G. Minot, *Secretary*.

Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer.

Mrs. Roger Wolcott.

Mrs. Charles E. Mason.

Mrs. George R. Fearing.

Mrs. F. Lothrop Ames.

Miss Dorothy Forbes.

Robert Winsor.

Rev. Paul Revere Frothingham.

Adj.-Gen. Jesse F. Stevens.

J. Frank O'Hare.

Stillman F. Kelley.

L. B. Hayes.

Walter C. Baylies.

A. C. Ratshesky.

James J. Phelan.

B. Preston Clark.

Jesse S. Wiley.

The occasion for this Committee and the work which it was expected to do were set forth in a bulletin issued at the time by Mr. Endicott and the chairman, reading in part as follows: —

In our judgment there are very many societies which are duplicating the work of already existing agencies, and are spending their time, their money and their energies without being of the least help to our country in this occasion of need. There are also societies which we believe are so unbusinesslike that the cost of collecting funds and the cost of doing business take a very large share of the money which each person contributes. There are undoubtedly other organizations which solicit funds for improper purposes.

Therefore, realizing the danger of duplication, and the danger of inefficiency, and the danger of wastefulness and dishonesty, a sub-committee of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety has been appointed to take active steps to have properly supervised all such appeals, in order to ensure as far as possible in behalf of the generous giver to patriotic societies that the particular cause itself is worthy, and that the management of the funds shall be economical and their final disposition follow accredited channels.

The Committee had its first general meeting on March 11, 1918, and met for the last time on November 8, 1918, being in existence almost exactly eight months. During that period something like 366 different activities were investigated, 80 of which were examined very thoroughly.

The Committee divided its investigations into four classes:—

1. Organizations which appeared distinctly fraudulent. These were generally turned over to the district attorney for such action as he deemed advisable.

2. Those where overlapping and duplication of effort appeared, causing an unnecessary amount of overhead charges.

3. Those purely commercial in their nature.

4. Those which, though honest, were so poorly managed that the beneficiaries received but a small part of the contributions.

The second class required, when possible, an adjustment of interests which was often quite difficult to bring about. The third class was not held to be dishonest in character, but there always exists a certain body of professional men and women who make, year after year, a good income by promoting various charities, receiving either a large salary or working on a percentage basis which sometimes realizes more than 50 per cent of the total amount collected. For example, an instance came to the attention of the Committee where \$25,000 was admittedly the average percentage yearly received by one such promoter, and yet his transactions appeared to be both honest and open. It was a purely business matter with him, which, however it may be classified in times of peace, was pernicious in a crisis when moneys given for charitable purposes should be conserved as far as humanly possible.

The Committee's investigations covered not only Massachusetts, but New York and Pennsylvania as well, for it was found that a significant interlocking of methods and persons existed between many of the undesirable organiza-

tions. New York City, particularly, was the headquarters for much questionable solicitation, and from this center both appeals and agents were sent into all the neighboring States.

The Committee had no recognized legal authority. The power it exercised, though very effective, was purely a moral influence, generally enhanced by a fear of publicity.

For the enforcement of its suggestions the Committee was dependent mainly upon public sentiment and the cooperation of those prominent in business and social affairs. Recourse to the courts was deemed advisable only when there was evidence of misappropriation of funds, or of obtaining money under false pretenses. Moreover, in the absence of any legal requirement for keeping and verifying accounts showing sums collected and disbursed, misappropriation was not a matter readily susceptible of proof. However, some such authoritative supervision was exercised by most of the other States, but in three only was this based on specific legislative authority. The State of Illinois very early adopted a system of licenses, and held solicitors of funds for such purposes to a strictly legal accounting.

Without doubt this last method would have been the more direct and businesslike procedure, for there is no question that in Massachusetts alone considerable sums of money were wasted or dishonestly appropriated while the slower methods of elimination and adjustment were going forward. Large amounts might have been saved to the givers or conserved for more worthy causes had legal supervisory regulations been instituted from the beginning. District Attorney Swann of New York, in a report on the investigations of his office in relation to this group of war activities, estimated that in a period of twelve months there was a loss to the general public through theft and misappropriation of more than \$3,000,000, and these losses were occasioned by fraud, simply, and were exclusive of wastage through extravagant and inefficient management.

Yet despite these limitations it may be said with some



certainly that the method of supervision alone resulted in a very distinct and marked success, both locally and throughout the country. The evidence of this is shown by the fact that when supervision was largely discontinued by reason of the armistice, partly through the influence of Committees on Public Safety, and partly by the force of public opinion, the country-wide activities had become consolidated under seven major, and less than a dozen minor, organizations, while the purely local activities were reduced and coordinated largely on a community basis. The most difficult problem which the Committee had to deal with in Massachusetts was that of the individual who sought to exploit the patriotic sympathies of the public for his or her selfish or mercenary purposes. Even here, in the end, and as a result of the Committee's work, the public was largely spared from calls, under the guise of helping the war-stricken, to provide such seekers with a position or a salary.

The wonderful generosity and readiness of the citizens of Massachusetts in services and contributions to war charities demanded every safeguard the Committee was able to offer for their protection and the conservation of their money to the best uses. With that end in view steps were at once taken to direct public attention to the Committee's real purpose, and to invoke that assistance which every one was able to render. Letters were addressed by the chairman to the sub-committees of the Committee on Public Safety throughout the Commonwealth, in which it was stated:—

I hope you will look into all appeals in your locality, of this general character, excepting, of course, those promotions well known and accredited. When in your judgment any such appeal coming under your observation does not meet with your approval, whether on account of its object, organization, financial methods, agencies, expenditures, etc., or because it overlaps or duplicates an already existing and dependable patriotic object; or if for any reason you doubt its usefulness or desirability in the line of its proposed activities as the recipient of subscriptions, we request that you will notify us at your earliest convenience, giving all the information you have in the premises and such suggestions as in your judgment may be helpful.

Similarly, a form of questionnaire was adopted and sent to the various agencies who were known to be soliciting funds in the State or planning to do so, the essential points of which were: —

#### *Organization*

1. Names and addresses of the responsible officers; location of principal office; if the organization had its headquarters outside of the State, the name and address of its responsible Massachusetts representative.
2. Names of the principal endorsers of the activity, and a statement as to whether these endorsers consented to the use of their names.

#### *Scope of Activity*

1. Specific purpose of the activity; how organized, and whether the proposed beneficiaries had accepted the plan.
2. The amount of money to be raised, and probable duration of the activity.
3. Proposed method of solicitation, and the nature of the credentials given to its authorized agents.

#### *Business Methods*

1. Salaries paid to any officer or agent, direct or contingent.
2. Actual or estimated expenses per month for labor, rent, stationery, printing, postage, etc.
3. Where the funds collected were deposited; and whether the accounts were audited and open to inspection.

This preliminary inquiry in many cases developed two facts, both of which were of importance in checking up undesirable enterprises. The first was the unauthorized use of names, always a warning signal; and the second, the careless lending of names to activities which had not been subject to careful investigation by those sponsoring them. Naturally, the latter were the more numerous, as the dishonest worker was generally, though not always, too clever to lay himself open to quick detection through the printed use of unauthorized patrons. But the Committee from time to time directed the attention of such sponsors, and more particularly if their prominence gave weight to their name, to the obligations which they assumed when they gave their

endorsement to any undertaking of this class which sought contributions from the general public. It was in this way that certain forms of entertainment were discouraged, and ultimately eliminated, as where the principal end in view savored of personal exploitation, and the net results handed over to the beneficiaries were bound to be insignificant.

As to the various activities which, for one reason or another, it was found necessary to discourage, there is no occasion to discuss them in detail. The Committee made it a fixed rule not to give approval to any organization, not even to the Red Cross, Y. M. C. A., Knights of Columbus, Jewish Welfare Board, Salvation Army, or to any of the world-wide recognized efficient bodies engaged in charitable endeavor. The purpose of this may readily be seen, for if no association whatever was formally endorsed, then no umbrage could be taken in any specific case, nor injury done, by a refusal. Yet the mere fact that the Committee did not interfere with an organization collecting money was generally and to all intents and purposes equivalent to an endorsement. When, after a close examination, an enterprise was judged to be doubtful, and its activities could not be stopped, information was given to the papers.

There were more than one hundred war charity organizations regularly working in Massachusetts, independent of others which were relatively transitory. Among the former were —

Different societies for the relief of	Ball and Bat Fund.
American, French, Italian, Eng-	The Battle Song of Peace.
lish, Armenian, Syrian, wounded,	French Heroes' Lafayette Memo-
blind, impoverished, etc.	rial Fund.
The Huguenot Committee.	League of Loyal Americans.
The Army Relief Society.	Samaritan Circle of Fatherless
Convalescent Home Associations.	Children in France.
Flying Yacht Clubs.	Chain Letters.
Christmas Cheer Fund.	Christian Service.
Poets' Ambulances in Italy.	Association for the Prevention of
Ambulance Relief in Russia.	Tuberculosis.
Comfort Kit Committee.	Cripples' War Relief.

British Empire Rally Fund.  
War Babies' Cradle.  
Friends of German Democracy.  
Memorial Funds.  
100 per cent Boys.  
League of National Unity.  
American Prisoners in Germany.  
Treasure and Trinket Fund.  
Polish Victims.  
Children's Ambulance Service.  
Aberdeen Fund.  
American Red Star.  
American Military Hospital.

Bohemian National Alliance.  
Belgian Mission.  
Belgian Artists' Commission.  
British War Relief.  
Finnish League.  
National Allies.  
Lafayette Fund.  
Navy Relief.  
Navy League.  
Stage Women's War Relief.  
Naval Reserve.  
Military Naval Reserve.  
Welfare Union.

The Committee's work consisted largely of personal interviews, and of explanation and persuasion verbally or by letter. It was found in most cases that, when all the conditions surrounding any particular proposition had been discussed with those concerned, particularly in their bearing upon the general emergency situation, the nonessential or unimportant ventures were promptly discontinued. It is enough, therefore, to mention a few of the special classes of organizations which were discouraged, as indicative of the viewpoint taken by the Committee in its work.

1. Certain organizations, the propriety of whose aims was not questioned, were inclined to adopt special means for raising money which were open to criticism both in point of taste and of good business.

For instance, such a plan was that of the promiscuous distribution of pencils through the mails, with the names of the involuntary recipients printed thereon, and accompanied by the request that the same be returned or \$1 remitted. Many persons were decidedly annoyed by this proceeding, while it had also a reactionary effect upon public sentiment which was harmful in other directions. This was indicated by the many complaining letters received by the Committee. Further, in spite of the high price asked for these pencils as merchandise, it was not good business. After proper allowances had been made for the cost of the pencils — for the



labor, stationery, printing and postage in connection therewith, and for failures to respond — the margin remaining for beneficiaries was inadequate, as was indicated by an examination of one such account. Indeed, it may be said that wherever the Committee found merchandise to be used as an ostensible means for getting contributions the plan rarely justified itself from any angle.

2. Again, the sale of "tags" was not without certain objectionable features, which the Committee endeavored to correct. Naturally, this became a very popular means for raising small amounts of money for special or local objects, as it required little preliminary preparation and advance expenditure. But the facility with which "tag days" could be instituted made it easy to secure contributions in this wise for purposes not altogether worthy, while the scattered public from whom the money was obtained had no way of knowing how it was finally disbursed. The dime, or quarter, which the tag cost was not enough to arouse upon the part of the contributor very much consideration as to the object of its use. Cumulatively, the sum raised would amount to a great deal.

Moreover, young girls were largely employed upon the streets and at the railroad stations in the sale of these tags. This was by no means an unmixed good. In fact, the Committee was in co-operation with prominent social workers of the State with the idea of formulating more careful regulations, in the girls' interest, by restricting the hours and defining the conditions under which such sales should be made. In this same connection, and presenting possibilities far more pernicious, it was found that young girls were being solicited, under certain conditions and limitations, to volunteer for work in foreign lands, the character of such a request on the face of it being, to say the least, doubtful. For instance, in one such enterprise a girl would be asked to visit headquarters, and when there she was looked over as if with a view to appraising her physical value. It appeared that if she passed muster she was asked to call again, and



then questioned regarding her age and whether or not she was independent of home influences or other control. If accepted, she was required to make a deposit of cash in order to meet the expenses of being properly trained for what was represented as "general relief" work, and at the same time instructed that she was not to take abroad with her either money or letter of credit. It is needless to say that this organization was quickly broken up.

3. The "chain letter" plan of raising money was disapproved absolutely, and a bulletin issued advising that it be "discouraged in every way," the fundamental objection being the absence of any definite obligation to any person or persons on the part of the promoters. One phase of this irresponsibility was illustrated by early attempts to promote such schemes in Massachusetts, of which the two following are noticeable examples. One was in the form of an appeal for funds for founding a special hospital in France for the treatment of wounds in the face and jaw. The second was a plan for the sale of war saving stamps. With each proposition the name of a prominent and established organization was linked; yet both of these organizations denied having given the right to use their names.

4. Under this class came a rather numerous group whose objects, even if attained, were not considered essential to the needs of the hour, or were not timely, or were covered by fully accredited existing agencies. Largely, these were what might be described as personal propositions. Many of them had no formal organization, but were managed solely by their originators. In most cases the money was to be spent in some way beneficial to the Allies, which involved sending agents to Europe to conduct the work. In the absence of convincing reasons all such propositions were disapproved.

Of this last type was a project for raising funds for certain special hospital work in France. A large sum of money for this purpose was actually obtained, but later, with the consent of all concerned, this was turned over to the French

Ambassador, to be expended under the direction of his government.

Similarly, and in the home field, the activities of the so-called United States Boy Scouts, with its various interlocking organizations, were not approved. They were regarded as not having a necessary place in the work of the State. Investigation convinced the Committee that they were all essentially personal enterprises mostly under one general directorate, and that the business methods adopted were often open to the severest criticism. Further, the unfortunate similarity of name with that of a well-known and splendid organization, the Boy Scouts of America, was felt to be a real injury to the latter as well as a source of confusion to the public.

Well within this class was another scheme, sponsored in Washington. About the 1st of May, 1918, the Committee was approached by an agent of the Department of Films of the Committee on Public Information at Washington, asking its encouragement and financial assistance in promoting a four or five days' festival in the thirty larger cities of the country, including Boston, at which, for educational and informational purposes, the activities of the army and navy, the Red Cross and other patriotic organizations would be portrayed. It was proposed, as part of this endeavor, to transport from one place to another hundreds of trophies, including heavy ordnance captured from the Germans by French, British, Canadian and Italian forces, all of which, together with soldiers lent by the government and other attractions, would stir the patriotism of the people. The proceeds derived from the entertainments were to be divided on a 50-50 basis with the Red Cross. The cost for the Boston exhibit alone was calculated as somewhere in the neighborhood of \$100,000 to \$150,000. This venture the Committee distinctly disapproved of, on the ground that the expense would necessarily come out of the pockets of the people, and that the transportation of the properties, as well as of the soldiers, would interfere with the carrying on of regular

business by interrupting and further congesting traffic; furthermore, that the amount of labor required, which could only come from industries where it was vitally needed and could not be spared, was most inadvisable under existing conditions; and certainly the doubtful beneficial result, to this section of the country at least, would in no wise compensate for the cost.

In regard to the amount sought to be collected by the different organizations, the general and more human principle developed was to get all there was in sight; but where specified sums were aimed for, a broad margin of difference existed. One perfectly honest young colored girl, collecting money for colored soldiers, was greatly worried lest she be relieved of the 50 cents already given her in dribblets, though she had dreamed of eventually raising possibly \$50 if not interfered with. In another more ambitious and apparently equally honest case an organization conceived the plan of raising \$100,000,000, admitting that the overhead charges would be at least 50 per cent.

5. The Committee recorded itself as opposed to the "war chest" method of raising money in the State, and this position was confirmed at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee on Public Safety after very careful deliberation. The strongest argument offered in favor of the plan was that it conserved energy by concentrating money drives to one particular time. On the other hand, there were possible and probable losses to be considered which were likely to more than offset this gain.

In the first place, a single drive was likely to produce less money than a number of separate ones, and there would be lacking the cumulative inspiration which would come from a series of appeals. Again, the single campaign would afford a refuge for the slacker. As pointed out by the Executive Committee:—

In every community are selfish people who contribute only because they will be advertised if they do not. These people can hide to a certain extent behind the war chest movement.

Secondly, it gave no opportunity to contributors to indicate their preference as to relief agencies. This involved a distinct loss of individual interest, — in fact, would be a complete surrender of the personal equation. Quoting from the letter of a prominent worker, and also contributor to war charities: —

The war chest will, I believe, substitute a relatively cold, impersonal, money-gathering and distributing machine for a method which stimulates patriotism and makes the giver feel that he is contributing to a cause which appeals to him and stirs his best impulses. Speaking for myself, and, I believe, for the majority of people, I prefer to say where my contributions shall go rather than delegate that contributing privilege to the majority vote of a war chest appropriation committee.

Thirdly, the plan made no provision for unexpected occurrences or disasters.

It is only fair to say, however, that the "war chest" was adopted by several cities and towns in the Commonwealth, with every indication of probable success, though the early signing of the armistice precluded any final determination as to its real merits.

The members of the Committee were unanimous in their sense of obligation to Mr. Charles H. Taylor, Jr., of the "Boston Globe," who, both through the services courteously rendered by his paper and his own constant personal interest and effort, materially aided them in their work.

In regard to statutory authority for the supervision exercised, efforts were made in May, 1918, to secure such legislation in Massachusetts, but so late in the session that nothing was accomplished; also a bill for Federal control of all war charities was introduced into Congress by Senator John W. Weeks, which likewise did not reach the enactment stage. But the Committee put itself on record, as the result of its experiences, that, should another such emergency befall the country, the question of legislative restriction in the solicitation of funds for patriotic purposes should receive early attention; for, however successful supervision

by way of an educated public opinion — which is, after all, merely a psychological influence — might be, it is obtained through the expenditure of too much time and money, when a more expeditious and permanently binding result would be obtained through legislative enactment.

The purpose of the Committee was to check a prevailing evil which curtailed the fuller efficiency demanded for our public safety, — a war-time measure to continue during hostilities. In its membership the Committee embodied a very strong and influential representation of our citizenship, as well as of the Committee on Public Safety. In many cases its duty was not perfectly clear or well defined; and its efforts, often restricted by the lack of specific legal authority to enforce its judgment, required at all times the exercise of a thoughtful discretion in order to avoid trampling on the rights of others and losing that popular backing which was its chief executive power and encouragement.



## CHAPTER II

### COMMITTEE ON NEW ENGLAND SAWMILL UNITS

"The New England Sawmill Unit was the best sporting event that has come to my attention during the war." So spoke Lord Lovat, Brigadier-General in charge of lumber interests for the British government.

At the time the United States entered the war Great Britain was in sore need of timber. Her available woodlands had been invaded and her immediate lumber supply greatly reduced. A similar shortage existed also in all the other belligerent countries, even Germany being forced to ruthlessly deplete those forests which she had laboriously planted and scientifically nursed through several generations. The erection of innumerable ammunition plants, the building of hospitals, barracks and ordnance depots; the manufacture of boxes and shell cases; the increasing need for railway mileage for military purposes and for making highways passable; the speeding up of mines and mills; the construction of trenches; with many other new demands incident to modern warfare, all contributed to this deficiency. A further drawback was the limited transportation for overseas service, which, with the menace of increasing submarine activities, prevented the United States from shipping lumber across the water. So pressing was England's need that on April 16, 1917, Col. Vernon Willey of the British War Office cabled to Mr. William A. Gaston, chairman of the Finance Committee, suggesting that America could best help England by sending over experienced lumbermen to manufacture lumber for war purposes.

Compliance with such a sudden and unexpected demand called for a wide departure from any activity the Committee on Public Safety had heretofore contemplated. But this request, coming from so authoritative a source, at once

caught the interest and enthusiasm of the Executive Committee, who on April 23 voted that Mr. Storrow should send to Colonel Willey the following message in reply: —

Understanding that skilled lumbermen are needed in England to supply timber for forces in Europe, New England gladly offers its services in assembling men and material for ten complete, working, portable sawmill units, all to be shipped from Boston, each unit to consist of thirty experienced men, with portable sawmill, ten suitable horses, harness, wagons, saws, axes, or other tools and camp equipment, ready for business on landing; men, all civilian volunteers, with capable men in general charge. The cost of the portable mill, horses and of equipment, including freight and other expenses to steamer side, about, and not over, \$10,000 per unit; wages per month per unit about \$2,000. Have not yet consulted lumber companies because not certain English government would desire these outfits, but we are sure New England would want to contribute five of these outfits, delivered at the steamer's side. We assume, if desired, the English government could arrange space on steamer sailing from Boston. We prefer men and outfits to be all together on the same steamer.

An immediate acceptance of this offer was received by telegram through the British Embassy at Washington: —

The War Offices are most pleased to accept Mr. Storrow's offer, and request that this acceptance should be communicated to him, and ask for a date on which the transport for these units should be provided.

A corroboration of the above came by letter a few days later.

BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, May 15, 1917.

SIR: — I have received a telegram from the Foreign Office stating that the War Offices accept with gratitude your generous offer of ten complete sawmill units for work in England. The War Offices request me to convey to you an expression of their high appreciation of the very welcome co-operation of the New England States in this matter, and I wish to add a word of personal thanks to the gentleman who initiated a movement of such immense practical importance to the successful prosecution of the great struggle in which our two Nations are so happily united.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,


CECIL SPRING-RICE.

On receipt of the wire from the Embassy the proposal was taken up directly with the War Department at Washington, and the Secretary of War advised going ahead without further delay or more formal authorization. Correspondence then ensued with the Governors of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Massachusetts, all of whom gave full assurances of their sympathy with the project, and their desire to co-operate to the best of their ability.

In the meantime Mr. James J. Phelan, who had had long experience in the lumber business, and whose inspiring energy was from first to last the mainspring of the whole enterprise, formulated a general plan which he offered to the Committee, by whose authorization he later presented it to a gathering of lumber men. The latter quickly formed an organization to put the proposition through, with Mr. W. A. Brown of the Berlin Mills Company as chairman, and Mr. Phelan as vice-chairman, and, assisting them, Mr. F. W. Rane, State Forester of Massachusetts, and Mr. H. G. Philbrook of the Connecticut Valley Lumber Company. Many well-known lumbermen and State Foresters of New England volunteered for service, and devoted a great deal of time and thought toward making the undertaking a success. Headquarters were established in the Committee on Public Safety's rooms at the State House, where all the details of organization, transportation and equipment were carried through under the general direction of Mr. Phelan, Mr. Brown and Mr. Philbrook.

Within a month 122 horses and 10 portable sawmills were purchased. The above were fully outfitted, the equipment numbering over 2,000 different articles. During the same period more than 350 men were enlisted. Funds raised by subscription, and amounting to \$130,000, were formally presented as a "gift from New England to Old England," — a unique example of the former's good will and patriotism. Of this sum, each of the six New England States agreed to furnish \$12,000. The balance was secured from 77 firms, corporations and individual subscriptions, in





Some of the Lumbermen





sums varying from \$10 to \$5,000, supplemented by a gift from the Committee on Public Safety of \$12,017.47.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of holding together during the three days' wait prior to their departure so large an aggregate of lumber jacks, — many of them fresh from the remote back woods, and all anxious to investigate the attractions of our Boston town, — nevertheless, without the loss of a man, the Sawmill Units set sail for England on June 15, 1917, the men traveling on rations as British soldiers. They comprised the first organized body of American lumbermen to respond for service overseas. Each man was under separate contract with the British government, his term of service to expire on June 15, 1918, at which time the British government agreed to send back to the United States any man who so desired.

At a farewell banquet given to them at the City Club, Boston, on the eve of their departure, Governor McCall said: —

This movement is a most remarkable one, and one of the most splendid contributions that our country could make to the war. It means comfortable buildings erected for the wounded back of the lines. It means the rapid restoration of bridges necessary for military strategy. It means trenches lined with wooden sheathing which will obviate to a great extent the unpleasantness of mud. It means the accomplishment of work for which the Allies have neither available nor trained men. There is no body of men who will contribute more to the success of the Allied cause than you whom I see before me, and I think you should feel that you are as much America's contribution to the war as if you wore a uniform and carried a gun.

On July 4, 1917, the contingent disembarked at Liverpool, and after a journey of five hundred miles, the following day reached Argyday, Rosshire, Scotland, a small village on the Dornoch Firth, about fifty miles north of Inverness. There was a slight delay in the arrival of the equipment, but July 28 witnessed the first board ever sawed on foreign soil by an organized body of Americans. By the middle of August the entire outfit was in full action. Timber tracts

chosen for operation were on mill sites, situated in north-eastern Rosshire and southeastern Sutherlandshire, and all were comprehended within a radius of five miles from the units' headquarters at Arghday. Seven of the units operated on the estate of Sir Charles Ross, the inventor of the Ross Rifle, and three on the Skibo Castle property of Andrew Carnegie. The greater part of these tracts had once been cut over to supply lumber for the Napoleonic Wars, and the replanted trees, now nearly a century old, had attained to a magnificent size, offering a high-grade dimension lumber. All together they were supposed to carry about 24,000,000 feet of timber.

Lumber production began in August, each unit being organized as follows: —

Foreman and clerk.	Woods: —
Mill: —	Four to 5 head choppers.
Millwright.	Four to 5 second choppers.
Sawyer.	Four to 5 swampers.
Unloader and scaler.	Four to 5 teamsters.
Roll-on man.	General: —
Take-away man.	Cook.
Checker.	Cooke.
Fireman.	Blacksmith.
Slab-and-fuel man.	
Teamster.	
Lumber sticker.	

Each unit plant consisted of the following: —

Portable steam sawmill, boiler and engine.

Buildings: —

Cook house, sleeping camps, stable, blacksmith shop and outbuildings.

Camp equipment: —

Complete kitchen and dining-room utensils, camp bedding and necessary supplies.

Ten to twelve horses.

Woods outfit: —

Crosscut saws, axes, wedges, hammers, cant dogs, scoots and sleds.

Wagons were used for hauling lumber from mill units and for mill supplies. A few logging trucks were available for transporting logs from main highways to the mills, though very little use was found for wagons in the woods.





Sawing Lumber



Bunk House

During the first nine and one-half months of operating time 20,000,000 board feet of lumber were produced, including railroad ties, dimension lumber and mine props. Over 60,000 railroad ties were made, and a quantity of special dimension lumber sawed for army and navy special construction purposes; and in addition a large volume of sidings and larger dimension sizes were shipped to resawing plants to be manufactured into munition boxes. All of this timber was cut on private estates, and consisted in the main of Scotch pine, larch and Norway spruce. The trees were felled on land so steep as to require the use of "scoots" or wood-shod sleds; yet more feet of lumber were produced per man per day than by any similar organization in Great Britain. This was due in part to the mills being portable, and also to the general make-up of the whole outfit, which proved peculiarly well adapted to the lumbering conditions in Scotland, and enabled the operators to work economically on small lots. This would not have been possible with larger plants. Before the units left for Liverpool the men had been recruited as civilians. This was of great advantage, since it resulted in fewer men being employed to do a given amount of work than would have been required under military control, and subjected them to less restraint and loss of that freedom which they had always been accustomed to.

However, in order to guarantee a continuity of production, and to meet the needs of the many war industries dependent on a steady supply of lumber, arrangements were later made to loan to the British government a company of the 6th Battalion of the 20th Forest Engineers of the United States Army. When the men of the Sawmill Units were given the option of joining this battalion, about one hundred of them did so. Others enlisted in different branches of the army and navy, and about one hundred and fifty returned to the United States.

Shortly after the arrival at Argday, Mr. D. P. Brown of the Berlin Mills Company, who had accompanied the



expedition as its general manager, resigned that he might return to the United States and enlist in our army. Mr. Edgar C. Hirst, State Forester of New Hampshire, was then put in charge, having on his staff as assistant managers and chief engineers, Mr. H. M. Hackett of Athol, Mass., Mr. G. M. Shea of the Connecticut Valley Lumber Company, and Mr. C. A. Pratt. Mr. Hirst practically remained in control from the time the cutting operations began until the new military unit was fully organized, the commissioned officers of which were in general chosen from the foremen of the New England Sawmill Units.

After Mr. Hirst returned to America he received the following letter from the Assistant Controller of Timber Supplies for Scotland, which expressed the appreciation of that department for the splendid assistance given by the units: —

DEAR MR. HIRST: — I desire to convey to you formally the thanks of this department for the valuable assistance it has received from you during the year you have been in charge of the New England Sawmill Units.

Even in this time of great events, the action of the New England States in sending this expedition to Great Britain stands out as a notable episode. Thanks to the energy, zeal and hard work of yourself and your assistants, your mill foremen and men, the gift so generously designed by the Committee has most happily achieved its object. It has provided us in time of need with timber we could not otherwise have produced. It has bequeathed to us valuable plant and horses. On our side it leaves a feeling of profound gratitude and friendship towards the States that sent you over, and of warm personal regard to yourself. . . .

Yours very sincerely,

JOHN STIRLING MAXWELL,

*Assistant Controller of Timber Supplies, Scotland.*

The formal presentation of the units from New England to Old England was made by Mr. George S. Lewis of Holyoke, Mass., to Right Hon. Arthur James Balfour, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the British government, at the office of the Ministry in London. Mr. Lewis carried with him a letter of gift from the Governor of each New England State. The gratitude of the British government for the help given

them by New England in sending this assistance may be gathered from the following letter written to Mr. Lewis just previous to his embarking for America: —

DEAR MR. LEWIS: — I cannot allow you to leave England without again expressing my heartfelt thanks for the splendid help you have given to this country in general and to my department in particular.

Words fail me to give adequate expression to my gratitude, both for the magnificent gift from New England and for the infinite pains which you have taken to insure that Old England should receive the fullest benefits from that gift.

You have given your Lumber Units a splendid start, and I am very sorry that you cannot stay to see the great results which we are all confident they will achieve. You will be sorry, too, but you will have the supreme satisfaction of knowing that your generous sacrifice of time and thought in our interests has rendered us a most signal service.

When you return to England, as I sincerely hope you will, a warm welcome awaits you from the many friends you have made during your brief stay among us; from none will it be warmer and more sincere than,

Yours most sincerely,

J. B. BALL,

*Controller of Timber Supplies of the British Board of Trade.*

The climate of Scotland seemed to agree with the men in more ways than one. They were both well and happy, and most cordially and hospitably welcomed by the people of the neighborhood, who expressed great admiration for the manner in which they conducted themselves and turned out their work. Indeed, so naturally did they succumb to the charms of their Scotch environment that the home passage was enlivened by the presence of a large bevy of *bona fide* Highland lassies as brides.

In the matter of rations, each man was allowed by the British government the following: —

Meat and fish, 18 ounces per day.

Bread, 16 ounces per day.

Sugar,  $\frac{1}{2}$  pound per week.

Tea,  $\frac{1}{2}$  ounce per day.

All non-rationed articles, such as potatoes, beans, fresh vegetables, coffee and cocoa were obtained in practically unlimited amounts.

Many interesting letters were written home by the men after they had a chance to become acquainted with their surroundings, and of these it may be of interest to record a few. Under date of July 9, 1917, one member of the organization wrote:—

We stayed in Halifax Harbor nearly a week, and when we finally did start we had an old boat with us, besides a destroyer, and we had to go slowly to keep with them, so did not get across for nine days, landing at Liverpool on the afternoon of the Fourth. About two days out from port we were met by a destroyer, which accompanied us in, and it was lucky for us that it did, for the night before we docked a torpedo missed us by about 30 feet; but the "sub" was chased off. We wore our life belts all the time coming over, and we felt as though we had lost something when we were on land again. Most of the municipal buildings were flying our flag in honor of our holiday, and the crowds all cheered and whistled when they saw our American flag.

Another correspondent wrote:—

We arrived at Liverpool late in the afternoon and took a train right away. We traveled all night long and arrived at this point in Scotland (Argday) at about noon the next day. The days here are very long at this time of the year, and they have what is known as the "English twilight," the twilight lasting until about 11 o'clock at night. There is only about three hours of total darkness, as the sun begins to rise again at 2 o'clock in the morning. . . . This is a very pretty town with mountains on all sides, and is very near the sea. It is quite a distance north of Edinburgh. . . . The spot where we are located is very unique because we get the benefit of the mountains, woods, rivers, and also the sea not far away, so you see you cannot beat the location. . . . The mountains are certainly wonderful; when the sun shines on them they make one of the prettiest sights I have ever gazed upon, — in fact, I think they have got our White Mountains beat a mile. The weather has been real dry, but the temperature never rises very high. When it reaches 80 degrees or over the people think it is a very warm day.

The following extract taken from the British "Board of Trade Journal," an official publication of the British government, is evidence of the splendid work done by this contribution from New England:—

In the spring of 1917 it was suggested that lumbermen from the United States might also be willing to help in timber production in Britain. The

idea was taken up so heartily by the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety that ten complete Sawmill Units were raised and equipped with mills, horses and all necessary impedimenta, free of cost. These Sawmill Units are not a military organization, the men being under individual contracts with the government. Considerable enthusiasm was manifested in connection with the send-off of these units. Their provision is one of the striking incidents of the story of how the timber problem has been dealt with. These lumbermen have more than realized the high expectations formed of their work, and have put up some remarkable records, their total output being well ahead of what was estimated.

That the enterprise was not one of merely momentary interest, but was held in appreciative memory after its conclusion, is shown in a letter to Mr. Lewis from the Controller of Timber Supplies of the British Board of Trade: —

SEPTEMBER, 1918.

DEAR MR. LEWIS: — Now that the work of the Lumber Units raised by the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety has come to a conclusion, consequent upon the enrollment of the men in the United States Forces for service in France, I should like to convey to you my personal appreciation of the work achieved by the officers and the men of these units. I trust that the sojourn of the men in Scotland was not altogether unenjoyable, and I need hardly say how valuable a contribution to the solidarity of the Allied cause is afforded by such work as that performed by the units.

My sincere thanks are also due to you personally for the very considerable share you took in the work of organization.

Yours very truly,

J. B. BALL.

Surely when Lord Lovat, so prominent a representative of that virile England long recognized as the pristine center of sporting life, forgetting any insular prejudices, allowed in his enthusiasm that the New England Sawmill Unit was the sportiest event of the war, he not only repaid the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety and its supporters in full, but touched that little human chord that makes the whole world kin.

### CHAPTER III

## COMMITTEE ON MOBILIZATION OF SCHOOL BOYS FOR FARM SERVICE

Years have elapsed since Massachusetts could lay claim to being an agricultural State. The multitude of farms dotting plains and hillside, and once yielding a generous livelihood to the farmers, with a little over to meet emergencies and insure a comfortable old age, have year by year become fewer and fewer, till gradually many are abandoned either in whole or in part. Our rapid industrial evolution out of all proportion to the growth of population, its demands on labor, the ever-increasing cost of living, the universal advance in wages, the call of the city, and the paradise for farmers offered through the development of the vast acreages in the West, were among the more obvious and potent causes to strip the New England homestead of its youth. In addition, better schools, with a stricter enforcement of regular attendance, and the opportunities offered by the establishment of educational boards and institutions, advanced the standard of our young men's mental efficiency and gave them a better knowledge of what the world offered. All this induced a restless ambition for a broader life than the conduct of the average farm could supply.

During the late winter and early spring, plans aiming to place boys on farms sprang up apparently spontaneously all over the country, and it has not yet been definitely determined in what section of the country this first originated; but in Massachusetts the movement to mobilize boys for farm labor had its inception in the Committee on Public Safety. It was the result of a campaign conducted by that organization in the early spring of 1917, the purpose of which was to enlarge the amount of cultivated acreage, to stimulate home and community gardens, and through every vehicle possible to increase food production.



Usually Massachusetts yields less than one-fifth of the food it requires, and about 5 per cent only out of a population of 3,800,000 are normally engaged in agricultural pursuits. The situation was emphasized in a pamphlet issued by the Committee on Public Safety, in which it was said: —

New England has 5,000,000 acres less under tillage than she had fifty years ago. Massachusetts has 54,000 less cows than twenty-five years ago. Active farming in many of our hill towns in the western part of the State has diminished alarmingly. The farming section in Massachusetts has been harder hit in the matter of labor than almost any other, for the proximity of manufacturing centers paying high wages has caused a tremendous migration to the cities. Many small farms are already vacant or idle because the farmer and his former workmen are manufacturing machines, shoes, tools or munitions. The high price of grain is driving dairymen to the wall daily. Boston will probably be confronted with a severe shortage of milk, and the poultrymen report to our committee that 50 per cent of the flocks in some of our best producing sections will be slaughtered within the next two months.

The campaign of the Committee on Public Safety for school and home gardens, factory gardens and community gardens met with a prompt response; yet it was fully realized that the chief contribution in effective production of staple crops must come from farms. Other agencies could supplement, but thereby only to a very limited extent offset, the food shortage and high prices incident to the enormous demand for export foodstuffs and the congestion of transportation systems sure to follow.

Inquiries conducted by county farm bureaus, and reports made directly to the Committee on Public Safety, indicated that the Massachusetts farmer was not, as a rule, planning to increase his acreage, flocks of poultry, or herds of cattle and swine. Many causes operated to reduce rather than to increase production. The high cost of grain, seed and fertilizer, and the scarcity of labor, occasioned a very discouraging situation. One of the most menacing difficulties to be overcome, perhaps the greatest, was the scarcity and

high price of farm labor. In fact, the Committee was virtually faced with the contention on the part of the farmer that, "If you want us to raise more food you must find an available labor supply, which we have not been able to discover at a price we can afford to pay."

Among other measures the Committee adopted the following: —

1. An investigation to be conducted through the county farm bureaus of the need for labor on farms.
2. The encouragement of labor agencies to be created and organized by the county farm bureaus.
3. Establishment at the State House of a farm labor agency, to be controlled by the Sub-Committee on Food Production and Conservation.
4. The mobilization of school boys to meet the labor deficit.

The general scheme of mobilization was based on the following principles: —

1. To encourage boys under sixteen to remain at home to work on home, school and community gardens.
2. To enlist high school boys too young for military or navy service, but old enough to render a real service on farms, and move them where farm labor is needed; making them understand that enlistment for farm service is in all ways as patriotic as any other service they could render to the Nation's defense.

Mr. Storrow was empowered by the Committee on Public Safety to appoint a sub-committee to formulate a more detailed plan for enlistment and placement, — in general, to act as an administrative board.

At the outset it was thought there would be a surplus of labor in the eastern part of the State, and that the high schools of the larger cities would contribute most of the boy labor. It was therefore planned to enlist boys in Suffolk, Essex, Middlesex and Norfolk counties, and move them to the agricultural portions of the State where labor was more especially needed. A conference of the superintendents of schools in the cities of the above-named counties was held on April 24, 1917, and a committee appointed consisting of —

F. V. Thompson, Assistant Superintendent of Schools, Boston, *Chairman*.  
C. S. Clark, Superintendent of Schools, Somerville.  
Bernard Sheridan, Superintendent of Schools, Lawrence.  
F. H. Nickerson, Superintendent of Schools, Medford.

The plans suggested by this body received a good deal of newspaper publicity. They were also a leading feature of the discussion at a meeting of the Massachusetts Superintendents' Association held at the State House on April 27, the general subject considered being the work of the schools in war time. It appeared to those in attendance that the scheme for mobilizing school boys carried with it certain advantages which ought to be of general State-wide application, and should not be limited to the eastern section of the State. In response to a resolution adopted at the meeting, the Committee on Public Safety authorized the extension of the above measures throughout the State, and the following names were added to the Committee's membership by Mr. Storrow: —

W. I. Hamilton, Agent, Massachusetts Board of Education, Boston,  
*Secretary*.  
J. H. Van Sickle, Superintendent of Schools, Springfield.  
C. G. Persons, Superintendent of Schools, Pittsfield.  
J. F. Gannon, Assistant Superintendent of Schools, Worcester.

The Committee also received valuable assistance from the following, who were appointed advisory members: —

Dr. A. W. Gilbert, Acting Manager, Middlesex Farm Bureau.  
S. W. Parker, State Leader, Farm Bureaus.  
Prof. W. D. Hurd, Director, State Extension Service, Massachusetts Agricultural College.  
Prof. Curry Hicks, Massachusetts Agricultural College.  
J. G. Barnes, Director of Boys' Work, Boston Y. M. C. A.

The full Committee never met as a working body. It conducted its business mainly through correspondence. For the first two or three weeks Messrs. Thompson, Clark, Sheridan, Nickerson, and Hamilton, acting as an executive

committee, were at the office in the State House every day. Mr. Stephen R. Dow was specially assigned by the Committee on Public Safety, and with the assistance of Messrs. Hamilton and Thompson carried on the work under the direction of the Executive Committee. Mr. Dow succeeded Mr. Hamilton as secretary on August 1. The first work of the Committee was to formulate and publish detailed plans and proposals. In a very short time it appeared that farmers were skeptical concerning the value of boys on farms. It became necessary, therefore, to conduct an active propaganda, and the Committee undertook to accomplish the following:—

1. By correspondence, personal interviews and public meetings to get in touch with local Committees on Public Safety and Committees on Conservation of Food.

2. To secure from all the school committees in the State having charge of high schools, arrangements whereby boys of sixteen years of age and over should be released, at any time during the spring and up to October 1, whenever their services were needed in agricultural work.

3. To secure for the boys an arrangement whereby their school standing should not be impaired; and further, for those who were going to college, recognition of this work as emergency service in lieu of regular certification or examination for entrance to college.

4. To place boys on farms in one of three ways:—

- (a) To put one or more boys on individual farms when requested by farmers, the boys to live in the farmers' homes.

- (b) To arrange for co-operation with high schools, so that boys could work on farms in the vicinity when required, returning home at night.

- (c) To organize camps, from which boys would go to work by the day or week on the farms in the vicinity of these camps.

5. To secure the co-operation of the county farm bureaus as a medium of information, of labor exchange, and of convincing the farmers that the high school boys were available and would be of real value in farm work.

In carrying out its scheme the Committee received hearty co-operation from college authorities, school committees, superintendents of schools and high school principals, besides valuable assistance and advice from the Y. M. C. A., with Mr. L. C. Barnes as welfare director; and especially from

the State Department of Health, whose district inspectors made an examination of each camp and offered suggestions for sanitary improvement in several camps, supervising also inoculation against typhoid. The State Board of Labor and Industries placed the services of Dr. T. M. Harrington, its medical adviser, at the disposal of the Committee. The metropolitan press was also most generous in the allotment of space for any material the Committee desired to put before the public. Through the efforts of Mrs. Malcolm Donald reliable information was secured regarding proper sanitation for the boys, and also effective means of inducting satisfactory commissariat departments in the camps. In general, college authorities, school committees, superintendents of schools and high school principals co-operated heartily in furthering all the projects suggested by the Committee.

Unlike other States attempting a similar enterprise, no public funds were appropriated in Massachusetts for the mobilization of school boys. The whole venture, except the office expenses, — which were under the supervision of the Committee on Public Safety, — was financed by private subscription. The willingness of several municipal State offices to co-operate in the movement by releasing the time of such members of the Committee as were in their service, indicated the prevailing spirit in Massachusetts regarding all war emergencies.

The boys were placed on farms in the three different ways above stated. Relatively few requests came to the central office for single boys. Such as did come were filled by the supervisors resident in the locality of the prospective employer.

The advantages in this connection to the boys, the schools and the farmers were as follows: —

1. A labor group was organized and made available such as the farmer could readily reach. Boys were available in larger numbers than heretofore.

2. By the organization of a State-wide plan it was possible to induce



many school committees to release boys on full time prior to the close of school; to allow them to remain after the schools opened in the fall; and to make suitable arrangements for the continuance of their education.

3. The Committee also secured for all boys in farm service under its terms of enlistment a satisfactory status for admission to college.

Many boys were released to work on the farms by the day, but lived in their own homes. Such work was supervised by local school authorities, and contributed enormously to food production in their respective neighborhoods. While the work in camps was more picturesque, and attracted more attention and publicity, special honor is due those boys who, without the incentive that came through camp life, stuck manfully to their tasks throughout the summer. In many instances this indirectly entailed a distinct financial loss, for nearly every boy could have obtained a higher wage in some other employment. The superintendents of schools and the teachers acting as supervisors performed a useful, frequently difficult and always additional duty without extra pay. The amount of self-sacrifice and true patriotism exhibited by both boys and men was fully realized and appreciated, not only by the Committee on Public Safety, but by all in any wise cognizant of the excellent work done.

Except in cases where close and constant supervision of boys was possible, or where the parent would assume the responsibility for a boy's welfare, the Committee did not advise sending boys away from home to work on isolated farms. The method of placing boys through camps proved to be, in the opinion of all who watched the experiment, the most successful way of taking labor from the place where a large surplus existed to the place where it was needed. There were many reasons for this, among them: —

1. The possibility of personal oversight of the boy during his out-of-work hours, and supervision of his food, gave a reasonable guarantee for his safety, and made a strong appeal to parents, so that it became possible to enlist the services of boys whose parents would be unwilling to have them go into the country on isolated farms and without responsible supervision.

2. By locating the boys with an established commissary in one place, it was possible to relieve farmers' homes from any necessity of making provision for food and lodging.

3. The "team" spirit which was found to be fostered through the camp carried the boy through many periods of discouragement, notably when the work became monotonous and uninteresting.

4. A properly organized and well-administered camp will have behind it the interest of at least two communities, — the one in which the boys are working, and the one from which they come. Out of this group interest many advantages may be developed, — social, economic and educational, all of great value to the parties concerned.

On the whole, high school boys were enthusiastic, and enrolled for service in large numbers, but there was not at the outset a corresponding demand from farmers for boy labor. By personal conferences, however, with farmers and farm organizations, sufficient interest was aroused to warrant establishing in the summer of 1917 a limited number of camps, and for these the Committee, together with members of the Committee on Public Safety and a number of public-spirited individuals, secured both locations and equipment, meeting all charges for the same and later paying for the running expenses as well.

Camps were established in the following towns: —

Bolton.	Lincoln.
Concord.	Marblehead.
Egypt.	Plymouth.
Essex.	Stockbridge.
Groton.	Topsfield.
Ipswich.	Walpole, N. H.
Lenox.	Weston (3).

In addition, the Committee had co-operative relations, but not supervision of camps, under other managements, three being under the direction of the Y. M. C. A.

Had the Committee begun its labors earlier in the first season, 1917, and been thereby enabled to meet personally more farmers' organizations, it is probable that many additional camps would have been established that year, and at least twice as many boys employed.

In every town where a camp was located an attempt was made to secure a group of public-spirited people interested in the welfare of the boys, and to utilize all such community resources as were available. For example, in the town of Bolton the boys were housed in a building belonging to the agricultural society; in Topsfield a building on the fair grounds was used for a mess shack and kitchen; in Concord a carriage house was secured for general quarters. Through the Committee on Public Safety three hundred second-hand militia tents were placed at the disposal of the Committee. As a rule, most of the boys slept in tents. A considerable amount of money, in part contributed from local sources and the remainder from funds put at the disposal of the Committee, was invested in cooking equipment, dishes, cots and other camp necessities.

The management of the camps, the first year, was by volunteers, with the advisory assistance of local school officials; that is to say, the Committee, having secured a site and a promise of employment for boys, equipped or assisted in equipping the camp. It also selected the high school from which the boys were to be detailed. The local school authorities were asked to appoint a supervisor of a camp, to pay him a modest stipend, and to detail the boys for service, thus putting the responsibility for the labor in every case on the school from which the boy was taken.

The success of a camp depended very largely upon the efficiency of the supervisor. He was responsible, not only for the supervision of the boys in a disciplinary way, the distribution of their labor, buying food and managing the details of the commissary, but saw to it that the boys were kept in good condition, and that both they and the farmers got a square deal. It was an arduous and responsible position when the number of boys was over twenty, as was the case in most of the camps. In a few of the camps, where employers boarded the boys, the duties were less onerous.

For lack of space only two camps are discussed. These



**At Scituate**



**At Feeding Hills, Springfield**





are typical examples, however, of what could be done when the right spirit of co-operation and helpfulness was developed by all the parties interested.

*The Bolton Camp.* — Three members of the Committee, by previous arrangement, met one evening at a gathering of farmers at Bolton. The camp project was put before them in detail, and in response to a suggestion from the Committee a local committee was appointed. The principal of the high school from which it was proposed to draw the boys impressed upon the meeting that the boys to be sent from his school should be the kind of boys the town would be proud of. Arrangements were completed by the local committee to obtain the use of a large building belonging to the Agricultural Society, and a certain amount of equipment was furnished by the town. When the camp opened there was employment in sight for ten boys. The camp grew rapidly, and by the latter part of the season it numbered over thirty boys. For the most part, boys were employed throughout the summer on small farms within the limits of the town.

In summing up the results of this camp, the manager of the largest farm in the vicinity put the matter in this wise: —

This Bolton camp experiment has accomplished three things: —

1. It has given a more or less discouraged group of farmers a new view of their own possibilities and the possibilities of their farms.
2. By bringing a supply of seasonal labor when needed, it has enabled the farmer to increase his acreage one-third to one-half, and has insured the proper cultivation of the crops at an expense he can afford.
3. It has been one of the most valuable parts of the city boy's education, in that it has given him a first-hand experience in production which he could get in no other way.

*The Concord Camp.* — The Concord camp was located in a different type of community, but was no less successful. Fifty to sixty boys were employed in the town throughout the summer; of these, thirty-five to fifty were housed at the camp. The boys worked mostly on truck farms, thereby coming in contact with the commercial farmer and his



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problems. The immediate value of the labor employed to cultivate and market the produce made the Concord camp one of real success from an economic standpoint.

Both the Bolton and the Concord camps were typical of the best results as the Committee viewed the season's work.

At the very beginning the Committee was confronted with the vexed problem of child labor and the laws governing its use. There was a general fear, amounting to conviction, that only with the greatest difficulty could the country organize its labor resources so as to conserve its industries, transportation and agriculture for effective prosecution of the war. On this account many States passed laws temporarily suspending the statutes dealing with the employment of women and children. "The Survey" of August 4, 1917, referring to the Commonwealth Defence Act passed May 26, made the following statement:—

Massachusetts created a commission of five persons with power to suspend any law licensing or regulating labor or the employment of labor, or any law affecting in any manner the conditions of labor. This power can be exercised only upon the application of an employer who declares that a law of the sort described interferes with work that he is doing, and that it is required by an emergency arising out of the war. The law applies, moreover, only for the duration of the war and six months thereafter.

During the week of April 28 the National Child Labor Committee published a circular containing full statements and proposals for placing boys on farms. During the same week the Massachusetts Committee was engaged in formulating its proposals entirely independently.

The two plans differed somewhat in detail but not in spirit. The Massachusetts Committee soon realized that to put children on farms without supervision, unless the need were positive, would be wasteful; that no demand whatever for inexperienced boy labor existed, but that it had to be created; and that only boys of sixteen years of age and over ought to be enlisted, and only from May 1 to October. It was also satisfactorily demonstrated that their hours of







At Marblehead



At Hudson

labor should be adjusted to special conditions, such as local demand, emergency conditions, the state of the weather, etc., and that it would be impossible to fix absolutely an eight-hour working day throughout the State, although a maximum number of hours per week could be maintained without any hardship, provided the work was properly supervised.

Early in 1917 the United States Department of Labor suggested to the Committee on Public Safety that the work being done by the Committee on Mobilization of School Boys for Farm Service be merged with that of the United States Boys' Working Reserve, an organization which was about to be formed by the Department. Now the boys already mobilized in Massachusetts were under contract up to October. Further, the plan of the Working Reserve comprehended the enlistment of any boy between the specified ages, whether a school boy or not, whereas the Massachusetts plan comprehended only the placement of high school boys. Still further, the Boys' Working Reserve had adopted the following principle: "The Nation needs boys in many lines of endeavor other than agriculture, and boys will be enrolled for the kind of work to which each applicant and boy's training and temperament is best suited."

But the Massachusetts plan originated and was being carried forward solely as a measure for helping farmers. At no time did the Committee on Mobilization of School Boys, or the Committee on Public Safety wish to depart from this plan.

Eventually, the Committee on Public Safety, after much correspondence with Washington, voted to unite with the United States Boys' Working Reserve, provided the Reserve accepted the method of organization, purposes and policies of the Massachusetts Committee without enlarging its scope of activity, and further stipulating that the chairman of the committee, Mr. F. V. Thompson, be appointed State Director.

During November and December, 1917, an honorable dis-

charge signed by Governor McCall and Chairman Storrow was presented to each of the 1,600 boys, all of whom had well earned this recognition by faithful farm work during the season of 1917.


During the season of 1917 the mobilization of boys for farm service had been in a great measure experimental. Although the venture was successful beyond anticipation, nevertheless mistakes had been made, and the Committee studied painstakingly to avoid their recurrence in the future.

The report of the original Committee, under date of October 1, 1917, contained the following recommendations: —

- I. That the work begun during the current year be continued through 1918, and that plans be made for 50 camps.
- II. A reorganization of the methods of conducting the work, involving —
  - A. Slight modifications of the plans for individual placements on farms.
  - B. Complete reorganization of the control of placements by camps: —
    1. Direct connection with the Executive Committee of the Public Safety Committee.
    2. State support.
    3. A salaried director on full time.
    4. Training classes for supervisors and camp cooks.
    5. Appointment of supervisors.
    6. Standardization of camp equipment, supplies, commissary and business methods.
- III. That the director have his office with the Committee on Public Safety, and serve as its responsible agent in all matters of policy and action connected with boys' camps.

In accordance with these recommendations, made by the Committee and approved by the Executive Committee, Mr. Storrow appointed, in the autumn of 1917, the following as members of a new Committee on School Boys for Farm Service for the season of 1918: —

Frank V. Thompson, *Chairman*, Superintendent of Schools, Boston.  
W. I. Hamilton, *Secretary pro tem.*, State Board of Education.



**Certificate of Honorable Discharge**



**Boy's Camp, Stockbridge**





R. Edwards Annin, Jr., State Board of Agriculture.  
Stephen R. Dow, Committee on Public Safety.  
George H. Lanen, Labor Editor, "Boston Post."  
James J. Storrow, Chairman, Committee on Public Safety.  
John D. Willard, Secretary, Board of Food Administration.

This Committee met November 30 and elected Mr. Stephen R. Dow, director and secretary, at the same time requesting the United States Secretary of Labor to appoint Mr. Dow State Director of the United States Boys' Working Reserve. This appointment directly followed.

An advisory committee was subsequently named, as follows:—

Charles S. Clark, Superintendent of Schools, Somerville.  
John E. DeMeyer, Superintendent of Schools, Bridgewater and Abington.  
Clarence A. Dempsey, Superintendent of Schools, Haverhill.  
John R. Fausey, Superintendent of Schools, West Springfield.  
Francis McSherry, Superintendent of Schools, Holyoke.  
John F. Scully, Superintendent of Schools, Brockton.  
E. F. Howard, Superintendent of Schools, Northfield.  
Sumner R. Parker, County Agent Leader.  
D. W. O'Brien, Board of Agriculture.  
Rufus W. Stimson, Agent, Board of Education.  
E. A. Hackett, Bolton.  
Gordon Hutchins, Concord.  
Leslie R. Smith, Master, State Grange, Hadley.  
C. D. Richardson, West Brookfield.  
H. W. Gibson, Secretary, State Y. M. C. A., Boston.  
Dr. Thomas F. Harrington, State Board of Labor and Industries, Boston.

Mr. Hamilton resigned from the Committee March 8, 1918, and Mr. R. W. Stimson of the State Board of Education was appointed in his place.

A series of training classes for prospective camp supervisors were held at the State House on Saturday afternoons, beginning February 16, and continuing on the five Saturdays following. These gatherings were attended by some sixty teachers from the schools throughout the State. The director, Mr. Dow, assisted by some of the men who had supervised the camps the previous summer, covered the

following subjects: finances, discipline, recreation, camp routine, equipment, community co-operation, etc. Through the courtesy of Boston University all who attended these classes were invited to a course of lectures on camps, conducted by Mr. Walter S. Cowing at the University.

The training of some fifty high school boys for camp cooks was undertaken in the kitchen of the North Bennet Street Industrial School, the entire necessary equipment for which was generously donated. From this training class twenty-five boys were selected and assigned as cooks to the various camps. While a few of these eventually proved unequal to the task, the majority went through the season successfully. The cook's wages, \$15 a week and board, were charged to the camp maintenance account, which otherwise related solely to food, expenditure for the boys and the salary of the supervisor.

Mr. Dow visited sixty-eight high schools during the winter and spring, attended meetings of thirty-six school boards, and addressed many gatherings of farm and local public safety committees on the subject of school boys on farms and the United States Boys' Working Reserve. He also inspected many prospective camp sites.

An allowance of \$4,000 from the Committee on Public Safety was set aside for expenses from October 1, 1917, to May 1, 1918, of which amount \$3,714.99 was actually expended. On April 24, 1918, an additional \$46,000 was allotted by the Committee on Public Safety, this being part of an allowance of \$100,000 voted by the Legislature for the stimulation of food production, etc.

Twenty-five hundred boys were placed on farms in the summer of 1918, compared with 1,600 in 1917. Farmers generally were more willing to hire boys, and the boys themselves proved more satisfactory than during the previous summer. Nine hundred boys were placed in 20 camps, the number in each varying from a minimum of 25 to a maximum of 110. The larger camps were provided with additional supervisors and cooks. Of the 20 camps established, 17

were operated successfully for the season, and 3 were closed for lack of support by the farmers in their districts.

From reports sent in by farmers, based on the cost of labor for each \$1,000 worth of farm products raised, it is evident that these 2,500 boys added nearly \$2,000,000 to the supply of farm products in Massachusetts during the year 1918. Reports on 600 boys showed they earned \$100,000 during the summer, — an average of \$166.66 per boy. Many bought thrift stamps and Liberty Bonds with these earnings.

The boys were enrolled in the high schools of the Commonwealth by a special officer, nominated by the principal of each school and officially appointed by Mr. Dow.

Many of the school officials released selected boys on May 1, and their services became available until October 12. Others were enrolled for the vacation period only; that is, from July 1 to September 1. Employed boys, and boys no longer attending school, were enrolled at the State House by the State Director. Wherever possible, groups of boys from the same school, with one or more of their own teachers as supervisors, were assigned a camp. Where this arrangement was not possible several groups were combined. The single group proved the more satisfactory.

The teacher supervisors were released by the schools, and were given their board at the camps in addition to the \$50 per month which they had from the State appropriation.

Camp equipment, medical attendance, supervision and transportation were provided by the State, but the camps themselves were self-supporting, the boys paying for the camp food and cook's wages, the average weekly expense being \$5.18 per boy. Wages varied in different sections, ranging from \$1.50 to \$3.50 per day, depending on the ability of the boy and the point of view of the farmer. The more successful farmers paid the highest wages.

Through the splendid co-operation of the State Y. M. C. A., supervision of the boy on the individual farm was successfully accomplished; and supervision is three-quarters of the "boy on the farm" problem.

The outcome of Director Dow's and Mr. Thompson's efforts in the formation and management of the Committee to Mobilize Boys for Farm Service, so helpful as a war measure and successful as it proved to be, was not simply the immediate and very excellent results obtained. The whole scheme, from start to finish, though a new departure, ought under a like management, when backed by permanent legal authority, to serve as a basis to resuscitate our decadent New England farming by supplying a growing need through a new source, and at the same time broaden the character, outlook and interest of a large and important contingent of our youth.

## CHAPTER IV

### COMMITTEE ON WAR EFFICIENCY

The latter part of November, 1917, the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety was requested by the Council of National Defense to organize a Committee on War Efficiency, the chairman of which was subsequently to be appointed by the United States Department of Labor to the office of director for Massachusetts of the United States Public Service Reserve and the United States Employment Service. The Committee appointed was as follows: —

William A. Gaston, *Chairman.*

Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer.  
William M. Butler.  
B. Preston Clark.  
W. Murray Crane.  
Henry I. Harriman.  
Robert F. Herrick.  
Martin T. Joyce.

James Logan.  
Arthur Lyman.  
Walter L. McMenimen.  
Joseph B. Russell.  
John F. Stevens.  
Edward F. McSweeney,  
*Executive Secretary.*

This body, under the auspices of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, was to represent the State in all war labor problems as they arose during the war, its life to terminate with the war.

When the Committee was formed, it was with the understanding that the war labor program of the United States government should be under the control and direction of the Council of National Defense, and follow the same general plan of organization as the United States Food and Fuel Administrations.

The Committee was confronted by several exacting problems. It at once decided on two points: First, that the war labor organization in Massachusetts should be con-



structed not only to assist in the transfer of labor from peace to war purposes, but that it might also be available for the purpose of war readjustment and retransfer back from war to peace; and with this end in view to provide while the war was still in progress, as far as humanly possible, for the employment of soldiers and sailors on their discharge. Secondly, that no new agency should be created if the end sought could be accomplished with the co-operation of an existing department of the State.

At the time the Committee was formed, no great difficulty existed in securing workmen for war or any other kind of work. There was, in fact, from November, 1917, to April, 1918, a surplus of unemployed labor in Massachusetts, due to the seasonal unemployment normally expected during the winter months, and also because of the disorganization of industry as a result of the war.

The Fore River Shipbuilding Corporation, the year following the entry of the United States into the conflict, was able from the available labor supply to multiply its Quincy plant five times. During the winter of 1917-18 there was no special demand for shipyard labor other than skilled shipworkers, and during the first week of April, 1918, more than 5,000 persons applied for employment at the intelligence offices in Boston alone.

Keeping always in mind the certainty that the end of the war was likely to bring peace problems of even more importance than those of war, the Committee drew up a program, approved by the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety and the Council of National Defense, which provided for labor placement offices; the safeguarding and training of women in war industries; the Americanization of aliens; housing; transportation; education and training for war labor; health; control over idle and casual labor; and industrial and man power statistics, etc.

To insure the best results through a practical and scientific program, skilled experts and specialists were appointed, forming Advisory Committees on: —

Labor Employment Agencies.  
Women in Industry.  
Aliens in Industry.  
Housing and Transportation.  
Capital Expenditure.

Training in Industry.  
Health in Industry.  
Idle and Casual Labor.  
Industrial Man Power Survey.  
Publicity.

These Committees, whose services were gratuitously given, began in the latter part of December, 1917, consideration of the various topics assigned them, serving for eight months and until August, 1918, at which time the work, as will be seen, was taken over on a paid basis by the United States Department of Labor.

While the process of organization of war labor problems proceeded uninterruptedly in Massachusetts during the first six months of 1918, there was a great deal of delay at Washington, due to a dispute as to which national authority the work properly belonged. This question was finally decided by putting the matter under the charge of the United States Department of Labor. On February 14, 1918, Mr. Gaston was appointed Massachusetts Director of the United States Public Service Reserve, and subsequently director for the Commonwealth of the United States Employment Service.

Under the supervision of the Committee the labor program as worked out and recommended by the various Advisory Committees began at once to be effective. The State was organized, and representatives of the Committee secured in every municipality of any size. By March 1, 1918, more than 600 persons in Massachusetts, unpaid, were giving practically all their time to the work of the United States Public Service Reserve. In addition, about 700 officials of labor unions acted as local agents within their respective trades. At the State House, for seven continuous months, from fifteen to twenty-five volunteers, mostly women, worked eight hours a day.

At the request of the United States Shipping Board an appeal was made in March, 1918, for volunteer shipyard enrollment. In four weeks, due to the generous co-operation

of volunteer assistants, an enrollment of 28,000 mechanics was obtained, being double the quota asked of Massachusetts. The excess registered in Massachusetts over the quota equaled, in fact, the entire quota assigned to New England, while in character of personnel the Massachusetts enrollment was not excelled by any State in the Union.

With the co-operation of the Boston School Committee and the Clerical High School, all application cards in response to the appeal were classified under twenty major and seventy-two minor trade divisions, and made available for reference by cities, towns and counties.

In April, May and June a drive for emergency farm labor was carried on with moderate success.

Programs for Americanization, war housing and transportation, training in industry, education and health in industry were worked out by the various Advisory Committees. A law extending the scope and activities of vocational schools and evening schools was drafted by the Committee and enacted by the Legislature.

An idle and casual labor program was worked out, and in accordance therewith, under chapter 286, General Acts of 1918, it was made compulsory for every able-bodied male between the ages of eighteen and fifty to engage in some useful occupation.

Through the efforts of the Advisory Committee on Capital Expenditure, a large amount of building construction, which, if begun, would have impeded the program of war activities, was delayed or modified.

Under the joint direction of Mr. Gaston, and Mr. B. J. Rothwell, chairman of the State Bureau of Immigration, together with the co-operation of the Advisory Committee on Americanization, a questionnaire was issued to all aliens working in Massachusetts' factories employing fifty or more persons. This was done in order to ascertain the number of aliens, their nationality, ability to speak, to read and write English, and their intentions regarding citizenship, etc. The result gave a definite idea of the extent

of this problem, and was a decided contribution to a most important question.

A survey of the amount and kind of power used by manufacturing industries in Massachusetts was made by the Committee in co-operation with the Boston Chamber of Commerce, and under the direct supervision of its president.

In co-operation with the State Bureau of Statistics, a list of all manufacturers in the State employing fifty or more persons was made, and was used as a basis for war labor correspondence with Massachusetts employers.

By May, 1918, all the unemployed to be found within the Commonwealth were at work, and there began to be an unfulfilled demand for labor of all sorts. Women, replacing men, were being taken into industry in large numbers, and each successive draft made the demand for labor more acute.

The Committee then worked out and offered a program providing for war labor transfer, which should act as the basis for after-the-war reconstruction. This plan, afterwards adopted, and still later elaborated by the Department of Labor, was included in the War Community Board program, by which local control of the various problems involved was concentrated under local community boards.

About July, 1918, by direction of the United States Department of Labor, the following Executive Committee was chosen: —

William A. Gaston, *Chairman*.

Alfred A. Glidden and Albert R. White, representing management.

Martin T. Joyce and William A. Nealy, representing labor.

This body established thirty-five branch employment offices in Massachusetts, and appointed about two score local community boards, each of which had full charge of the war labor program for their respective localities.

In August, 1918, Mr. Gaston resigned his position as chairman of the Committee as well as director for Massachusetts of the United States Public Service Reserve and United

States Employment Service, and his place was filled by the selection of Dean Everett W. Lord of the College of Business Administration of Boston University, who had with him as vice-chairman of the Committee, Mr. B. Preston Clark.

From December 1, 1917, to August 1, 1918, the money furnished by the United States government in behalf of the Committee was less than \$900, all the nominal expenses of the office being paid, up to that time, by the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety. But when, in August, 1918, the Committee's activities were put by the United States Department of Labor on a paid basis, and Dean Lord was left in full control, subject only to the direction of the United States Department of Labor, all further responsibility on the part of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety ceased.



## CHAPTER V

### MASSACHUSETTS HALIFAX RELIEF COMMITTEE

On the morning of Thursday, December 6, 1917, at 11.20 A.M., while the Board of Food Administration was in session at the State House, Assistant Food Administrator James J. Phelan was hurriedly called to the telephone. He returned to report that a terrible catastrophe had befallen Halifax; that two vessels — the “Mont Blanc,” loaded with munitions, and the “Imo” — having collided, the resulting explosion had laid half the city in ruins.

Accompanied by Mr. Endicott, Mr. Phelan then went directly to the Executive Chamber to inform His Excellency Governor McCall. Every known means was immediately put in operation to acquire as far as possible a full and accurate report of what had taken place, and the full extent of the disaster, by checking up with the Boston newspapers and the Associated Press such news as had come in over their lines. It transpired, however, that the only information they were able to obtain was very confused and unreliable. Undoubtedly a terrible accident had taken place, involving great loss of life and property, but by reason of the destruction of wires such news as came through was fragmentary. This was chiefly to be accounted for by the fact that the Dominion government had commandeered the few wires left standing. Having ascertained all the trustworthy news to be had, the Governor despatched the following telegram to the mayor of Halifax: —

Understand your city in danger from explosion and conflagration. Reports only fragmentary. Massachusetts stands ready to go to the limit in rendering every assistance you may be in need of. Wire me immediately.

It was then decided that a full meeting of the Committee of One Hundred should be called as soon as possible, and a telephone message was sent to each member requesting his attendance at the Governor's Council Chamber at 2.30 the same afternoon. Notwithstanding so short a notice, more than sixty members responded to the summons, but up to the time the meeting adjourned it proved impossible to obtain any additional news from Halifax, — in fact, the city seemed to be completely isolated.

Dr. William A. Brooks, Acting Surgeon-General of the Commonwealth, and chief of the Medical Department of the State Guard, advised that a base hospital unit for doctors, nurses, medical supplies, etc., be at once organized, to be ready at a moment's notice to depart for the stricken city. Mr. Endicott then recommended that unless news came to the contrary, a relief expedition, with the base hospital unit suggested by Dr. Brooks and what emergency supplies could be quickly collected, should start for Halifax without waiting for the advices called for by the Governor, even at the risk of its later being found unnecessary, in which event it could immediately return. Mr. Hustis, formerly president, and at that time receiver for the Boston & Maine Railroad, when asked how soon a special train could be made ready, at once replied, "Within half an hour of notification by your Committee." Later in the afternoon it was definitely decided to carry out Dr. Brooks' proposal, and at 10 o'clock the same night, December 6, 1917, a train carrying doctors and nurses, with Mr. John F. Moors in charge of the Red Cross workers, — the latter having been invited by the Committee on Public Safety to join the party, — and a large assortment of medical supplies, clothing and food, started on its way to the devastated city in charge of Mr. A. C. Ratshesky.

Previously, and after the meeting of the Committee of One Hundred, Governor McCall sent a second telegram to the mayor of Halifax, as follows: —

Since sending my telegram this morning offering unlimited assistance an important meeting of citizens has been held and Massachusetts stands

ready to offer aid in any way you can avail yourself of it. We are prepared to send forward immediately a special train with surgeons, nurses and other medical assistance, but await advices from you.

After the party left Boston, Governor McCall appointed the following to be members of the Massachusetts Halifax Relief Committee:—

Henry B. Endicott, *Chairman*.  
James J. Phelan, *Vice-Chairman*.  
Matthew Luce, *Secretary*.  
Robert Winsor, *Treasurer*.

James J. Storrow.	B. Preston Clark.
A. C. Ratshesky.	J. Frank O'Hare.
Joseph B. Russell.	Charles S. Baxter.
Robert F. Herrick.	Edwin U. Curtis.
W. Murray Crane.	George C. Lee.
George H. Lyman.	Walter C. Baylies.
Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer.	James Jackson.
John F. O'Connell.	

Messrs. James Jackson and Walter C. Baylies, members of the above Committee, also represented the Red Cross.

The Committee met for organization Friday morning, December 7, at 10 o'clock, and sent out the following appeal for funds:—

#### AN APPEAL FOR FUNDS FOR HALIFAX

It is evident from all reports on hand that thousands are in great distress as a result of the great catastrophe which has spread death and devastation in Halifax.

Generous contributions will be needed to carry on the work of relieving immediate distress by providing clothes, food, medicines and material for the temporary housing of the homeless and suffering. Later will come the great work of rehabilitation to which we are all committed as near neighbors of the stricken city.

Cash will be required to do all this, and Massachusetts may be called upon for a million dollars. Everybody is asked to subscribe generously and as quickly as possible.

Mr. Endicott also sent the following telegram to the sub-committees on Public Safety throughout the State:—

Governor McCall has appointed from Committee of One Hundred of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, Massachusetts Halifax Relief Committee, of which Committee he has appointed me chairman.

It is Governor McCall's desire that all local Public Safety Committees, men and women, throughout the Commonwealth shall co-operate in the raising of funds for this work. Will you please call your committee together at once for this purpose and set them to work raising funds. Send all checks to Robert Winsor, Treasurer, care of Kidder, Peabody & Co., Boston. Your Committee is hereby delegated as local representative of the Massachusetts Halifax Relief Committee.

The Committee met again early on Saturday morning, December 8, and established a Halifax Information Bureau at the State House in charge of Mr. B. F. Felt, which was to act as an information bureau to those having friends and relatives at Halifax.

At noon on the same day a Halifax relief meeting was called at Faneuil Hall, at which Governor McCall, Mayor Curley, Mr. Endicott and Messrs. McLeod and McIntyre of the British and Canadian Missions made short addresses, pledging all the help in their power to relieve the unfortunate people who had suffered from the disaster. All that day, and far into the night, as well as on Sunday, the various sub-committees of the Relief Committee worked persistently, striving to collect the needed supplies and to provide for transportation facilities, Mr. J. A. Malone and Mr. E. G. Preston giving the invaluable assistance of their long experience, and buying quickly and wisely much of the supplies eventually sent to Halifax.

The United States Shipping Board, through Mr. Howard, chairman, loaned the steamship "Calvin Austin" to the Committee. This boat, in command of Capt. Eugene O'Donnell, sailed from Boston at 3 o'clock Sunday afternoon, December 9, three days after the explosion.

The cargo was under the personal supervision of the Hon. Edmund Billings, who with Deputy Collector Alfred Anderson accompanied the expedition. These officers, together with Special Deputy Collector Eli Perry, Deputies

R. G. Frye and S. J. Devlin, and Deputy Surveyor Moses B. Mann, were of inestimable help to the Committee on Public Safety in this emergency, as they proved to be at all times whenever their assistance was called for.

The equipment consisted of about \$300,000 worth of supplies, together with an emergency wrecking crew fully furnished, a crew of glaziers and trained workmen, a large supply of window glass, putty, etc., and the following articles:—

Mattresses (packages), . . . . .	985
Cots, . . . . .	591
Pillows (bundles), . . . . .	86
Castings (keg), . . . . .	1
Flour (bags), . . . . .	200
Canned beef (cases), . . . . .	115
Canned meat (cases), . . . . .	100
Condensed milk (cases), . . . . .	100
Canned beans (cases), . . . . .	200
Coffee (cases), . . . . .	62
Tea (cases), . . . . .	26
Sausage (cases), . . . . .	2
Putty (packages), . . . . .	25
Dry goods (cases), . . . . .	5
Shoes (cases), . . . . .	6
Oilcloth (cases), . . . . .	2
Rubbers (case), . . . . .	1
Cotton piece goods (bales), . . . . .	4
Roofing paper (rolls), . . . . .	1,870
Glass (cases), . . . . .	1,496
Canned soup (cases), . . . . .	200
Evaporated milk (case), . . . . .	100
Baker's cocoa (case), . . . . .	1
Malted milk (cases), . . . . .	40
Sugar (bags), . . . . .	15
Crackers (cases), . . . . .	200
Second-hand clothing (packages), . . . . .	700
Clothing, etc. (cases), . . . . .	200
Blankets (bundles), . . . . .	305
Bread (packages), . . . . .	150
Cheese (cases), . . . . .	50
Oleomargarine (packages), . . . . .	27



The "Calvin Austin" almost immediately plunged into a heavy sea, and after a rough trip arrived at Halifax on Wednesday, December 12.

On Sunday, December 9, after the departure of the "Calvin Austin," the Committee reassembled at the State House to consider what further purchases should be made, and to arrange for the sailing of a second steamer, the "Northland," on Tuesday, December 11. This vessel was lent to the Committee, free of charge, by the Eastern Steamship Company. Mr. John F. O'Connell of the Committee accompanied the steamer in charge of the following supplies:—

Beaver board (rolls), . . . . .	2,084
Crackers (cases), . . . . .	200
Gasoline (drums), . . . . .	10
Second-hand clothing (packages), . . . . .	510
Nails (kegs), . . . . .	51
Cement (drums), . . . . .	23
Dry goods (cases), . . . . .	13
Glass (cases), . . . . .	837
Rubbers (cases), . . . . .	94
Boots and shoes (cases), . . . . .	1,045
Fittings (keg), . . . . .	1
Glazier tools (bundle), . . . . .	1
Cot beds, . . . . .	420

On December 10 Mr. Endicott advised Mr. Ratshesky by telegram that ten motor trucks had been forwarded as a present from Massachusetts to Halifax, and that more would be forthcoming if needed. These trucks, valued at \$25,000, were secured by Mr. H. J. McAlman, president of the Automobile Dealers' Association, before noon on Monday, December 10, and, under the command of Capt. J. S. Hathaway of the Governor's staff, also went on the "Northland." Each truck, manned by a driver and well supplied with gasoline, was ready for service on landing. They proved of inestimable value, enabling supplies to be transferred to different points which up to that time had been inaccessible because of the deep carpet of snow that covered the city.

A great deal of difficulty was encountered in obtaining, at so short notice, some of the articles which were deemed most necessary. For example, the market at that time was practically denuded of all kinds of rubber footwear, yet 5,000 pairs were secured. Certain shoe firms gave these, as well as other articles; and, generally, substantial reductions were made from the wholesale prices. Mr. Charles Sumner Bird gave three carloads of roofing materials, and the Loose-Wiles Company, 400 cases of crackers. Mrs. Russell S. Codman, as chairman of the Special Committee of the Special Aid Society, added three truck loads of clothing, consisting mostly of underwear collected by the Society. The Red Cross sent 275 cases of selected clothing.

In the meantime Mr. Winsor and his Committee were at work collecting a fund. Subscriptions began to pour in from every section of the Commonwealth, finally reaching the sum of \$699,189.91. In addition, a great many needed and valuable gifts of clothing, roofing paper, footwear, etc., were brought together ready for shipment.

Very soon more normal means of communication were established, and despatches began to arrive from Halifax expressing the very great gratitude of her people for the help given them by the citizens of Massachusetts. On Wednesday, January 12, however, as a natural result of so great a disarrangement of affairs, the Halifax authorities wired to delay sending any more nurses, doctors, helpers, food or clothing of any kind, until further advised, on account of the great congestion and impossibility of properly handling the goods on arrival.

The party, under charge of Mr. Ratshesky, it will be remembered, left Boston at 10 o'clock on the evening of the disaster; and beginning at Portland, Me., and from thence regularly thereafter at each station until the arrival at St. John, the mayor of Halifax was telegraphed to, without any answer being received in reply. Again, during a short delay at McAdam Junction it was sought to ascertain what was going on at Halifax, but only unsatisfactory and vague

rumors were obtainable. These became more and more grave as time went on. At every stop after leaving the Junction, workers bound for Halifax in various capacities waylaid the train seeking accommodations, and Mr. Ratshesky issued instructions that every available space should be filled, with preference given to the doctors and nurses. Directions were also issued to Captains Hyde and Lapham of the Quartermasters' Department to secure additional drugs during the stop at St. John, and they were successful in getting aboard large quantities of all kinds of medical supplies before the train pulled out of the depot.

It was not until the party reached St. John that any full intimation of the seriousness of the disaster was received; and with this came the news that all the telegraphic and telephone wires within a long radius from Halifax were down, and that no word had come through of just what had happened, except by relay and in a roundabout way. A wire was at once sent to Mr. Endicott, asking him to have forwarded a train load of window glass and putty as well as building materials of all kinds.

On leaving St. John the party encountered a heavy snow-storm, which proved one of the severest of the winter, accompanied by a driving gale, the heavy snow piling up in great drifts and making progress more and more difficult, so that a large freight engine had to be attached to the train. Beyond Truro and Moncton the storm increased to a veritable blizzard, and the engine finally broke down, causing a delay of several hours for repairs. The climax was reached at the time the party started to ascend the up grade at Folleigh Mountain, when the conductor in charge, and also General Agent Howard of the Canadian government, stated that an enormous snowdrift which lay across the track altogether prevented further progress. But Mr. Ratshesky, fortified with official telegraphic orders to give the party the right of way under all conditions, pleaded with the officials to do everything known to railroad men to clear the track. Ordinarily, no attempt would have been



Halifax, N. S. — Governor McCall Apartments. Largest apartment houses in the world, sheltering three hundred and twenty families, completed in three hundred and twenty working hours





made to keep the train in motion, but all hands understood how urgent was the need, and worked with might and main to clear the track. At last, by hard shoveling and the use of steam and ramming, the drift, standing higher than the door of the baggage car, was ploughed through amid the "hurrahs" of all on board. On arriving at Truro an extra engine with crew were found waiting for the final haul to Halifax. The city was reached at about 3 o'clock on the morning of December 8, the passengers, including those taken on board at Fredericton Junction, now numbering about sixty-five. The last stop was made at Rockingham Junction, about six miles from the terminus, a detour being necessary around the city on account of the destruction of the depot at Halifax. The terminus was reached at about 7 A.M., whence communication was quickly made with Sir Robert L. Borden, Premier of Canada, whose private car was on a side track close by, and who was not slow to express his gratitude to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for her prompt response. The party, accompanied by the Premier, then went to City Hall to present Governor McCall's letter to the mayor, and to make preliminary arrangements. The vehicle that conveyed them from the depot had been used night and day in carrying the wounded to hospitals and the dead to the morgue. The driver, a young man, had lost his whole family, consisting of a wife and four children. As Mr. Ratshesky afterwards said, "It was a gruesome start."

The streets they passed through were blocked with débris and covered with freshly fallen snow, and it was only with considerable difficulty that the party arrived by 9 o'clock at City Hall in the center of the city. From here an awful sight presented itself. Buildings lay shattered on all sides, with chaos and confusion everywhere.

Unfortunately the mayor was away, but the party found awaiting them His Honor Governor McCullum Grant of Nova Scotia; General Benson, Military Commandant of the District; Admiral Chambers, Naval Commandant of

the District; Colonel McKelvie Bell, Military Medical Officer; Chief Justice Harris of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia; Chairman R. T. MacIlreith, who was in charge of the medical relief of the city; and members of the Halifax Temporary Relief Committee. In the same room, about 12 by 20 feet in size, were assembled men and women trying to organize different departments of relief. Other rooms in the building were jammed to their utmost capacity with people of every age and sex begging for doctors, nurses, food and clothing for themselves and members of their families. It was evident that in this condition of turmoil the first necessity was a definite plan of organization. The Relief Committee secured as headquarters the City Club building, centrally located, where a thorough organization was put under way. It was at once apparent that first of all a Transportation Committee was needed in order to handle the crowds of people flocking to the city to help in relief work, and also to facilitate the arrival of the large quantities of food, clothing and other necessities coming in from all parts of Canada and the United States. Other committees included in the organization were: a Committee on Supplies, divided into food and clothing; a Finance Committee; a Committee on Construction, to take charge of buildings partially destroyed which had to be demolished or temporarily repaired, and to collect building supplies and labor from Canada and the United States; a Relief Committee, in which the members of the Red Cross should take an active part, and for which their experience made them peculiarly adapted; a Housing Committee, to provide for those whose homes had been entirely destroyed or which could not be repaired, and also to care for the large number of people entering the city from Canada and the United States; a Medical Department, to apportion the work of the surgeons, doctors, nurses and assistants; and a Warehouse Department, to sort, store and distribute all the supplies now being rushed into the city.

The most pressing demand was for doctors and nurses.

This was partially met by scattering members of the hospital unit through different quarters of the city, with instructions to keep the central office informed of their whereabouts in order that they might readily be gathered together at night, it being considered vitally important to keep this unit together and to establish a permanent hospital at the earliest possible moment. Eventually the Bellevue Building, in use as an officers' club house, which was large and roomy and near the center of the city, was turned over to the Medical Department. This building was found to be in very bad condition, not a door or window remaining, and with water and ice covering the floors in every room. Its appearance was so discouraging and its rehabilitation apparently so hopeless that under ordinary circumstances it would have been at once abandoned, but by 12.30 o'clock on that first day Major Giddings with his quartermasters' contingent, ably assisted by some fifty of the crew of the United States training ship "Old Colony," — who had arrived with instructions to report to the head of the Committee for such services as they could render, — together with a contingent of Canadian soldiers under command of General Benson, was at work cleaning the rooms, covering the windows with papers and boards, washing the floors and woodwork, and removing all furniture to the upper part of the building. The result was that by 6 o'clock that night an operating room was installed and wards fitted up with one hundred beds and medical supplies brought from the relief train. By 9 o'clock sixty patients were received; and by noon the next day the fully equipped American Bellevue Hospital, flying the American Flag presented by Mr. Ratshesky, was in complete running order and caring for one hundred patients. This was not the only hospital in the city, but it received the worst cases from other hospitals when the latter became so overcrowded that proper attention could not be given to the patients. The Military Camp Hill Hospital, its original capacity limited to three hundred patients, was at that time caring for approximately sixteen hundred.

The British Medical Stores Depot furnished full equipment in the way of bedside tables, rubber sheets, dishes and tableware. The British authorities also furnished to the hospital unit cooks and kitchen utensils, besides supplying the hospital with food from its commissary and detailing a corps of trained clerks and orderlies.

Premier Borden personally made arrangements for the housing of the doctors and officials, and likewise took care of the Red Cross Contingent and the newspaper men, while the nurses were quartered in private homes in the vicinity, — four of them at Government House.

The ten surgeons of the Medical Department of the Massachusetts State Guard had with them a civilian anaesthetist, two officers of the Quartermaster Corps detailed to the Medical Department, and ten civilian nurses, all a part of the Massachusetts contingent, and these were the first medical outfit to reach Halifax from any outside section.

Part of the equipment of a portable hospital was also taken to Halifax and used to excellent advantage. When the Committee left for home all the medical equipment brought and not used, with the exception of a few blankets, was left behind for the sick and wounded.


The afternoon on which formal possession was taken of the hospital, Premier Borden issued the following statement: —

This afternoon I visited the hospital established at Bellevue by the Massachusetts Hospital Unit. They took possession yesterday afternoon at 2 o'clock, and within a few hours had every arrangement made for receiving patients, of whom nearly seventy-five are now being accommodated. All the arrangements were wonderfully planned considering the shortness of the time and difficulties that had to be overcome. The hospital is a triumph of organizing ability.

In a report made by Major Giddings to the Acting Surgeon-General the following excerpts appear: —

On the evening of December 9 the commanding officer attended by request a meeting of Red Cross representatives, Lieut.-Col. F. McKelvie Bell, Mr. Ratschesky and representatives of the Boston Red Cross Unit, which, with the independent contingent of Dr. E. A. Codman, had reached









Halifax that morning. Dr. Codman was also present at this conference. That day a Medical Relief Committee had been appointed, with Lieut.-Col. F. McK. Bell as chairman. Among other things discussed at the meeting were ways and means of best caring for the sick and wounded of the city. As a result of observations made on the 8th by various members of this unit, who had visited many people in their homes, we were able to suggest the mapping of the city into districts, with the recommendation that a house to house canvass be made first by the social workers, who would report as to whether medical or surgical help was needed, the case then to be seen by a doctor or nurse. This suggestion was made because our doctors found that large numbers of injured people requiring surgical aid had sought the shelter of buildings near the devastated area, where they were content to stay. So dazed were they by the disaster that they did not realize that help would come to them for the asking. Also the members of our staff had found that many people could not leave their places of refuge for dressings because they had literally lost all their clothing.

Another observation made by our doctors was that contagious diseases would be likely to make an early appearance, due to the complete destruction of toilet facilities, the huddling together of large numbers in small quarters and the general physical demoralization. Because of these conditions we recommended the immediate establishment of a contagious hospital. That our surmise of early contagion was correct was proved by the fact that on December 12 three cases of throat infection, cultures of which immediately were made, were proved to be diphtheritic.

Our suggestions, as above indicated, were both accepted, the house to house canvass being made by members of the United States medical units, which went to the aid of the city between the time of their arrival in the city and the establishment of their respective hospitals. While doing this work their headquarters were at City Hall.

The morning of December 10 saw the Stars and Stripes flying over the hospital, the first time they had appeared in the city following the disaster. The flag was secured for us by Mr. Ratschesky. . . .

On this same day we received an official visit from Samuel Wolcott and R. W. E. Ladd, the respective civil and medical heads of the Massachusetts Red Cross Unit, who were establishing a hospital and were anxious to learn how we had proceeded. . . .

On the afternoon of December 11 the volume of work had become so great that additional nurses were required. We notified medical headquarters of this fact, and they detailed to us the following ladies, all from St. John, and all, with one exception, graduate nurses: Miss Chambers of St. Luke's Hospital, New York; Miss Phillips, V. A. D., two years, England; Miss Donville, Newport Hospital, Rhode Island; Miss Harrington, Newport Hospital, Rhode Island; Mrs. Tilley, Royal Victoria Hos-

pital, Montreal; Mrs. Allison, Newton Hospital, Newton; Mrs. Bowman, Waltham Hospital, Waltham; Mrs. Davidson and Mrs. Brock, Royal Victoria Hospital, Montreal; and Mrs. McIntyre, Massachusetts General Hospital, Massachusetts. These ladies remained with us until we surrendered control of the hospital, and did very valuable work. . . .

On the 11th Mrs. Barrett Wendell arrived from Boston, who brought a considerable quantity of clothing for distribution and certain needed hospital supplies, the gift of Mrs. Charles D. Sias of Boston.

In addition to the Massachusetts and Rhode Island divisions of the Red Cross, and the physicians who had come independently, a number of doctors and nurses arrived from Maine ready to establish a hospital, so that a superabundance of ready professional help resulted. Therefore, after a general conference, at 7 o'clock on the evening of December 12, the Bellevue Hospital was transferred to the Rhode Island contingent.

Respecting the general character of the wounds treated at the hospital, Dr. Giddings reports in part as follows: —

They were very largely injuries of the face caused by flying glass, and included many injuries to the eyes. In fact, there were more of these than of any others. The explanation of this is as follows: Two explosions occurred. One was a comparatively minor affair, but was sufficiently severe to bring people to their windows to see what had happened; then came the terrific explosion which razed the city and created so much havoc. It was at this time that so many people were injured by the glass.

A number of cases of insanity were reported following the disaster, but at Bellevue we had only one such. This was a woman who finally created so much disturbance that it became necessary to transfer her to the hospital for insane across the harbor, at Dartmouth. Cases of mild shell shock, while not officially appearing on the hospital records, were not infrequent.

Many people came to the hospital simply for a roof to cover them, rather than to obtain treatment.

The work of every member of the Halifax contingent, under the leadership of Mr. Ratschesky, cannot be given too high praise; yet it should be stated that the services rendered by Captain Loring were probably more specifically exacting than any other. This was due to the multiplicity of injuries to the eye, which called him to constant service between

Bellevue, the Military Hospital, the Halifax Infirmary and the Camp Hill Hospital.

Mr. MacIlreith, chairman of the Relief Committee, addressed the following letter to Major Giddings:—

HALIFAX, N. S., December 13, 1917.

DEAR MAJOR GIDDINGS:— At a meeting of the Executive of the Relief Committee, held this afternoon, it was the earnest desire of all the members that before the Medical Corps of the State of Massachusetts took its departure from Halifax a formal minute should be placed on our records, which in the future will be the basis of the official history of the Halifax disaster, expressing the Committee's deep appreciation of the prompt and humane action of the authorities in Boston in despatching your corps to Halifax, and of the professional efficiency and noble spirit which you and all members of your unit have exhibited since coming to our stricken city. We shall always bear you in grateful remembrance, and wish you a safe journey home.

Yours truly,

R. T. MACILREITH,  
*Chairman, Relief Committee.*

The accompanying figures will give some idea of the amount of medical and surgical services rendered in this short period:—

Total out-patients treated, . . . . .	167
Visits in homes, . . . . .	53
Hours spent in advisory capacity, . . . . .	23
Combined surgical and medical service:—	
Total house admissions, . . . . .	75
Total operations done (exclusive of eye service), . . . . .	10
Total discharges, . . . . .	17
Total ethers, . . . . .	46
Total ether used (pounds), . . . . .	3½
Total cases turned over to Rhode Island Unit, . . . . .	58
Eye service, Dr. Loring:—	
Total cases seen at Bellevue, . . . . .	27
Total cases seen at Cogswell Street Military Hospital, . . . . .	85
Total cases seen at Halifax Infirmary, . . . . .	10
	— 122
Total operations at Bellevue, . . . . .	18
Total operations at Cogswell Street Military Hospital, . . . . .	15
Total operations at Halifax Infirmary, . . . . .	2
	— 35

The above list does not include a great many patients who were treated at the hospital, and in regard to whom no clinical records were kept.

The immediate results of the catastrophe were 1,800 lives lost; 10,000 people injured, many mortally, others to a less degree, though all in need of medical attendance; 2,500 homes entirely destroyed, together with ruined churches, schools, hospitals, asylums, public buildings, factories and warehouses. There was, in fact, scarcely a building that escaped without some damage, and all glass throughout the greater part of the city was shattered. The financial loss exceeded \$30,000,000.

On Friday, January 4, 1918, a second visiting committee, comprising Henry B. Endicott, chairman, James J. Phelan, vice-chairman, Robert Winsor, treasurer, A. C. Ratschesky and Joseph B. Russell, left for Halifax. On their arrival Sunday, January 6, the Committee immediately met with the Executive Committee of the Halifax Relief Committee, and did not adjourn until late the same night, to come together again early the following morning. Many propositions were brought forward at this meeting relating to the administration of the fund in the Committee's possession and the best use to which it could be put.

Meanwhile it was concluded by the Massachusetts contingent that the most satisfactory results would be obtained by buying furniture for those families who had lost in whole or in part their household equipment, thus re-establishing as far as possible their home life. This plan coincided with the views of the Halifax Committee, and the following Halifax men and women were appointed to represent Massachusetts at Halifax in the disbursement of the fund: —

G. F. Pearson, *Chairman.*

A. D. MacRae, *Secretary.*

Mrs. G. S. Campbell.


Mrs. J. Norwood Duffus.

R. T. MacIlreith.

H. R. Silver.

W. R. Powell.







It was agreed by both Committees that in a general way this fund should be expended in behalf of those who had wholly or partially lost their furniture and were unable of themselves to make good their losses, and that they should have their homes refurnished on the basis of what they had lost. For this purpose \$500,000 was set aside; yet, as it proved later, only one-half of this amount was required. The outlay originally judged necessary had been based partly on the prices obtaining at Halifax, but when the Committee returned home they were able to get bottom prices, and, in addition, the Canadian authorities remitted all duties on relief goods crossing the border. It was generally acknowledged by the recipients and by the Halifax Committee that the furniture was of superior quality to what those receiving it had originally possessed. The difference between what was paid here and the cost of the same goods at Halifax amounted to about \$300,000.

The necessity of caring in the future for many cases of actual and threatened blindness resulting from the calamity was brought to the attention of the Committee by Sir Frederick Fraser. In compliance with his views an additional allowance of \$25,000 was made for the immediate care and education of these special cases, and the best advice possible was sought for the supervision of its expenditure.

The Halifax branch of the Massachusetts Halifax Relief Committee was also empowered to spend a limited amount of money in all cases where prompt action was necessary, after a majority vote and with the written approval of at least three members of its Committee. This rule was to apply also to all requisitions upon the Boston Committee for materials of any sort.

Subsequent to the return from Halifax of the second visiting committee, the Massachusetts Halifax Relief Committee in Boston, together with its Halifax branch, worked to organize and carry out the general plans of relief so far as they came within the scope of the subscribed fund.

On June 24, 1918, the Massachusetts Committee met at the State House to discuss more particularly the questions of tuberculosis and the blind in Halifax, and it was voted to ask Mr. James Jackson of the Red Cross to obtain an expert from the Rockefeller Foundation, who should investigate and report to the Committee what the conditions were in these respects.

As a result of this vote Dr. Victor G. Heiser, director for the East of the Rockefeller Foundation, International Health Board, New York City, met the Committee at the State House on June 9, and later went at their request to Halifax to investigate the whole question of tuberculosis and blindness as it there existed, especially so far as chargeable to the disaster. Dr. Heiser, realizing that the vital principle governing convalescence would be the hygienic conditions pertaining throughout the city, and in conjunction with the Halifax branch of the Massachusetts Relief Committee, by whom he was provided with every facility, made an independent and exhaustive investigation of public health conditions in the city, and submitted to the Committee at Boston his report of a constructive health program for Halifax. His recommendations were strongly endorsed by the members of the Halifax branch in a report made by them under date of August 13, 1918, as being directly in the interest of those who had suffered or might suffer from the effects of the disaster; and it was further advised that Dr. Heiser's suggestions be carried out. Under date of November 5 Mr. Pearson, chairman of the Halifax branch, sent the following letter to Mr. Endicott:—

The undersigned has the honor, by direction of the Massachusetts Halifax Relief Committee, Halifax branch, to report as follows:—

Your Halifax Committee is of opinion, as you have been previously advised both by written and verbal reports, that the rehabilitation of the people of Halifax and Dartmouth, following the explosion of December 6, 1917, resolved itself into the following phases, viz.:—

1. The provision of immediate relief in the way of medical attendance, medical supplies, food, clothing, building materials and means of transportation. Before the appointment of this Committee, and under your



direction, the people of Massachusetts had made instant and most valuable contributions to this phase.

2. The provision of temporary dwellings, and the making of the same habitable by the provision of household furnishings. The temporary dwellings have been provided by the Halifax Relief Commission. This Committee, under your instructions, devoted itself to the provision of household furnishings for those persons who had lost their furniture in the explosion and were, wholly or partially, unable to replace it themselves. What has been accomplished along this line has been fully reported to you, but generally it may be said that when the applications on hand are dealt with and furniture delivered, approximately 1,800 families will have received gifts of furnishings from this Committee, involving an expenditure of approximately \$200,000. Because of the favorable prices obtained from the manufacturers of Massachusetts, the remission of Canadian duties by the Dominion government, and the advantage taken of lowest transportation rates, goods of a similar nature purchased in the Halifax market at this time would have cost, in the opinion of this Committee, practically three times as much. When the applications in hand for gifts of furnishings have all been dealt with, in the judgment of this Committee, all necessitous persons in the city of Halifax who suffered loss of furnishings by reason of the explosion, and who have applied to this Committee, will have been cared for either through the instrumentality of this Committee, by the Halifax Relief Commission or by co-operation of both of these bodies.

3. The provision of permanent homes for those whose homes were destroyed on December 6 last. This work is properly the duty of the Halifax Relief Commission, which has embarked on an extensive policy of rebuilding homes or providing compensation for those whose homes were destroyed.

4. The care of the blind and the provision of pensions for those whose earning capacity has been impaired by physical disability incident upon the explosion. To the care of the blind the Massachusetts Halifax Relief Committee has already appropriated the sum of \$25,000, which will be used in conjunction with other funds provided from other sources to carry out a policy now in course of preparation with respect to those blinded by the disaster. The provision of pensions or disability allowances comes properly within the scope of the Halifax Relief Commission, which has a settled policy in this regard and is adjusting and paying all claims of this character.

5. The readjustment and improvement of the public health conditions of the city, which were seriously impaired as a result of the disaster. Your Halifax Committee is seriously apprehensive of the damage done to the health of this community following the explosion. Exposure, privation and overcrowding during the severe and inclement weather following the



6th of December, undoubtedly, in the opinion of all competent judges, has left its mark upon the general health of this community. This fact is so exhaustively dealt with in the letters accompanying this report that it is unnecessary to go into it at length here. These facts also have been the subject of other reports, verbal and written, with the result that upon our recommendation that you send an expert to this city to study the subject, you sent to this city Dr. Victor G. Heiser of the Rockefeller Foundation, New York City. When Dr. Heiser came to Halifax, your Committee was glad to be able to provide him with all facilities required by him for the purpose of making an independent and impartial investigation into public health conditions in this city and Dartmouth. Dr. Heiser consulted with everybody in authority having to deal with any branch of the public health of this city. His report, which you forwarded to this Committee, has been given most careful consideration, and this Committee is unanimously of the opinion that it is distinctly to the interest of this city and of the citizens generally that the recommendations made by Dr. Heiser should be carried out. This Committee believes that such a policy would be the capstone to the splendid efforts the people of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts have made for the relief of our city. The opinion of this Committee in this regard is endorsed by:—

His Worship the Mayor and the Board of Control, representing the citizens of Halifax.

The president and council of the Board of Trade, representing the business life of the city and embracing seven hundred members.

The president and members of the Commercial Club, also representing the business life of this community and embracing four hundred members.

The president and members of the Rotary Club, representative of the business and professional life of this city and embracing one hundred and fifty members.

The president and members of the Halifax Medical Association, representative of the medical profession of this city.

The president and members of the Halifax Anti-Tuberculosis League.

The president and members of the Victorian Order of Nurses.

The chairman and members of the City Board of Health.

Dr. W. H. Hattie, Provincial Health Officer.

The Halifax Relief Commission, who will co-operate in carrying out such policy.

The undersigned begs to attach hereto the endorsements in writing of the various bodies above referred to.

Your Halifax Committee, therefore, begs respectfully to recommend that, generally, the recommendation of Dr. Victor G. Heiser, contained in a report to you under date of August 13, 1918, be carried out. If this

policy be determined upon by your Committee, your Halifax Committee will be glad, if required, to make detailed suggestions with respect to the organization and personnel of a committee to carry the recommendations into effect.

The opportunity to permanently help those stricken or threatened with blindness or tuberculosis as a result of the explosion was at once recognized as a part of the obligation resting on the Committee, and one due to those citizens who made possible the immediate relief and had committed themselves to rehabilitation. Therefore on November 15, at a meeting of the Committee, it was voted as follows:—

*Voted*, That the treasurer be and he is hereby authorized to expend for the rehabilitation of the city of Halifax the sum of \$50,000 a year for the period of five years beginning with the year 1919, such sums to be used for the restoration and improvement of the sanitary conditions of the city and the health of its inhabitants, in accordance with a general plan outlined in a report prepared for the Committee by Dr. Victor G. Heiser of the Rockefeller Foundation, dated July 25, 1918, and in a further letter from Dr. Heiser to this Committee, dated August 13, 1918, and also in a letter from G. Fred Pearson, Esq., chairman of the Halifax branch, Massachusetts Halifax Relief Committee, to the chairman of this Committee, dated October 11, 1918. This report and these letters shall be annexed to this vote and made a part hereof for the purposes of setting forth in detail the purposes for which the money appropriated by this vote shall be expended. This appropriation is made and the authority of the treasurer to expend the sums of money above set forth is given upon the following conditions, and no expenditure or payment shall be made by the treasurer unless and until such conditions shall be duly fulfilled:—

1. The city of Halifax shall establish by incorporation or otherwise a commission,<sup>1</sup> corporation, or other public agency, which shall be responsible for the receipt and disbursement of the moneys which may be paid to it during the period of five years by the treasurer of this Committee, and which shall further undertake and be responsible for the formation of a definite program for the rehabilitation of the city of Halifax in accordance with the report and letter of Dr. Heiser and letter of Mr. Pearson. The chairman and treasurer are hereby authorized on behalf of this Committee to approve the form of public agency which shall be created by the city of Halifax for this purpose, and are further authorized to enter into

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix for act, p. 554.

any contract on behalf of this Committee with the city of Halifax, or such public agency as may be necessary, to satisfy themselves that the money paid by the treasurer through such period of five years shall be disbursed for the purpose of rehabilitation in accordance with the plans described in the report and letters above referred to.

2. The treasurer, at such time or times as in his discretion he may deem advisable, may employ experts in accounting, municipal sanitation, public hygiene, or other kindred subjects, to examine the books and actions of the public agency having charge of the disbursement of the funds appropriated by this Committee, and if as a result of the report or reports of such experts he is of the opinion that the moneys or any part thereof have not been disbursed by such public agency in accordance with this vote, or are not being used for the purpose above set forth, he shall make no further expenditures or payments under the authority of this vote without further vote of this Committee.

3. No payments shall be made in any year during the period of five years by the treasurer to the city of Halifax or the public agency above referred to until he is satisfied that there has been paid or will be paid in the same year to the city of Halifax or to such public agency the sum of \$15,000 by the Canadian government Halifax Relief Committee, and the sum of \$10,000 by the Province of Nova Scotia and the city of Halifax, which sums shall be applicable for disbursement by said public agency for the purpose set forth in the report and letters above referred to, and shall actually be applied and disbursed for such purpose.

4. The expenses incurred by the treasurer for the reports of the expert above referred to, and any other expenses incurred by him for the purpose of satisfying himself from time to time that the conditions set forth in this vote have been fulfilled, including counsel fees, may be paid by him from the annual appropriations of \$50,000 above referred to, and in the event of such expenses being incurred by him he may pay over to the city of Halifax or the public agency appointed to receive and disburse the sum only the balance of such annual appropriations of \$50,000.

5. Subject to the conditions above set forth, and upon the fulfillment thereof, the treasurer shall annually during said period of five years pay the sum of \$50,000, or such balance as shall remain after the payments referred to in the previous paragraph, in one sum or in such instalments as in his discretion he shall deem wise, to the city of Halifax or the public agency above described, to be disbursed by it for the rehabilitation of the city in accordance with the plans described in the report and in the letters of Dr. Heiser and Mr. Pearson, and the receipt of the city of Halifax or of such public agency for sums received by it from the treasurer of this Committee shall discharge the treasurer from any liability of any character whatsoever for the application of the moneys so paid by him.

This action on the part of the Committee was immediately made public, in order that the Commonwealth might know of the assistance which her generous gifts were still rendering in behalf of a friendly neighbor, now our Ally in the Great War.

The above vote, based on the recommendations of Dr. Heiser, constituted a well thought out plan for a constructive health program extending over five years, and was designed to make good, in a permanent way, the health damage caused by the explosion, the annual expense of which was to be shared as follows: —

Massachusetts Halifax Relief Committee, . . . . .	\$50,000
Canadian government Halifax Relief Commission, . . . . .	15,000
Province of Nova Scotia and the city of Halifax, at least, . . . . .	10,000
	<hr/>
	\$75,000

At the request of the Red Cross several of their representatives accompanied the first relief train to Halifax. Their work, helpful throughout, proved to be of incalculable assistance to the Committee. Mr. Endicott wrote: —

The aid that the Red Cross has given to the Committee in this emergency cannot be overestimated, and they have certainly demonstrated that they possess an organization which, when it is called upon in an emergency, can and will respond promptly and nobly.

It must be borne in mind that the Halifax Relief Committee was financed neither from the Committee on Public Safety's fund of \$100,000 given by a generous citizenship, nor from the \$1,000,000 appropriation of the Legislature, but through a special popular subscription given in behalf of a stricken neighbor. Although the work of rehabilitation will continue for some years to come, and remain within the control of the branch of the Massachusetts Committee at Halifax, its relation to the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety ceased at the time the latter was dissolved, in November, 1918.

# MASSACHUSETTS HALIFAX RELIEF FUND, JULY 1, 1919

## *Treasurer's Statement*

Total subscriptions, . . . . .	\$699,189 91	
Rebates on bills, . . . . .	192 36	
Interest on deposit, . . . . .	17,095 35	
		<hr/>
Total receipts, . . . . .		\$716,477 62
Expenditures for: —		
Clothing, . . . . .	\$32,214 55	
Material, . . . . .	23,167 36	
Furniture, . . . . .	261,702 29	
Supplies, . . . . .	40,369 64	
Other essentials, . . . . .	95,164 95	
		<hr/>
Total expenditures, . . . . .		452,618 79
		<hr/>
Balance on hand, . . . . .		\$263,858 83
On deposit as follows: —		
Shawmut Bank, . . . . .	\$161,180 84	
United States Trust Company, . . . . .	102,677 99	
		<hr/>
		\$263,858 83



## CHAPTER VI

### COMMITTEE ON COMMONWEALTH MILITARY EMERGENCY HOSPITAL

James J. Phelan, *Chairman*.

Joseph B. Russell, *Vice-Chairman*.

George H. Lyman, *Secretary*.

Col. William A. Brooks.

Adj.-Gen. Jesse F. Stevens, Custodian.

Brig.-Gen. John A. Johnston,  
U. S. A.

A. C. Ratschesky.  
John F. Stevens.

In January, 1918, the casualties at the front began to be listed in the home papers, and the possibility of a troopship returning to our shores with invalided soldiers brought about an investigation of hospital accommodations. This inquiry revealed that the normal bed capacity of the hospitals in Massachusetts was only 6,000, which under stress of circumstances might possibly be pushed to 9,000.

Dr. Brooks, Acting Surgeon-General of the Commonwealth, and head of the Brooks Hospital, Brookline, was the first to realize the serious danger of the situation, and suggested that the large riding-ring at the Commonwealth Avenue Armory, Boston, might be converted into an emergency hospital. This idea he submitted to the Committee on Public Safety, who approved the plan and brought it to the attention of Governor McCall.

It was argued that the necessity of establishing such a hospital was imperative in the interests of the public safety, though it was always recognized that the hospital might never have to be used, or, if at all, only temporarily. At the same time it was pointed out that under any circumstances the State would not suffer material loss, because even if the hospital had to be abandoned, its fittings, furnish-

ing and material would always remain useful for any sudden emergency or for permanent institutions under State control, or could be turned over to the military forces. This position was fully justified at the time of the influenza epidemic, when the necessities of the temporary hospitals were largely supplied from the Commonwealth Emergency Hospital.

On His Excellency's representation and advice the Council appropriated \$50,000 from the Massachusetts War Emergency Fund of \$1,000,000 to establish and equip the Commonwealth Emergency Hospital, under the general charge of the Committee on Public Safety.

The Committee, as above constituted, met on January 21, and voted that the entire medical control of the hospital should be placed in Dr. Brooks's hands, with full powers, and that the custody of the property should be put in charge of Adjutant-General Stevens. Dr. Brooks was also authorized to engage the services of a matron and nurse to take charge of surgical instruments, dressings, supplies, etc., whose yearly salary was not to exceed \$1,800.

The hospital was equipped to the last detail, and during the entire period of its existence had two trained nurses on duty or on call during each twenty-four hours. It could at any time have been opened and put into running order on four hours' notice. The State, however, is to be congratulated that no necessity for its use ever arose; its purpose was merely in the way of insurance.

The floor space allotted at the armory, 175 by 300 feet, was divided into twenty-two wards built of matched boards with canvas roofs sliding on wooden frames, and was ventilated at the top. It contained 440 beds. Passageways were so arranged as to make it possible for a large number of ambulances to drive on to the floor of the hospital and unload simultaneously. This last was a very important feature, as in most hospitals, owing to poor facilities for receiving the patients at the point of entrance, there is customarily a long delay in bringing them in, especially if a large number arrive at about the same time. The beds,

moreover, were so disposed as to enable the ambulances to come up to the side of the bed to which the patient was assigned. Inasmuch as on investigation it was found that there were practically no transportation facilities to meet a great emergency even under normal circumstances, the purchase of twenty standard Ford ambulances was authorized at a cost not to exceed \$15,000. In addition to the above, a White ambulance was given by the Retail Trade Board of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, two Fords by the Massachusetts Golf Association, and a General Motor Company's ambulance by the Knights of Pythias.

The experience of the Massachusetts Halifax Relief Committee proved how invaluable would have been the aid rendered at the time of that disaster if an emergency truck had been obtainable and established in the center of, or near to, the devastated district, where people suffering from severe cuts, burns and other injuries might have been relieved to a great extent from unnecessary pain, and in many cases saved the necessity of going to a hospital. Accordingly, the Emergency Hospital Committee had two Pierce-Arrow trucks made with special bodies, and equipped them with a supply of dressings and with attendants ready for service. These trucks, of 2-ton capacity, bought and furnished at a total cost of about \$5,000, were each capable of carrying six or seven physicians and nurses, and both were fitted with the necessary appliances for making hot coffee and giving a limited supply of food and stimulants.

On or about the 1st of April, 1919, the Council decided that there was no longer a chance of any hospital emergency resulting from the war. Thereupon, through the Adjutant-General's office, the order was given to store all the beds and bedding and dispose of the equipment. These directions were carried out, and the Commonwealth left without any emergency hospital, a situation which is deeply to be regretted, since the maintenance of an institution of that character would provide against incalculable suffering in case of any great disaster.

The total amount expended by the Committee in behalf of the hospital, including ambulances, equipment, salaries of nurses, etc., was \$81,941.54.

## COMMITTEE ON TRAINING AND INSTRUCTION OF DISABLED SOLDIERS AND SAILORS

James J. Phelan, *Chairman.*

J. Randolph Coolidge, Jr.

George H. Lyman.

Guy Murchie.

J. Frank O'Hare.

John F. Stevens.

Col. Jesse F. Stevens.

In his inaugural address of January 3, 1918, Governor McCall said: —

I . . . recommend the study of the question of educating men who may find it necessary, on account of injury received in the service, to renew the same or adopt some form of employment other than that which they had followed before entering the service, should the national government not make proper provision for such kind of education.

The Committee on Public Safety, wishing to give effect to this recommendation, decided to petition for legislation of the following scope. It was desired to recruit the industries of Massachusetts from returning soldiers and sailors, residents of the State, discharged from the service of either the United States or its Allies. It was assumed that where partial disability had been incurred in war service it might be necessary and desirable to train the discharged soldier and sailor so as to fit him for employment in the industries carried on in Massachusetts, make him independent of charitable aid, and preserve his self-respect.

It was recognized that the Federal government would in all probability undertake the re-education and training of men disabled in the service of the country, but until legislation should be secured by action of Congress there might be an interval in which no public provision would exist unless action were taken by the State Legislature. It was also deemed important to authorize the Governor to make

use of any existing State hospital, school or workshop for the purpose of education or training, whether or not adequate measures were taken by the State or by the Federal government; and it was believed that contracts could be made by the agents of the State for the training of individual soldiers and sailors, later to be assigned to any Federal agency created for the purpose of providing this education.

The Committee on Public Safety was convinced that it would be of advantage to the State, on the one hand, if men capable of finding employment in its industries should be encouraged to accept training, and to the Federal government, on the other, to distribute the men for whose training it was responsible among the trade schools of Massachusetts, and also among the industries that were ready to provide training, each in its own specialty.

The Committee prepared a bill which was somewhat modified by committees of the Legislature, but was enacted as chapter 230 of the General Acts of 1918. Under this statute the Board of Education was directed to establish a division for the training and instruction of disabled soldiers and sailors resident in Massachusetts at the time of their discharge, or within one year thereafter. The division was to consist of an executive head appointed by the Board of Education, and an advisory board, who should pass upon questions of educational policy, and assist in placing men after their training was completed. The act authorized the Governor to transfer with the consent of the Council the use and custody of any State hospital, school or workshop, including the equipment and employees, or any other suitable resources of the Commonwealth, to the Board of Education for a period not exceeding two years after the termination of the war. It authorized the Board of Education to make contracts to provide similar facilities where needed, and to employ teachers and supervisors for soldiers and sailors under re-education. The Governor was authorized to lease to, or permit to be used by, the United States or any agency thereof any suitable resources belonging to



the Commonwealth for the purpose of re-education and rehabilitation in industry of soldiers and sailors in the service of the United States or of its Allies. An appropriation of \$10,000 was made to provide the necessary expenditures under this legislation during the fiscal year of 1918. The act was approved on May 28, 1918, and only after that date did Massachusetts boys disabled in military or naval service have a title to its benefits. It was, however, looked upon as a stop-gap in case of protracted delay by the Federal government in making similar provision for disabled soldiers and sailors in the service of the United States. On June 21 the Federal Board for Vocational Education was directed by act of Congress to organize the training and placement of such men after their discharge from government hospitals, and an initial appropriation of \$2,000,000 gave the Board financial means sufficient for the undertaking.

The Governor's intention was carried into effect in form by the Legislature, and in substance, as it should have been, by the action of the national government.

## **COMMITTEE ON HIGHWAYS TRANSPORT — COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE**

In the summer of 1918 the Council of National Defense created a Highways Transport Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Roy D. Chapin of Detroit, the purpose of which was to bring about through a State Committee (appointed by the Committee on Public Safety or State Council of National Defense in each State) an effective and economical use of the public highways by motor vehicles, particularly those serving the needs of the army or of the industries accessory to the prosecution of the war. The establishment of Return Load Bureaus of rural motor express lines, and the co-ordination of highway transportation with transportation by water and by rail, seemed to demand careful attention with a view to improving the distribution of food supplies and to conserving materials and labor in connection

with motor transportation. Incidentally, the maintenance of service over important highways liable to be closed by snowfall or spring thawing called for expert study and public action.

The scheme of organization of the Highways Transport Committee included eleven regional directors, appointed by the Council of National Defense. Of these, the director in charge of New England, not including Connecticut, was to have his headquarters in Boston, and to keep in touch with the Committees on Public Safety of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Massachusetts. The Council of National Defense, through Mr. Chapin, appointed as regional director for Region No. 1, Mr. J. Randolph Coolidge, Jr., of Boston, formerly President of the Boston Chamber of Commerce. At the invitation of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, Mr. Coolidge had the use of its offices at the State House.

In August, 1918, the Council of National Defense asked the Committee on Public Safety to create a State Committee on Highways Transport, to succeed to the functions of its Committee on Motors and Trucks, and to assume the additional undertakings planned for it in Washington.

This request was at once complied with, but the signing of the armistice brought the Committee on Public Safety's efforts to a close before the plan could be fully carried out.

Had the war continued, Massachusetts, with its exceptional activity in motor truck transportation, would doubtless have helped largely in solving the problems which the Highways Transport Committee of the Council of National Defense was created to study.

## CHAPTER VII

### COMMITTEE ON AMERICANIZATION

On April 23, 1917, the following Committee was appointed: —

Alexander Whiteside, *Chairman*.

B. Preston Clark.

Bernard J. Rockwell.

Chauncey H. Brewer.

David A. Ellis.

It has been repeatedly asked what was the direct purpose of this Committee, and what the need for its formation. Indeed, what was meant by the term "Americanization" has often seemed to be uncertain. It might be answered: Americanization is to teach the foreign elements of our citizenship the greatness of this country, both physical and spiritual; to interpret to them its system and aspirations; to inculcate in their minds and souls the American idea and what it offers; to banish illiteracy and ignorance; to teach all men to honor our flag for what it stands for, and to revere it as the symbol of their hopes and affections.

In Massachusetts, with its extended industrial activities employing nearly 400,000 foreign-born citizens, Americanization had become in these times of great labor unrest a necessity, and its neglect a menace. At the outset the Committee on Public Safety, realizing the importance of educating and assimilating this foreign element in our midst, appointed as one of its sub-committees a Committee on Patriotic Activities among Non-English Speaking Peoples, a name later changed to the Committee on Patriotic Assimilation, which organized similar committees in many cities and towns. It soon became apparent, however, that considerable overlapping of effort and great confusion resulted due to the formation locally of independent committees of like character, so that much time was lost. Finally, at the request of the Council of National Defense, the Committee

on Public Safety, in an endeavor to co-ordinate all Americanization work undertaken in the Commonwealth, formed the Committee on Americanization, June 4, 1918.

About 3 per cent of the entire population of the State can neither read nor write any language. Eleven and one half per cent (228,062) of those ten years of age or over, though able to read and write some language, have no knowledge of English. Secretary Lane of the Interior Department stated that in the whole United States there were over 5,500,000 of the above ages equally ignorant, of which number practically 4,500,000 were twenty years of age or over.

Again, three-tenths of the Massachusetts population is foreign born, and one-half of this number come from non-English speaking countries.

Mr. James A. Moyer, head of the Department of University Extension, State Board of Education, in a bulletin issued by him and from which the above figures are taken, says:—

It is perhaps fair to conclude that the people in general have not fully understood the significance of the presence in our body politic of this large unassimilated mass of humanity, — a most potential power for good or evil.

On June 5, at the request of the Federal government, the Committee on Public Safety and the Massachusetts Division of the Women's Council of National Defense called together a large meeting of the civic organizations and individuals advocating Americanization, in order to promote a general interest in the movement and to lay plans for an effective co-ordination. At this meeting, which was largely attended, it was determined that in carrying on the work all agencies were to act voluntarily and without any coercion. A resolution offered by Mr. E. F. McGrady, Secretary-Treasurer of the Boston Central Labor Union, pledging the co-operation of all present in support of the Committee's undertaking, was unanimously agreed to.

The Americanization Committee divided itself into fourteen sub-committees, — Executive, Publicity, Community Organizations, Racial Groups, Education, Industry, Labor, Naturalization, Immigration, Peace Activities, Speakers, Private Agencies, Women's Organization, and Public Agencies in National Problems.

This extensive organization was being energetically perfected when the war ended. The Committee on the Termination of War Activities, appointed by Governor McCall to wind up the affairs of the Committee on Public Safety, expressed its earnest recommendation that the work of the Committee on Americanization should be continued in the future by means of State and national agencies.

## COMMITTEE ON LANDLORD AND TENANT — WAR PROFITEERING

George H. Lyman, *Chairman*.

W. L. Putnam, *Secretary*.

Samuel L. Powers.

Robert Winsor.

John F. Stevens.

P. R. Frothingham.

Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer.

In August, 1918, Mr. George P. Hyde, housing adjuster of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, and Mr. Henry A. Burnham, head of the real estate department of the Ship-building Corporation at Quincy, called to the attention of the Committee on Public Safety the unsatisfactory relations existing between landlord and tenant at Quincy, due to the concentration of workmen in localities where war work was being carried on, and to the shortage of dwellings to harbor them. Tenants, employees of the Ship Building Corporation, found themselves without redress in case of exorbitant increases in rent, the delayed payment of which caused threatened ejectment under the owners' common-law right. The subject embraced the whole question of landlord and tenant in its relation to war profiteering.

The landlord protested that the charges he had to pay for



food, fire, insurance, taxes, coal, interest on mortgages, and the up-keep of his realty holdings, had materially advanced. All this was undeniably true. On the other hand, the argument was made that as the whole country was sacrificing, the landlords should patriotically do their share as soldiers of the home army.

Mr. Endicott brought the matter to the attention of Acting Governor Coolidge, who, under the authority conferred upon the Executive by the Commonwealth Defence Act, to meet all exigencies that might arise relating to the public defense, on the 28th of August, 1918, issued the following proclamation:—

*Whereas*, The necessity for greatly increased production of munitions of war, ships and materials required for the prosecution of the present war has made necessary the assemblage in localities where the same are produced of large numbers of workmen, and thereby has created a shortage in the supply of dwelling places for such workers and their families; and

It appears that, while the majority of landlords are recognizing the needs of their country and dealing fairly with their tenants, certain unpatriotic persons in these localities are unduly increasing rents, unjustly evicting or seeking to evict such workmen and their families unless their demands for the payment of exorbitant and unreasonably high rentals are complied with, and thereby handicapping and embarrassing the Federal authorities in steps designed to secure a successful prosecution of the war, and consequently prejudicing and threatening the public safety and welfare of the Commonwealth;

*Now, therefore*, I, Calvin Coolidge, Lieutenant-Governor, Acting Governor, by virtue of authority vested in me by chapter 342 of the General Acts of 1917, having determined that circumstances warrant the exercise of the powers hereinafter mentioned, do hereby, with the approval of the Council, confer upon the following-named person, to wit, Henry B. Endicott, executive manager of the Massachusetts Public Safety Committee, the power and authority in the name of the Governor of the Commonwealth to take possession of any buildings and so much of the land of the owners of such buildings adjacent thereto as he may determine, which buildings are or may be occupied by workmen or the families of workmen employed in the production of munitions of war, ships, or articles, materials or substances directly or indirectly used or employed in the prosecution of the war, for such time and in such manner as he shall deem for the interests of the Commonwealth or its inhabitants, together with the power and authority granted by section 23 of said act to conduct any investiga-

tion he deems expedient with reference to housing facilities for war workers, to publish, as therein authorized, any data obtained, and, in making such investigation, to exercise all the powers which might be exercised by the Governor by virtue of said section in aid thereof.

And I do hereby direct him forthwith to prepare and publish rules and regulations governing the conduct and action of such landowners and landlords with reference to such properties and tenants, in default of the observance of which the powers hereby conferred will be exercised.

*Witness* my hand this twenty-eighth day of August, 1918.

CALVIN COOLIDGE.

Approved in Council August 28, 1918.

E. F. HAMLIN,  
*Executive Secretary.*

On the same date Mr. Endicott, after appointing the above Committee, delegated to them the powers given to him under the Governor's proclamation.

Immediately applications in person and by letter began to pour in from every direction, complaining of increases in rent and often demanding the reduction of long-established pre-war rentals. At least one-half of the cases brought to the attention of the Committee were associated in no way whatever with government employment or dwellings within homing distance of government activities. In order to prevent further misunderstandings, and to take advantage of the patriotism of the landlords and avoid as far as possible requisitioning or other drastic procedure, the Committee advised Mr. Endicott to issue the following statement: —

#### KEEP RENTS LOW

We have all noticed the influx of workmen into certain places in Massachusetts where there are munition plants, shipbuilding plants, and similar great industries doing government work or other necessary war work.

This has given great opportunity to owners of real estate to show their patriotism by keeping their rents as low as present conditions warrant, and refraining from taking advantage of the opportunities offered for profiteering.

The splendid spirit with which every one has responded to all patriotic requests shows that the people are glad to have ways pointed out to them in which to prove their readiness to make sacrifices for the government and for the boys "over there."

Having been very recently directed by the Governor to make investigation of alleged profiteering, and if necessary to take possession of land where the welfare of the Commonwealth requires it, it has seemed to us wise, as a first step, to make this appeal to the patriotism of landlords and of those having rooms to let, with the full confidence that the vast majority will welcome the suggestion as an opportunity.

This statement resulted, almost immediately, in a distinct falling off of applications by tenants for relief. Moreover, although the powers given by the proclamation were limited to cases in which the rent payer was actually engaged in war work, the Committee, by friendly representations to landlords, and backed by the moral influence that the Committee on Public Safety held in the community, was often able to settle differences between landlord and tenant and prevent further friction between them, although the particular case in point might be outside the stated province of the Committee.

The Committee, however, found great difficulty in determining the proper basis of rental for any given locality. It realized that, notwithstanding the source from which its power emanated and the legal authorization given under the Defence Act, the measure in itself was so extreme as well as contrary to the traditional rights of landlord and tenant as established by common and statute law that in every case dealt with the utmost caution became necessary.

On consultation with Mr. Charles F. Choate, Jr., of official counsel for the Committee on Public Safety, it was advised that while the power to declare and prosecute war had been delegated to Congress and the President of the United States, it would seem, inasmuch as war had been declared and the President was engaged in the exercise of all necessary powers in the direction of war, that the Commonwealth Defence Act was in full harmony with the action of Congress and the President, and that there was a residuum of war power retained by the Commonwealth of which the Defence Act was also a proper exercise; moreover, that the Committee on Landlord and Tenant was justified in acting under

this assumption until such time as a court of competent jurisdiction should declare to the contrary. Likewise, a provision of the Defence Act provided that "Whenever the governor shall believe it necessary or expedient for the purpose of better securing the public safety or the defence or welfare of the commonwealth, he may with the approval of the council take possession: (a) Of any land or buildings, . . ." and it was most certainly necessary for the public safety, defense and welfare of the Commonwealth that the work in the shipbuilding and munition plants should continue without interruption, and as a necessary incident to this work that the workmen should be properly housed. Again, where a landlord asked an exorbitant rent, he was in a way refusing the use of his property for a necessary public purpose, and under such circumstances the Governor had a right to exercise the power given him by section 6 of the Defence Act.

It was also determined that a practical method of exercising the power would be for the Committee to designate areas, reasonably adjacent to the shipyards and munition works where housing needs existed, sufficiently large to properly accommodate a fair proportion of the workmen employed; and, having fixed these areas, if in any instance it appeared that the workmen could not obtain housing therein at reasonable prices, then to exercise the power of eminent domain given by section 6. What the extent of this area should be would have to be determined by circumstances, and it might conceivably follow that a first delimitation would have to be enlarged. Wherever a rental within the delimited area was made the subject of complaint, an investigation should be made in order to satisfy the Committee whether the rent demanded amounted to a practical refusal to lease, and was sufficient to justify the Committee's acting under the statute. The Committee carried on its work in general accordance with the above advice, though as a matter of fact it was found unnecessary to map out areas.

When any one complained to the Committee of an un-



reasonable rent charged, or that eviction was threatened, the following questionnaire was given to be signed by both employer and complainant: —

1. Name and address of person making complaint, or for whom complaint is made. ....

2. Name of company by whom employed. ....

3. Name and address of owner of premises. ....

4. Name and address of his agent or attorney. ....

5. Is complainant married? .....  
Number of children. ....

6. Present rent. .... Rent asked. .... Estimated fair rent. .... Previous rents of the same rooms. ....

7. Description of tenement. ....  
Number of rooms. .... Floor on which it is situated, back or front. .... Other particulars. ....  
I hereby certify that the foregoing statements are correct and true.  
And I hereby request your assistance in having the rent fixed at  
Date. .... Complainant.

*Approval of Employer*

The above-named \_\_\_\_\_ is an employee of ours, and we approve of the foregoing application made by him in regard to his rent.  
.....

It is only fair to say that an analysis of the applications made by tenants shows that the landlords as a class did not attempt to avail themselves of their opportunity to get excessive increases of rents as a result of war emergencies. On the contrary, it would appear that the rents seldom rose in proportion to the landlords' increased expenses for labor, building materials, wages of janitors, interest on bank mortgages, cost of living, etc. In the many applications for relief that were received, — all of which were carefully considered, — wherever in the opinion of the Committee the circumstances justified any interference the landlord was induced to waive or compromise his claim in almost every



instance. In no case was it found necessary to exercise the power of requisition authorized by the Governor's proclamation. In short, notwithstanding the unusual and drastic powers given to the Committee, the universally prevailing patriotism made their direct exercise unnecessary.

## COMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL ECONOMY

Walter C. Baylies, *Chairman.*

W. L. Putnam, *Vice-Chairman.*

Matthew Luce, *Secretary.*

Henry B. Endicott,

B. Preston Clark.

Levi H. Greenwood.

Mrs. Herbert J. Gurney.

J. Frank O'Hare.

George H. Lyman.

James J. Phelan.

A. C. Ratschesky.

John F. Stevens.

Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer.

Charles F. Weed.

The activities of this Committee were more especially directed to conservation and economy in retail deliveries throughout the State.

It was brought to the attention of the Committee that paper was wasted to an extravagant degree by the unnecessary wrapping of articles bought in stores. The conservation of paper and twine would seem on its face of little material value in the interest of saving, but an examination into the subject showed conclusively that the price of these commodities having risen so enormously in value it was for the benefit not only of the merchant but likewise of the public that great care should be taken to prevent further waste in either material.

The cost to department and large specialty stores for each package delivered was figured to be from 8 to 25 per cent on the purchase price, according to the size of the bundle. The stores claimed that this large percentage was chiefly due to an unjustifiable demand on the part of the customers for wholly unnecessary service, besides their refusal to carry small bundles which would not inconvenience them in the

least. Moreover, inasmuch as many goods sold are likely to be returned, the merchants had to take the loss entailed by an unpaid-for wrapping and tying into consideration. In the last analysis this uncalled for expense naturally came out of the pocket of the consumer. It was estimated by the Commercial Economy Board of the Council of National Defense that the services of thousands of men engaged in the delivery of goods could be dispensed with and made available directly for war purposes, or indirectly for other lines of business; and inasmuch as the coming draft calls made it essential to conserve in every possible way the man power of the country, all unnecessary employment should be avoided, thereby reducing the cost of operation, and, as ancillary thereto, the price to consumers.

Again, in order to save wasting paper and string by sending out parcels in superfluous wrappings, at the request of the Commercial Economy Board at Washington the Committee on Public Safety, through its Committee on Commercial Economy, took this conservation also in hand, and Mr. Endicott called a meeting at headquarters in the State House of representatives of the leading department and specialty stores, and advised them on the following general lines: —

1. That delivery service be restricted to not more than one trip a day over each route.
2. That the privilege of returning merchandise be limited to three days, and that special deliveries be eliminated.
3. That co-operative delivery systems should be introduced wherever practicable.

In some communities special service was in part eliminated by making a charge for every such delivery; also the handling of needless C. O. D. orders, wherever it was serious enough to need correcting, was regulated by requiring a deposit.

On the general proposition, those present at the meeting were in complete harmony in their willingness to comply

with the requests of the national government, and the assurance prevailed that a fair-minded public would meet the conditions imposed in a proper spirit. To this end a recommendation was issued to introduce a system of one delivery a day on certain routes, and on others of but one delivery a day to each customer. It was further recommended that the privilege of returning goods, either for exchange or credit, be limited to three days; that special deliveries be done away with; that co-operative delivery systems be introduced wherever practicable; and that all non-essential operations be curtailed or entirely dropped. These suggestions were given widespread publicity, the slogan being, "Carry a bundle and help release a man for war work," and were at once taken up and followed out by practically all the retail stores represented. An example of this was the assurance given of cordial co-operation by more than five hundred druggists from different sections of the State.

The Committee at one time also worked out what appeared to be a very promising plan for salvaging iron, copper and various other materials which commonly went to the junk dealer, an idea that had already been carried through successfully in several large western States. However, owing chiefly to the fact that the Council of National Defense at Washington had, in the interest of retail merchants, been for several months preparing a scheme for reducing to a minimum every cost of operation, the Economy Committee held their salvage plan in abeyance while carrying out the general recommendations of the Washington Board.

In the latter part of August, 1918, Mrs. Thayer and Mr. Endicott issued a joint letter to the press, in which they asked the people of Massachusetts to save all peach stones and dry them thoroughly, saying in part:—

In most localities the larger stores and the Red Cross headquarters are being asked to attend to the collection and distribution of these stones.

In Boston and vicinity they can be sent to almost any large department store, or to the Red Cross headquarters at 142 Berkeley Street, to their

cottage on the Common, or to any of their branches throughout the city. They will be held by the stores and by the Red Cross subject to instructions as to shipping from the Gas Defense Division of the United States Army.

Later an opportunity will be given to the people to help the government by saving other fruit stones, but it is thought best at this time to concentrate the saving on peach stones.

The material derived from 100 peach stones furnishes the necessary carbon for one gas mask.

On July 22, in accordance with the recommendations of the War Industries Board appointed by the President, Mr. Endicott issued a letter to all grocers, provision dealers and their customers in regard to the saving of labor, gasoline, rubber, stock feed, etc., and urging them to arrange their business so as to eliminate unnecessary trips over any one route. Householders were also asked to place their orders, as far as possible, but once a day, and that on the day before the delivery was desired; and further, on account of the overburdening of deliveries prevailing on Fridays and Saturdays, they were requested to arrange so that non-perishable supplies should be delivered early in the week.

In respect to every one of these restrictions and recommendations the people of Massachusetts showed a very willing spirit in seconding the efforts of the Commercial Economy Committee in the interest of conservation.

## COMMITTEE ON NON-WAR CONSTRUCTION

A. C. Ratshesky, *Chairman*.

Stuart W. Webb, *Vice-Chairman*.

Leonard W. Cronkhite, *Secretary*.

Harold L. Bond.

A. K. Cohen.

Frederick H. Curtiss.

Levi H. Greenwood.

James H. Hustis.

Everett W. Lord.

James E. McLaughlin.

J. Frank O'Hare.

Joseph B. Russell.

William D. Sohler.

James J. Storrow.

Commodore B. T. Walling.

Fred A. Wilson.

Colonel A. W. Yates.

Demands for labor and material for war purposes became so pressing in the latter part of 1918 that the War Industries

Board at Washington requested all Councils of National Defense and Committees on Public Safety throughout the country to organize boards on non-war construction, for the purpose of curtailing such expenditures of labor and material in building operations as could properly be postponed during the war period. Washington set the standard and the method of organization to be followed in the other States, the idea being to unite all interests in any way connected with building operations, including labor and material. Massachusetts was the first to form a Committee for this purpose, and its plan of organization was carried out in every city and town of the Commonwealth in accordance with the instructions of the War Industries Board.

The Committee constantly sent information through newspapers and local boards of the State on rulings regarding such forms of construction as were deemed less essential to winning the war.

Acting with the regional advisor, whose scope covered strictly war construction, and the Highway Commission, whose field embraced highway construction, the Committee codified and printed all rulings bearing on construction, and likewise published, in advance of Washington, forms of application for permits to build. These forms and summaries of rulings were given wide distribution within the State, and were also copied and used by neighboring States. Revised editions were printed as changes in rulings demanded.

Meetings of the Committee, held at the State House, were particularly well attended by its members, already burdened with other war work. Applications approved by local boards of each city and town in the State were handled promptly and passed upon for transmission to Washington, with recommendations that permits be granted.

The total number of applications considered by the Committee between September 24, 1918, and November 22, 1918, when its work ended, was 235; approvals for permits, 182. It was estimated that \$30,000,000 worth of building was deferred, in addition to the permits refused, on account of



the restrictions placed by the State, the intent of the Committee being to hold back everything of a non-essential building character until after the war.

The decisions of the Committee were accepted by the public in a truly loyal and generous spirit, notwithstanding that in many cases a great hardship was imposed. Conferences with those interested were frequently held in order to convince the applicants of the great necessity of conserving labor and materials. The ability of the Board to get expert testimony from its own membership on the many types of application coming before it resulted in despatch, and constantly justified the wisdom of its composition and the co-ordination of so many representative elements within its membership. The Board and its chairman received recognition of this fact in communications from Washington.

The expenses of the Board, clerical and printing, were borne by the Committee on Public Safety.

## CHAPTER VIII

### INFLUENZA EPIDEMIC OF THE AUTUMN OF 1918. — EMERGENCY HEALTH COMMITTEE

On September 25, 1918, Governor McCall appointed the following as members of this Committee: —

Henry B. Endicott, *Chairman.*

W. L. Putnam, *Manager.*

Matthew Luce, *Secretary.*

Dr. William A. Brooks.

Miss B. W. Billings.

B. Preston Clark.

Dr. E. R. Kelley.

George H. Lyman.

Mrs. F. S. Mead.

W. Rodman Peabody.

James J. Phelan.

A. C. Ratshesky.

Adj.-Gen. Jesse F. Stevens.

John F. Stevens.

Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer.

Dr. William C. Woodward.

Early in September, 1918, it was brought to the attention of Dr. E. R. Kelley, State Health Commissioner of Massachusetts, that the influenza scourge had broken out in the State. The rapid increase of this disease, as is well known, was unprecedented. By about September 15 Quincy, Revere and Boston were badly affected, and the situation also in Chelsea, Gloucester and Brockton very quickly became serious. From this time on the epidemic spread throughout the Commonwealth in every direction.

The resources at the disposal of the regular State departments being inadequate to deal with the emergency, the Governor's Council appropriated for the emergency \$100,000. This was afterwards increased to \$500,000.

Dr. Kelley, Dr. W. A. Brooks and Adjutant-General Stevens reported to the other members of the Committee what had already been done by the State, and explained the needs of the situation.

Dr. Brooks, who was employed by the United States Shipping Board to take charge of its numerous patients, had already, September 9, established an emergency tent or field hospital on Corey Hill. Here he brought the methods of treating the influenza epidemic and protecting the nurses and attendants to such a state of perfection that this hospital served as a model for all others thereafter established in the State.

Owing to the foresight of the Committee on Public Safety and the Governor's Council in providing equipment for the Commonwealth Military Emergency Hospital, the Adjutant-General was able without delay to furnish Dr. Brooks with all the additional equipment necessary for his emergency field hospital.

The gravest feature of the situation was found to be a shortage of doctors, nurses and assistants. Dr. Kelley telegraphed to Surgeon-General Blue of the United States Public Health Service at Washington, asking for his aid in obtaining doctors. Dr. Kelley also appointed a nursing Committee, with Miss Billings of his department as chairman, which endeavored to obtain as many nurses as possible.

The first task confronting the Committee was to assist in securing and assigning doctors and nurses to meet the pathetic appeals for help pouring in from every section of the State. The next was to awaken the public to the gravity of the danger, and to do everything possible to prevent the spread of the disease.

The various activities of the Committee will be discussed under the following heads:—

Doctors.	Supplies.
Nurses.	Transportation.
Lay help for nurses.	Report of Public Safety.
Emergency hospitals.	Committees, hospitals, etc.
Investigation of vaccines.	Protection and quarantine.
Convalescents.	Location of work and personnel.
Children.	Finance.
Burials.	Follow-up work and preparation
Emergency canteens.	for the future.

*Doctors.* — The American Medical Association had long since realized that, so many doctors having gone into the military service, vigorous steps should be taken to provide proper medical attention for the civilian population in order to meet just such an emergency as now presented itself. Accordingly, a volunteer medical corps had been established which every physician in the country, not in the service, was invited to join, with the request that he fill out a blank stating what help he would be able to render, and particularly, whether he was willing to serve in another than his home community. Nearly all the members of the profession joined this corps.

When Dr. Kelley appealed to Surgeon-General Blue for aid, the latter selected from the list of members of the volunteer medical corps certain physicians in those communities which were free from the plague, and wired them to report as soon as possible to Dr. W. F. Draper, State House, Boston. He likewise asked them to be prepared to render any service which might be required of them in fighting the epidemic.

In patriotic response to this appeal men came from as far west as Iowa and as far south as North Carolina, dropping in many cases lucrative practices to serve at a small fee and to undergo the hardships of a country doctor, all in the service of the Commonwealth and its people.

In the same way, with a splendid spirit of self-sacrifice, Dr. Brooks suspended all other work, and at great personal loss and inconvenience devoted his entire time to the establishment and supervision of the emergency hospitals.

Likewise the medical officers connected with the State Guard gave their services cheerfully, working day and night, also to the great detriment of their personal affairs. In addition, many physicians throughout Massachusetts, residing in communities which the epidemic had not yet reached, volunteered in the same patriotic spirit for service in afflicted sections.

At first, doctors offering their services were assigned by

Dr. B. W. Carey of the State Department of Health to the places where they were most needed, but on Friday, September 27, Dr. W. N. Bryan of the United States Medical Corps, attached to the Naval Department of the Northeast, was lent by that department to assist in fighting the epidemic, and the task of assigning doctors was given over to him. This work required careful and comparative study of the needs of each community, as well as of the qualifications of the different doctors offering their services. These physicians were put on the State pay roll at \$10 a day and expenses, the latter not to exceed \$4 a day.

On Monday, September 30, Dr. Draper of the United States Medical Service, was sent to Boston by Surgeon-General Blue with six assistants to take up the work on behalf of the United States. From this time, all doctors coming from outside the State were assigned by Dr. Draper and put on the United States pay roll. Each one of his assistants was delegated to a particular district to help the local authorities in organizing. Dr. Draper and Dr. Bryan co-operated most closely, working in entire harmony. After a week the latter was able to report that all requests which had come in for the services of doctors were filled. Thereafter the supply kept up with the demand.

Dr. Bryan then made a tour of inspection of the eastern part of the State and visited various sections which had appealed for aid, in order to find out whether the needed help had been given, whether the fight was going on successfully, and whether assistance was still necessary.

During Dr. Bryan's absence, and after his return to the navy, his duties were ably carried on by Dr. J. W. Carroll of the same service. In all, 169 doctors were assigned, of whom 113 came from outside the State. Seventy-six fourth-year medical students were also assigned.

*Nurses.* — As early as September 25 six nurses were sent out by Dr. Kelley to investigate the nursing situation, and to give assistance wherever the influenza epidemic was most severe.



On September 26 the Emergency Nursing Committee held an important meeting, at which a program for home nursing was adopted.

Most urgent appeals for nurses were issued through the press and through the Red Cross, which were responded to by nurses from Providence, Halifax, Toronto, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maine and elsewhere.

The constant application to the Committee for nurses in behalf of patients who were in extreme suffering and danger for want of proper care was a heartrending feature of the situation. Miss Bernice Billings, detailed by the State Department of Health, attended to the enrollment, and an effort was made to assign nurses on the basis of 1 to 15 patients. But even at this low scale, during a period of three weeks several hundred more nurses were needed than could be supplied. Miss Billings was assisted from the beginning by Miss Churchill of the State Department of Health, and after September 28 Miss Ross of the Red Cross was also on duty, relieving Miss Billings, who had temporarily sacrificed her health by her unremitting and faithful work. For the first two or three days Miss Billings was at the telephone from 8 o'clock in the morning until 11 at night. The Department was open from early in the morning until late at night, including Saturdays and Sundays, and from the time the epidemic became serious until it began to abate.

Nurses chosen by Miss Billings to work in Boston were at first sent to the Instructive District Nursing Association to be assigned to duty, but later to the city health officer. Nurses assigned to other cities were instructed to report at once on their arrival to the local board of health or to the agencies it designated. All nurses were put on the State pay roll at the rate of \$4 per day and expenses, and nurse's helpers at rates varying from \$10 to \$15 per week and expenses. The total number of the nursing force assigned was 1,003, of whom 344 were graduate nurses and 659 untrained lay women. There were also a limited number of

attendants. Eight hundred and sixty nurses were put on the State pay roll, and 143 gave their services as volunteers.

*Lay Help to Nurses.* — Dr. Bryan, foreseeing the great shortage of nurses, requested Mrs. Thayer and Mrs. Mead to secure the assistance of persons, whether trained or untrained, willing to work among the sick. An appeal was also made through the public press and through the heads of organizations to send volunteer assistance.

The services of the Catholic and other sisterhoods, and of the Federated Jewish Charities, were also generously placed at the disposal of the doctors, and His Eminence, Cardinal O'Connell, by special dispensation, authorized in certain exigencies the employment of cloistered nuns. The Household Nursing Association offered its trained assistants and supervisors, and also its undergraduate assistants, and most of the hospitals furnished undergraduate nurses.

In response to a letter from Mr. Endicott, a number of the stores, such as E. T. Slattery & Co., Wm. Filene's Sons Company and Houghton & Dutton Company, volunteered the personnel of their First-aid Units, and through the courtesy of the Milo Thread Company a group of lay helpers came from Maine to help the sufferers in Massachusetts.

A department for registration was established at headquarters by the Volunteer Service Bureau of the American Red Cross and by the Special Aid Society for American Preparedness, in charge of Miss Priscilla Whiton. Nine hundred and seventy-one people were examined by this department, 659 volunteers being secured, who were then passed on to Miss Billings for appointment. All those desiring to serve in the city were sent to the Boston District Nursing Association.

The assistance of this group can only be fully appreciated when it is realized that they formed two-thirds of the total nursing service in the State. No effort was made to divert assistants from one city to another, it being argued that workers would be more useful in the localities where they lived. Any woman who felt herself in any respect capable

of assisting in the care of the sick was urged to offer her services to her local board of health.

Miss Amy Woods, of the League of Preventive Work, was sent to organize a number of communities that they might provide their own lay help. Her methods proved so effective that the State Department of Health sent a statement of her plan of procedure throughout the Commonwealth and to the Department of Health in every State in the Union.

*Emergency Hospitals.* — Reports gathered from many cities and towns showed a lack of hospital facilities, but Dr. Brooks's very successful experience with his emergency hospital on Corey Hill pointed the way to meet this need.

The emergency hospitals so constituted were put in charge of the military authorities, as in no other way could discipline be promptly established and quarantine efficiently maintained. The Surgeon-General and Quartermaster-General, in co-operation with the local authorities and the district health officers, chose the sites. The Adjutant-General provided tents, field ranges, cooking utensils, and such equipment as the State was able to furnish, and called out appropriate details of the State Guard. Other necessities were furnished by the Supply Department of the Emergency Health Committee. The Surgeon-General, with the co-operation of the district health officers and of the Enrollment Bureau of the Emergency Health Committee, secured the medical, nursing and service personnel.

To accomplish these results promptly the assistance, authority and backing of the Committee on Public Safety were given in the fullest measure, and through its efforts in some instances shacks for emergency hospitals were erected in less than forty-eight hours, — between Saturday noon and Monday morning. In several cases segregated wards for influenza patients were established in existing hospitals, such assistance being given in twenty-six cities and towns throughout the State. About October 8 a letter giving full instructions for establishing temporary emergency hospitals

was issued by the Health Commissioner to the local boards of health.

*Investigation of Vaccines.* — In view of the favorable reports made by different physicians as to the results of using vaccine, Dr. Kelley appointed a Committee to investigate the subject. Dr. T. W. McCoy of the Hygienic Laboratory, United States Public Health Service, Dr. M. J. Rosenau, of Harvard University, director of the State Laboratory, and Maj. Frederick Gay of the United States Army composed the scientific members of the Committee, while Prof. G. C. Whipple of Harvard University, Mrs. William Davis of the United States Bureau of Census, and Mr. F. W. Crum of the Prudential Life Insurance Company were the statistical members.

Without, however, awaiting the report of this Committee, Dr. Kelley purchased for Dr. Leary material on which to grow the vaccine, loaned assistants from the State Laboratory, and detailed for the work Dr. Hinton in charge of the State Wassermann Laboratory. He also requested Dr. Bryan and Dr. Hinton to co-operate with Dr. Leary in the distribution of the vaccine. Dr. Kelley also prepared a letter, addressed to every city and town board of health in Massachusetts, stating that the State stood ready to furnish vaccine. All bottles of vaccine had printed instructions wrapped around them, a franked postal card for every one immunized was issued by the Board of Health, and the local board was at the same time requested to see that the person vaccinated filled out and returned the card to the United States Public Health Service office at the State House within two weeks after the receipt of the last dose of vaccine. Thus a positive demonstration was made as to the value of the procedure.

The report of the Committee of Experts, showing the results obtained by using the vaccines, was so favorable that the work of making and distributing the same was continued at the expense of the State so long as the need lasted.

*Convalescents.* — Very soon after the organization of the



Committee, His Eminence Cardinal O'Connell offered the large and spacious buildings of St. John's Ecclesiastical Seminary, situated on hills overlooking the Chestnut Hill Reservoir and surrounded by beautiful grounds, for any use to which they might be adapted. This timely offer was at once taken up by the Committee, the seminary being peculiarly well suited to receive and take care of convalescent patients from Boston and the neighboring towns. This relieved the congestion at the hospitals, and thereby the wearing strain on the nurses. Dr. William H. Devine undertook the task of superintendent, and also of securing doctors, attendants and service. This opportunity was utilized from October 6 to October 26, and was productive of splendid results. Important clinical observations, and full details as to patients and personnel, were given in a report made by Dr. Devine. Ninety-two patients, ranging from ten to sixty years of age, were admitted to the seminary, — the average stay being about seven days, — and were sent by the following institutions: —

Boston City Hospital, . . . . .	9
Massachusetts General Hospital, . . . . .	30
Arlington Emergency Hospital, . . . . .	2
Homœopathic Hospital, . . . . .	2
Carney Hospital, . . . . .	1
Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, . . . . .	7
Beth Israel Hospital, . . . . .	1
Jewish Home, . . . . .	1
Merrill School, Cambridge, . . . . .	15
Brookline Hospital, . . . . .	1
Town of Norwood, . . . . .	1
Cambridge Emergency Hospital, . . . . .	5
Other sources, . . . . .	17

An offer was also made by the Episcopal City Mission of the Mothers' Rest at Revere as a convalescent home for women and children. This retreat, commonly closed at that time of year, was immediately opened and put in charge of Dr. Jane D. K. Sabine, with Dr. Edith H. Swift and Dr. Cordelia I. Williamson as assistants. Mrs. Georgina



Withington offered her services to take care of the household and the well-being of its inmates. Sixty-five patients were cared for, and the work carried on for one month with the greatest success. Miss Mary P. Winsor took full charge of the business administration of this home, purchasing supplies, transporting patients in her own car, auditing all the expenses, and working day and night in its interest.

*Children.* — The influenza brought about a great deal of suffering among children, both from the disease itself, and also, in many instances, through the death of their parents or others responsible for their care.

As a rule, these otherwise helpless cases were taken care of locally; but in Boston the pressure was so great that the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, the Children's Aid Society and the Church Home united in organizing a home for the care of children who had been exposed to but were not taken down with influenza. The Emmanuel House, 11 Newcomb Street, Roxbury, was lent by Emmanuel Church for this purpose. Miss K. P. Hewins of the Church Home Society, under the supervision of a committee representing all the societies above mentioned, took charge of the house. These societies paid all the expenses of the enterprise excepting a certain amount of household utensils, beds and other appliances, which were furnished by the Emergency Health Committee. Accommodations were sufficient to take care of about thirty-five children at one time, and the home met one of the great needs of the situation.

The Catholic Charitable Bureau also opened a shelter at Orient Heights, with accommodations for about forty children.

*Burials.* — The number of deaths was so large in the vicinity of Boston and at the camps that a serious difficulty presented itself in obtaining coffins. To meet so imperative a necessity the Committee on Public Safety, that the output might be increased, induced a large cabinet maker to lend fifteen of his employees to the New England Casket Com-

pany. Dr. Woodward, moreover, reported that the city of Boston was under obligation to furnish laborers to certain cemeteries so that interments could take place promptly.

*Emergency Canteens.* — Good, wholesome food, hot, appetizing and served frequently, was early shown to be one of the most important requisites of treatment.

Accordingly, on Sunday, September 29, the plan of the Emergency Canteen was initiated in co-operation with the District Nursing Association and the Boston City Food Conservation Committee. The scheme was twofold: (a) to supply food, under the direction of the nurses and doctors, to the patient and to the healthy members of his family where the latter were unable to cope with the situation; (b) to feed the nurses and doctors.

Originally, the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety agreed to pay all expenses, but the Boston Committee on Public Safety assisted by taking over all canteens operating inside the city limits. Three canteens were in operation on Monday, September 30, and fifteen by Thursday, October 3. Many existing kitchens were taken, including those in churches, high schools, cooking schools and settlement houses, the last two mentioned providing effective and complete centers for food distribution. Through the generosity of the many Food Conservation organizations and of volunteer helpers, dietitians were obtained who did the cooking. In most of the districts the City Food Conservation Committee was called upon to provide untrained volunteers who could help in the preparation of food and its distribution. This last was effected by volunteer motor service. In the districts where such motors could not be obtained, the Red Cross and the State Guard were called upon to help. Contributions of glass, tin containers and also vegetables were asked for. By this method, and because of the extraordinary and ready response to all calls for help, the only liabilities incurred were for fuel, carton containers and the actual food purchased.

Attention might here be directed to how great a degree

the influenza emergency demonstrated the value of decentralization to promote efficiency; and that each center should, if possible, be a complete entity in itself, relying upon a Central Committee for help only where its own organization broke down.

This general plan for canteen work was advertised through the State on Monday, September 30, by telegrams and letters asking the Women's Council of National Defense, local officials and Committees on Public Safety to start the canteens wherever the necessity arose, after consulting with the local boards of health and other existing activities which might aid in such work.

*Supplies.* — Supplies were bought and furnished, partly by the Emergency Health Committee, and partly through the Adjutant-General's office.

The Committee purchased and distributed in considerable quantities masks, paper napkins, paper bags, paper plates, spoons, veils, aprons and such other appliances as were recommended by the doctors, — all tending to prevent the spread of the disease from the patient to the nurses, or to other people in the State. Printed instructions for the use of these articles were distributed with them, as well as circulars giving information as to the detection and treatment of the disease and how to avoid it. Many valuable suggestions were made to the numerous applicants for advice by attendants who had been carefully coached by the trained nurses.

The Committee also purchased and distributed to hospitals and local Committees on Public Safety, or boards of health, supplies — such as bedding, blankets, sheets, etc. — needed to outfit the emergency hospitals or emergency wards. It also furnished to the boards of health a certain amount of similar articles when needed for the proper care of patients in their own homes; but this latter distribution was very carefully restricted, as it was felt that such cases, as a rule, should be taken care of through the regularly established charitable agencies.

Mr. Matthew Luce and Miss E. G. Dewey attended to the purchasing of supplies, and were assisted by Mr. E. G. Preston and Mr. J. A. Malone. Mr. Luce also superintended the distribution, whether made directly from the stores or from the State House. A careful record was kept of all supplies given out, either in quantity or small lots.

Paper stock furnishings were given free to 1,363 persons, who came or sent for them, in large or small quantities, as follows: —

Plates, . . . . .	135,000
Spoons, . . . . .	100,000
Cups, . . . . .	120,000
Napkins, . . . . .	100,000
Bags, . . . . .	50,000
Paper towels with rollers (cases), . . . . .	7
Aprons, . . . . .	1,000
Quart containers, . . . . .	1,900
Pneumonia jackets, . . . . .	400

In addition, many thousand masks were provided.

As illustrating the educational work accomplished outside the Commonwealth, samples of paper supplies and masks were forwarded to many parts of the country, — to Washington, D. C., Alabama, Minnesota, California, New Hampshire, Maine and South Dakota.

Through the untiring efforts of Mr. Malone and Mr. Preston, the purchasing agents, the Committee was able to provide everything needed for a hospital of seventy-five or one hundred beds in less than twenty-four hours.

For the Emergency Hospital at Taunton the following supplies were obtained: —

Beds, . . . . .	100
Springs, . . . . .	100
Mattresses, . . . . .	100
Pillows, . . . . .	105
Pillowcases, . . . . .	260
Paper plates, . . . . .	6,000
Paper cups, . . . . .	6,000

Paper spoons, . . . . .	6,000
Sheets, . . . . .	550
Double blankets, . . . . .	120
Towels, . . . . .	250
Bedpans, . . . . .	32
Urinals, . . . . .	6
Paper napkins, . . . . .	10,000
Paper bags, . . . . .	1,000
Paper towels and the rollers, . . . . .	500
Masks, . . . . .	1,000

For emergency hospitals, regular hospitals or for home distribution in Amesbury, Arlington, Auburndale, Boston, Bridgewater, Brighton, Brockton, Cambridge, Dorchester, Fairhaven, Fall River, Gloucester, Haverhill, Hudson, Ipswich, Lawrence, Lowell, Mansfield, Nantucket, Peabody, Plymouth, Revere, Salem, Somerville, Springfield, Stoughton, Taunton, Tyngsborough, Waltham, Whitman, Winthrop and Woburn the following articles were supplied:—

Beds, . . . . .	335
Cribs, . . . . .	22
Springs, . . . . .	245
Mattresses, . . . . .	287
Pillows, . . . . .	411
Pillowcases, . . . . .	3,020
Sheets, . . . . .	4,408
Blankets (wool), . . . . .	2,560
Blankets (paper), . . . . .	120
Night robes, . . . . .	854
Doctors' coats, . . . . .	12
Rubber coats, . . . . .	12
Rubber hats, . . . . .	12
Rubber boots (pairs), . . . . .	12
Alcohol (gallons), . . . . .	30
Bedpans, . . . . .	181
Enamel washbasins, . . . . .	42
Enamel pans, . . . . .	30
Pus basins, . . . . .	45
Towels, . . . . .	2,512
Rubber sheeting (rolls; 12 yards in one roll), . . . . .	23



Mosquito netting (pieces), . . . . .	5
Needles (papers), . . . . .	8
Notebooks, . . . . .	12
Playing cards (packs), . . . . .	2
Checkerboards, . . . . .	2
Combs, . . . . .	72
Common pins (papers), . . . . .	12
Thread (spools), . . . . .	18
Toothbrushes, . . . . .	48
Bed slippers (pairs), . . . . .	12
Chloride of lime (can), . . . . .	1
Crockery pitchers, . . . . .	8
Envelopes, . . . . .	250
Face cloths, . . . . .	120
Iodine Lime Tablets (bottle), . . . . .	1
Padding (yards), . . . . .	12
Temperature charts, . . . . .	1,150
Temperature charts, holders and the paper utensils and masks, . . . . .	74
Clinical thermometers, . . . . .	53
Wooden tongue depressors furnished from the supply room, . . . . .	1,000
Treatment charts, . . . . .	200
Urinals, . . . . .	56
Flannelette (yards), . . . . .	100
Hot-water bags, . . . . .	57
Hypodermics with needles, . . . . .	25
Ice caps, . . . . .	45

Dr. Brooks, in behalf of the United States Shipping Board, called upon the Adjutant-General's office to authorize and assist in establishing the emergency field hospital on Corey Hill, Brookline, for those of the enlisted personnel of the United States Shipping Board who were stricken with the epidemic. Similar hospitals were established in Gloucester, Ipswich, Lawrence, Brockton, Waltham and Haverhill; and supplies such as cots, blankets, etc., were furnished both to them and to the local boards of health at Fall River, Fairhaven, Arlington, Fitchburg, Fayville, Barre, Springfield and other places.

The supplies on hand at the State Arsenal not being adequate for the emergency, 1,034 cots, 3,696 blankets, 28 pyramidal tents and 170 wall tents were procured through

the Chief Quartermaster's Department out of the funds of the Emergency Health Committee. The Adjutant-General's Department was able to secure the use of over 400 tents, and of many cots, from various organizations, including the Northfield Summer Conferences, the Y. M. C. A. in various towns, the Agricultural College, county fairs, high school boys' agricultural camps, in charge of Mr. Dow, and also from many individual and other sources.

*Transportation.* — The Transportation Department was under the management of Mrs. Livingston Cushing, assisted by Miss Mary T. Sawyer, Mr. A. K. Sweet, Mr. F. A. Turner, and Mr. R. A. Powers. It arranged for meeting nurses on their arrival in Boston; furnished information as to the departure of trains; provided motor service to take doctors and nurses to the station, and, when necessary, directly to the towns to which they were assigned. It also notified officials of the local Committee on Public Safety, or of the board of health, to meet them on arrival. It delivered supplies from the Supply Department, and planned for ambulance service on request. As the uniform worn by its agents made them easily distinguishable, arrangements were made with the Canteen Department of the Red Cross to meet nurses coming from a distance. This work necessitated much detail in locating trains, but was done with remarkable despatch and success.

When headquarters were first opened at the State House, the Committee was almost wholly dependent on the assistance of the First Motor Corps of the State Guard. This body rendered efficient and most willing service, the Committee always having the privilege of calling upon its members. As the corps had many calls to which it must give first attention, especially the very important work of the Instructive District Nursing Association, a volunteer service of private cars was enlisted. This was secured in great part by personal appeal, and the co-operation and interest of those who volunteered proved invaluable. Two hundred and sixty-three calls for motor service were answered within

the first ten days. The greatest number of calls filled in any one day was 46; the lowest, 11.

The First Motor Corps furnished automobiles, with chauffeurs, to transport doctors and nurses from patient to patient in the city of Boston, and in addition turned over its complete ambulance outfit to the Medical Department of the State Guard. Its four auto trucks were also in constant use transporting supplies under the direction of the Chief Quartermaster. The twenty-six ambulances, belonging to the First Ambulance Corps and the Commonwealth Military Emergency Hospital, were always in use. Two of these were loaned to the Northeastern Department; two to the First Naval District; two to the Fore River Shipbuilding Company; two to the city of New Bedford. The remainder were employed in the city proper and at the different emergency field hospitals.

*Reports of Public Safety Committees, Hospitals, etc.* — Inasmuch as the influenza was not at the time it broke out a disease which the doctors were required by law to report, the figures sent in by the local boards of health were at first incomplete.

Accordingly, telegrams were sent to the chairman of each local Committee on Public Safety throughout the State, requesting information as to the number of cases of influenza and the number of available doctors and nurses in his particular town or city, with a further request that a detailed report of its most pressing needs be also forwarded. Moreover, in order that the course of the epidemic might be properly watched, the recipients of the messages were instructed to immediately wire in reply. Mrs. Thayer, in behalf of the Woman's Committee of the Council of National Defense, sent similar telegrams to each of her chairmen. In addition, and to check up these figures, telegrams were sent to the presidents of the District Nursing Association in fifty cities and towns, requesting the same information asked of the sub-committees on Public Safety.

The messages received in response were handled by Mr.

W. R. Peabody and his assistants, Miss Esther Nickerson and Miss M. S. Conrad, who immediately turned over the reports and requests to Dr. Bryan and Miss Billings, whereby the latter were enabled to allot doctors and nurses to Dr. Carey, and also to watch more understandingly the prevalence and spread of the disease.

On September 30 a circular letter was mailed to every chairman of a local Committee on Public Safety, asking his co-operation in the reception and care of visiting doctors and nurses. Still further, telegrams were sent to many of the hospitals throughout the State asking for the number of beds they were able to furnish, and what assistance, if any, they needed.

The answers to all the telegrams sent by the Committee were received and tabulated, and proved of great value in many ways.

*Protection and Quarantine.* — Several details from the State Guard were furnished by the Adjutant-General to protect emergency hospitals, and also for service at New Bedford, Cambridge, Malden, Norwood and Southborough, in which places the local authorities supplied their own hospital facilities. These guards were indispensable in maintaining the requisite quarantine necessary to prevent the spread of the disease. In addition, a guard was provided in Boston for the contractor who was building the Emergency Hospital buildings.

*Closing of Theatres, etc.* — At a meeting of the Committee on September 30 it was voted to recommend the closing of theatres, moving-picture shows and soda water fountains, and, in general, that all gatherings which might in any way assist in spreading the disease be discontinued.

Wide publicity was given to these recommendations, and in consequence the Liberty Loan Committee at once gave up all rallies which it had planned throughout the State. Following this example, almost every meeting contemplated by societies or organizations of any kind was immediately and voluntarily abandoned. Many churches discontinued hold-

ing divine service. In most cities and towns, all schools, theatres and moving-picture shows were closed, as were soda water fountains and public bars.

This widespread and rigorous action greatly mitigated the force of the disease, delayed its progress, and helped to bring it under control.

On September 26 Mr. Endicott made public the following statement:—

I have been asked to explain more comprehensively than was possible in the brief notice already published in the papers, the attitude of the Public Safety Committee in regard to holding public meetings during the influenza epidemic.

It is the general opinion of the physicians that influenza germs are transmitted directly, not only by the sick but by those who are infected although not yet ill, to persons in close proximity to them; therefore the danger of infection is always present when people are gathered together. Accordingly, no unnecessary gatherings should be held at present in Massachusetts.

Unnecessary gatherings include schools, theatres, moving-picture shows, churches, wherever possible, and all outdoor meetings and parades. Unnecessary meeting places, therefore, should be closed at once and remain closed until the authorities tell us the danger is over. The observance of ordinary health precautions is part of the duty owed by every citizen, not only to himself but to his neighbors, and no one should feel at this time that he is a moral coward because he takes care of himself, if he realizes that his own health may mean the life or health of those with whom he comes in contact.

One of the things we should all strive to do during this epidemic is to get into the sunshine as much as possible, and, above all, we should get plenty of fresh air. In other words, it is our duty to keep well or to get well as soon as possible, in order that our part in the war may not be interrupted.

There are undoubtedly towns and cities in the Commonwealth from which the influenza has not been reported, but of course we must face the fact that the chances are very much in favor of the spread of the disease. I urge such communities to assume their part of the common responsibility, and to act as if they were already in the midst of this epidemic.

The doctors and nurses of Massachusetts who are devoting themselves to the care of the sick in this emergency are all heroes and heroines, and many of them have paid the penalty. Not one of them, as far as I am aware, has shirked in any way; they have overworked; they are without



sleep — yet still they go on. Massachusetts can never repay its debt to this noble band of men and women. We are using every effort, both through the government and outside the State, to get additional help for these people. In this connection the Red Cross is doing splendid work and using every effort to increase the number of nurses within our borders.

When I speak of carrying on the war, the action of the Liberty Loan Committee points out to us all the way our duty lies. The Liberty Loan Committee realizes the seriousness of the situation; they had laid out their entire plans for the coming campaign for months, and all these plans they have changed to save the people of Massachusetts, believing that by so doing they are contributing to the success of the war. They have sacrificed more in making this change than any other organization, public or private, possibly can.

The cancellation of all Liberty Loan meetings places upon the people of Massachusetts a responsibility for individual effort greater than that which the citizens of any other State are called upon to bear. It is comparatively easy to subscribe generously when the emotions are stirred by the appeal of a soldier fresh from overseas, or by the thrill of patriotic music, or by the sight of a neighbor's response. Massachusetts will have the benefit of none of these rallying forces to arouse the generosity of her subscribers. The very absence of parades and oratory, however, makes the duty of each man and woman clearer than ever before. Subscriptions which have heretofore been made in the excitement of public gatherings must be offset by the appeal to each man's own conscience. It will never be said of Massachusetts that she was so immersed in her own private troubles that she for one moment failed to heed the Nation's call to practical service. Massachusetts must and will do her part.

Dr. William C. Woodward, commissioner of the Health Department, city of Boston, in a very interesting and able report, says: —

Whether or not it may be more than a succession of coincidences, it is certainly of interest to note that the November outbreak of the influenza showed itself three days after the Peace Day celebration on November 12, when the streets, eating places and public conveyances were jammed with crowds; and that the December epidemic began to manifest itself after the Thanksgiving Holiday, with its family reunions and visiting; and that reported cases mounted rapidly during the periods of Christmas shopping, reaching a maximum a week after the holiday.

The secondary epidemic of influenza thus occurring in Boston in December found the city in a far different position to cope with the disease

than at the time of its appearance in September, and there was virtually no difficulty in supplying prompt and appropriate medical care and nursing in individual cases.

*Location and Personnel.* — Owing to the prevalence of the epidemic, it was almost impossible to secure professional office help. Mr. Bazeley, assistant executive manager of the Committee on Public Safety, was able to detail four stenographers from his staff, but no office boys or other assistants were available. Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, however, loyally offered their services as messengers.

While the most important work was carried on in the offices of the different State departments and those of the Committee on Public Safety, Room 363 at the State House served as headquarters for eleven of the Committee's sixteen departments. It would have been difficult for so many groups to work together, in so confined a space, had they not been animated by the common desire to procure doctors and nurses for the sorely beset people of the Commonwealth, irrespective of any personal discomfort to themselves.

The personnel of the Bureau was in the hands of Mrs. Mead. The staff consisted of about seventy-six people, all volunteers, with the exception of a few secretaries from the State departments and the Committee on Public Safety, and three other secretaries. As the hours were long (from 8 A.M. to 9 or 10 P.M., including Sundays), the service was arranged in shifts. Owing to the closing orders referred to, Mrs. Mead had the advantage of much professional help, though the Bureau was to a large extent manned by members of the National Civic Federation and the Boston Teachers' Unit. In addition to this, Mrs. Thayer, Mr. Endicott, Dr. Kelley, Dr. Brooks, Adjutant-General Stevens and many persons from their staffs gave practically their whole time to the cause.

*Finance.* — Mr. Edmund W. Longley, with his customary watchfulness and ability, acted as treasurer of the Committee. The total expenditures will be found in Mr. Longley's general report.

*Follow-up Work and Preparation for Future Epidemic.* — An advisory council was appointed to carry out a plan for future medical and social service, whose efforts will be given in detail under “Women’s Activities,” Part IV, chapter 5.

It must be remembered that the activities of the Emergency Health Committee, in its relation to the influenza epidemic, covered only the first visitation of that disease and the six weeks following the 25th of September, the date of its appointment. The second outbreak, early in December, 1918, did not take place until the Committee on Public Safety had disbanded.

During the former period the number of deaths due to the epidemic, in Massachusetts alone, was approximately 11,000. This is exclusive of about one week in the latter part of September, of which no complete record exists, as it was not until the 4th of October that the disease was made reportable by law.

The far-reaching assistance rendered by the Emergency Health Committee to the Commonwealth during this period of prevailing distress, when a veritable plague vitally imperilled and sapped the strength of our people, thereby directly menacing the efficiency of our armies at home and abroad, was one of the most important of those unforeseen activities constantly springing up, and which proved the wisdom of Governor McCall’s creation of a Committee on Public Safety.

## PART IV

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### WOMEN'S ACTIVITIES

Thus far this story has dealt almost exclusively with the activities of Massachusetts men.

It is now time to introduce another and equally important half of the home army, and to turn our attention to the unselfish and sturdy Americanism displayed by the women of our Commonwealth. With untiring zeal and patient helpfulness they rallied to the Nation's call, a mighty influence in supporting the crusaders battling in foreign lands, and rendered a service never to be forgotten in the annals of the State.

Soon after our entry into the war, from one end of the Commonwealth to the other the women, as previously stated, eager to help and restless in their activity, started new organizations or reconstructed existing ones, anticipating every want and challenging every emergency. Yet these associations as a whole were neither correlated nor in any respect centralized, but represented an immense amount of cumulative but duplicated energy, much of which was necessarily wasted, and which in the existing emergency all felt should be amalgamated into a single well-organized body. No one understood this state of things better than the officers and influential leaders of these multiple organizations. With a view to the betterment of these conditions the Preparatory Committee on Co-ordination of Aid Societies was appointed, the successful outcome of whose efforts under Mr. B. Preston Clark's direction may be found in the discussion of that Committee in Part I.

In May, 1917, Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer of Boston was chosen temporary chairman of the Massachusetts Division

of the Woman's Committee of the Council of National Defense, an appointment which later, in response to a unanimous desire, was made permanent. On the invitation of the Committee on Public Safety, the Woman's Committee became part of its organization, and occupied adjoining offices in the State House, its work being entirely financed by the Committee on Public Safety during the continuance of the war.

From that time on, as the Massachusetts woman representative of the Council of National Defense, and still later as Home Economics director by appointment of Mr. Hoover at Mr. Endicott's request, Mrs. Thayer, loyally and ably assisted by Mrs. Herbert J. Gurney as vice-chairman, and by a very efficient committee, administered practically all the more important women's war functions throughout the Commonwealth, — a position at once unique and exacting. It is unnecessary to enlarge on the success of Mrs. Thayer's efforts. Her work has become part of the history of Massachusetts. It was a noble and memorable achievement which won for her and her associates the admiration and respectful affection of the entire Commonwealth.



## CHAPTER I

### MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION, WOMAN'S COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer, *Chairman*.

Mrs. Herbert J. Gurney, President of the Massachusetts Federation of Women's Clubs, *Vice-Chairman*.

Mrs. William W. Taff, *Treasurer*.

Mrs. Samuel W. McCall, *Honorary Chairman*.

Mrs. Andrew J. Peters, *Honorary Chairman*.

Mrs. Frank D. Ellison, Massachusetts State Regent of the Daughters of the American Revolution.

Mrs. W. M. Cumiff, representing the League of Catholic Women.

Mrs. A. C. Ratshesky.

Miss Anna Bowen, representing labor.

On June 15, 1917, a large meeting was held in the State House, to which every woman's organization in the Commonwealth had been requested to send a representative with voting power. Two hundred were present, Mrs. Thayer was made permanent chairman, and the Committee, as above given, appointed.

The Council of National Defense, a body authorized by act of Congress in August, 1916, consisted of the Secretary of War, of the Navy, of the Interior, of Agriculture, of Commerce and of Labor. The Council was given the power to organize subordinate bodies and committees.

The Woman's Committee of the Council of National Defense was formed on April 21, 1917. The purpose of this Committee was to co-ordinate the activities and the resources of the organized and unorganized women of the country, that their power might be immediately utilized in time of need, and also to supply a new and direct channel of communication and co-operation between women and governmental departments. The Committee was requested to organize State divisions, which in turn should

form local units of all women's associations and societies without regard to creed, purpose or race. Women not belonging to any organized societies were likewise eligible to membership. The Woman's Council of National Defense was composed of nine members from different States, Mrs. Stanley McCormick of Boston representing Massachusetts.

In the Massachusetts division the following departments of work were organized, as suggested by the Woman's Committee in Washington: —

Registration.

Food Production and Conservation.

Miss Sarah Louise Arnold, *Chairman*, later succeeded by Mrs. Malcolm Donald.

Women in Industry.

Mrs. William A. Troy,<sup>1</sup> *Chairman*.

Mrs. George T. Rice,<sup>1</sup> *Vice-Chairman*.

Child Welfare.

Miss Mary T. Beard, *Chairman*.

Miss Gertrude Peabody, *Vice-Chairman*.

Maintenance of Social Conditions.

Mrs. Frederick S. Mead, *Chairman*.

Education.

Mrs. Sumner B. Pearmain, *Chairman*.

Liberty Loan.

Mrs. Barrett Wendell, *Chairman*.

Red Cross and Allied Relief.

Mrs. William H. Lothrop, *Chairman*.

Health and Recreation.

Mrs. John A. Johnston, *Chairman*.

Mrs. Robert W. Lovett, *Executive Chairman*.

The purpose of each of these departments was carried out, with the exception of Registration, which was found to be unnecessary owing to the large number of registration facilities already available for women, through several organizations. The two departments of Food Production and Conservation were conducted as one. In June, 1918, the department of Liberty Loan was separated from the Committee in Washington.

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<sup>1</sup> Both appointed by the American Federation of Labor.

Local chairmen were appointed (see Appendix, page 557) in each of the 356 cities and towns in the State, with the exception of a very few towns so small and with such scattered population that united work was impossible. In some of the larger towns several chairmen were appointed for different sections, making the total number of chairmen larger than the number of towns and cities. Much of the work was done by the following county field secretaries, who gave invaluable assistance by personally visiting and interesting large numbers of women: —

Mrs. R. M. Harper, Barnstable County.  
Mrs. Carlos de Heredia, Berkshire County.  
Mrs. Louis A. Frothingham, Bristol County.  
Mrs. Charles P. Greenough, Dukes County.  
Mrs. Richard S. Russell, Essex County.  
Mrs. Richards M. Bradley, Franklin County.  
Mrs. William E. Towne, Hampden County.  
Miss Helen A. Harriman, Hampshire County.  
Mrs. William F. Wharton, Middlesex County.  
Mrs. William S. Patten and Mrs. Richard W. Hale, Nortolk County.  
Mrs. Wirt Dexter, Plymouth County.  
Miss Ruth Thayer, Worcester County.

A series of monthly conferences was held, beginning June, 1917, and continuing without interruption, except during the influenza epidemic, until several months after the armistice was signed.

These meetings were largely attended by women from all over the State, and were always in the nature of a general discussion, where questions might be freely asked and reports submitted by the chairmen of the respective departments. Many special and interesting speakers were heard at these gatherings, usually including several from the more important of the men's departments of the Committee on Public Safety.

On comparing notes at the several conferences held in Washington during the eighteen months of its work, the Woman's Committee was satisfied that Massachusetts en-

joyed remarkable privileges and opportunities from the co-operation, advice, ready sympathy, and financial support given at all times by the Committee on Public Safety.

The co-operation and loyalty of the large, as well as of the smaller, existing women's organizations were very encouraging. The Federation of Women's Clubs, under Mrs. Gurney; the Catholic Women's War Work Council, under Miss Mary A. Barr; the National Civic Federation, under Mrs. Frederick S. Mead; the Women's Municipal League, under Mrs. William Morton Wheeler; the Special Aid Society, under Mrs. Barrett Wendell; the Jewish Women's Organizations; the Red Cross; the Collegiate Alumnæ, under Mrs. Sumner B. Pearmain; the Daughters of the Revolution, under Mrs. Frank D. Ellison; and county and city home demonstration agents of the Massachusetts Agricultural College were only a few of the many organizations which gave their hearty co-operation to every branch of the undertaking.

An account of the work of the more active committees directly associated with the Massachusetts division of the Woman's Council of National Defense follows.

## CHAPTER II

### COMMITTEE ON CHILD WELFARE, WOMAN'S COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Miss Mary Beard, *Chairman*.

Miss Gertrude W. Peabody, *Vice-Chairman*.

Mrs. Michael M. Cuniff.

Miss Isabel Hyams.

Mrs. Robert L. DeNormandie.

Mrs. William Lowell Putnam.

Mrs. S. Burt Wolbach.

Mrs. W. W. Whitcher.

It would be impossible to tell the story of the Child Welfare Department of the Council of National Defense without giving in part the history of the State Department of Health in its work for child conservation. The task was a joint one, to which both sides devoted themselves with enthusiasm.

Soon after the United States declared war, the Massachusetts State Department of Health turned its attention to the probable effects of such action upon the civilian population, and outlined a program for the protection of maternity and infancy. War, it was recognized, was sure to produce an economic situation which would react on the health of children. The price of food would increase, thus inviting difficulties in providing children with proper nourishment. Men would be drafted into active service, thereby lowering the income of the family, or forcing the mother, at the sacrifice of her child, to work. The high wages offered under pressure of war conditions would tempt mothers to become wage earners and to neglect their children. The infant mortality rate was certain to register the results of these conditions. Furthermore, the birth rate would naturally decline, and unless this was in some degree counter-balanced, a serious shortage of man power faced the coming generation. Normally, over 12,000 babies under five years old, of whom 4,000 are under a month old, die annually in



Massachusetts. Medical experts assert that this slaughter of the innocents, and economic waste, could be reduced one-half if scientific knowledge and skill were made available to women. Dr. Grace Meigs's study of the effect of the war on infancy and maternity in the European countries gave actual proof that the anticipated conditions had there resulted, and were so serious in their nature that in the second year of the war each country had taken radical steps to combat them, with very encouraging results.

On May 26, 1917, Dr. Allan J. McLaughlin, Massachusetts Commissioner of Health, was appointed, with others from the State Department of Health, to serve in an advisory capacity as a Committee on Child Conservation. In a letter to Governor McCall, announcing the appointment of this Committee, he referred to conservation of child life as the most important type of conservation in our national stress; and as essential thereto, prenatal care, obstetrical care and infant feeding.

The State Committee planned to make a survey of every city and town, village and hamlet, in the State, in order to discover the mortality and morbidity statistics of children under the age of five years, and also to ascertain what facilities existed for lowering these figures. It therefore appealed for help to the Metropolitan Chapter of the Red Cross, and a special fund was raised to meet this war emergency so directly affecting the civilian population. With salaries thus assured, a public health nurse was appointed for each of the eight health districts in the State. These nurses were selected with the greatest care, all of them having had not only public health training, but a considerable amount of experience in actual public health field work for children.

From the first it was evident to the State Committee on Child Conservation that the official connection between the nurses and the boards of health was not in itself sufficient to assure the desired results. New lines of work had, as a rule, been promoted by private initiative and paid for out

of private funds, and only after their value had been demonstrated was the responsibility for their continuance assumed by some public body. It appeared that the interest and active support of the entire community would have to be aroused, if infant mortality were to be reduced and the recommendations of the State Committee carried out. The State Committee, therefore, turned to Miss Mary Beard, chairman of the Child Welfare Department of the Woman's Committee of the Council of National Defense. That Department was asked by the State Committee to co-operate with it in carrying out its program, and by its aid, in October, 1918, established a Child Welfare Committee in each town, under the local unit of the Council. These local committees varied in their membership and activity with the needs of the community. The more populous cities organized on a large scale, and the committees were usually composed of representatives of all organizations working for children, and of others who might be interested. Two hundred and forty of the committees were formed, ranging in membership from one to fifty. In order to arouse and maintain their interest and to create a healthy rivalry, monthly conferences were held at the State House, at which specialists on the various parts of the program spoke, and where informal discussions and reports were made. For the convenience of those living at a distance from Boston conferences were held from time to time throughout the State. The value of these committees, measured by the influence they exerted upon their local communities, can hardly be overestimated.

To organize and direct the local committees was the function of the Committee of the Child Welfare Department of the Council of National Defense. To make the surveys, the nurses visited the representatives of the boards of health, Child Welfare Committees of the Council of National Defense, the child welfare agencies, the visiting nursing associations, and other private organizations which were doing child welfare work. They also gained informa-

tion by personal investigation concerning the quality of work being done by these organizations. From these facts the nurses made to the State Committee on Child Conservation such suggestions for developing the project as seemed to them best adapted to a particular locality. A meeting of the State Committee was held at which the nurse who made the survey was present, as frequently, also, the health officer of the District, and a specific program was outlined. A letter, written by the State Committee, was sent to the chairman of the Child Welfare Committee of the local unit of the Council of National Defense, stating the program and urging its adoption. The Commissioner of Health at the same time sent a letter to the local board of health in the town or city under consideration, urging its assistance in putting the plan into operation.

The recommendations of the State Committee and the Commissioner called at times for an extension of the work already being done by the local boards of health, or for the undertaking of new work by the Committee itself. Sometimes these advices suggested that additional nurses be furnished by the Visiting Nursing Association, or demanded reorganization of that body. Again, they called for free obstetrical beds in hospitals, and often for the extension of prenatal care, or the provision of such care where none had been previously given. The Committee invariably urged the supervision, also, of healthy children from birth up to five years of age. Not infrequently it recommended the establishment of prenatal and well-baby clinics. It sometimes urged that hospitals provide out-patient departments to which sick children could be brought for treatment. The Committee insisted in every instance on the necessity of special training for nurses who did public health work, and urged the Department of Health and the visiting nursing associations to make special effort to secure this type of nurse. These recommendations were in many places carried out, through the efforts of the Child Welfare Committees.

In February, 1918, the Child Welfare Department of the

Council of National Defense and the Federal Children's Bureau proclaimed the "children's year" to be from April 6, 1918, to April 6, 1919, and that "the second year of the war should be marked by determined Nation-wide effort on behalf of childhood." The program also included:—

- I. Public protection of mothers, infants and young children.
- II. Home care and income.
- III. Child labor and education.
- IV. Recreation.
- V. Children in need of special care.

The first part of this comprehensive plan for child conservation dealt with problems of infant mortality and child hygiene, and the program presented was almost identical with that already being carried out in Massachusetts. The national plan, however, urged that as a basis for permanent child welfare work a physical census of all children under five years old be taken by a national weighing and measuring test. The country would then know the physical condition of its young children, and take the necessary measures to improve it, while the coming generation would be able to pass a better physical examination than the young men of the present day had proved themselves in condition to do when examined for the draft. The test was approved by the State Committee, and was carried out by the local Child Welfare Committees with the active and enthusiastic assistance of the child welfare nurses. Record cards and printed instructions were supplied by the Children's Bureau, and each committee was instructed that the value of the test lay in the thoroughness with which plans for permanent follow-up work were carried out.

The usefulness of the weighing and measuring test lay in two directions: first, the parents and the community learned what was the physical condition of their little children; and second, they learned how conditions unfavorable to the health of the children could be improved. One hundred and fifty-two towns, cities and villages in Massachusetts went



through this wholesome experience. To give but one example, the test was applied in a certain city to 742 children, of whom one-third were below the average standard. One child had been suffering for four years with badly inflamed and swollen eyes. A very lame little boy was found upon examination to have considerable shortening in one leg, caused by a broken bone of which the parents were ignorant. A tuberculous mother was struggling to take care of her three children. Poorly nourished women were nursing their babies, and children were being improperly fed. Numbers of adenoids and enlarged tonsils were discovered. Mothers were eager to substitute artificial feeding for breast-feeding, and others were ignorant of the physical care their babies required in order to keep them well.

The question was, what would the attitude of the community be towards this revelation of its neglected and uncared for children? Would more proof be needed that it was failing to give them the chance to become strong and able to do their school work? As a result, in this particular city three permanent clinics were established, and the under-average cases received special attention from the public health nurse. Some children were sent to hospitals for treatment, and others were referred to family physicians; the child with sore eyes was put under special supervision, and thus saved from blindness; and the little lame boy was much benefited by hospital treatment. Mothers gladly received and acted upon the instruction given them in infant care and feeding.

The methods of procedure in different places varied greatly. In one town of 4,000 the first step of the Child Welfare Committee was to procure a nurse. The weighing and measuring process followed, which gave publicity to the work. Co-operation between the doctors, the school officers and the Committee was quickly secured, and the execution of the program begun. The final outcome was the organization of a Visiting Nursing Association which represented a broader interpretation of public health service, and of which



the Child Welfare Committee became a part. In many communities where visiting nursing associations already existed, the Child Welfare Committee urged upon the association the need for prenatal and child welfare work. Well-baby clinics were established; sometimes by the Child Welfare Committee itself, often by its influence on an existing organization, and again by the public health officials. The same variety of influences took part in the establishment of special child welfare nurses. One city, with a population of 62,000, reported that through the pressure of the Council of National Defense the need for further work in the interest of baby saving was so emphasized that finally the matter was given consideration in the inaugural address of the mayor, and promises were made for sufficient appropriations to meet all requirements.

In the city of Boston, after the weighing and measuring test was completed, the clinics of the Baby Hygiene Association more than doubled in many of the districts, and the children's clinics in all the hospitals increased very perceptibly, that of the Children's Hospital increasing 20 per cent. However, with Boston's thousands of underweight children, the Child Welfare Committee realized the impossibility of carrying out in a few months' time an intensive follow-up campaign for the whole city, and therefore selected one district for a demonstration.

Side by side with this medical program an educational propaganda was also carried on in Massachusetts. Preventive medicine is still a new science, and is to a large extent unrecognized in its relation to maternity and infancy. Its possibilities and actual accomplishments in this connection must be presented clearly and repeatedly to the public, if the demand for such care is to be so universal as to insure its being supplied. Material for this propaganda was distributed weekly to the local Child Welfare Committees, as well as published in the newspapers throughout the State. In addition, the baby hygiene program was personally

explained. The physicians of the State Committee presented the plan to the medical groups; the supervisors spoke at meetings in every town; and the vice-chairman of the Child Welfare Department journeyed through the Commonwealth, meeting her local chairmen at convenient points in conference. Women's clubs had the plan brought to their attention by their public health committees, and each local committee endeavored to arouse its community to the importance of introducing and developing these measures, if only for its own benefit. The excellent literature of the State Department of Health on the care and feeding of the baby was also widely distributed.

An important piece of educational work was done by the Boston Committee in connection with the Child Conservation Cottage, one of a group placed on Boston Common during the war. Posters and exhibits on the care and hygiene of the expectant mother, and on the hygiene of the baby and the medical supervision essential for children up to five years of age, were all arranged in attractive form. Printed placards showed the value of a doctor's care for the expectant mother, both for her own safety and that of her baby. Breast-feeding was emphasized, and modification and supervision of milk explained. Suitable and reasonably priced clothes for mother and baby were put on view. A cariole made from a packing box, a clothes-basket bed, and other useful articles were displayed. A trained nurse, a graduate of the Children's Hospital, was in attendance to answer questions and explain exhibits. Her work was reinforced by that of a corps of volunteers. Mothers sought her professional advice, and eagerly listened to her talks on the many details of health and hygiene. Lectures were given in the cottage by experienced physicians on prenatal care, physical care of young children, and hygiene of the eyes, ears and teeth. Two talks were given for Italian mothers in their native tongue. A Liberty Milk Shop was also opened in Boston for the purpose of educating the people in the value of milk as food, and

the many ways of using it. On account of the increased price much less milk was being used, and in some homes the children's milk supply was entirely cut off.

As the result of a conference with the vocational school division of the Board of Education, a course on child welfare was outlined by the department and the State Department of Health, for use in the vocational schools. This was approved by the State Board of Education, and published by the State Department of Health. About 1,000 copies were distributed, being designed for the practical instruction of girls over fourteen years of age and for young married women. Such topics as prenatal care, infant feeding, care of the baby, and mental development were included, with a final study of community resources for child care. Each subject was treated in a practical way, fully illustrated, and with ample suggestions for demonstrations. It was believed that this might be the beginning of a more general education for girls in infant and child care, and it was earnestly hoped that the opportunity would be given later for all girls over fourteen to have like training.

It is impossible to estimate the results of these twenty months of intensive child-saving in Massachusetts, or how far their influence reached. Certain definite statements may, however, be made. Positions were created for sixty public health nurses. Thirty-three child welfare stations and eight prenatal clinics were established. The sum of \$85,480 was raised by subscription for nurses' salaries. The terrible epidemic which swept over Massachusetts in September and October, 1918, demonstrated in many localities the crying need of the community nurse. Many towns of 2,000 or 3,000 inhabitants were at that time still asking for municipal appropriations for public health service. The education of the public in the value of child conservation largely determines progressive action in this direction, and Massachusetts may indeed look forward to steady increase in the practical work as the natural outcome of the activities of public and private agencies urging these ends.

In June, 1918, the recreation program for "children's year" was issued. An appeal was made to save the children of the country from the dangers incident to war, by providing them with wholesome recreation and activities for their leisure time. In a study of child welfare in warring countries in Europe, made by the Children's Bureau, it was stated that juvenile delinquency had increased. Greater numbers of children than usual were being brought to court, with increasing seriousness in their offenses. Writers on the subject were unanimous in their reasons for this delinquency, such as the absence of fathers in the army, and of mothers in the factory; the fact that leaders had been drawn away from the schools and clubs; that parks and playgrounds had been closed; that children could command high wages, and therefore developed that sense of freedom from discipline which comes to a child with independent wage-earning ability.

The national program asked that a "patriotic play week" be arranged for every town during September, with the idea that all summer play activities might culminate in one great demonstration. Leaflets were published with suggestions for games, pageants, picnics and physical efficiency tests. These were sent to every chairman in Massachusetts. It was realized, however, that to do any thorough work expert leadership was necessary, as in the baby hygiene program, where the nurses had taken so important a part. The Playground and Recreation Association of America was appealed to, and a field secretary was sent to develop recreational work in Massachusetts in connection with the Child Welfare Department. She came in August, but unfortunately her work was seriously interrupted by the influenza epidemic and her own illness, forcing her to be away for three months and preventing the resumption of her work until January. Her report of the situation reads as follows: —

In Massachusetts the plans for a play week amounted to nothing — as such; but the Child Welfare Committee in disseminating the material



on the subject did a very effective piece of constructive work. The literature sent out has been of decided educational value, and has had an untold influence in arousing communities to the realization of the importance of play in child conservation. The proof of the efficacy of this propaganda is the number of towns which have asked for further information regarding the movement, and which have shown a desire to start the work. If follow-up work can be provided before this interest has a chance to lag, without doubt much progress will be made.

In November the national program for the "back-to-school drive" was issued. This aimed to return to school those boys and girls who left in June but failed to come back after vacation; also to educate parents, and the public generally, in the value of a longer period of instruction for boys and girls, and in establishing scholarships for those who would otherwise be unable to obtain such education. Continuation classes and vocational guidance were given consideration in the scheme. The Child Welfare Department turned to the State Board of Education for advice, and offered its co-operation in carrying out that part of the program which the commissioner considered proper and necessary in Massachusetts. After several conferences between the two departments, the commissioner made the following statement, which was sent to Washington:—

The laws of this State appear to provide adequate means to be used by the properly constituted authorities of the State for the enforcement of compulsory education laws, and for the prevention of illegal employment of children in industry. Moreover, it is proposed to strengthen the compulsory education law, and to add provisions for compulsory continuation schools. Plans for this legislation are being vigorously pushed.

The commissioner further stated as his belief that "ample machinery was provided by law, through the authorized school officials of the State, for dealing with this group of boys and girls from fourteen to sixteen years of age." As a result of the foregoing, the "back-to-school drive" received no further emphasis.

With the cessation of war, the departments of the Council of National Defense were asked to make plans whereby



such activities as were of use to the State in times of peace should be organized in such a way as to be permanent and independent of the Council of National Defense. This work, also started by the Massachusetts Committee, would appear to be as important in peace as in war time. In considering the actual results accomplished by the department, the program in relation to child hygiene stood out most forcibly, and it was determined that every effort should be centered upon insuring its permanency and further development. Accordingly, each chairman was asked to report how the work started by the local committee could best be tied to a permanent local organization. The replies fell into three groups: (1) the work should be carried on by the Visiting Nursing Association; or (2) by the Board of Health; or (3), in a few instances, the Child Welfare Committee of the Council of National Defense should itself become a permanent Child Hygiene Association.

There already existed in Massachusetts an Association of Directors of Public Health Nursing Organizations, of which many child welfare chairmen were members, and which others expected to join. The vice-chairman of the Child Welfare Department was the president of this association, and the State Board of Health had the list of its members and was ready to continue to hold conferences at the State House, and also to call upon this same group of women to help carry out a State program governing the health of children. The official backing of the Council of National Defense will be missed, but the work that was in existence for a year should be strong enough to stand by itself with the co-operation of an unofficial State association. In a few cities the local interest in recreation was so great that a special committee was being formed to further the work independently. It is therefore not unreasonable to hope that what was begun as a war emergency will be of permanent value to the Commonwealth.

## CHAPTER III

### COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN AGRICULTURE

The Committee on Women in Agriculture, for the summer of 1918, was as follows:—

Mrs. J. Montgomery Sears, *Chairman*.

Mrs. Gordon Abbott.

Miss Mabel Babcock.

Mrs. William A. Copeland.

Miss Helen Holmes.

Mrs. Lewis K. Morse.

Mrs. William S. Patten.

Mrs. Richard S. Russell.

Mrs. James Swift.

In the spring of 1918 a conference was called by Mrs. Thayer to plan for the work of women in agriculture in Massachusetts, at which were present representatives of the Committee on Public Safety and the Women's Agricultural Committee of the Council of National Defense.

At this meeting it was decided that the registration of women for agricultural service should be done by the Land Service Committee of the Woman's National Farm and Garden Association, and that the experiment of establishing separate units should be attempted, rather than to make a State-wide canvas for woman labor. As the chairman of the Land Service Committee, Mrs. Sears, was also a member of the Woman's Committee on Agriculture, this work was done in co-operation with the Council of National Defense.

Twelve hundred women were registered, and 250 were placed in units or on private estates. Eleven units were established by the Land Service Committee, and the two largest, at Lancaster and Westwood, were financed by the New England branch, both being installed as demonstration units and sources of labor supply.

In connection with the Westwood unit, which began work in May and closed October 1, a community market was established in Dedham, where fresh vegetables were sold by the farmerettes two days each week. Canning was also

carried on throughout the season, and the unit furnished labor to 50 employers. In its behalf a farmerette festival was held, September 19, 1918, on the estate of Mrs. Edward Cunningham, which proved a great success. Five hundred people were present, 100 of this number being farmerettes, and the net returns amounted to \$1,400.

The demands for service at Lancaster began with the first warm days in the spring, when the emergency work consisted of asparagus cutting, and continued until after harvesting, in October. In all, 52 employers were served in Lancaster and vicinity, and 33 per cent of this service remained in the country to work during the winter.

Ten other young women, from various summer units, were placed at work on the estate of Mr. Richard T. Crane, Jr., at Ipswich, where they likewise studied various phases of farm life.

Very few of the women employed had any previous knowledge of farm life, but their spirit and attitude toward the project contributed largely to its success. This was proved by the appreciation shown on the part of their employers, who felt (the labor problem being so acute) that their crops in many cases would have been lost but for this extra help.

On Labor Day, the Pittsfield Unit, which was supervised by Miss E. M. Boutwell and financed by Miss Gertrude Watson, held a county fair in Pittsfield, which netted \$400. This sum was given to the Land Service Committee, who added another \$100. The whole was then contributed to the New England branch for a scholarship fund, to be used by young women wishing to take special agricultural courses at Amherst the following winter. These scholarships were awarded to five young women who had worked in units the previous summer, and who wished to take up agriculture as a vocation and to pursue their studies at the Massachusetts Agricultural College.

Improved health was reported by practically all workers, and for the first time the joys of country life and work in the open were realized by many of these young women.

A report of the work on the Brookline gardens, under the direction of Mrs. William S. Patten of the National Civic Federation, stated:—

The Brookline Girls' Gardening Unit was most satisfactory. Not one of the girls dropped out, missed a single day or was late at her work. Twelve out of the fifteen girls asked to be allowed to work until September 8, five weeks longer than the time for which they volunteered.

A dance was given for the girls at the Brookline Day Nursery. On July 13, Mrs. Higginson and Mrs. William Reed invited them to Cohasset, where they thoroughly enjoyed a swim and a picnic supper.

On July 15, the garden was inspected by Mrs. Mead. We fed the girls at the Brookline Day Nursery morning and evening at a cost of 25 cents a day for each girl. With the cook's wages of \$10.50 a week it brings the cost per girl to 38 cents a day. As we receive 50 cents from the town of Brookline, the expense to the Civic Federation, not including installment, for eight weeks, May 15 to July 10, is \$8.08.

The Lowthorpe Horticultural School, represented by Miss Babcock, director, reported:—

The school established short training courses for supervisors in the spring of 1918. During the summer eleven students were enrolled who did good work. Courses of lectures were given by Amherst men. The classes planned and planted their own gardens, assisted the Girl Scout Camp of Harvard, and did most of the work on the farm at Lowthorpe—haymaking, apple picking, canning, etc.,—except plowing, and learned to milk and to take care of the stock. The garden and crops proved successful, and we were able to send frequent contributions of vegetables to Camp Devens.

The Service Unit of the North Shore Garden Club, represented by Mrs. Gordon Abbott, reported:—

Last spring, when the food shortage was beginning to be acutely felt in this country, a group of young girls, most of them still at school, offered to give their time during the summer holidays to growing vegetables for the Beverly Hospital, if the Garden Club would underwrite expenses.

This offer was gladly accepted, and the hospital, with a personnel of one hundred, has bought no vegetables since the early crops were ripe. The supply of canned and dried vegetables will last until next spring's crops are ready.

The girls enlisted for voluntary service of at least nine hours a week,

under the name of the Service Unit of the North Shore Garden Club. Their work had three branches, — a motor corps that collected surplus vegetables from neighboring gardens, a group of farmerettes who did all the work exclusive of plowing and harrowing, and a canning group. This last worked at the Wenham Cannery under the direction of Mrs. Edward B. Cole for one day a week, and the members put her instruction to such good use that they were able, by the 1st of July, to undertake, without supervision, the canning and preserving of large quantities of their garden produce at a small and well-equipped room that was lent to them for the purpose in the neighborhood of their farm. Only 4 jars of the 3,069 prepared by them have spoiled.

No man worked on the farm, nor was any labor hired. Most of the girls worked with splendid spirit, and earned the arm band of the Farm and Garden Association, which was given to any girl who kept conscientiously her agreement with the unit. The results, that no bookkeeping can compute, are the gain to the girls in character, the real benefit to patients and nurses of an ample supply of fresh vegetables, the increased production of food at a time when it was much needed, and the help to the hospital when the funds of all home charities were low. Much encouragement and useful advice from older North Shore residents have helped to make this experiment of the girls and their youthful leaders a success.



## CHAPTER IV

### COMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND RECREATION

The Department of Health and Recreation, under the leadership of Mrs. Clarence R. Edwards, was formed in May, 1917. During the summer Mrs. Edwards was instrumental in starting three service clubs, — one in Ayer, one near Camp Devens, and one in Boston at 48 Boylston Street. Mrs. Edwards also formed a very efficient committee of chairmen of existing organizations interested in work among women and girls. Later, Mrs. Edwards left Boston, and Mrs. Robert W. Lovett was appointed executive chairman, the chairmanship being held by Mrs. John A. Johnston, with the following executive committee: —

Miss Mary A. Barr.  
Mrs. A. K. Cohen.  
Mrs. William Coolidge.  
Miss Mary Fay.  
Mrs. George R. Fearing.

Mrs. Henry Howard.  
Mrs. Joseph Lee.  
Mrs. Harold Peabody.  
Mrs. R. S. Russell.  
Mrs. Robert Weston.

This department was formed, not only to act as a clearing house and co-ordinating agency, but to carry out in the State the work so ably suggested and accomplished by the War Camp Community Service in the cantonments. It co-operated closely with the Naval Auxiliary, the Special Aid, the Massachusetts League for Catholic Women, the Jewish League, the Jewish Welfare Board, the Massachusetts League for Women and Girls, and the War Work Councils of both the Young Women's and Young Men's Christian Associations. The chairman served on both of these councils, and the department worked in concert with the local committees of both organizations and with the Massachusetts Committee for Girls Work.

Since it was found that there existed pressing need to

awaken girls from fourteen to twenty-one years of age to a sense of their responsibilities and to the definite part they must take in the war, certain service leagues were established with the help of trained, as well as of volunteer workers. These leagues were organized in the following twenty-two cities and towns of the State: Springfield, Northampton, Greenfield, Sunderland, North Adams, Ayer, Pittsfield, Worcester, Fitchburg, Leominster, Framingham, New Bedford, Fall River, Weymouth, Scituate, Wakefield, Medford, Ipswich, Newburyport, Lowell, Quincy and Cambridge. In ten cities trained organizers were provided by the War Camp Community Service. This is only one of the many cases where the co-operation of these service leagues was of vital importance to the department. Four of the cities were equipped with such organizers through local support.

The experience of the Committee in Lowell showed great possibilities. A community recreational center was established under the auspices of the War Camp Community Service. This was entirely non-sectarian, and was enthusiastically supported by Jews, Catholics and Protestants.

In Ayer, where the congestion caused by Camp Devens was very acute, the Committee was able, through the kind offices of the State, to establish a comfort and first-aid station.

The enthusiasm shown by the girls, and their eagerness to do their share, encouraged every effort to continue in the future the plan so started, and to profit by the lessons taught by the emergencies of war. It was therefore especially gratifying when later the War Camp Community Service agreed to take over the work of the department, as under its auspices none of the benefits of the past months were likely to be wasted.

## CHAPTER V

### COMMITTEE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING SOCIAL AGENCIES

Mrs. Frederick S. Mead, *Chairman*.  
Mrs. L. Carteret Fenno, *First Vice-Chairman*.  
Miss Ida M. Cannon, *Second Vice-Chairman*.  
Miss Mary T. Beard.  
Miss Francis R. Morse.  
Miss Mary M. Riddle.

The duties of this Committee were not considered to be executive. Through its co-operation with the other departments of the Council of National Defense and its Advisory Committee, and in consultation with the leaders in the field of social agencies, its task was:—

*First.*—To be satisfied, through a preliminary survey, that the existing agencies were not being seriously crippled because of the war emergency. In this connection a survey conducted by Miss Cannon, Miss Ella Lyman, and Miss R. Emerson showed that Massachusetts charitable agencies did not apprehend serious difficulty financially. They reported that their greatest trouble lay in a shortage of social workers, many of whom had been drawn upon for service in the Red Cross, Young Men's Christian Association, etc.

*Second.*—To carry and interpret the messages from Washington, and to make sure of such correlation among the peace-time agencies as was essential to meet the necessities created by war conditions. Recognition of this requirement had already been felt among the agencies, which were found to be working satisfactorily.

#### Settlements

Boston was especially fortunate in its many settlement groups. The Council had little to offer to them. On the

other hand, they were of inestimable service to the community during the continuance of the war.

One piece of settlement work, however, was brought about, through the Council of National Defense, with the sanction of this Committee, and with the approval also of Mr. Robert A. Woods, president of the Social Union. This was the districting of the city of Boston by neighborhoods, undertaken by Mr. S. Woods of the South End House, Miss Wills of the Lincoln House, Mrs. Gookin, overseer of the poor, and Miss Mary A. Barr, chairman of the Food Committee for Boston. Under Miss Barr's leadership the plan ultimately developed, for the food work of the city proved to be of permanent value.

### Day Nurseries

Several conferences were held with day nursery groups of the State Department of Health, following which the work was undertaken by the Department of Women in Industry, and it was ultimately decided to leave the matter entirely in the hands of that organization. Particular attention was given to the question of licensing day nurseries in the State.

### Hospitals

The necessity for increasing both the number of candidates and the facilities for a nursing service was judged to be the most obvious requirement. A year previously conferences of hospital superintendents, called by Dr. Herbert B. Howard of the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, led to a survey of facilities in training schools, and arrangements were made to fill all available space in these schools.

To increase the nursing service without lowering professional standards, different methods were adopted:—

1. *The Housing-out of Pupils.*— This was not widely favored by superintendents in Massachusetts, who felt that nurses should have routine hospital life during their training.

2. *Admittance of College Women.*— This permitted the

admittance of college women, whose degree is accepted as the equivalent of one year's service.

3. *Release of Pupil Nurses.* — Encouragement was given for the release of pupil nurses for a period of four months during their senior year, that they might acquire special experience in public health work.

Opportunities for the training of sixty of the nurses thus released were arranged through the Instructive District Nursing Association and Simmons College. A sub-committee of the Council of National Defense, under the chairmanship of Mrs. Stephen Rushmore, rendered helpful service. Provision for housing the nurses was made through a special grant of \$20,000 from the Metropolitan Chapter of the Red Cross.

4. *Army Nurses' Training Corps.* — Massachusetts had one of the first army nurse training schools, — at Camp Devens. Miss Mary M. Riddle, superintendent of the Newton Hospital and a member of the Committee, was chosen superintendent. At this juncture Washington inquired whether the Committee would be able to secure suitable personnel for the opening class within a fortnight's time. Dr. Anne H. Strong undertook the task, and the class was largely chosen from a list submitted by her. The members entered the service for patriotic reasons, and brought a new group into the field of nursing. Miss Strong was asked to send to Washington a synopsis of the method she used to secure this group.

A sub-committee, with Mrs. F. L. Higginson as chairman, and Mrs. L. C. Femmo as treasurer, raised a fund to buy equipment, textbooks and other necessities for the routine of the school. Without this money the training would have been much delayed, and in many instances found to be impossible.

### **Drive for Army Nurses' Training Corps**

When the general call came from Washington for the enrollment of candidates for the Army Nurses' Training



Corps, a joint meeting was held with the councilors of the State Nursing Association, by which their co-operation was secured in making the plan known throughout the State, and also in the establishment of a bureau at the Massachusetts General Hospital under the guidance of Miss Helen Wood. Exceedingly important work was done through the bureau in the distribution of information on the general subject of nursing, as well as in regard to the army course. The results were far greater than is shown by the figures.

Number receiving army application blanks, . . . . .	204
Average age of applicants, . . . . .	24
Number having more than a high school education (not including a business course), . . . . .	75

Two hundred and fourteen applicants were found to be ineligible for the army school. These were given a list of civilian hospitals, to which they were directly to apply.

### **Student Nurses' Reserve Corps**

A meeting was called of representative superintendents throughout the State, and their opinion asked as to the manner in which the Student Nurses' Reserve Corps should be organized. With their assistance, and through the Committee's connection with the Council of National Defense, as well as by extensive publicity, a large enrollment was secured. The work was so well done that the training schools throughout the Commonwealth will continue in the future to reap the benefit thereof in the increased number of applicants they have to draw from.

Other work undertaken by the Committee follows.

### **Commission for Nurses**

At the request of Acting Surgeon-General Brooks, 100 nurses were passed upon to serve in case of emergency in the Massachusetts State Guard. These nurses were given the rank and pay of Lieutenant. It is believed that this is

the first time such rank and pay have been given to women in the United States, although a similar system has been customary in Canada and parts of Europe.

### **Survey of Hospital Accommodations**

In connection with the Council of National Defense of Boston, Miss Riddle prepared a questionnaire to ascertain the number of beds, the immediate use of which could be depended upon for returning wounded. The estimate was about 6,000 for the whole State. Plans were discussed with the same group as to adequate provision for syphilitic and tuberculous cases, and for those needing training for rehabilitation service.

### **Health Emergency during Influenza Epidemic**

The chairman of the Committee, Mrs. Mead, through her connection with the Council of National Defense, was asked to serve on the Governor's Health Emergency Committee, and was put in charge of its personnel. The experience of that period made it more than ever evident that our nursing service was far from adequate in numbers, and, moreover, that there was real need of widening the service by the inclusion of licensed attendants. Of the total 1,000 women who passed through the bureau and took part in the care of the sick, 600, or nearly two-thirds, were untrained laywomen. At a meeting of very representative interests in the nursing world, called just after the epidemic, it was agreed by all that a place in the nursing service should be made for attendants, and that every effort should be advanced to further legislation insuring the registration of nurses based upon graduation from an approved hospital, and also for licensing attendants.

Mrs. Thayer, as chairman of the Woman's Department of the Council of National Defense, was asked to appear for this bill, and the Committee had reason to hope that the legislation so long hoped for would be passed, for great interest in nursing had been stimulated both by the war

and by the epidemic, and perhaps, in a slight measure, through the efforts of the Woman's Committee of the Council of Defense to enlist public interest in nursing problems. The bill in question had not been enacted at the time the activities of the Committee ceased.

Realizing that the epidemic, like every other great disaster, would leave much suffering in its trail, an advisory council was appointed to carry out the plan for medical social service as drawn up at Mrs. Thayer's request by Miss Ida M. Cannon of the Committee. Miss Edith N. Burleigh, superintendent of the Girls Parole Department, was loaned to take charge of the work. District supervisors, all highly trained social workers loaned by various agencies, were placed in the eight health districts of the State, the first approach to each district being made through the district health officer. The supervisors quickly determined the need in their respective districts, and whether there was any possibility of its being met through local resources. This often resulted in a request for a certain type of worker to stay long enough on the local job to help develop a good working plan. The supervisors also visited 123 cities and towns of the 354 in the State, and found that the emergency was adequately met in 43, but only partially in 37. There appeared to be distinctly inadequate leadership in 11, and no community organization at all in 14. In the majority of instances the local board of health was the prominent factor controlling treatment and relief; in others, the Red Cross and Committee on Public Safety had charge. Thirty-seven of the towns had district nursing organizations. In 27, emergency hospitals had been opened. In 30 or more instances the district supervisor was the direct means of consolidating community forces.

### **Social Service**

At the Committee's request a short course for social service workers was held at the School of Social Work (Simmons College) in the summer of 1918, case work being

provided in connection with it. This was done in conjunction with the Red Cross and other war service organizations, and made a definite appeal to those who wished to uphold peace-time agencies.

Conferences were held in regard to the possibility of increasing the attendance at meetings of the Massachusetts State Conference, and extending that body's influence. Upon the advice of leading social workers it was decided to put to one side, for the time, at least, the question of federating charities, both as to their functions and their finances. A plan for a social service bureau was considered, and a survey prepared by Mrs. Harvey N. Davis, but this was not acted upon because of the efficient work of the bureau of the American Red Cross and that of the Special Aid for American Preparedness societies, both of which were in a position to extend their work among peace-time social agencies.

Two conferences with city and town representatives of the Council of National Defense were held to discuss plans and procedure. Several cities, among them Cambridge and Newburyport, had already appointed women to represent this department of women's work. With these exceptions it was decided that it would not be necessary to have special representatives, but that local work should be handled through town and city chairmen. Thanks to the latter's splendid co-operation this arrangement proved most successful.

Two large and inspiring meetings were held at the State House in connection with the nursing drive. In addition, the Council of National Defense arranged for addresses to be given at many meetings elsewhere.

The Committee was very grateful to the late Mrs. Harvey N. Davis and to Miss Elizabeth Andrews for their valuable work as secretaries. Mrs. Mead's task as chairman and directing influence in administering the Committee for the Maintenance of Existing Social Agencies involved peculiarly difficult problems, the satisfactory solution of which is the best evidence of her success.



## CHAPTER VI

### THE ARMY AND NAVY YARN SHOP COMMITTEE

Mrs. A. C. Ratshesky, *Chairman.*

Miss Katharine Endicott.  
Mrs. Walter Hunnewell, Jr.  
Mrs. W. S. Patten.

Mrs. James J. Phelan.  
Miss Rosalind Wood.

This enterprise was under the auspices of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, in co-operation with the Massachusetts Woman's Council of National Defense, and was opened for business on November 17, 1917. Its purpose was to give the public an opportunity to buy the highest grade yarns at wholesale prices, provided those purchasing agreed to send the article made therefrom directly to the boys overseas or in the camps, independently of the Red Cross or any other organization.

When the subject first came under consideration by the Committee on Public Safety, Mr. P. A. O'Connell and Mr. George W. Mitton were requested to serve as a sub-committee to co-operate with members of the Committee on Public Safety to assist in installing and organizing the shop, but Mr. Mitton's other work in behalf of the Committee on Public Safety caused the greater part of the organizing to devolve upon Mr. O'Connell. The shop was located in the Little Building on Tremont Street, and was given rent free through the courtesy and generosity of Mr. John Mason Little. Mr. O'Connell arranged to have a temporary floor laid in the store, and also to have all the fixtures built suitable in size for capable and efficient handling of a general yarn business. He also arranged for publicity work in connection with the enterprise, and for signs in and outside of the building, besides organizing an adequate mail order system for taking care of mail orders in the various cities and towns of the Commonwealth. Furthermore, he supplied



several of his own employees to overlook the business and give their help until such time as it was properly organized and a going concern, when it was taken in charge by the Committee. The yarn sold for about \$2.70 to \$2.80 per pound, the prevailing price for the same grade in the retail stores being about \$4 a pound. A condition precedent imposed on any one applying for the yarn was to sign a pledge card to the effect that the article made would be given to some one serving in the army or navy. Each of the six ladies comprising the Committee took charge of the shop for one day during the week, and was responsible for securing eight or ten volunteers to sell the yarn on that day. Practically the only paid workers were one head saleswoman and two cashiers. The furniture, cash register and other necessities were all donated free. In every direction the undertaking met with the most generous sympathy from the public.

The co-operation of the metropolitan chapter of the American Red Cross also aided materially towards the success of the shop. It furnished its own representative to assist in selling the yarn, as well as giving printed directions and information for the proper knitting of the garments. Samples of finished articles were always on exhibition.

One hundred thousand pounds of yarn — khaki, gray and natural wool — were contracted for by Mr. A. C. Ratshesky at a very much lower rate than the market price, through the courtesy and patriotism of Mr. William M. Wood, president of the American Woolen Company. After the shop was once started its entire management came under the direction of Mrs. Ratshesky, who day and night was unremitting in her painstaking interest in conducting its affairs.

When, by a careful accounting, it was found on closing the shop that a surplus remained, it was decided to divide this amount among projects of a similar character, such as war relief agencies. The appended report shows how far the surplus was disposed of up to the time the shop closed, as well as the amount still left over.

This last balance (\$16,890.92) was later put into the hands of Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer, Mrs. A. C. Ratshesky and Mrs. Eugene Endicott as trustees to expend the same for similar agencies, in accordance with a vote passed by the Committee appointed to wind up and liquidate the affairs of the Committee on Public Safety.

There is no doubt that this enterprise gave to many women who otherwise would not have been able to purchase the necessary material with which to make sweaters, gloves, wristers, stockings, mufflers, etc., an opportunity greatly desired, and one which they could have obtained in no other way. Their gratitude and appreciation more than repaid the efforts put forth in their behalf.

#### ARMY AND NAVY YARN SHOP

##### *Receipts*

Sale of 100,000 pounds of yarn, . . . . .	\$259,448 71	
Sale of burlap, . . . . .	101 55	
Bank interest on deposit, . . . . .	591 01	
	<hr/>	\$260,141 27

##### *Expenditures*

Cost of 100,000 pounds of yarn, . . . . .	\$230,109 40	
Expense account, . . . . .	} 2,140 95	
Salaries, . . . . .		
Light and fixtures, . . . . .		
Express and freight, . . . . .		
Paper and twine, . . . . .		232,250 35
Telephone and telegraph, . . . . .		
Insurance and advertising, . . . . .		
		<hr/>
Net profits, . . . . .		\$27,890 92

##### *Contributions*

American Red Cross, . . . . .	\$5,000 00	
101st Auxiliary, . . . . .	1,000 00	
United War Work Campaign, . . . . .	5,000 00	
	<hr/>	11,000 00
		<hr/>
Cash on hand February 1, 1919, . . . . .		\$16,890 92

## CHAPTER VII

### COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION

At the request of the Woman's Committee at Washington, Mrs. Thayer appointed as chairman of her Department of Education the State appointee of the National Association of Collegiate Alumnae, Mrs. Sumner B. Pearmain of Boston, who secured an advisory board or committee, consisting of the president and deans of women's colleges, besides others well known in educational work in the State, as follows:—

Miss Sarah L. Arnold, Dean of Simmons College.

Miss Bertha M. Boody, Dean of Radcliffe College.

Miss Ada L. Comstock, Dean of Smith College.

Miss Frances G. Curtis, Boston School Committee.

Miss Caroline S. Davies, Dean of Jackson College.

Miss Florence Jackson, Appointment Bureau, Women's Educational and Industrial Union.

Mrs. Lee S. McColester, President, Boston Branch of the Association of Collegiate Alumnae.

Miss Ellen F. Pendleton, President of Wellesley College.

Miss Eva Gowing Ripley, Department of Education, Massachusetts Federation of Women's Clubs.

Mrs. William Morton Wheeler, Women's Municipal League.

Miss Mary P. Winsor, Director, Winsor School, Brookline.

Miss Mary E. Woolley, President of Mount Holyoke College.

Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer, *ex officio*.

After many weeks of correspondence, local chairmen were placed in most of the towns and cities in the Commonwealth, more than half of whom were members of school boards. The rest were college graduates or women willing to undertake such educational propaganda relating to the war as the Washington Committee indicated to be the special business of the Department of Education.

Members of the Advisory Committee, individually and collectively, gave much valuable time and thought to the

best method of conducting a war educational campaign. The college officials serving on the Committee made every effort to secure from their alumnae recruits for the Army School of Nursing, and to offer in their colleges the extra curriculum courses required by the exigencies of the war.

One of the college presidents, Miss Woolley, prepared a circular appeal to students, urging them to remain at school as a patriotic duty. Another member, Miss Jackson, obtained for the Committee's use a similar appeal written by an undergraduate of Smith College. A third, Miss Winsor, took the lead in compiling a patriotic reading list, entitled "Patriotism, Internationalism and the Great War," which, with permission of officials of the New York Library, was issued by the Committee as a supplement to the New York library list, entitled "Patriotism." In September, 1917, President Pendleton sent a personal, signed appeal to all Wellesley alumnae in behalf of the need for nurses. All members of the Committee took an active interest in an effort, suggested by Mrs. Thayer, to have the Harvard Medical School open to women on the same terms as to men. Much time was spent in preparing a petition to the President and Fellows of Harvard University, to which were appended the signatures of well-known educators, men and women, not only in Massachusetts, but in the cities of New York, Washington, Chicago and St. Louis, and at Columbia, Wisconsin, Brown, Vassar and Bryn Mawr. A letter from President Lowell of Harvard University to Mrs. Thayer acknowledged the receipt of the petition, and stated that it would have very earnest consideration, and a special Committee was appointed by the college for this purpose.

In the name of the Advisory Committee, a number of circular letters and questionnaires were sent to the 350 local representatives, asking their co-operation: first, to secure patriotic speakers for the schools; second, to place the Committee's patriotic reading list, appeals to students, war pamphlets and other literature in schools, public libraries, current events classes, and with individuals living in sparsely

settled communities; and third, to combine organized forces for a campaign of patriotic education according to the needs of the community, and for that end to use local four-minute speakers and other speakers furnished free of charge by the Speakers' Bureau of the Committee on Public Safety; also government films, posters and State Food Exhibits.

In order to mobilize all available forces of college women in the State, the Department of Education, with the full co-operation of Mrs. Thayer, prepared and issued during the third week in September, 1918, a very carefully worded questionnaire to about 8,000 college graduates, asking for a record of their war work to date, and of the work they would be willing to undertake the following year, at home or abroad, along the lines required by the various State and United States war agencies. Owing partly to the influenza epidemic, but also to the sudden termination of hostilities, only 2,000 cards were filled in and returned. Of these, 1,700, representing some 225 towns, were filed with metal clips of different colors showing the different kinds of service available under the headings Agriculture, Americanization, Child Welfare, Community Singing, Education, Food Conservation, Liberty Loan, Health, Red Cross and Allied Relief, Social and Recreational Service and Miscellaneous. Long lists of workers were furnished from these cards to the Red Cross for use in its various departments of civilian relief, and for canteen workers at home and abroad; to the Bureau of Immigration for its work in Americanization; to the Committees responsible for the United War Work Campaign and the Liberty Loans; to the Farm and Garden Association; to the Child Welfare Committee; to the Committee on Community Singing; and to Mrs. Wheeler's Committee on Retail Food Prices. In addition, lists of college graduates willing to undertake the required training or already trained as nurses, and of psychiatric social workers and reconstruction aides, were placed in the hands of officials directly concerned.

Altogether, during the year and a half of its existence, the



Department of Education distributed to its local chairmen, to public and private schools outside of Boston, to public libraries, and to many organizations and individuals, printed matter consisting of 34,150 copies of circular letters, questionnaires and cards. These included pamphlets on "Appeal to the Patriotism of Students," "Patriotism," "Patriotism and Internationalism in the Great War," "Government's War Information Series," "Suggestive Outline for Study," "Truth Teller," "Intercollegiate War Emergency Record," explanatory cards, etc. Much of this literature was printed by the Committee on Public Safety.

Propaganda for a potato campaign was issued in April, 1918, by Mrs. Donald of the Committee on Food Conservation to the local chairmen of the Education Department, and through their co-operation was widely used in the public schools of the State.

The Executive Committee of the Department of Education assumed nearly all the expenses incident to its activities.

## CHAPTER VIII

### COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN INDUSTRY

Mrs. William A. Troy, *Chairman*.

Mrs. George T. Rice, *Vice-Chairman*.

Miss Veronica A. Lynch, *Secretary*.

Miss Mary Donovan.

Miss Mabel Gillespie.

Miss Mary A. Mahoney.

Miss Mary Meehan.

Miss Mary E. Wiggin.

The National Committee on Women in Industry, with affiliated State branches, was created by Mr. Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, as part of his Committee on Labor advisory to the Council of National Defense. The Massachusetts division also became a component part of the Massachusetts Woman's Committee, of which Mrs. Thayer was chairman.

The purpose of the Committee on Women in Industry was to safeguard the welfare of women workers and minor children; to maintain the industrial standards established for their benefit; and to concern itself with the conservation of their health and industrial interests.

The task proved twofold, — it was necessary to urge the entrance of women into industry as its man power decreased; and it was likewise essential to prevent, so far as possible, the exploitation of women under the guise of war necessity.

To accomplish its duties the Committee maintained a close relationship with State and civic bodies which had already been engaged in advancing and protecting the welfare of the worker.

As part of the national organizations, the Massachusetts Committee operated to maintain, under the following heads, certain standards to govern the employment of women in industry, which were endorsed by the War Labor Policies Board: —

Hours of labor.	Posture at work.
Daily hours.	Safety.
Half holiday on Saturday.	Conditions needing correction.
One day of rest in seven.	Prohibited occupations.
Time for meals.	Uniforms.
Rest periods.	Home work.
Night work.	Employment management.
Equality with men's wages.	Co-operation of workers in enforcement of standards.
The basis of determination of wages.	Co-operation with official agencies.
Comfort and sanitation.	

Through the medium of the press and addresses delivered before public and private gatherings by the chairman and vice-chairman of the Committee, diligent effort was made to bring the rules adopted for each standard to the attention of employers and the public in general.

After the formation of the Massachusetts Committee, the first work that came to hand was an investigation into the employment of girls as messengers. It was disclosed that cases existed where girls under eighteen years of age were engaged in carrying messages during the daylight hours. In order to prevent the general employment of young girls in this capacity, the Committee obtained a ruling from the State Board of Labor and Industries prohibiting the employment of female minors as messengers.

Through the efforts of the Committee, the Building Managers' Association determined to send representatives to meet those of the women employed as office building cleaners before the Massachusetts Minimum Wage Commission, in order to reach a wage agreement.

One of the first occupations in which women took the place of men soon after the United States declared war was the elevator service. This work was easy to learn, and although its scale of wages had never been high, substitution was not difficult. The then existing labor laws of the State did not limit the working hours of women thus employed in hotels and office buildings. To meet this deficiency, a bill was drafted by the Committee to include women

elevator operators under the provisions of the fifty-four-hour law. The bill became a law on May 12, 1918, chapter 147, General Acts.

The increase of women in industrial occupations necessitated, in the opinion of the Committee, an addition to the number of inspectors employed by the State Board of Labor and Industries. A special message was sent by the Governor to the Legislature in regard to the advisability of appointing additional inspectors, and the chairman of the Committee appeared before the legislative committee on public service, urging the passage of a bill filed for that purpose. As a result of this hearing, five additional inspectors were granted to the State Board of Labor and Industry.

In conformity with one of the principles set forth in the standards of employment advised by the Committee, at a hearing before the Committee on Social Welfare the Committee recorded itself in favor of a forty-eight-hour week for women and minors.

In company with representatives of the Massachusetts War Efficiency Board, the chairman of the Committee made a trip through the State, so as to express to county farm agents and members of the local Public Safety Committees the government's ideas relative to releasing men of farm experience in mercantile and industrial establishments, especially at planting and harvest times. Particular stress was laid on the fact that in order to secure greater food production it would always be better to retain men of experience, rather than to attempt to train women or inexperienced men in farm duties.

In some cases it was explained that lighter farm work could be done by women, but it was urged that all heavy work should be done by men, as women are physically unfitted to perform heavy farm labor.

In order to fill places made vacant in industrial establishments by releasing labor for farm work, it was suggested that, whenever feasible, processes of manufacture be adjusted so as to make the substitution of women possible.

The Committee also collected data for exhibits concerning women in industry, to be displayed at State and county fairs. In these exhibits the Committee advocated a system whereby the attention of women was called to various industrial occupations existing in the Commonwealth, together with the hours of labor, wages paid, where employment might be secured, and other necessary information of similar character. In addition, the prominent display of the adopted standards relative to the employment of women workers was requested as part of these exhibits.

A recommendation was made by the chairman of the Committee to the Massachusetts Community Labor Board, urging that the employment of female labor might also come under the Board's official control, as otherwise the purpose for which community labor boards were formed would be defeated.

Miss Veronica A. Lynch spent ten days in Washington obtaining data and a plan to assist the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics to compile a description of the character of employment in rubber manufacturing, sugar refining, machine building and the manufacture of soap, — all Massachusetts industries, or closely related thereto. The object of this special inquiry was to facilitate, where most needed, a proper and equitable distribution of the labor supply through the employment service of the United States government.

Because of the increasing number of women having small children who became wage earners during the war, the Committee deemed it expedient to direct attention to an intensive study of the day nursery problem. Miss Lynch and Miss Grace M. Caldwell were appointed a special committee to conduct an investigation of the day nurseries of the State. Their preliminary findings, as based on conditions found in the nurseries visited between August 21 and September 24, 1918, — at which time they were obliged to suspend the investigation on account of the influenza epidemic, — showed that four of these nurseries were closed



for the summer, four were combined nurseries and homes, — with the home the biggest factor in three, — and in three of them the matrons said there was some doubt as to their operating as nurseries in 1919.

The investigation covered a period of about two and one-half weeks, during which twenty-nine out of the fifty nurseries in the State were visited. After a general summing up of the conditions found in twenty-one of these nurseries, the special committee submitted for consideration the following outstanding facts: —

In fourteen of the nurseries factory work was the predominating occupation of the mothers. In two the principal occupation was general day work, cleaning, etc.\* In five the occupations were about equally divided between factory and day work.

Necessity seemed to be the principal reason for these mothers taking up work, and most of them were deserted wives or widows. In comparatively few instances was the reason given that the husband had entered the service. Many applications were being made at the nurseries by mothers who desired to work because they were attracted by the high wages. This was particularly true of women who were entering the employment field for the first time.

*Location.* — In regard to the location of the nurseries, it was noticed that the majority of them were located at a considerable distance from the principal industries. For instance, in one city it was found that the committee operating the day nursery had just purchased a fine, single-family, wooden house in an exceptionally good residential district, — an ideal location for the nursery, but entirely remote from the district in which the largest industries were located. In this instance the nursery was at one end of the city and the industrial section at the other.

*Statistics.* — It was found to be almost impossible to gather satisfactory statistics. This was true in practically all of the nurseries. There were no medical or family records, and very incomplete records of attendance. In one nursery,

just as the investigators were about to leave, a man came to the front door to call for his little girl to take her home. He did not speak very good English, and it was difficult for him to make the matron understand just which little girl was his. It was not very hard for the investigators to appreciate the matron's position, when she said that a strange little girl had come to the nursery that morning with some other children, and she had not taken her name, but supposed she must be the child called for. Here was a child admitted without any medical inspection, with no investigation into her home conditions, and with not even her name asked when she was brought to the nursery by other children.

*Fire Protection.* — In most of the nurseries the fire protection was good.

*Toilet Facilities.* — Nearly all of the nurseries had adequate toilet facilities, though not all were in good condition. A few were absolutely unfit for use. Some were in good repair, but poorly ventilated and not clean. In one nursery, where toilet facilities of the newest and most up-to-date type had but lately been installed, a very bad odor was apparent.

*Medical — Hygienic Conditions.* — The medical inspection proved to be inadequate. Many of the nurseries did not require a medical certificate before admission. Very few had daily medical inspection. In many the doctor did not come unless called. Only three had trained nurses. Two had partially trained, or so-called "practical," nurses. Six were without isolation rooms or other means of caring for children suffering from contagious diseases.

Very few provided individual face cloths, towels, tooth-brushes or combs, and in some instances, where individual towels were provided, they were hung so close together that they ceased to be "individual."

In far too many dry sweeping was employed as a method of cleaning.

Nineteen took in infants one year of age or under.

*Diet.* — Copies of the diet sheet were taken wherever possible, and in most of the nurseries there appeared to be

a real effort made to provide proper and suitable diet for the children.

The milk supply was good, some milk being given in all but two nurseries. One bad feature, however, seemed to be that whenever condensed milk was given to infants by the mothers, the same practice was carried out at the nursery. The matrons made very little attempt to improve on the ignorance of the mothers.

After a careful consideration of the foregoing facts, it would seem that the inefficiencies of the nurseries were due principally to a lack of co-operation between boards of management and matrons; to a paucity of funds to run adequately; and to want of training on the part of the matrons.

In view of other measures before the Legislature, looking to the reorganization and consolidation of various State departments, the Committee deemed it inexpedient to petition for legislation affecting the operation of day nurseries in the State.

## CHAPTER IX

### COMMITTEE ON PUBLICITY

Mrs. Frederick E. Dowling, *Chairman.*  
Miss Grace M. Burt.

Late in October, 1917, Mrs. Thayer called a meeting of the newspaper women of Boston, together with representatives from the "Brockton Times," "Salem News," "New Bedford Standard," "Springfield Republican," "Worcester Telegram," "Lynn Item," "Newton Graphic," and the press department of the State Federation of Women's Clubs. The outcome of this gathering was a permanent Publicity Committee, each member of which was pledged to further by every means possible the work of the Massachusetts Woman's Division, Council of National Defense. This promise was amply fulfilled during the succeeding year and a half.

As the members of this conference were all dependent on their work for a livelihood, the question of securing a volunteer who would be at the State House every day, in order to keep closely in touch with the trend of events, became somewhat of a problem. This situation was overcome when the State Federation of Women's Clubs lent the services of Mrs. Dowling, who was joined by another member of the Federation, Miss Burt of the "Newton Graphic." Both of these ladies gave two days of each week to the work, and together constituted the Committee. As a result, on the first Monday in November, 1917, the Women's Publicity Committee was installed, with desk room in Mrs. Thayer's offices.

The first work of the Committee was a circular letter to each of the 135 weekly newspapers in the State, asking for donations of space. Of these, about 40 per cent at once answered in the affirmative, and many more eventually came into line; so that before the midsummer of 1918 news-

letters setting forth the more urgent work of the Council were given every Thursday to all the weeklies in Massachusetts. The State House News Service was the medium through which most of the semiweekly suburban and Boston daily papers were reached, and gave excellent service.

Late in December of 1917 the "Boston Advertiser-American," through Miss W. M. Jerdone, sent word that the columns of its Sunday and daily editions were at the disposal of the Committee. This gave an opportunity to put into practice a hope which Mrs. Thayer had entertained of having an allotted space in some Boston Sunday paper, where the more important matters of each sub-committee of the Committee on Public Safety, women's committees of the Council of National Defense, State Food Administration, State Home Economics Department, and Fuel Administration might be placed before the public under the signature of the heads of the various Committees. The "Advertiser-American" welcomed this suggestion, and a plan was mapped out for a half page insertion in the next issue, Sunday, July 13, 1918. All subsequent issues were arranged and edited by Mrs. Dowling, as chairman.

As the work developed, it became evident that a State-wide publicity organization was needed to secure an outlet in the country weeklies for the great mass of news matter received daily from Washington. Mrs. Thayer authorized the Committee to communicate with the women county food administrators, and to ask for suggestions as to the choice of county publicity chairmen. These, when appointed, in turn chose assistants in every town where a paper was published, thereby obtaining a local and a widespread personal interest towards securing publicity for important projects. The plan proved of great value a little later in obtaining full publicity during the great drive for nurses, the purpose of which was to recruit 2,000 women for the hospital training schools. It called, however, for strenuous effort at a time when world-thrilling news coming from the European war front crowded all else from the newspapers,



the size of whose editions had been reduced by government orders; yet the Publicity Committee secured sixteen different notices, varying in length from a "stick" or two to a column in length. Two paid front page advertisements in the "Herald" and "Transcript," and another in the Chamber of Commerce "Current Events," were found necessary, but these, with certain car posters, constituted the only expense incurred by the Committee, outside of postage. Both the "Boston Post" and the "Transcript" gave editorial space, and the country weeklies did good work in reaching the more remote districts. Mr. Herbert Carl, New England director of the Associated Press, put out excellent stories. Fifteen hundred posters, reading "Join the United States Nurse Reserve, Recruiting Office, Massachusetts General Hospital," were displayed upon electric cars in Greater Boston. Posters, furnished from Washington, were placed in all railroad stations throughout the Commonwealth, in many of the large department stores and in restaurants. Slides, telling of the drive and of the quota that Massachusetts was asked to furnish, were displayed each night upon the screen at the Food Administration cottages on the Common. These slides were also exhibited in many of the moving-picture houses in the State.

A wheatless food demonstration car was established, which was the medium of disseminating much information on food matters. The car was on exhibition for several days in Post Office Square, and, upon permission being given by the Committee, was greeted by a battery of photographers the morning of its first arrival. Unfortunately, the demonstration assigned for that day to the kitchen installed upon the front platform was not on hand. The photographers insisted that only "working" pictures would be acceptable to the city editors, and that "action" was absolutely necessary. Fearing the loss of so much good advertising if their request was not fulfilled, Mrs. Dowling donned cap and apron, hastily fashioned from paper toweling, and impersonated the demonstrator at work among the kitchen utensils,

with complete success. The electrotypes of these pictures, as well as the negatives, were given by the papers making them, and were used many times afterward in advertising the coming of the car in the various suburban districts, while the Western Newspaper Union gave out a description story in advance.

The Publicity Department was willing at all times to secure every possible space for other women's organizations engaged in conservation or any type of war work. Among the outside interests served were the Liberty Bread Shop, the Women's National Farm and Garden Association, the Women's Land Army, the Lowthorpe School of Agriculture and Farm Management for Women, and the Retail Stores Clearing House, the latter a branch of the United States employment service.

Upon request of Mr. Michael M. Davis of the Boston Dispensary, the chairman of the Committee reviewed his publication entitled, "Food Supply in Families of Limited Means," and also secured for it six newspaper notices, in addition to a column story with seven column flare-head in the "Boston American," written by a member of its staff. Mr. Davis's book was the outcome of a survey made by him of 200 families having small incomes, and the relation of the food actually consumed and the food purchased by them in one week. This revealed some amazing facts in the matter of thrift. It also demonstrated specifically how for the same amount of money, better expended, more nourishing food could have been procured. The pamphlet had the endorsement of the Food Administration, and was considered to be of much value to social workers during the war. The publicity secured for it by the Committee created a demand for copies that soon exhausted the edition.

Many hours each week were spent in studying the exchange literature from other States, and selecting what might prove effective for use in Massachusetts. The bulky news-letters that came almost daily from all departments of the Council at Washington had also to be carefully read, and excerpts



Food Administration Demonstration Car





prepared for publication in the State press. This task was probably the most tedious duty of the Committee.

Articles descriptive of the formation and functions of the Woman's Division, Council of National Defense, were supplied to the bi-monthly publication of the League for Preventive Work upon request, and reports of all unusual war work in Massachusetts were furnished frequently to the Creel Bureau, the Washington News Bureau of which Miss Ida Tarbell was in charge, the Russell Sage Foundation, and several of the well-known magazines.

What proved of special value as a means of promoting food conservation was a set of model menus of church suppers and socials, with accompanying recipes issued by the Committee. These were printed in many of the religious publications of the State. These menus were the work of Mrs. Harriet L. K. Darling, attached to the Home Economics Department of the State Council. Articles on home economics were also written by the chairman and printed by the "Boston Herald." The work of the Committee often extended far outside the State, when requests for help demanded it. For example, a call came from the Michigan State College to furnish a collection of all publications regularly used by the Publicity Committee, for exhibit at the Farmers' Week Festival in that State. In response, copies of the "Sunday Advertiser" half page, the weekly newsletter, and the Food Administration bulletins were forwarded.

The last but not the least of the activities of this Committee were the many interviews arranged, or refused, for Boston newspapers with the chairman of the Council, Mrs. Thayer, or with the vice-chairman, Mrs. Gurney. It was always, however, a matter of personal gratification to the Committee that at all times the pleasantest relations existed between the Council and the press. Fair, intelligent and courteous treatment was given every statement issued by the Committee, and the space allowed was quite as generous as conditions permitted.



## PART V

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### MASSACHUSETTS FOOD ADMINISTRATION

#### CHAPTER I

#### **Personnel and Introduction**

*Federal and State Food Administrator for Massachusetts*

Henry B. Endicott.

*Assistant Food Administrators*

A. C. Ratshesky.

James J. Phelan.

Later appointed:—

Z. C. Dickinson.

H. C. Everett, Jr.

R. M. Everett.

A. A. Kidder.

Edward Wigglesworth.

John D. Willard.

*Federal Home Economics Director for Massachusetts*

Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer.

*Board of Food Administration*

Henry B. Endicott, *Chairman*.

A. C. Ratshesky, *Vice-Chairman*.

Philip R. Allen.

Kenyon L. Butterfield.

B. Preston Clark.

Z. C. Dickinson.

Mrs. Malcolm Donald.

George H. Ellis.

Warren C. Jewett.

A. Lawrence Lowell.

Matthew Luce.

George H. Lyman.

Mrs. Samuel W. McCall.

George W. Mitton.

J. Frank O'Hare.  
James J. Phelan.  
James H. Ropes.  
Joseph B. Russell.  
Paul J. Sachs.  
John F. Stevens.  
Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer.  
Mrs. W. M. Wheeler.  
John D. Willard.  
Robert Winsor.

*General Officers*

Edmund W. Longley, *Treasurer*.  
John D. Willard, *Secretary*.  
James H. Ropes, *Assistant Secretary*.  
Z. C. Dickinson, *Assistant Secretary*.  
Matthew Luce, *Assistant Secretary*.  
Arthur A. Kidder, *Manager of Offices and Personnel*.  
W. A. L. Bazeley, *Former Manager of Offices and Personnel (in Service)*.  
Levi H. Greenwood, *Former Manager of Offices and Personnel (in Service)*.  
Thomas J. Moore, *Secretary to Mr. H. B. Endicott and Manager of Executive Office*.

The history of the Massachusetts Food Administration should begin with the work of the Food Production Committee of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety. During the latter part of February, 1917, at the suggestion of the Executive Committee, a voluntary Committee on Food Production and Conservation was organized, which included in its membership leaders of agricultural and educational organizations in the State. On March 3 this Committee became a sub-committee of the Committee on Public Safety, and worked as such up to the time of the organization of the Massachusetts Food Administration, and thereafter in conjunction with and as a part thereof. Through its activities, provisions concerning food supply were included in the Commonwealth Defence Act of May 26, 1917 (chapter 324, General Acts of 1917).

As previously stated, on July 11 Mr. Hoover requested Mr. Endicott to act as his representative in Massachusetts,

which was followed by his official appointment immediately upon the passage of the Federal Food Control Act, August 10, 1917. On July 11 Governor McCall appointed him State Food Administrator for Massachusetts.

On July 18 Mr. Endicott named a Board of Food Administration, largely recruited from the ranks of the Committee on Public Safety. The membership of the Board was so selected that it gave representation to the widest possible range of interests, — banking, manufacturing, mercantile, labor, professional and education, — including representatives of various races and religious denominations. Every effort was made to provide for the most complete preliminary consideration of problems, in anticipation of their effect on all the people of the State.

The authority of the Commonwealth Defence Act with reference to food supply, and the powers of the Federal Food Control Act of 1917, were both vested in Mr. Endicott; and by reason of this dual authority the powers of the Food Administrator in Massachusetts were ample to meet all needs, and were greater than those exercised by similar officials in many other States.

One of Mr. Endicott's first steps was to recommend to Mr. Hoover the appointment of Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer as home economics director for Massachusetts, thus continuing the work which she had developed as State chairman of the Woman's Council of National Defense, and also the work which had its inception in the Women's Committee on Food Conservation under Dean Sarah Louise Arnold, this latter Committee having been appointed by the Committee on Food Production in March, 1917.

During the early days of the war, food production diminished alarmingly because of the diversion of land, men, horses and material from agricultural pursuits to warfare. It has always been a phenomenon of war that its advent is immediately followed by a diminution of food production. Peculiarly, in modern warfare, the same materials which normally enter into the manufacture of implements and

fertilizers are in great demand for war equipment and munitions. Moreover, the ploughman and the plough horse have always been regarded as basic material for army building.

Owing to the comparative elasticity of our use of food, and to the fact that the United States is always a food exporting Nation, the pressure of diminishing food supply was not immediately manifested in the United States by actual shortage of commodities, but was clearly indicated by the sharp rise in prices caused through frantic buying in our markets by the allied powers. When it became evident that the United States was destined to enter the war, the possibility of world famine became apparent to the American people, and it was soon evident that the combined food stocks of allied countries must be pooled to meet allied needs. An inventory of the world food stocks showed a dangerous shortage. The carry-over of wheat in the United States from the yields of 1916 had indeed provided not only all supplies necessary for domestic use, but a large exportable surplus. On the other hand, the short wheat yield of 1917 left little exportable surplus at the precise period when the armies and civil population of Europe were making the greatest demands.

Although prices of foods in the United States had not advanced by any means as they had in the countries actually at war, the momentum of upward movement was increasing. The governments of the world were paying for their purchases in the American cereal markets, first with gold, then with securities, and finally with credit extended to them from banking sources in the United States. After our entry into the war, government loans still further enabled the allied countries to come into our markets and bid for supplies with credit furnished by our government. This resulted in so great an advance in the price of wheat that in May, 1917, operations in futures on the Chicago Board of Trade were stopped. Wheat had reached the unheard-of price of \$3.28 per bushel.

Early in the year 1917 Mr. Hoover had been recalled from Europe to advise the President and Congress in matters of food supply. A bill providing for food control was introduced and was before Congress for consideration in May. For various reasons the passage of this bill was delayed until August 10; but in the meantime Mr. Hoover was requested by the President to go as far as possible in the preparation of an organization which should be ready for activity as soon as the Food Control Act became law.

The Food Administration was charged by this act with a variety of duties. It was to regulate exports so that adequate supplies should be left in this country for the use of our own population; to arrange for an equitable distribution of food supplies within the United States, so that all sections should have food stocks adequate for the people's needs; to check speculation and profiteering activities, in order that such supplies as were available might reach the consumer at as low cost as possible; and to effect prevention of waste, and actual conservation of stocks, so that sufficient supplies of exportable foods should be available for the feeding of our own armies abroad, for the armies and civilian population of allied countries, and for the relief of stricken people in the war zone. The Department of Agriculture was charged with the task of planning for the stimulation of production, so that in succeeding seasons production of essential commodities should be adequate to war-time needs.

The problem confronting New England was more difficult than that of other parts of the country because of the relatively small food production compared with food consumption, and also on account of the remoteness of New England from the large sources of supply, and its dependence on overburdened transportation systems. Altogether, New England was in a critical situation with regard to her food supply, and problems of provisioning became very intricate. The Atlantic seaboard, and particularly the northern ports, furnished the outlet for war supplies moving toward Europe. The main railway lines were compelled to give preference to



such export commodities. The enormous growth of industries manufacturing war materials added a further burden to the railways. The very condition of the New England transportation systems was of itself a menace, as the chief railways were in a state of virtual bankruptcy, and neither funds nor actual supplies were available for rehabilitation. The extreme winter of 1917-18 imposed the severest task of recent years on all transportation systems. Added to this, the withdrawal of coastwise shipping for government uses threw upon the rail systems the burden of an enormous tonnage normally moving by water.

From the first the policy of both State and Federal Food Administrations was to accomplish the utmost possible by gaining voluntary co-operation of the entire people, especially of the food handling trades. Mr. Hoover early announced his opposition to rationing and to police control of conservation, contending that even in Germany with its huge police system such rationing had not been successful, while in allied countries the success of conservation had been inversely proportioned to the amount of police interference. He further expressed the belief that the rationing of households was inconsistent with the habits of thought and with the ideals of the American people, and that therefore every effort should be made to secure a voluntary rationing by the people themselves. Though this was by far the more difficult course from the standpoint of governmental effort, Mr. Hoover's judgment was completely vindicated by the results. At no point, even in the most intense shortage of sugar, did the Food Administration establish any legally effective system of rationing for householders; and in the case of both sugar and wheat substitutes, the selfish disregard of Food Administration requests, shown by a few, was much more than offset by the voluntary efforts of that great majority who went well beyond the requested measures, and brought about a total saving far greater than would have been possible by a mechanical rationing program.

With regard to the food handling trades, Mr. Hoover's

principle was to secure the data concerning available stocks and requirements necessary to formulate programs, and then, as far as possible, to leave actual administration in the hands of the trades. Here, again, he felt that to secure the voluntary co-operation of the majority of grocers, bakers and managers of eating places would accomplish more than a rigorously enforced system of policing. As time passed, the moral support, not only of consumers but also of the great majority of the food handling trades, was achieved. Such measures of prosecution as were necessary to protect those who honestly co-operated from the unfair competition of those who selfishly disregarded regulations met with general approval.

In matters both of production and of distribution the economic doctrine of the Federal Administration was clear. Men will not continue to produce, or to perform the functions of distribution, unless by so doing they not only recover actual costs, but receive a fair return on their efforts. In all contracts for supplies and for construction work the government recognized the principle of adequate return to those with whom it contracted. This same policy was carried over into the food production and distribution programs, and guaranteed prices on wheat and hogs secured the desired results in the form of increased production of these commodities. Likewise, in the food distribution trades it was held that the only way to secure results was to permit the usual handlers of food to take reasonable and equitable profits for the services which they performed. On the other hand, the intent of the Food Administration was equally clear cut with regard to profiteering and speculation. Speculation in the necessities of life is doubly reprehensible in war time. Petty profiteering in peace time is limited, because the buyer usually has an opportunity to trade with competing establishments where prices are more reasonable. In war time, and with a very much higher level of prices, it becomes a distinct menace. To control these evils the Food Control Act made possible the licensing of dealers,

and the licensing power was speedily brought into play. All rules and regulations concerning trade were formulated by the Federal Food Administration on a national basis, with such regional modifications as were necessary. The function of the State Administration was to make these rules effective, and to be the medium of information as well as the enforcing agent.

Far more important than the regulatory functions were those of education and publicity. It was the belief of all concerned in Federal and State Food Administration work that if the people of the United States were once given the facts, together with suggestions for meeting the emergency, their response would be prompt and adequate. Particularly in Massachusetts, to give such information in effective form was no small task. With a dense and complex population, much of which reads no newspaper in English, and part of which is absolutely illiterate, every possible device became necessary to give the true picture of conditions in Europe, and to present the program of the Food Administration in such compelling form that compliance would be ready and willing.

While neither phase of the work would have been successful without the other, it is not unlikely that the educational and appeal work by itself would have accomplished more than the regulatory work alone. As the program was developed, the two phases went hand in hand, and by securing the voluntary compliance of consumers and handlers of food, the regulatory work was reduced to a minimum.

In both Federal and State Food Administrations every effort was made to avoid the evils of bureaucracy. The administrators, on whom responsibility rested, were in all cases volunteers recruited from the most capable men of the entire Nation. Men of large and engrossing business affairs dropped their work and devoted their whole time to national problems, with the result that in a remarkably short period a coherent and effective governmental department was built up, with connections reaching from the

Capitol at Washington to the utmost limits of the Nation. This entire system was noticeably free from the deadening mechanical influence of hired service, and the spirit of intense application and unstinted effort was manifested all along the line, from the Chief of the Administration to the clerks in Alaska and Hawaii. The authority granted to the Food Administration was sweeping, and was justifiable only as a war emergency. Because of this fact, it was from the first the intent of the Food Administration to withdraw from its activities as soon as its necessary work was done. While Mr. Hoover saw clearly the necessity of continuing food conservation during the period immediately following the war, he early expressed the belief that restrictions and regulations should be abolished even before peace was finally concluded, and such operations as continued should be restricted to appeal for voluntary co-operation. It is significant that the Food Administration dwindled to very small proportions immediately after the signing of the armistice, and only such functions were continued as seemed necessary for the protection of the people against the grosser forms of profiteering and speculation.

The staff of the Massachusetts Food Administration was at its largest during the fall of 1918. Both the central office and the county offices were overcrowded, and the largest corps of volunteers as well as paid workers were in service during this period. The armistice was quickly followed by the dissolution of the sugar staff. From that time the entire force diminished rapidly. On January 1, 1919, but 34 were left on the pay roll, and on January 31 announcement was made through the press that the work of the office was closed. It was remarkable, and a source of great satisfaction, that so complete an organization could disappear so quickly, and that the members of the staff so speedily become absorbed again in peace-time pursuits. On the other hand, it was admirable that, after a period of such stringent regulation, business could return to normal conditions with so little upset and disturbance.



Some of the activities of the Food Administration were continuous, some recurrent, some seasonal, and others of such a nature as to present themselves but once and then disappear. It seems unwise to relate the story of the Food Administration in strict chronological sequence. The attempt is rather to record the activities of different committees and divisions, and to comment on various other matters which were taken up by individuals or by groups without assignment to any regular division. The organization grew, by the appointment of committees, up to September, 1917. From that time an attempt was made to follow the divisional organization of the Federal Food Administration, so that matters might move through similar channels both in the State and in the Federal office, and that contacts with the Federal divisions might be definite and complete.

The writer embraces this opportunity of expressing his obligation to Prof. James H. Ropes and to Mr. John D. Willard for their help in compiling the data of the Food Administration. Because of Mr. Ropes's great familiarity with the general scope and detail of the activities of the Committee on Public Safety, his courteous assistance, readily given in all matters, has been of the greatest value.



## CHAPTER II

### FINANCES AND ORGANIZATION

#### A. Finances

When the work of the Food Administration first developed, Mr. Endicott approached the Governor and Council on the question of accepting Federal aid. It was decided, however, that inasmuch as Massachusetts had thus far paid her own bills, it would be better to continue this practice, at least for a time. Federal aid, therefore, was not accepted until the very great expansion of the work made necessary a larger staff and much greater outlay.

In March, 1918, arrangements were made whereby many of the central staff employees were placed on the Federal pay roll. After July 1 it was arranged that for the fiscal year July 1, 1918, to June 30, 1919, the sum of \$35,000 should be available from Federal sources for the expenses of the central office, and \$36,000 for the county offices.

From May, 1918, when orders came for the licensing of manufacturers using sugar, to the close of the sugar control work, the bills incurred by the Sugar Division were paid from funds of the United States Sugar Equalization Board, and were not charged against the allotment already made for the Food Administration. The same was true of the work of the Food Administration Grain Corporation in purchasing wheat substitutes in New England.

To summarize the division of expense, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts contributed the use of office quarters, and, through the Committee on Public Safety, all of the expenses of the Food Administration up to April 1, 1918. From that time on the State contributed, in addition to rent, a total of approximately \$150,000; and the Federal government about \$75,000, including payments in behalf of the Sugar Equalization Board and the Grain Corporation.

County offices were as a rule given rent free, and the greater part of the service was rendered by unpaid volunteers.

The contribution of both time and money by individuals connected with the Food Administration can never be computed in dollars and cents. Several of the volunteer workers paid for their own clerical assistance, and numberless incidental bills were met from private pockets. Many persons on State, county and city staffs refused to submit expense accounts covering their necessary telephone tolls, traveling expenses, printing supplies and the like. In some cases these accounts amounted to thousands of dollars.

## **B. County Food Administration Division**

Philip R. Allen, *Chairman of County Administrators.*

Matthew Luce, *Secretary of County Administrators.*

John D. Willard, *County Information.*

Ellen K. Jones, *Clerk.*

### *County Food Administrators*

Barnstable, Eben S. S. Keith.

Berkshire, Frederick G. Crane.

Bristol, William M. Lovering.

Dukes, William J. Look.

Essex, James C. Poor.

Franklin, John W. Haigis.

Hampden, Horace A. Moses and Theodore W. Leete.

Hampshire, W. M. Purrington.

Middlesex, J. Howell Crosby.

Nantucket, Arthur H. Gardner.

Norfolk, Fred B. Rice.

Plymouth, C. P. Holland.

Suffolk, P. A. O'Connell.

Worcester, L. H. Buckley.

### *Women County Food Administrators*

Barnstable, Miss Elsie Trabue.

Berkshire, Dr. Mary Anna Wood.

Bristol, Mrs. Charles H. L. Delano.

Dukes, Mrs. Norman Johnson.

Essex, Mrs. Richard S. Russell.

Franklin, Mrs. John Wilson.  
Hampden, Mrs. W. C. Dwight and Mrs. A. C. Dutton.  
Hampshire, Mrs. Clifton Johnson.  
Middlesex, Mrs. George Minot Baker,  
Norfolk, Mrs. Eugene Endicott.  
Plymouth, Mrs. J. Harry Poole.  
Suffolk, Miss Mary A. Barr.  
Worcester, Miss Helen Heywood.

*Assistant County Food Administrators*

Barnstable, H. V. Lawrence.  
Berkshire, Frank H. Cande and James O'Brien.  
Bristol, Merle T. Barker.  
Essex, Albert P. Hubbard.  
Middlesex, Charles Burnham and Edward Fisher.  
Plymouth, W. L. Bragg.  
Suffolk, W. H. Binnian.  
Worcester, Albert E. Jewell and Ernest S. Reid.

During the first months of the Food Administration work proper, it did not appear necessary to extend organization throughout the State. Messages which required publicity were sent broadcast through the channels of the Food Production and Food Conservation Committees, and the local Committees on Public Safety. The press responded generously with space. With the formulation of a more definite program in September and October, 1917, and particularly when the licensing of handlers of foods greatly increased contact with local dealers, it became plain that local centers were needed.

The first home-card campaign brought up the problem of delivering a message to every householder of the State. The experience of the Food Production Committee had shown the use of county committees, to which the responsibility for town committees could be delegated. Plans for district or county administrators were already under way when, somewhat later, suggestions came from Washington concerning county organization, especially called out by the needs of western States, where the county, rather than the township, is the natural unit.

The chief problem was the choice of the county administrators. As finally selected, the administrator in nearly every county was a banker or business man already interested in promoting farm bureau work. In but one county did any conflict arise between production and administration groups, and here the difficulty was speedily overcome. In only three instances was the appointment declined by the person first approached, and in each of these cases with sincere regret.

The county administrators were first brought together early in 1918, and their responsibilities outlined. They were to employ such assistance as they needed, hire offices if necessary, and otherwise equip themselves to represent the Food Administration in their respective counties. In some counties volunteer assistants were given the immediate management of the office, leaving a general supervision to the administrator. Nearly all counties had a staff of stenographers, clerks and inspectors, greatly varying in size in the different localities.

It soon became evident to the county administrators that they in turn must decentralize their work. In cities with over 100,000 population, a city administrator appointed by the county administrator became responsible for many matters. Most of the county administrators appointed deputies for each town and city, and upon these much responsibility devolved. In some instances, notably in Berkshire, deputies were appointed to cover districts consisting of several towns.

It was the task of the local administrators to see that rules were enforced, that educational material was distributed, that offenders were warned, and, if possible, persuaded to obey regulations, and that persistent offenders were summoned before the county administration. The county administrators were the court of appeal for the town administrators. Some of them sat as trial judges, putting offenders on probation, placing cases on file, or referring them to the State House for further hearing if the offense was serious

and prosecution necessary. The largest practicable measure of responsibility was put on them.

Wide divergence of practice would have developed between the counties had it not been for the attendance by administrators, at weekly (later bi-weekly) meetings of the Board of Food Administration. In consequence of their participation, these gatherings, instead of being meetings for executive business, came to be a forum for the discussion of problems, and a means of conveying information and requests to county groups.

With the dissolution of the Sugar Division, the chief troubles of the county administrators ceased, and early in December, 1918, orders were given to disband all county staffs so that all county expenses should cease by January 1, 1919.

The county officers made possible direct access to a responsible source of information for householders having inquiries and complaints, as well as direct and prompt dealing with handlers of food.

Some divergence between the practices of counties was discovered, varying conditions prevailing in different parts of the State. Much of the work of issuing permits for the feeding of wheat to poultry, for the milling of Massachusetts grown wheat, for disposing of stocks of feedstuffs accumulating through diminished demand, and for the purchase of sugar for canning purposes, was left in the hands of the county administrator. One large piece of work in all county offices was the supervision of wheat substitutes and sugar distribution.

The regular correspondence and personal consultation with the county administrators took much time and thought at the State House. By the method finally worked out as being the most satisfactory, county letters on all subjects were addressed to a single secretary, who was responsible for getting the inquiries promptly answered by the departmental officer in question.

At the time the county administrators were appointed,



women county administrators were also assigned for household conservation work under the leadership of Mrs. Thayer. The results of their work were varied and important. Canning kitchens and like devices were arranged with the aid of the home demonstration agents of the farm bureaus and the Agricultural College. The knowledge and judgment of the women administrators was invaluable. It was later noticeable that in counties where the women's food work had made most progress, greater assistance was more immediately available in meeting the needs of the influenza epidemic, and food centers and canning kitchens were readily converted into supply depots for stricken families.

Without the services of the county administrators the functions of the Food Administration would have been seriously hampered.

Nor can too much credit be given to the many volunteer workers in counties, cities and towns, who made effective plans arranged in the Federal and State offices which depended for success on the support of the whole body of citizens.

### **C. Zone No. 1 Organization**

A. C. Ratschesky, Assistant Food Administrator for Massachusetts,  
*Chairman.*

W. L. Putnam, *Secretary.*

H. B. Endicott, Federal Food Administrator for Massachusetts.

Frank H. Brooks, Federal Food Administrator for Vermont.

Huntley Spaulding, Federal Food Administrator for New Hampshire.

Dr. Leon B. Merrill, Federal Food Administrator for Maine.

Alfred Coats, Federal Food Administrator for Rhode Island.

Recognizing the similarity of problems confronting the New England States, and the necessity for close co-operation, Mr. Endicott called a conference of New England Food Administrators in September, 1917. This conference was not for the purpose of initiating particular measures so much as to establish a mutual acquaintance with the various problems of the administrators in the different States.

During the spring of 1918 it seemed desirable to organize the various States into groups, and in June, 1918, Mr. Hoover created in New England a Food Administration zone similar to the Grain Corporation zones which had been established for some time. Precedent for the creation of a food zone in New England had been furnished by the formation and effective work of the Federal Milk Commission for New England. All the New England States, excepting Connecticut, comprised the first food zone, and consisted of the Food Administrators of the States constituting that zone, of a representative of the Grain Corporation, and also of the Food Administration, in Washington.

At the first meeting, July, 1918, the plans of the Milling Division and Grain Corporation for distribution of grain and substitutes were explained. The systems for local distribution of flour in use in the different States of the zone were discussed, and also the method of handling flour, Indian corn meal and other grains coming from the local mills. The question of sugar was also discussed, particularly with reference to preserving and the ways it was being handled in different States. The various New England States agreed that milling regulations applying to corn and wheat in New England would work great injustice to the farmers, and, by concert of action, the Federal regulations were quietly disregarded in order that wheat grown in the zone might find its way to human consumption rather than be fed to animals. This meeting was of great service in giving the State Food Administrators an opportunity to receive full explanations of the plans of the Food Administration at Washington and also of the Grain Corporation, and in showing the local needs; also in giving the administrators an opportunity to get together and exchange ideas as to the best way to carry out the policies inaugurated by Mr. Hoover. It likewise tended to avoid unnecessary differences between adjoining States, and, where local conditions required that there should be a divergence of opinion, it gave opportunity to discuss the reasons for the same so that harmony might prevail.

A regular meeting day was fixed for the third Monday in each month. A second meeting was held in August, 1918, and a third meeting in October. The September meeting was given up because of the fact that the administrators had recently come to Washington at the call of Mr. Hoover, and the November meeting was abandoned because of the signing of the armistice.

At the August and October meetings the sugar question was the most important matter discussed. Representatives of the Sugar Division of the Food Administration at Washington attended these gatherings. The problem of obtaining supplies for New England during the winter months, and the necessity of accumulating sufficient food stocks in December to carry through the winter, thus avoiding the transportation difficulties of the preceding year, were brought to the attention of the Washington representatives, and their aid and suggestions sought.

Other matters to come before the zone for consideration were the various changes in wheat substitute percentages; the clean-up of wheat substitutes left on dealers' hands by changes in the percentages; the reasonable profits which might be allowed on staple groceries; and various questions relating to the storage of supplies.

Mr. Robert S. Scoville, Food Administrator for Connecticut, and the administrators of adjoining States were always invited to attend the meetings of Zone No. 1, and were occasionally present. Similarly, Mr. Endicott was invited to meetings of Zone No. 2 in New York, which he was unable to personally attend, but was represented by Mr. Putnam. These latter meetings were similar to those held in Zone No. 1, and Mr. Putnam was able to report to Mr. Endicott many interesting ideas and suggestions brought out at the meetings.

## CHAPTER III

### PRODUCTION

#### (a) **Committee on Food Production**

Immediately after the organization of the Committee on Public Safety, there had been organized, as previously stated, under President Kenyon L. Butterfield of the Massachusetts Agricultural College, a group to arrange for meeting food supply problems. This Food Production and Conservation Committee became a part of the Committee on Public Safety on March 3, 1917, and with its various projects was transferred to the Food Administration in July. It continued work until the armistice was signed, and was dissolved on December 20, 1918. Its functions therefore embraced two phases: first, as a constituent committee of the Committee on Public Safety, and later, with the same chairman and a somewhat enlarged membership, as a committee of the Food Administration. The activity of the committee, however, was in the main continuous, and must be described by topics without attempting complete distinction between the two periods.

The personnel of the Committee included representatives of the State Board of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural College, county farm bureaus, United States Department of Agriculture, Boston Chamber of Commerce Agricultural Committee, State Board of Education, Society for the Promotion of Agriculture, Grange Homestead Commission and various producers; also representatives of distributors' and consumers' agencies. (See list of Preparatory Committees, Appendix, page 539.) From the first it was felt that the Committee should act primarily as a co-ordinating agency, using all existing machinery and making new organizations only where work could not be done by those already in the field. The co-operation of the various bodies repre-



sented in the Committee was immediate and cordial. The Agricultural College was at once mobilized for war service, and the teaching staff organized into committees to which definite problems were assigned. Courses were quickly arranged which would train upper class men for work as supervisors and as special demonstrators. The farm bureaus placed their staffs at the disposal of the Committee, and it was decided that these organizations furnished, on the whole, the best means of approach to the public.

The first great task was that of publicity. Few realized the immensity of the food problem and the swiftness with which it would become real in the United States. To bring this to the attention of the public many agencies were needed. The Committee recruited a staff of speakers. Meetings and rallies were planned for all parts of the State. A weekly news-letter was issued from the State House, giving publicity and reporting the plans of the various town committees. A technical news-letter was also sent frequently from the Agricultural College, offering advice and suggestions for problems of the moment. For the first few months a publicity man was borrowed from the department of journalism of the Agricultural College, and much material was thereby furnished to the daily and weekly press. Several bulletins on the technical subjects of gardening, poultry raising, preservation of products, etc., were prepared by specialists at the college. The farm bureaus issued special bulletins, in some cases translated into many foreign languages. The American Woolen Company found that its employees represented twenty-six different tongues, and gardening bulletins were translated into most of these. Posters and fliers were used. By various methods public interest was gained, so that within a month the greater part of the State was reached.

In carrying out this policy the staff at the State House became overwhelmed with daily calls for information and assistance, and the county farm bureaus and county agricultural schools were at once requested to organize county



food production committees, which should be representative of all forces that might assist in the production or conservation of food. These committees were usually appointed after a county mass meeting to which all were invited, and were organized in all counties of the State except Suffolk, Dukes and Nantucket.

The county food committees in their turn were requested to organize food production and conservation committees in every city and town. By the end of April committees were active in 334 of the cities and towns in Massachusetts, and other towns were represented in regional committees. It was while this movement was in progress that the Committee on Public Safety, as hereinbefore related, decided to organize sub-committees in the cities and towns throughout the State. This caused momentary confusion, but before long the city and town committees on food production became sub-committees of the city and town Committees on Public Safety, just as the Massachusetts Committee on Food Production was a sub-committee of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety.

Following this program food production rallies were arranged for all parts of the State, first in county rallies, then locally for the cities and towns. Wherever possible existing permanent agencies, such as boards of trade, school committees, granges, clubs and churches, were made use of. A food program for Massachusetts was published in March. The outline was as follows:—

#### DETAILED PLAN OF WORK.

##### I. Farm production.

###### Plan.

1. Urge production of staples, particularly corn, beans, cattle, swine, poultry and farm gardens.

###### Method.

1. Locate supplies, seeds, plants, fertilizers, animals, etc.
2. Locate supply of farm labor.
3. Inventory needs of towns, also resources (land, labor, etc.).
4. Discourage slaughter of calves and dairy cows.

## II. Boys' and girls' gardens.

### Plan.

1. To encourage boys and girls to contribute to the support of families.
2. To utilize vacant lots for gardens.

### Method.

1. Furnish printed information and directions (varieties, planting, etc.). Many college boards, boards of agriculture, and United States Department of Agriculture bulletins are available.
2. Get banks and boards of trade to finance supplies (seeds, fertilizers, pigs, poultry, etc.).
3. Get towns and cities to provide supervision.
4. Promote larger club projects where possible (larger acreage of corn, potatoes, etc.).

*Note.* — Adequate supervision is most essential.

## III. Family gardens for adults.

### Plan.

1. To encourage families to have gardens.
2. To utilize vacant lots.

### Method.

1. Get industrial concerns to provide land for operatives.
2. Get municipalities to provide land for residents.
3. Provide printed information.
4. Get banks to assist.

*Note.* — It is recommended that a single system of supervision cover both juvenile and adult garden activities.

## IV. Home conservation of foods.

### V. Economic distribution of food supplies.

With reference to home conservation of foods, the Women's Committee on Household Conservation was organized under Dean Sarah Louise Arnold of Simmons College as chairman.

This Committee issued material on the need and wise methods of household conservation of foods, and examined and gave its public approval to bulletins prepared by other agencies. It also organized local Women's Food Conservation Committees in 330 cities and towns of the Commonwealth, being 83 per cent of a possible total. Before the work had gone far the Woman's Council of National Defense organized a Massachusetts branch under the chair-

manship of Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer, who was a member of the Committee on Household Conservation; and as part of the program of the Council of National Defense, a Food Committee was called for in every city and town. This again caused some confusion, but in the majority of cases existing women's committees on conservation were merged with the Council of National Defense Committees, thus furnishing an excellent basis for work when Mrs. Thayer was appointed home economics director by Mr. Hoover as Federal Food Administrator. It is worthy of note that the Women's Committee on Conservation had a program for food thrift in operation before the Federal program of the Council of Defense was published, and several months in advance of the home economics work undertaken by the Federal Food Administration.

The campaign for the production of food was hardly under way before a committee was assigned to the task of making out a more detailed program for food distribution. In conjunction with the department of economics of the Massachusetts Agricultural College, a careful outline was prepared, and in April, 1917, the committee was definitely at work on problems of distribution. The proposed program, which later furnished the basis for the first few months' work of the Food Administration, follows: —

#### A PROGRAM FOR FOOD DISTRIBUTION AND INVESTIGATION IN MASSACHUSETTS, MAY, 1917

Presented by the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, Sub-Committee on  
Food Production and Conservation

The distribution of such food products as are shipped into Massachusetts, together with the few farm products that are shipped out, are matters of interstate commerce. As a general principle of administration, the distribution of local produce may well be placed in the hands of city directors of markets, county marketing advisors, supervised by the Committee on Public Safety, and existing State institutions. Matters with reference to transportation of produce entering into interstate commerce should largely be in the hands of a food administrator appointed by the United States government.

### *Administration*

1. The Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety will assume direction of the emergency distribution program. It will work in the fullest co-operation with —
  - (a) The State Board of Agriculture.
  - (b) The Massachusetts Agricultural College.
  - (c) County farm bureaus.
  - (d) United States Department of Agriculture.
  - (e) Chambers of commerce and boards of trade.
  - (f) Committees of Public Safety.
  - (g) Producers', distributors' and consumers' associations.
  - (h) Other existing agencies for similar purposes.

They will urge the appointment of —

2. County market advisors in county farm bureaus.
3. City directors of markets and market news bureaus in the large Massachusetts cities.

### *Information*

1. Establish a State Bureau of Market Information to act as a clearing house for all sorts of market news and information concerning markets. There are two distinct functions: —
  - (a) A market news service, carrying an appropriation of \$500 per month.
  - (b) Marketing assistance and direct information to producers and distributors in Massachusetts, carrying an appropriation of \$500 per month.

This is a very important project, and should begin immediately.

2. Take a census of agricultural production, including acreage and crops of 1916 and 1917, animals and animal products raised and sold in 1916 and 1917, supplies needed, and inventories of food and feed supplies on hand.

This project should be in charge of the Committee on Public Safety, but can be made in co-operation with the county farm bureaus and boards of trade on blanks prepared by the Food Committee. The Food Committee should assist in financing the project.

Not only the census of farm products, but the city garden census, should be made on uniform blanks furnished by the Committee on Public Safety.

It is imperative that the data from this census be adequate and uniform, since they must be used by the Committee on Public Safety for

making plans for distributing the crop of 1917, and for planning a food production campaign for 1918.

A survey has already been made in the three western counties, and is now being made under the direction of the Worcester County Food Committee. The project, however, may be delayed until Federal plans are known, but it should be undertaken before October, in order that the Committee on Public Safety may lay its plans for conserving the harvest of this year, and plan next year's program. The necessary appropriation for assisting in this project is \$12,000.

3. Make an inventory of the normal food and feed consumption, including stocks of food and feed on hand now and under normal conditions, the source and quantity of food shipped into Massachusetts, the quantity of food and feed locally produced, and the seasons and quantities of consumption. This inventory may be made by the county farm bureaus or by boards of trade in larger cities. The blanks and the direction of the survey should be in the hands of the Food Committee, and tabulations made under their supervision.

Co-operation with the Board of Agriculture and the Federal government is very desirable. This project may be delayed until the Federal plans are made known, but it can well be begun at once in such counties as are ready to finance it.

4. Take a census of food storages and foods in storage, both farm and commercial, including —
  - (a) The capacity of the storage and the available stocks on hand.
  - (b) Monthly reports of stocks of food in storage. This is being made, and can well be taken care of, by the State Board of Agriculture. The statistics should be available in great detail to all cities and towns.
5. Make a monthly inventory of crop acreage and conditions, with yields and available supply of crops as they mature, including especially local crops, but also crops outside of Massachusetts which are sold here.

This project may be carried out by the State Board of Agriculture co-operating with the United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Crop Estimates, and with the county farm bureaus. This project should be undertaken at once and carried out through the season. The Committee on Public Safety should appropriate \$200 per month for its execution.



### Organization

6. Organize farmers' exchanges in local producing centers for the purpose of —
  - (a) Securing market information.
  - (b) Sorting, grading and preparing products for market.
  - (c) Storing and selling.
  - (d) Constructing storages, warehouses, distributing plants, possibly canneries, dryers, packing plants.
  - (e) Purchasing supplies, machinery, equipment, etc.

Propaganda and information should be furnished by the Committee on Public Safety co-operating with the Agricultural College, the work or organization to be largely in the hands of county farm bureaus and farmers' co-operative exchanges.

Propaganda and organization work should be begun at once.

7. Organize a campaign for the local utilization and consumption of locally produced material wherever possible, including advertising, local exchanges and the like.
8. Organize city and farm market places, particularly for the use of amateur growers and children who wish to dispose of ungraded and irregular lots of produce.

Encourage the organization of groups of neighboring consumers who desire to buy directly from producers.

Propaganda and publicity work by the Committee on Food Supply. Organization work to be carried out by city directors of markets and county farm bureaus.

9. Encourage the use of future contracts for farm products, either for immediate consumption or storage supplies for *bona fide* trade. These contracts are chiefly available between wholesalers, retailers and local producers.

An appropriation of \$4,000 is necessary to cover projects 6, 7, 8 and 9. This work should be begun immediately.

10. Co-operate with the National Food Administration, the United States Department of Agriculture, the Agricultural College, State Board of Agriculture, county farm bureaus, committees of public safety and other agencies, to facilitate the distribution of farm products, eliminate waste, prevent gluts, famines and exorbitant prices.

NOTE. — The Committee on Public Safety should take charge of this program, co-operating with existing agencies, official and otherwise, until

such time as there is appointed a State Food Administrator or a Federal Food Director for the State of Massachusetts. Thereafter the Committee stands ready to co-operate with the new agency, to give up any part of the work to that agency, or to give over the work in its entirety if the United States government or the State of Massachusetts so decrees.

*Farm versus Household Gardens.* — We now return to the several topics of the food program relating to production.

The Food Production Committee felt from the first that the largest results in food production could be secured from professional farmers. In many counties an inventory of land, labor, seed, fertilizer and machinery was made. This inventory was not wholly satisfactory, but in the counties where it was most carefully done it proved of value, and clearly showed the desirability of a regular annual inventory of the agricultural resources of the State.

In February, 1919, a bill came before the Legislature providing for a part of this work as a joint project of the Department of Agriculture, the Tax Commissioner and the Federal Bureau of Crop Estimates, but was never made law.

*Land for Farming Crops.* — For farm purposes land was available in great plenty. Farmers were urged to devote their materials and labor to their best land, and it was pointed out that clearing of unimproved land resources should rather be used where the greatest production would result.

*Seed.* — A survey of the seed situation in 1917 showed a shortage of seed beans and very high prices for seed potatoes. The Committee provided for adequate stocks of seed beans, and made arrangements with houses in Boston to provide seed potatoes at \$3.25 per bushel, \$1.50 less than prevailing prices. In this alone upwards of \$50,000 was saved to farmers and gardeners in the State.

In the spring of 1917 the Committee, which in general discouraged the planting of potatoes except by those sure of a market, found it necessary to safeguard the supply of potato seed for family gardens and regular potato growers

by urging the public not to eat potatoes until after planting time.

In 1918, under a threatened shortage of seed corn due to low germination of seed stocks injured by early frost, arrangements were made with six Boston seed houses, and adequate stocks made available for the supply of all.

*Fertilizers.* — In 1917 little could be done in the matter of fertilizer supply except to hasten delivery of stocks of commercial fertilizers already purchased and in transit, but greatly delayed by the congestion of traffic incident to the movement of war material. Here the Committee's work had good results. In addition, through the county agricultural agents, farmers were urged to more careful conservation and a wiser use of farm manures.

Prices of fertilizers were investigated in 1918, and the Food Administration stood ready to prosecute any dealers found to be profiteering. Such action, however, proved unnecessary, and no cases of excessive profit were discovered where prosecution seemed called for.

*Labor.* — The immediate demand of farmers, when asked to increase production, was for labor. War industries were at the time competing in all labor markets, and wages were advancing beyond the amount which farmers dared to pay. The first effort, therefore, was to promote the growing of such crops as required fewest hands.

To increase the body of laborers, the Committee on Public Safety organized the Committee for Mobilization of School Boys for Farm Service, — a detailed account of whose activities has already been given in Part III, Chapter III, — and in promoting this was able to use many of the same agencies which the Food Production Committee had found useful.

Manufacturers also lent their aid, and many agreed to release men from their factories in order to help neighboring farmers when the deficit in labor supply was at its height. In Worcester County this assistance was most marked, the farm bureau presenting to the manufacturers a carefully worked-out schedule of the number of hours needed each

week, the location of the farmers asking for help, and the transportation facilities for carrying the men to and from their work.

The Massachusetts Agricultural College lent to the Committee a specialist in labor, who opened a registration office for general farm help. To secure the necessary contact with farmers, branch offices were opened with the farm bureaus in nearly all the counties. Every effort was made to supply local labor needs from local labor supply, and to send men from county to county, or from Boston to the western part of the State, only where imperatively demanded. By this system over a thousand men were placed on farms during the season.

During 1918 a different plan was followed. The Department of Labor and the United States Employment Service took over the matter of soliciting farm labor, and from the central registration office the names of men available as farm help from each county were sent to the county agricultural agents. Little was accomplished, however, for when the actual demand for labor came the men who had registered were unwilling to go to farms except for wages far beyond the ability of the farmer to pay. The chief result, but an important one, was to disprove the claim that an abundance of labor was available for farm work.

Plans were considered during the summer of 1918 for joint efforts by the United States Department of Agriculture and the Food Administration, with a view to meeting labor needs for the harvest of 1918, and for the season of 1919. Massachusetts was in much worse condition than the northern New England States, since the war industries were near enough to make attractive proposals to all competent men who could be detached from the farms. Many reports came, indeed, of idleness and unemployment, but the usual type of unemployed men was the habitual loafer, unreliable for farm work, and unwilling to stay if by chance he reached the farm. One of the best dairymen of the Commonwealth, a member of the Food Production Committee, reported that



for several months his superintendent had to spend much time recruiting labor from the barrooms of the city, with the certainty that the men hired would not remain and would prove unsatisfactory while on the farm; yet this was the only supply available. Some loss of food products and of forage crops resulted from inability to get hands when crops were all ready for harvest. The quality of hay was injured by standing too long. A further circumstance causing loss was the unusually early maturing of fruits and vegetables, so that the harvest season arrived from one to three weeks before it was expected. As emergency labor could not be secured, quantities of fruit and produce went into storage in poor condition, and much complaint was heard that waste in storage was far greater than usual.

*Syndicate Farming.* — In some cases groups of business men and manufacturers contributed to the food supply by employing professional farmers to grow extra crops. Manufacturers and business men of Northampton employed a local farmer to raise 100 acres of additional crops in the Northampton meadows, the business men hiring land and providing supplies for the purpose. In some cases factories established factory farms in order that supplies for their help might be produced near at hand. While the products of these efforts were relatively small, the efforts themselves showed clearly the general patriotic interest and purpose.

*Boys' and Girls' Gardens.* — About the value of boys' and girls' garden production many were skeptical, and prophesied that fertilizers, seed, land and labor would be wasted without any proportionate return. Those, however, who had watched the development of boys' and girls' agricultural and home economics clubs were convinced that a great increase in food production might be made by this means. The work was supervised by the State leader of junior extension work at the Massachusetts Agricultural College, who had previously been responsible for such developments. City and town committees, county farm bureaus, agricultural schools, granges and many other agencies fell in with the



program of juvenile gardening, with the result that over 100,000 boys and girls were registered. From some of these gardens the product was relatively slight; in other cases the value of food output ran into hundreds of dollars. Prof. George L. Farley of the Massachusetts Agricultural College, State leader of boys' and girls' club work, reported \$654,-441.56 as his estimate of the value of food production by children, and it should be remembered that these crops were raised on the spot by the ultimate consumers.

Important, also, was the canning and preserving which went hand in hand with the boys' and girls' garden work. A surprising number of householders have never appreciated the possibilities of preserving the surplus above their immediate family needs. The influence of past efforts of the Agricultural College and farm bureaus in teaching the possibilities of canning and drying made possible the preservation of virtually the entire surplus of the boys' and girls' gardens, and gave excellent foundation for more extended work by adults. During 1918 the Food Administration provided still more assistance for the college and the farm bureaus, which in a measure accounts for the better results from the efforts of the club members during that year.

In 1918 the total number of gardens was somewhat increased, and the quality and size of gardens substantially improved. With the advanced price of garden produce the output value was materially greater.

As a stimulus to interest, many city and town committees arranged garden exhibits in the autumn, and some of these communities had in this way their first experience in discovering their agricultural resources. The number of such exhibits was greater in 1917 than in 1918, because in the latter year the influenza epidemic made public gatherings unwise. The experience of such county fairs as held their exhibits before the epidemic became widespread showed distinct advance in quality over the exhibits of the previous year.

The moral value of the boys' and girls' gardens in im-

pressing the urgency of national crisis on the whole public was an element not easily overestimated.

*Family Gardens for Adults.* — Much care was given to organizing a campaign for increased gardening by householders. City and town committees were requested to solicit land of those who had surplus, and apportion it to those who had none. Many committees undertook to plough gardens at a nominal charge, and to provide seed, fertilizers, insecticides and fungicides at cost. Many clever and successful devices were arranged by the committees. In the town of Concord, for instance, a supply of knapsack hand sprayers was purchased, and these were rented to household gardeners at a nominal fee, a solution being prepared by the town supervisors and furnished by the gallon, ready mixed at cost. In the town of Framingham gardens were so arranged that all the potatoes of all the gardeners were planted in continuous rows for easy cultivation and for machine spraying. The town spraying apparatus was used, and the costs were charged *pro rata* to the individual gardeners. Those who had previously cultivated gardens added to their area if possible, and greatly increased their efforts. Many who had never before planted a seed became enthusiastic horticulturists. The appearance of gardens in all manner of unheard-of places, and in great numbers, gave early evidence of the success of the campaign.

The Committee felt, however, that such huge beginnings would lead to equally huge failures unless provision were made for careful assistance and follow-up work. Therefore, every town of any size was urged to provide paid supervision. The State Board of Education offered to co-operate with the school committees of towns by providing teachers of agriculture. In other cities and towns the school committee, without formality, assigned a competent teacher to this work. In still others the Committee on Public Safety or the Food Production Committee provided emergency funds for such supervision as seemed necessary. Losses through ill-advised gardens were materially decreased by these efforts,

and many, who would undoubtedly have failed, were enabled to score a substantial success. The Committee further urged cities and towns to use every means to discourage gardeners from undertaking work on undesirable land, or in locations where the product might be destroyed by subsequent building or use of land for other purposes.

In April, 1917, the Committee endorsed and urged the passage of a daylight-saving law; and later, when this became effective, much time was available for gardening which otherwise would have been lost.

In the season of 1918, in view of the widespread interest created the previous year, it was considered unnecessary to give much publicity to garden work; in fact, more was produced in gardens that year than in 1917.

The value of the household garden became increasingly evident, not only with respect to the food which it contributed to the maintenance of the family, but perhaps still more from the provision which it made for wholesome exercise and interest.

Much opposition to the household garden work developed in 1918 from the market gardeners, who felt that the increase in household production had seriously affected the market for commercially raised produce. It was the opinion, however, of those connected with the market gardeners' experiment station, with the farm bureaus of eastern Massachusetts, and with the Agricultural College that the increased consumption of vegetables had more than offset the increased production by householders. The fact seems to be that commercial production had overtaken normal consumption; and if the war had not come, bringing abnormal consumption and abnormal household gardening, the same glutting of markets would still have resulted.

A further factor in the situation, of no small account, is the increase in the use of motor trucks. Producers in the Providence neighborhood reached out into the Massachusetts markets in 1918, and brought in volumes of produce from farms which previously were not in competition with Massachusetts growers.

*Factory Gardens.* — Early in the season of 1917 request was made to groups of manufacturers that they provide gardening opportunities for their employees, and many large firms responded generously. The Committee urged that whatever was done should not be in the nature of philanthropy, but that land leased by the factory should be sublet to individual gardeners at actual cost. The ploughing and harrowing might well be done by the company, but should be charged to the gardeners at cost; the same principle was advised in the matter of fertilizers, seeds and insecticides.

Some striking results were achieved in the case of the American Woolen Company. At some 50 different mills, 520 acres were brought under cultivation; and the operatives of this company produced over 45,000 bushels of potatoes, many thousand bushels of other root crops, and 40,000 ears of sweet corn, in addition to the usual more perishable summer vegetables. The project was still more carefully developed in 1918 by the Norton Company in Worcester, which perhaps has set a standard for permanent work of this kind. It must also be recorded that some corporations, under poor advice, made bad failures, one Plymouth County firm losing over \$15,000 in a single season.

The Food Production Committee urged that the factories provide adequate supervision and assistance to amateur gardeners. Some firms employed trained supervisors; others, by canvass of their forces, found among them men who were successful gardeners, and who could be allowed time to instruct and assist their fellow workers.

A special committee was appointed to further this project in 1918, with the result that for the season 211 factory gardens were reported, with a total of 1,621 acres and 17,380 individual plots. This demonstration of what can be done is now being used as a basis for further planning; and it is recognized by many manufacturers that such provision for their employees is of great value, not only in contributing to the support of families, but in its bearing on permanence of occupation and on contentment of mind. That the cost of living in New England is greater than elsewhere puts at



a distinct disadvantage manufacturers who must produce in competition with sections of the country where wage schedules are lower. The garden may prove a considerable element in offsetting this disadvantage. Plans now being considered may become the starting point of organization of the New England Farm and Food Foundation, which hopes to do much in years to come toward making permanent the work which was begun during the war emergency.

At the final meeting of the Food Production Committee it was estimated that upwards of half a million gardens had been stimulated by the various agencies concerned, and that the value of their products, all told, ran into millions of dollars.

*Protection for Gardens.* — After the campaign for increased gardening, complaints were soon heard of depredations, both juvenile and adult. Co-operating with the Probation Commission and various juvenile agencies, a committee was formed to undertake a campaign for protection of gardens. "No trespass" signs were furnished from the Department of Agriculture; and a different type was issued by the Food Production Committee, rather appealing to patriotic instinct than threatening punishment. It is gratifying to record that through the latter part of the season of 1917 and through the year 1918 very few reports of damage came to the Committee; on the contrary, many city and town committees reported that by the co-operation of police judges and departments their communities had been remarkably free from this type of misdemeanor.

*Credit Problem.* — Complaint was made by farmers early in the season of 1917 that credit was not adequate to provide for increased production. In meeting this complaint the experience of the Plymouth County Trust Company and other banks in the distinctly agricultural sections was taken as a basis for publicity work. A bulletin was prepared and circulated to all banks urging that liberal credit be given to farmers who wished to increase production. The county agricultural agents were in many cases asked to pass upon the projects of the various applicants, and less demand was



discovered for additional credit than had been anticipated. In one of the western counties the county agricultural agent reported that to only one application had he refused endorsement; and the president of the bank which handled the larger portion of this business reported at the close of the year that, with one exception, all notes had been paid. From a western Massachusetts town of less than 300 inhabitants, 11 farmers came to this bank and signed a joint note for the amount of their total requirements. This loan was entirely paid by the beginning of the next season, and the bank had made business connection with several new clients. The districts in which it was difficult to secure credit were, for the greater part, not distinctly agricultural sections, but had become largely devoted to estates and to suburban residences.

The Committee failed to hear reports of any cases where permanent losses were sustained by banks through the extension of emergency credit.

*Crop Underwriting.* — Appeal for production had hardly been made before the farmers of the Commonwealth complained that the government was guaranteeing manufacturers and producers of war materials against loss, but was asking farmers to increase production without any such guarantee, and without certainty that the market would be adequate to take the produce. Several schemes to take care of the increased produce were developed. In Hampshire County a so-called 50-50 plan was worked out. Business men and manufacturers established a fund from which seeds and insecticides were provided for certain specific crops, primarily potatoes. A preliminary census of the county showed that the greater quantity of potatoes therein consumed was imported from distant sources, and an attempt was made to provide the consumers within the county from local sources. The plan resulted in some increased production, but, like many others, was valuable chiefly in stimulating interest.

The Worcester County Farm Bureau initiated a move-

ment among business men of the County for the establishment of a guarantee insurance fund, to be held as a reserve in order that cost of production might be repaid to all who would contract to grow certain staple crops. As the season advanced it seemed best to agree upon an arbitrary price per unit for the crops, and this was done. At the close of the season but one claim was presented, and for a total of about \$12. In view of the security given to producers, and the resulting increase of production, the guarantors felt that the movement had been well worth while.

A somewhat similar movement was undertaken in Plymouth County in 1918 by the Rotary Club, which raised a guarantee fund of \$200,000 for the purpose of insuring recovery of cost of potatoes and corn. This was amply covered by the acreage offered for contract, since the experience of 1917 was here repeated, namely, that farmers were not as anxious to contract as early complaints might have led the guarantors to believe.

In Middlesex County a plan was originated by which consumers agreed to contract with farmers for the purchase of potatoes and beans at not less than a stated minimum price, and in addition pledged themselves to pay the Boston market price if it exceeded the minimum. This plan was developed further by the Associated Industries of Massachusetts. In various parts of the State manufacturing corporations offered to contract for the requirements of their employees. It is significant that in this case, also, it was difficult to place contracts, farmers believing that they could do better by taking their chances in the open market. In 1918 the Bristol County Independent Agricultural School developed a plan to stimulate the growing of corn for milling for human consumption. Various grocers and millers contracted with farmers to take the crop at a specified price. Here, again, farmers preferred to take their chances and sell their product at whatever market price prevailed. An increase of many hundred acres resulted from this movement in Bristol County alone.

*Campaign to prevent Slaughter of Poultry.* — Because of the stocks of poultry in storage, the market prices paid for poultry and poultry products did not advance in the year 1917 in any such measure as the cost of production. Massachusetts poultry raisers have always been at a disadvantage in comparison with poultry raisers of the West, because of the fact that the eastern poultryman must purchase feeds at the market price, while the westerner, who is himself a producer of feeds, and who raises poultry on free range, never knows the actual cost of his product. The flocks of the West and the South are in a measure self-sustaining through the summer, and such grain as is fed in winter is seldom charged against the flock. It is only by superior management methods that the eastern poultryman has maintained himself in competition with the West.

When the price of wheat advanced sharply in 1917, other grains rapidly followed, and the Massachusetts poultryman found himself under great stress. Many commercial flocks were reduced to a minimum of breeding hens, and many were entirely discontinued. The commercial hatcheries reported about 30 per cent of their usual volume of business.

To meet this the Committee on Food Production secured money to pay two specialists from the Agricultural College, who carried on an intensive campaign in various parts of the State for increasing the hatch. This was done with the conviction that the price of poultry and poultry products would shortly advance as soon as storage stocks were exhausted. As a result of the campaign, many commercial hatcheries again began business, and the poultry flocks of the State were maintained in much better numbers than was anticipated.

The unheard-of prices for eggs and dressed birds during the season of 1918 enabled poultrymen who maintained their flocks to that period to recover the losses which they had previously sustained, and to make a profit in addition.

During the latter part of 1917, and during the season of 1918, bulletins and press articles were issued from time to

time urging the culling of flocks in order that the feeding of non-producers might be discontinued, and the productive average of flocks increased. Many striking results were obtained in this campaign, in which the county agricultural agents gave the greatest assistance. In some cases, where the agent and the specialists of the college divided a flock into two pens, one supposedly producers and the other supposedly non-producers, the yield from the producing flock was virtually the same as the yield of the entire flock before the division, while the yield from the non-production pen was almost negligible. In one instance a flock of 160 birds was culled, and the production from the 8 birds which were retained equaled the production from the entire flock, while the pen of non-producers yielded a maximum of but three eggs a day.

The Committee on Food Production further recommended that poultrymen make every effort to produce more of their own feeds. On a number of farms where careful records of production costs were kept, it was found that the cost of producing a bushel of corn ranged from 37 cents as a minimum, to \$1.04 as a maximum. Even at the maximum, the corn grown in Massachusetts cost the grower much less than an equal amount purchased in the western markets. It was the conviction of the Committee that in the long run New England poultry growing, like New England dairying, would find its sure foundation only when the producers should become in a measure independent of purchased supplies of feeds, depending more upon the product of their own land.

*Assistance to County Farm Bureaus.* — The Food Production Committee, when first organized, realized that contact with farmers of the State could best be made through established agencies. Farm bureaus and county agents were in operation in all counties except Nantucket, Dukes and Suffolk, but home demonstration agents were at work in only four counties, and special boys' and girls' agricultural club agents in only three. The Committee, therefore, recommended to the Committee on Public Safety that assist-



ance be provided for farm bureaus, to enable them to make their work more effective. The sum of \$35,000 was granted by the Governor and Council, and apportioned to the different farm bureaus.

County farm bureaus were organized for the two island counties of Dukes and Nantucket, and both agricultural and home demonstration agents began work early in the summer of 1917. Funds were made available for home demonstration agents in all of the farm bureaus where none were as yet employed, these funds being used as a basis of co-operation with the United States Department of Agriculture through the Extension Service of the Agricultural College. In still other counties employment of special agents for boys' and girls' club work was made possible. The Committee believed that the war emergency would hasten normal developments in many desirable lines, and wished to assist or promote only such activities as were not being developed by regular agents. In addition, they desired to subsidize permanent agencies for what would ultimately be permanent work, rather than to create emergency machinery. The feeling was that if home demonstration agents and boys' and girls' club agents were once established in the various counties, their usefulness would be so well recognized that there would be little doubt of their continuance by the counties. This did in fact take place. With the end of the war and the withdrawal of emergency funds the farm bureaus themselves decided to raise revenue for continuing the work of the home demonstration agents and boys' and girls' club agents.

In the year 1918 this subsidy to counties was continued where necessary. It is gratifying to note that the majority of counties expended less than the amount allowed them.

The increased production of the State was in a very large measure attributable to the work of the farm bureaus, through their help in publicity and in assisting farmers to secure supplies. In the home demonstration work, likewise, the agents of the farm bureaus were of great assistance,



while the home economics leaders of the Food Administration depended on farm bureaus for reaching the more scattered population of the State with the messages of conservation. The earlier work of farm bureaus also made possible the organization of the State, in less than a month's time, with local emergency committees on food. Later, when organization for food control became necessary, the same machinery was of great help to the county administrators.

*Onions.* — The Food Production Committee, and later the Food Administration, was called on to assist in disposing of surplus stocks of onions. For a short period in the winter of 1916-17 the highest speculative price levels ever known for onions had been reached. Later in the spring too large a carry-over caused a corresponding slump to very low prices, with a great supply and very little demand.

During the winter of 1917-18 onion producers in the Connecticut Valley received from the Food Administration important aid in getting an adequate supply of heater cars for the movement of the crop, much of which would otherwise have been wasted. Through the Associated Industries of Massachusetts many manufacturers were persuaded to buy car lots for distribution, at cost, to their employees.

In the autumn of 1918 it became evident that the onion crop of the Connecticut Valley was not moving as fast as it should. Investigation showed that growers, who had been dependent on speculators to buy their crop in peace time, were unprepared to carry the crop and hold it for subsequent markets. In peace time the buyers habitually purchase heavily in the fall because of the possibility of speculative profit, but during the war, with all possibility of speculative profit removed, purchase was slow and prices ruinous. In one small area more than 50 carloads of onions were without a market, and 85 cents per hundred pounds was the highest price offered for limited quantities, while some sales were made for 75 cents per hundred pounds. The purchase by factories of the Associated Industries group

of several carloads in this territory immediately brought back the price to \$1.40 per hundred pounds, and at that figure the growers about recovered costs of production.

The large publicity given to onions effected a material, although temporary, increase in consumption. Retailers made no effort to handle the commodity when the permitted margin of profit had been reduced to a very small figure.

The large onion crop of 1918, although excellent in quality, was not a profitable venture to the farmers. Without the services of speculative buyers, producers were unable to sell or store the crop. This condition will continue until storages owned and controlled by the producers themselves are available.

*Corn Borer.* — In August, 1917, the department of entomology at the Massachusetts Agricultural College identified specimens of the European corn stalk borer, an insect which has done enormous damage to the corn plant in Europe, and has virtually prevented its culture in some sections. The caterpillar bores up and down the stalk of the plant, and frequently riddles the cob. Specimens in the caterpillar stage had been sent to the college for identification earlier in the season, but as the insect was absolutely new to this section of the country, a full identification was not made until the moth was found. The trouble was confined to an area near Boston, where gardeners noticed that, apparently without good reason, a slight breeze would blow down the entire stand of sweet corn.

The Food Administration reinforced the publicity work of the Department of Agriculture by urging all household gardeners to burn every bit of garden waste, particularly corn stalks, and to attempt the eradication of certain weeds known to harbor the pest. Circulars were issued and much newspaper publicity was secured.

*Transportation Problems.* — Complaints from farmers and shippers of farm products relating to stray shipments were at first dealt with through the Sub-Committee on Transportation of the Committee on Public Safety. Later all

such problems were cared for by the Division of Transportation, whose work is described elsewhere in this story.

Data were collected through the field agents in marketing, as to the use of motor trucks by commercial truckmen in bringing produce to the community markets. The department of markets at the Massachusetts Agricultural College made this information the basis of plans for the season of 1919. The same data were furnished to the Committee on Motor Transport, and that Committee would have followed the matter further had not the termination of the war stopped its activities.

*Campaign for Use of Local Products.* — In 1917, and again in 1918, the Committee urged the county farm bureaus and the Food Production Committee to plan as far as possible for the absorption of local produce by local demand. In Essex County, for instance, the slogan "Take Essex County out of the market" was adopted. Cross-hauling of produce has always been a source of some economic waste, although perhaps less than is often supposed. It has long been noted that the suburban towns around Boston are traversed through the produce season by the trucks of farmers from outlying sections; the produce is delivered to wholesalers in Boston, and on the return, over the same route, to the suburban consuming centers. Much was accomplished by local committees, and particularly by the committees which promoted local community markets, to stop the smaller lots of produce from going to the wholesale markets. It will, however, never be sound economy for the larger producers, who move and sell their produce in full truckloads, to take time to meet the requirements of suburban retailers.

*Canning and Drying.* — The stimulation of canning, drying and preservation of household garden products, was taken up particularly by the Division of Conservation, and will be dealt with under another heading. Feeling that further assistance was desirable, the Committee worked out co-operative plans with the Agricultural College by which

schools for leaders were held in various parts of the State, so that for each community provision might be made for the supervision of canning and drying activities.

During the first season "teams" of instructors from the college were organized, and held extension schools on canning and preserving at many centers through the State. Special courses were arranged at Simmons College, at the Massachusetts Agricultural College, and at various county agricultural schools and farm bureaus. Upwards of a thousand teachers received training in the sixty or more schools that were provided. Further effort was made to promote the establishment of canning and drying centers as community projects. These centers furnished valuable demonstration of successful and unsuccessful practices, and the data secured will be available to guide communities whenever the project of community canning and drying centers is brought forward.

*Canning Supplies.* — The general upset in manufacture and transportation caused a threatening shortage of glass jars for canning purposes in the year 1917. The Committee on Food Production and its Sub-Committee on Conservation urged all householders of the State to locate any stocks of glass jars that had been in disuse, and to provide themselves early with adequate supplies of jar rings. In addition to this many town committees purchased canning supplies in car lots, at a substantial saving to householders. It should be recorded, however, that the great majority of grocers were very reasonable in their charges for supplies, and there was little attempt to profiteer on either jars or rubbers. Through the season of 1917 a member of the food production staff was assigned to the task of following wholesale stocks and preventing shortages in any localities.

A further interesting and somewhat puzzling complication in cities came from the fact that in violation of the law many of the poorer householders utilized milk bottles for putting up preserves and marmalades, thereby depleting the already



small stock of milk bottles and adding very substantially to milkmen's costs of doing business.

In 1918 no particular shortage of jars threatened.

*Live-stock Problems.* — Because of the low prices for dairy products, and the scarcity of labor, many dairy herds in Massachusetts were dispersed during the early period of the war. Effort was made to show farmers that, with the consequent increasing shortage of dairy products, prices would become more remunerative. Little could be done toward the actual increase of herds, but the Committee tried to prevent further decrease. The later organization of the Federal Milk Commission made more extended work of the Committee in this line necessary.

Every effort was made to increase the number of hogs grown within the State. Boys' and girls' pig clubs were promoted. This work failed of large results because the available supply of pigs was exhausted before the number of householders who wished to raise pigs could be provided for. In the spring of 1918 the supply of pigs had increased, but at no time was it adequate. The use of household garbage for the feeding of the family pig was much increased, as is described elsewhere under the head of "Garbage."

*Tobacco Growing.* — The Committee received many complaints from citizens of the State, to the effect that the use of the best agricultural lands for the growing of tobacco was an economic waste. The demands of the army overseas for supplies of tobacco seemed a sufficient reply to this complaint. Moreover, the tobacco growers had sheds and equipment useful for no other purpose. Tobacco lands carried a high valuation, and it seemed unjust to the operators of these farms to request the non-profitable operation of their lands for the period of the war. The tobacco growers responded generously by agreeing to take idle land elsewhere, and to raise an acreage of grain or staple crops equal to the acreage of tobacco which they were normally producing. They thus made a direct contribution to the food supply of the Nation.

*Machinery Project.* — Early in the season of 1918 the



question of the wider use of harvesting and other machinery to replace man power received much attention. An inventory of available threshing outfits and other units of heavy farm machinery was made by the county agents, and machinery privately owned was more fully used by others than the owners.

But a larger project was desirable, and a bill was introduced in the Legislature of 1918 to provide for the purchase and operation by the State of heavy agricultural machinery, particularly of tractors and of threshing outfits. An appropriation of \$100,000 was made by the Legislature to the State Board of Agriculture, in the use of which the Committee on Food Production gave assistance. A report of this, specially to be commended, has been published by the Massachusetts State Department of Agriculture.

The Committee did not expect the project to be self-supporting, but supposed that it would furnish a demonstration of the possibilities for heavy machinery, and would greatly stimulate private purchase. As was expected, many farmers were led to buy tractors, as well as threshing outfits and hay presses, for their own use. The Agricultural College made provision during the season of 1918-19 for numerous schools for tractor operators, to assist farmers in avoiding the mistakes usually made by novices in the operation of such machinery.

Altogether, the demonstration was of great benefit to the State, and, in the opinion of the Committee, well worth what it cost.

*Crop Acreage Increase.* — At the close of the season of 1918 the county agricultural agents made a report to the State leader of farm bureaus, giving the following results: —

	Acres.
Increase in corn, . . . . .	29,000
Increase in potatoes, . . . . .	11,000
Increase in oats, . . . . .	5,000
Increase in wheat, rye and barley, at least, . . . . .	5,000
	<hr/>
	50,000

While this may not seem noteworthy when compared with the increase in larger agricultural States, it should be remembered that scarcely 4 per cent of the population of Massachusetts is engaged in agricultural pursuits, so that the percentage of increase over former production shown by the figures quoted is highly significant.

*Food Consumption Survey.* — Before the organization of the Federal Food Administration, the Sub-Committee on Distribution of Food recommended a survey to determine if possible the approximate food requirements of the State. In Hampshire County investigations by the Massachusetts Agricultural College department of economics showed that the towns of that county, although close to natural sources of supply, were yet largely dependent on food brought from a distance by rail. This was true even in the case of common local products. This investigation brought out, incidentally, the fact that communities vary much in their habits about food. One town is a large fruit-eating town; another seems to have no taste whatever for fruit. In one town consumption of potatoes was found to be two bushels per capita; in another, nearly six.

Working from a different standpoint, the Committee assigned men to study the food requirements of typical families in the city of Boston, and through this effort confirmed the Hampshire County estimates of the average per capita consumption of staple foods. Thus a basis was secured for a rough estimate of the quantities of various foodstuffs required for the State. The chief lesson was the necessity of keeping open the lines of transportation and the maintenance of adequate reserves of food in anticipation of coming needs.

*Milk Production Cost Survey.* — In the spring and early summer of 1917 the Committee believed it important to find out the cost of milk production in Massachusetts. The Boston Chamber of Commerce Agricultural Committee and the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth were already working on the problem. The Chamber of Commerce under-

took to publish the surveys, both in the field of production and of distribution. The Food Production Committee furnished the funds, and, under a plan of survey formulated by the Agricultural College and the Chamber of Commerce jointly, the college sent out investigators to secure data from the books of farmers.

The names of farmers who kept account books were learned through the county agricultural agents, from which the figures of a relatively small group were finally selected as furnishing satisfactory material for comparison with one another and with data to be secured in other New England States.

The actual cost of production was thus determined for a definite group of farmers, the average annual production of milk per cow owned being a little over 5,000 pounds. The Committee also furnished funds to secure data from other States which supply milk to Boston, and by this means the investigation was extended to Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and Connecticut. This valuable information was compiled and issued in a bulletin in season for the use of the Federal Milk Commission for New England. Further details on the subject of milk will be found in the section on the Federal Milk Commission.

*Insect Control Work.* — In the summer of 1917 the Committee felt that the army of new household gardeners were entitled to assistance in the matter of insect pests and their control. Money was granted to the Massachusetts Agricultural College for two insect and plant disease specialists, who were to be field agents assisting city and town garden supervisors in the identification of pests and diseases, and in planning means for their control. These men were constantly in the field, advising county agricultural agents, town garden supervisors and leaders of agriculture. Every conceivable question was asked them, and the list of pests which they identified is as impressive as it is unintelligible to the unscientific reader. This preventive work saved many times the cost of the service, and left a permanent educational effect.

In addition to the field work the insect and plant disease specialists kept continuous knowledge of stocks and prices of insecticides, and did much to assist in securing adequate supplies at reasonable prices.

*Final Recommendations of the Committee.*—At the last meeting of the Committee on Food Production a return to normal conditions in agriculture was urged. The weaknesses of our present system had been so clearly demonstrated by the crisis that efforts could be more intelligently directed to correcting them. The Committee strongly urged that all forms of artificial stimulation and subsidy be abandoned, and that the efforts to increase agricultural production be made to conform to sound peace-time principles of agricultural economics. It was also the conviction of the Committee that the various agricultural agencies of the State were making excellent use of the war experiences, and that substantial progress would be shown during the next few years.

The real credit for the increase of production belongs to the farmer who did the work. Credit for assisting him should go to all the agencies which gave their efforts and facilities to render the problems of production less difficult.

The Committee took this means of expressing to all the co-operating bodies its hearty appreciation of their efforts during the war.

It should also be noted, finally, that the success of the Food Administration in Massachusetts was in a large measure dependent upon the public attention and interest which had resulted from the efforts of the Massachusetts Food Production campaign of the spring of 1917. The entire Commonwealth was alive to the fact of an impending food shortage, perhaps more so than any other State in the Union. The appeals to patriotism and public spirit had prepared the way for the message of conservation and the measures of control which were later necessary. The Women's Committee on Conservation had prepared the way for the Woman's National Council of Defense, which in turn fur-



nished the basis for immediate results in conservation efforts with householders. The Sub-Committee on Distribution had initiated many projects which were continued without break in the Food Administration. It would, indeed, be impossible for those who have worked through the entire period to distinguish between the work of the earlier Committee and the work of the Food Administration, so fully did the two merge, and so completely did the policy of the Food Administration carry into effect the original plans of the Food Production Committee.

### **(b) Direct Buying and Community Markets**

Early in the work of the Food Production Committee, fear was expressed, on the one hand, that efforts for increased food production would be of no avail, and, on the other, that such emergency production would glut the market. The Committee felt that a certain amount of increased production would surely result, and in the report of a Sub-Committee on Distribution the establishment of community markets was urged. These were planned, primarily, for surplus products of home gardens, and for the products raised by small farmers and market gardeners who had no regular and easy means of approach to wholesale markets.

In July, 1917, the Committee on Public Safety in the city of Quincy opened a public market for farmers and gardeners on the grounds of Adams Academy. This was immediately successful, and was copied at once by Food Production Committees of Lowell and Springfield. Through the circulation of a bulletin describing the Quincy Market and the manner of its administration, wide interest was immediately created throughout the State. Volunteer members of the staff in Boston were assigned to the promotion and inspection of these markets, and much work was done.

The volume of business varied from a relatively small amount on one day in the week to \$3,500 a day in the larger



markets. The prices were considerably lower than prevailed in retail stores, and much of the material sold would have been wasted without this outlet.

In September, 1917, with a view to the market organization of the following summer, the Food Administration cooperated with the Extension Service of the Massachusetts Agricultural College in placing four market agents in the field, who were assigned to definite districts of the State. During the winter, communities were advised as to the wisdom of continuing or discontinuing markets, and were assisted in making their plans. The following account of the community markets is drawn from the experience of both summers.

State legislation requires cities and towns of 10,000 population or over to designate sites for farmers' markets. These sites, and rules and regulations for conduct of markets, are subject to approval by the State Board of Agriculture. Although little had been done in this direction before 1917, the Committee found this legislation helpful in compelling action on the part of officials who either were not interested, or who feared opposition from local retailers.

Various types of market developed. In Quincy there was parking space for forty or fifty teams and trucks, and ground rent was charged. The Committee also provided a community table with an agent in charge, so that small quantities of produce could be left and sold by the agent for a commission. The market was located in the center of the city and at the convergence of two important automobile routes. This market sold or rented scales to producers which had been sealed by the Department of Weights and Measures. Paper bags were furnished to farmers at cost, and baskets kept on hand for sale to consumers. These small points added greatly to the effectiveness of the market. The prices ranged below retail, but above current wholesale. On the morning of each market day the market master secured the Boston wholesale prices by telephone, and posted them on a bulletin board. This public knowledge



Quincy, Mass., Community Garden



made it safe for retailers to purchase of farmers for immediate delivery. It is worthy of note that the Quincy retailers were not hostile to this market, believing that it brought people into the city who remained to make other purchases in Quincy instead of in Boston. The market did away in part with the former practice of trucking materials through Quincy to Boston, to be sold immediately to purchasers from Quincy and then trucked back again over the same route. It also saved labor and time, and brought the produce to the purchaser in better condition.

A second type of market was that at Kingston. This was a relatively small market, and catered particularly to Saturday afternoon automobile travel moving toward the Cape. This market was conducted by a women's committee, and those who furnished produce and poultry products found it to be well worth while. While not serving the local population in reducing current prices, it furnished a profitable outlet for a certain volume of produce.

Still a third type developed in Boston. The deputy commissioner of markets interested himself in learning of farmers who would provide a regular supply, and with approval from the Board of Agriculture fixed on six market sites in densely populated parts of the city. The market was held one day each week at four of the sites, and two days a week at the others. The prices realized were considerably lower than prevailing retail prices, but above wholesale prices, this being possible because of the very great spread. In Central Square, East Boston, on the first market day the price of sweet corn to the consumer was reduced from 35 cents per dozen ears to 20 cents per dozen ears; and although the supply consisted of several truck loads, it was quickly exhausted. Similar results were secured elsewhere within the city. In Boston, opposition on the part of retailers developed much more than in Quincy, but the demand of consumers for this service was very insistent. Reaction on both wholesale and retail markets was noticeable. Retail prices which had been so high as

to diminish demand were brought down to lower levels, with a heavy increase in volume of sales. Unwillingness of retailers to buy from wholesalers had caused gluts to a ruinous level. Diversion of produce from the wholesale markets to direct community markets brought increased demand. In one instance a producer who was offered \$15 for a load of cabbage in the Boston wholesale district traveled to Cambridge, and in less than two hours sold the entire load for \$60, quadrupling his gross returns, and at the same time placing the product in the hands of the consumer at much less than the retail price.

In Framingham a different development came through the unwillingness of farmers to spend time in selling. There an agent was employed to sell the products of the entire group, so that the establishment came to resemble a general provision store.

In Gardner the farmers were sufficiently interested to call for a winter market, which was open each week, with the result that one farmer alone disposed of \$1,200 worth of apples and winter root crops. At the close of the 1918 season the Springfield producers rented a store and planned to continue direct retail selling as a permanent venture. In other sections the local indoor market was developed, and the experience of the past two years seemed to indicate that the most valuable developments of the work in the future would be in the line of wholesale business.

The markets were particularly successful in cities where a large foreign population was accustomed to use less meat and more vegetables in the regular diet; but everywhere, to the end, quality and prices attracted purchasers. By far the most difficult problem was to create interest among producers. It seemed an economic fallacy for fifteen to thirty producers to spend their time selling in competition with each other at a single market. Many farmers, short of help, needed their own and their men's time for their regular farm work. But the consumers' enormous demands made sales so rapid that this fear on the part of the farmers



was quickly removed. In many cases the time spent in selling produce at markets just outside of Boston was not greater than the time which it would have taken to dispose of a load in the Boston wholesale district. In many of the markets, on busy days, producers provided a continuous supply, bringing in several truck loads in a single day. By confining the market to two or three days a week, and placing in charge of the selling men and boys not physically fit to do heavy work in production, it was possible to forestall much criticism.

Another fear of the farmers, and by no means a groundless one, was that they would be boycotted by wholesalers if they sold direct in the community markets. This fear was soon forgotten after the Food Administration let it be known that pressure of this sort would be ground for prosecution under the Food Control Act, which prohibited action resulting in unnecessary or unreasonable charges, and required that commodities move in as direct a line as possible to consumers.

The attitude of retailers varied greatly. In many instances the retailers showed a thoroughly patriotic spirit in furthering the interests of direct markets. Others were antagonistic, on the ground that dealers who expected to provide this service the entire year, and particularly in the winter when volume was small and loss great, should be depended on for handling the large summer trade. In some cases a definite attempt was made to provide farmers' wholesale markets to which retailers might come for supplies. Some retailers felt that the increased sales of other supplies offset any loss, and some reported that the actual volume of their sales was materially increased on the days of the farmers' markets.

The opinion of most of those who had wide experience of these markets is that many of them could wisely be maintained in peace times, but that direct farmers' markets cannot expect success as a permanent institution unless certain conditions are met. A substantial buying group

and an adequate and regular supply must be available. The quality must be good, because as a rule the group that patronizes such a market includes the most discerning and careful buyers of the community. If the market is wholesale, retailers must be able to secure their entire requirements, and prices must take into account the nearest competing wholesale market. Retail prices to consumers must be low enough to be attractive, considering quality.

Direct farmers' markets should be conducted strictly on a business basis. Business expenses, such as the salary of the market master, the cost of materials, and incidental expenses, should be met by a charge on those who sell. Subsidy by Committees on Public Safety and city and town governments was frequent during the war, and as a war-time measure was wholly justified, but would be undesirable under normal conditions.

Two other factors should be considered. If existing wholesale markets are adequate to take care of the produce of the section, and if retail prices are reasonable, a farmers' market is unnecessary. If the supply were to become much greater than the demand, the market would be glutted, and ruinously low prices result.

The providing of ground rent free for farmers who sell in competition with retailers has led to a feeling that farmers ought to hire a site on private land and conduct their venture like any other private enterprise; yet much can be said on the other side of the question and in favor of such a subsidy. In Europe, and in many cities of the United States, provision is made at public expense for direct marketing.

To sum up, the farmers' markets in Massachusetts furnished useful outlets in periods of glut; they substantially increased consumption of vegetables; in most cases prices to consumers were lower and the vegetables in fresher condition; and in the Boston district, particularly, the wholesale market was relieved of some burdensome supplies. Home garden supplies and small farm supplies were handled

by the emergency markets, so that the wholesale channels were kept clear for regular commercial producers. It is worthy of note that several of the experts working with the market-garden industry felt that increased consumption of produce absorbed increased local production; also that the conditions of glut at times prevailing in the Boston market in the season of 1918, and during the following winter, were not due to production by emergency gardeners, but would have come in any case because of normal commercial over-production exceeding the normal demand.

## CHAPTER IV

### CONSERVATION AND PUBLICITY

#### (a) Home Economics

The entire conservation work of the Food Administration is here detailed in close connection with the women's work, which centered in the office of Mrs. Thayer, the director of home economics. In most cases members of Mr. Endicott's office staff were much occupied with the work described. In some instances by far the larger part, or even the whole, of the responsibility rested with them; in other cases the reverse was true. The two offices worked, indeed, as part of one organization, and it would be impossible as well as profitless to try to record their respective shares in each undertaking. It is only just, however, to treat all this great section of conservation as primarily pertaining to the department of the home economics director and her organized host of the women of Massachusetts.

#### DIRECTOR OF HOME ECONOMICS

*Organization of Women's Work.* — The women's food work in Massachusetts was started in March, 1917, by the appointment of a Food Conservation Committee, with Dean Sarah Louise Arnold of Simmons College as chairman, this Committee being a sub-committee of President Butterfield's Committee on Food Production and Conservation associated with the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety. In June, 1917, when the Massachusetts Woman's Committee, Council of National Defense, was established, with Mrs. Thayer as chairman, Dean Arnold was appointed chairman of Food Conservation and Production for the Woman's Committee, thus uniting the women's food work already under way with that proposed by the new organ-

ization. In August, 1917, when Mr. Endicott was appointed Massachusetts Food Administrator, Mrs. Thayer and Dean Arnold were appointed home economics directors for Massachusetts.

In continuance of work already begun, local committees of women on food conservation and home economics were organized in two hundred and nine of the towns of the Commonwealth. The chairman of each of these committees was made responsible to the chairman of the local unit of the Woman's Council of National Defense, who were themselves directly responsible to Mrs. Thayer.

A large and constant supervision was given to these local food committees by Miss Arnold, through visits to a great number of the towns and frequent consultation with the chairmen at her office in Boston. A large general committee, under Miss Arnold as chairman, for developing various branches of the work, was organized and continued to hold meetings until her withdrawal to take up work in Washington.

In the autumn of 1917 a Home Economics Committee was established by Mrs. Thayer in order to bring together in regular consultation a number of persons engaged in different branches of the work. The committee met once a fortnight on alternate Thursday afternoons, and consisted of the following members:—

Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer, Home Economics Director, *Chairman*.

Prof. James H. Ropes, *Secretary*.

Dean Sarah Louise Arnold, Chairman of State Food Committee.

Pres. Kenyon L. Butterfield, Massachusetts Agricultural College, Amherst.

Miss Laura B. Comstock, State Leader for Home Economics Extension Workers in Counties.

Z. C. Dickinson.

Mrs. Malcolm Donald, Chairman of Food Committee, Woman's Council of National Defense.

George H. Ellis, Vice-Chairman, Committee on Food Production.

Henry B. Endicott.

Mrs. Herbert J. Gurney, Vice-Chairman of Massachusetts Woman's Committee of the Council of National Defense; President, Massachusetts Federation of Women's Clubs.



Miss Louise Pryor, Agent in Charge of Vocational Work for Girls and Women.

Miss Antoinette Roof, State Leader for Home Economics' Extension Work in Cities.

Miss Frances Stern, Specialist on Food for the Industrial Worker.

This committee did not in general undertake executive and administrative work, but was of far-reaching importance in keeping in full mutual understanding different organizations whose co-operation was essential to the efficiency of the work in Massachusetts. Apart from this committee, also, but partly in consequence of its existence and meetings, the representatives of these organizations were in constant communication with Mrs. Thayer and with each other.

Early in 1918 Miss Arnold was requested by the United States Food Administration to take up work in Washington and in other parts of the country, traveling widely and making public addresses. Her place as chairman of the Food Conservation and Production Committees of the Massachusetts Woman's Committee of the Council of National Defense was filled by Mrs. Thayer's appointment of Mrs. Malcolm Donald, who had been chairman of the Household Economics Committee of the National Civic Federation. Mrs. Donald, although technically an officer of the Woman's Council of National Defense rather than of the Food Administration, became to all intents and purposes an officer of the latter, with an office at the State House. Her official status in the Food Administration was that of a member of the Massachusetts Board of Food Administration.

The picture of the organization would not be complete without repeating here what is elsewhere stated, that the whole force of county home economics agents, working under Miss Laura B. Comstock of the Massachusetts Agricultural College, as State leader of county agents, and the whole force of the emergency home economics leaders for cities, working under Miss Antoinette Roof, State leader of

this work, were at all times brought into the closest relation with the United States and Massachusetts Food Administration. These workers were regarded, and regarded themselves, as an integral part of the Food Administration, although in every respect their administrative independence, under the supervising officials duly appointed, was maintained. Under these agents and leaders a large number of local workers and demonstrators were constantly active.

In the spring of 1918 a State leader of volunteer college workers was authorized by the United States Food Administration, and Miss Ada Comstock, dean of Smith College, was appointed to this position by Mr. Endicott and Mrs. Thayer.

The daily routine of the office included such matters as these:—

Correspondence dealing with complaints and with requests for technical information.

Information bureau for the general public.

Arranging for and sending speakers.

Constant directions to food chairmen, teachers and private organizations, such as churches, women's clubs, etc.

Daily writing of newspaper publicity.

Informal conferences with State, county and city leaders.

From the first, a great number of leaflets, posters and bulletins and a large amount of other printed material were distributed through many channels. After February, 1918, when a more careful account began to be kept, 8,180,000 pieces of printed matter were sent out. For this purpose use was made of churches, clubs and miscellaneous gatherings; the county food administrators (men and women); the city leaders and county home demonstration agents; also the four hundred libraries of the State, with the aid of Miss Edith Guerrier, library director, and her representative Mrs. Libbey at the Food Facts Cottage, and others. Small "envelope enclosures" were sent out with all circular letters, and distributed with the bills and pay envelopes of

a number of great industrial and public service corporations. A "literature room" was maintained at the State House under the direction of Miss Louise W. Jackson, and similar service was rendered by the Food Facts Bureau.

For the needs of the foreign-speaking population, seven of the series of food leaflets on the use of corn, oats, milk, food for children, etc., provided by the government, were each translated into eleven languages, — Armenian, Finnish, French, Greek, Italian, Lithuanian, Polish, Portuguese, Swedish, Syrian and Yiddish, — and of these, 820,000 copies were distributed. During the latter part of 1918 plans were in hand for a still larger issue in foreign languages.

The work of the office centered largely in a long series of special efforts, more or less protracted in the several instances, but covering the whole period. The subjects of these campaigns were as follows: —

- |                                 |                                |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Hoover pledge card.          | 11. Using up corn meal.        |
| 2. White breadless days.        | 12. Flour card.                |
| 3. Wheatless and meatless days. | 13. Absolutely wheatless.      |
| 4. Fish.                        | 14. Beef conservation.         |
| 5. Corn meal.                   | 15. Canning and drying.        |
| 6. Fats.                        | 16. Milk.                      |
| 7. Potato.                      | 17. Storage of vegetables.     |
| 8. Posters.                     | 18. Cottage cheese.            |
| 9. Liberty bread.               | 19. Fruit pits and nut shells. |
| 10. Canning and food centers.   |                                |

In these campaigns a great variety of methods were employed, as the occasion suggested and required. Publicity was secured through newspapers of every type, with the aid of volunteer women publicity agents and others. Leaflets and pamphlets specially prepared in Massachusetts were issued, as follows: —

"The Why and the Wherefore of the Food Administration."

"Food Conservation and Production Work for Churches, Synagogues and Lodges."

"Canning without Sugar."

"Apple Butter."









"Plan for Conservation of Wheat."  
 "How to Live without Wheat."  
 "Eat Potatoes instead of Bread."  
 "Use More Milk."  
 "Corn Meal is cheaper than Wheat Flour."  
 "Milk is the Best All-round Food."  
 "How to Cook Fish."

Special posters were printed and widely exhibited, and through the efficiency of the State merchant representative great quantities of posters were brought before the public in stores, as well as in factories, railroad stations and hotels by the aid of the Associated Industries of Massachusetts; also through clubs, and by direct distribution at the State House, to individuals. To agencies already mentioned leaflets were sent in quantity for local distribution. Circular letters were dispatched to churches, newspapers, clubs, hotels, grocers, libraries, schools and private organizations. Slips were attached to their menus by hotels and restaurants. In the potato campaign a fairy story and an allegorical play, prepared in Washington, were sent out to schools. An outline for study of questions was used in many women's clubs. A poster contest was held, with the aid of the Normal Art School.

The moving-picture houses of the State lent their aid freely, and slides with a food conservation message were exhibited, each for a week or more, on the following topics: —

Sugar Ration.	Use Fancy Meats.
Wheat Ration per Person.	Eat Cottage Cheese.
Canning and Preserving.	Save Food for Humanity.

Outdoor pictures and appeals also attracted the attention of large crowds during the summer of 1918 at the Food Administration Cottage on Boston Common.

Elaborate plans were made, and, as described elsewhere, partly carried out for exhibits through the State. The largest achievements were those of the electric car and the demonstration truck, the store-window exhibits devised and

energetically pushed by the State merchant representative and his local agents, and the library exhibits.

Speakers were provided for a great number and variety of public meetings and clubs; one interesting work was a series of talks to cooks at employment offices.


For home conservation demonstrations of actual processes were important. These were carried on incessantly, chiefly under the direction of the county home demonstration agents and city leaders; and also in other ways, notably by the Conservation Cottages on Boston Common, the wheatless and sugarless demonstration electric car, the motor truck, and at Liberty Bread Shops and large stores. To this class of work belong the one hundred and thirteen canning centers established in the State.

Particular mention should be made of two enterprises already referred to. An electric car was equipped and maintained at the expense of Mrs. A. Lawrence Hopkins, and sent over lines in the eastern part of the State. Its purpose was to stimulate interest in the conservation of wheat, to teach how to make wheatless bread, to show methods of economizing in sugar, and to give instructions in the care and feeding of children. In forty-seven days 57 towns and cities were visited, and nearly 9,000 persons reached in a most effective way.

Similar was the work done in the city of Boston by the demonstration truck, made possible by the gift of Mrs. J. Montgomery Sears. This was in activity for two months, in which time sixty demonstrations were given and the same number of talks on child welfare. It was estimated that 6,500 persons were reached through this means.

*Cottages on Common.* — From May 1 to October 1, 1918, five Conservation Cottages were kept in operation on Boston Common, near the Tremont Street Mall and about opposite West Street. Charmingly grouped, and surrounded by a demonstration vegetable garden, these inexpensive cottages were the focus of a varied and most effective work. In the center stood the Food Administration Cottage, where a





Food Conservation Cottages on Boston Common

volunteer was always present to answer questions, and in which lectures, meetings and exhibitions (for instance, the poster contest exhibition) were held. A porch of this cottage provided for the exhibits and other work of the Women's Municipal League.

In a second cottage the Food Facts Bureau, supported by the Women's City Club of Boston, distributed literature and information about food, clothing and fuel; kept a permanent file of printed materials; and maintained a well-informed staff to answer questions. To this cottage 19,723 persons came; and from it 248,766 leaflets were sent out, with other printed matter.

The third building (opened June 4) was the Children's Cottage of the Women's Food Committee of the Boston Committee on Public Safety. Here 23,250 persons received information and instruction about child welfare through exhibits, consultation with experts, and printed material. Of the last, 69,750 pieces were distributed.

The National Civic Federation erected and maintained the fourth cottage, which was well equipped for cookery demonstrations, held twice daily. In all, 37 demonstrators gave instructions here, at 220 demonstrations, to 32,000 persons.

The fifth cottage was that of the Red Cross, where Red Cross activities of all kinds were exhibited and literature to the amount of 45,000 pieces distributed. The visitors numbered 20,000.

Mention may well be made here of the influenza work of the Women's Home Economics' office, and of its established agencies through the State, in setting up emergency canteens, 136 in number, for supplying food to nurses, doctors and families.

Besides the activities for which the administration was directly responsible, it was able to co-operate with the Red Cross Lunch Room and with the Liberty Bread Shops. The latter, provided for by Mrs. Augustus Hemenway, and managed by a committee of ladies, consisted of a central



shop with bakery at 35 Huntington Avenue, and five branches in different parts of the city. War bread was here made and sold, free instructions in making it given to bakers and householders, and bread recipes sold. In September, 1918, the ovens and equipment of the kitchen were transferred to Prof. Lawrence J. Henderson of Harvard University for his Food Administration experiments in the baking of bread.

The daily routine of the Home Economics office became well established in June, 1917, and continued, uninterrupted but occasionally expanded, until the need of further conservation work ceased. A calendar showing the course of conservation effort during the whole period from March, 1917, to January, 1919, may be found in the Appendix (page 580).

### **(b) Canning without Sugar**

By a cruel coincidence, the sugar shortage of 1918 became most acute at just the time when sugar was sorely needed to aid the conservation program by its use in preserving fruits, and so preventing waste of good food. The Federal Food Administration tried to obviate the difficulty as best it could by adjusting the allotment of supplies of sugar. But other steps were also necessary.

Fortunately the fruit products department of the Massachusetts Agricultural College had already been making extensive experiments in the field, and had found that heavy syrups had been habitually used where lighter ones would accomplish the same results. In tests with consumers' groups, where samples were submitted for judgment, it was found that for some fruits a 20 to 25 per cent syrup was quite as acceptable as one containing 50 to 60 per cent of sugar. It was further proved that fruits and berries which had ordinarily been preserved with sugar would be equally well preserved by sterilization, and that the sugar might be added later at the time of use.

In addition to an active propaganda for these ideas through the usual publicity channels, an excellent bulletin, "Canning without Sugar," and another on "Apple Butter" were issued in co-operation with the Massachusetts Agricultural College. The result was a saving of a large amount of fruit which would otherwise have gone to waste for lack of sugar.

### **(c) The Food Administration Home Card, 1917-18**

From the first it was Mr. Hoover's intention to appeal to householders rather than to coerce them. In order to furnish information as to what the Food Administration wished, "home cards" were prepared for distribution to every household in the United States. The first card, distributed in 1917, was sent out through a commercial mailing house to a list of names furnished by the State Food Administration, which secured them through the local committees. These home cards reached only the majority, by no means the whole, of the householders in the State.

With the home card went a pledge card, and the householders who signed the pledge were entitled to display a window card and buy a pin bearing the seal of the Food Administration. These insignia manifested that the householder had promised loyally to follow the Food Administration requirements, and was a member of the Food Administration. The distribution of these, however, was not thoroughly successful. A copy of the home card follows: —

Hang this in Your Kitchen.

## UNITED STATES FOOD ADMINISTRATION

Home Card 1918

Trade Where You See This  
Emblem



Eat Where You See This  
Emblem

### WHAT YOU CAN DO TO HELP WIN THIS WAR

See other side showing WHY you should do it

**Our problem** is to feed the Allies and our own soldiers abroad by sending them as much food as we can of the most concentrated nutritive value in the least shipping space. These foods are wheat, beef, pork, butter and sugar.

**Our solution** is to eat less of these and as little of all foods as will support health and strength. All saving counts for victory.

The Food Administration asks every loyal American to help win the war by maintaining rigidly, *as a minimum of saving*, the following program:—

Have **two wheatless days** (Monday and Wednesday) in every week, and **one wheatless meal** in every day.

*Explanation.*— On “wheatless” days and in “wheatless” meals of other days use no crackers, pastry, macaroni, breakfast food or other cereal food containing wheat, and use no wheat flour in any form except the small amount that may be needed for thickening soups or gravies, or for a binder in corn bread and other cereal breads. As to *bread*, if you bake it at home, use other cereals than wheat, and if you buy it, buy only *war bread*. Our object is, that we should buy and consume one-third less wheat products than we did last year.

Have **one meatless day** (Tuesday) in every week and **one meatless meal** in every day. Have **two porkless days** (Tuesday and Saturday) in every week.

*Explanation.*— “Meatless” means without any cattle, hog or sheep products. On other days use mutton and lamb in preference to beef or pork. “Porkless” means without pork, bacon, ham, lard or pork products, fresh or preserved. Use fish, poultry and eggs. As a Nation we eat and waste nearly twice as much meat as we need.

Make every day a **fat-saving day** (butter, lard, lard substitutes, etc.).

*Explanation.*— Fry less; bake, broil, boil or stew foods instead. Save meat drippings; use these and vegetable oils for cooking instead of butter. Butter has food values vital to children; therefore, give it to them. Use it only on the table. Waste no soap; it is made from fat. Be careful of all fats. We use and waste two and a half times as much fat as we need.

Make every day a **sugar-saving day**.

*Explanation.* — Use less sugar. Less sweet drinks and candy containing sugar should be used in war time. As a Nation we have used twice as much sugar as we need.

Use **fruits, vegetables and potatoes** abundantly.

*Explanation.* — These foods are healthful and plentiful, and, at the same time, partly take the place of other foods which we must save. Raise all you can for home use.

Use **milk** wisely.

*Explanation.* — Use all of the milk; waste no part of it. The children must have whole milk. Use sour and skim milk in cooking and for cottage cheese.

**Hoarding food.** Any one buying and holding a larger supply of food now than in peace time, except foods canned, dried or preserved in the home, is helping to defeat the Food Administration in its attempt to secure a just distribution of food and the establishment of fair prices. The food hoarder is working against the common good and even against the very safety of the country. Hoarding food in households is both selfish and unnecessary; the government is protecting the food supply of its people.

Loyalty in little things is the foundation of the national strength. **DIS-LOYALTY IN LITTLE THINGS GIVES AID TO THE ENEMY. KEEP THE PLEDGE.**

Do not limit the food of growing children.

Eat sufficient food to maintain health; the Nation needs strong people.

Co-operate with your local and Federal Food Administrators. Take their advice.

Preach and practice the "gospel of the clean plate."

Housekeepers should help the stores to cut down deliveries.

Use local supplies; this saves railroad transportation.

*Report to the nearest Food Administration officer the name and address of any person discouraging the production or saving of food.*

## UNITED STATES FOOD ADMINISTRATION

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### Why we must save Food

See other side showing HOW we can do it

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*To the Members of the United States Food Administration.*

The men of the Allied Nations are fighting; they are not on the farms. Even the men of the European neutral countries are under arms. The fields of both Allies and neutrals lack man power, fertilizer and machinery. Hence, the production of food by these countries has steadily lessened ever since the beginning of the war, while, at the same time, the shortage of shipping has grown more and more serious, with the consequent steady increase of diffi-

culties in bringing food from the far-away markets of India, Australia and the Argentine.

The situation has become critical. There is simply not enough food in Europe, yet the soldiers of the Allies must be maintained in full strength; their wives and children at home must not face famine; the friendly neutrals must not be starved; and finally, our own army in France must never lack a needed ounce of food.

There is just one way in which all these requirements can be met. North America must furnish the food. And we must furnish it from our savings because we have already sent our normal surplus.

We do not need to starve our own people. We have plenty for ourselves, and it is the firm policy of the Food Administration to retain for our people, by its control of exports, a sufficient supply of every essential foodstuff. We want nobody in our country to eat less than is necessary for good health and full strength, for America needs the full productive power of all its people. Much of the needed saving can be effected by substituting one kind of food for another. But the time has come to put aside all selfishness and disloyalty. The time has come for sacrifice.

The Allies ask us to meet only their absolutely imperative needs. They are restricting the consumption of their own people to the minimum necessary for health and strength. They are controlling their food by drastic government regulation. There is even actual privation among their women and children; there is starvation in Belgium.

The Allies need wheat and meat and fats and sugar. They must have more of all of these than we have been sending, more than we shall be able to send unless we restrict our own consumption. We can do it without harm, for, as a Nation, we are to-day eating and wasting much more food than we need.

The whole great problem of winning the war rests primarily on one thing, — the loyalty and sacrifice of the American people in the matter of food. It is not a government responsibility, it is the responsibility of each individual. Each pound of food saved by each American citizen is a pound given to the support of our army, the Allies and the friendly neutrals. Each pound wasted or eaten unnecessarily is a pound withheld from them. It is a direct personal obligation on the part of each of us to some one in Europe whom we are bound to help.

If we are selfish or even careless we are disloyal; we are the enemy at home. Now is the hour of our testing. Let us make it the hour of our victory; victory over ourselves; victory over the Enemy of Freedom.

HERBERT HOOVER,  
*United States Food Administrator.*

HENRY B. ENDICOTT,  
*Food Administrator for Massachusetts.*





In 1918, after many changes in the requests which householders were asked to follow, the Federal Food Administration planned to issue a second card in the spring, and a third for the winter of 1918-19. A copy of this card and a special preparatory message from Mr. Hoover was furnished to the several States; the cards themselves were to be printed by the State administrators. In Massachusetts the contract for printing was let, but in October the influenza epidemic, which appeared here earlier than in other parts of the country, led Mr. Endicott to urge the Federal Administration to suspend the distribution of home cards and cancel plans for public meetings. The Federal Administration, however, unwilling to delay the card, directed that the printing be continued and distribution made through the safest means possible. The printing of over 800,000 cards had to proceed, and only after the home cards were printed and the stock for the window cards cut, orders came that further distribution of home cards and posters be suspended until the latter part of November.

In order to relieve the printer, whose storerooms and hallways were burdened with upwards of ten tons of printed material, the cards were shipped to city and town administrators, who had prepared local organizations to deliver them to householders. At the signing of the armistice, on November 11, they had not yet been distributed. Finally, orders came for the cards to be disposed of by public auction, or by bids, and the proceeds returned to the Federal government, which had made itself responsible for the whole expense.

While it must be confessed that the 1917 home card distribution came far short of the expectations of its promoters, and that the final home card campaign came to naught, nevertheless, the device was a good one, and, had the war continued, the frequent placing of cards with messages in the hands of all householders would have been successfully carried through with important results. With-

out the impetus of the 1917 home card, and the information which it conveyed throughout the State, the conservation movement would have lacked a necessary aid.

#### **(d) No White Bread Week**

One of Mr. Hoover's first calls was for wheat saving. Mr. Endicott said that the only way to save wheat was to save it, and proposed to the Board of Food Administration a wheatless week, in which consumers would be asked to refrain from the use of wheat. The matter was fully debated by the Board, and the fact brought out that complete abstinence from wheat would be almost an impossibility; so the slogan was changed to "No white bread week." The suggestion was taken up with a group of hotel men, and further, with the New England Food Administrators, and was put into effect for the week beginning August 6, 1917. The co-operation of hotels, restaurants and householders was most remarkable. Corn meal was reintroduced into many families where it had long been a stranger. Rye bread was in greater demand than ever before.

It was impossible to get accurate data concerning the amount of wheat actually saved. Boston is a distributing point for New England territory and for other cities of Massachusetts, and also for export trade; the sales in Boston are not an index of local consumption. The great value of the work was in drawing attention to the urgent need of saving wheat. Subsequent appeals were readily accepted, and wheatless days and wheatless meals were made possible by the interest which was created by the no white bread week. It was the text upon which many sermons and appeals were delivered, not only for the saving of wheat, but also for the saving of fats and meats. All told, the "no white bread week" was one of the most effective introductions which could have been given to the entire Food Administration campaign.

### (e) Garbage Committee

In August, 1917, the Massachusetts Food Administration took up the question of the general utilization of garbage, and the following committee was appointed:—

James J. Phelan.  
Matthew Luce.

On investigation the Committee discovered that generally throughout the State sanitary measures as affecting garbage were already developed; that the disposal of it was handled through the regular established channels; that in a great majority of the cities it was segregated from other refuse; and that contracts for its collection were let out to reduction companies or to farmers. In the smaller towns, however, the disposal of garbage was left more to the initiative of individuals who collected for the larger establishments, or to householders, who either destroyed it by fire, or fed it to their poultry and pigs. It was also discovered that the city of Boston had as yet made no effort whatever to collect garbage in certain outlying portions of the metropolitan district. The Committee therefore undertook the three following distinct lines of work:—

1. To prevent eatable food being thrown into the garbage pail and thus wasted.
2. To prevent the waste of garbage by burning or destruction.
3. Where the mixture of garbage with ashes or other foreign materials was found to work against the reduction of garbage, or to make it injurious as cattle food.

One of the first complaints called to the attention of the Food Administration after its organization in July was the serious wastefulness occurring at Camp Devens, then under construction. Three members of the Committee on Public Safety—Messrs. Lyman, Bazeley and O'Hare—were delegated to visit the cantonment, and found that these complaints were grossly exaggerated; in fact, the waste through garbage had been so completely restricted that the farmers who were under contract to remove it were tired of their

bargain. At the same time, as a result of a conference between Colonel Sweetser, in command of the military authorities at the camp, the F. T. Ley Company, which was doing the construction work, and the representatives of the Committee, a still more careful system to prevent waste was at once put in operation. The camp kitchens and restaurants were at that time maintained by the construction company, and did not pass out of its hands until the authorities took control, early in the autumn. The farmers' agreements required them to remove not only garbage from the kitchens, but also manure and other refuse from all parts of the cantonment. On the other hand, the sanitary officers insisted that in order to safeguard the health of the workers this removal should be made daily, — a requirement which the farmers were unwilling or unable to comply with. In consequence all accumulated garbage was burned as a health measure, the fuel used being discarded building materials, the requisition of which for such a purpose was the cause of further complaint, on the ground that it was a waste of material. This latter complaint the Committee found in no respect substantiated. In different sections throughout the vast area, where buildings were being erected on rush orders, huge piles of odds and ends of scrap lumber accumulated daily, which, however useful elsewhere, were an ever-threatening danger in case of fire, and for lack of means to remove them had to be instantly disposed of.

The garbage difficulty, however, was settled when a contract for removing all garbage and manure was let to a corporation making daily collections, and carrying the reducible material to an established reduction plant. Later, in the autumn of 1917, and under full military control, a careful inspection of all camp kitchens and feeding places was instituted, and by a system of checks all waste eliminated.

Again, Mr. Endicott, now Food Administrator for Massachusetts, having in mind the productive use of garbage as well as its conservation, issued a letter to all boards of health in every city and town within the Commonwealth,



asking them to encourage as far as possible an increase in back-yard raising of swine and flocks of poultry, and to allow liberal interpretation of existing health laws. This undoubtedly greatly assisted in increasing production of these two articles of food. The county food administrators were asked to instruct their staff and local officers to preach the gospel of the clean garbage pail, and to prevent waste of garbage wherever possible.

The result of the Committee's work was shown in the scarcity of garbage which soon prevailed in Massachusetts. The reduction company of Boston, handling under contract most of the city garbage, reported that not only had the quantity of garbage fallen off some 25 or 30 per cent from the previous year, but that the same condition existed in regard to the grease the company collected. It also appeared from reports from Mr. Bamman, chief of the Garbage Division at Washington, that Massachusetts was one of the only two States credited with 100 per cent of garbage conservation in towns of over 10,000 population. On investigation the Committee found but three or four cases where the larger towns destroyed their garbage, and in those instances the condition was quickly remedied by the local food administrator.

In April, 1918, the Committee, with the hearty co-operation of the city of Boston and the reduction company, made an investigation in regard to the disposition of the Boston garbage, examining practically 40,000 premises before obtaining the following results:—

	Per Cent.
Garbage mixed with ashes or other materials, . . . . .	20.79
Garbage burned or destroyed, . . . . .	1.60
Waste of food in garbage, . . . . .	.15

It will be seen from these figures that practically no waste of food was taking place through the garbage.

The Committee charged a special agent to examine hotels, restaurants and clubs, and through the instrumentality of



Mr. F. C. Hall of Boston, chairman of the Hotel and Restaurant Division, these places reduced their mixed or burned garbage and waste to a minimum.

On May 2, 1918, Mayor Peters stated that he would have steps taken to educate housekeepers on the question of reducing garbage and other waste, and that he had already instructed public works, police, health and school departments to co-operate heartily in this respect with the Committee. At the same time, ordinances were unanimously passed by the council enabling the Boston board of health to act more effectively than it had heretofore been able to do in enforcing existing laws. For example, ordinances were strengthened penalizing owners or lessees of buildings who did not provide adequate receptacles for garbage, ashes, waste papers, rags, broken glass and other rubbish. Penalties were also provided for persons guilty of throwing paper or rubbish into public or private streets or property, and for those mixing ashes or garbage with any other material, or keeping it in any other than the prescribed receptacles.

It appeared that heretofore, in three or four Boston districts, the city had never attempted to collect garbage, but left it to be destroyed by the local residents.

During 1918 a real scarcity of garbage for feeding hogs and poultry prevailed throughout the State. Moreover, there can be no doubt that the work of the Committee pointed out to the entire community that garbage is a valuable commodity, to be considered as such in the future and to be kept free of foreign material. The conservation established by the Committee as a war measure will undoubtedly continue in peace time as a matter of business thrift.

#### **(f) State Merchant Representative**

In the early autumn of 1917, the United States Food Administration directed the State Administrators to appoint in each State a representative of retail merchants, to or-

ganize local storekeepers of every description for food work, and particularly for publicity, through window displays and the exhibition of posters. In October Mr. Endicott appointed to this position George W. Mitton of the Jordan Marsh Company, Boston. His assistant representative, Earle Powers, was in charge of the work, under Mr. Mitton, and had a desk at the State House.

The first work of Mr. Mitton and Mr. Powers was to appoint local representatives in all the cities and towns of the State, a special organization being provided for Boston. This was promptly and completely accomplished by the aid of the local Committees on Public Safety, Food Committees and selectmen. Upwards of 325 local men were so appointed.

To each of these local merchant representatives a letter was sent by the Governor of the Commonwealth, and full and careful instructions were furnished by Mr. Powers. The State merchant representative kept in constant communication and correspondence with the local men. Mr. Powers was also present at all the county conferences on food supply held in February, 1918.

Many of the local merchants were willing to contribute part of their newspaper advertising for food conservation matter, and material was furnished to all of them for this purpose. The total gift of the merchants to the administration, in this form, aggregated a very large sum, probably as much as \$60,000.

Sketches and ideas for window displays, adapted to large and smaller stores, were also issued at frequent intervals, and were extensively used. There were few towns or villages in which shop windows did not show, for a great part of the war, exhibits of substitutes, and appeals in interesting form to save wheat and meat and to avoid waste.

As striking colored posters of many designs were sent out from Washington in increasing numbers, the retail merchant organization came to be of indispensable service in getting these before the public in every hamlet. Printed material

of many kinds was distributed through the same channels, and many merchants themselves reprinted recipes and other leaflets. In each campaign of the administration and the Home Economics Committee these methods were available, and nothing could have exceeded the enthusiasm and energy with which the work of Mr. Mitton's office was carried on. His assistant's full time was a contribution to the administration from his employers, and was highly appreciated.

In some of the large city stores very elaborate food exhibits were shown, and conservation instruction and publicity carried on. In Mr. Mitton's own store, for example, demonstrations of various kinds were held daily for many weeks before many thousand persons, with the co-operation of the National Civic Federation and the Women's Municipal League; and a food booth was maintained, with well-informed attendants to give out leaflets and information and to answer the questions of the daily thousands of inquirers. Similar reports could be given of the work in other large establishments. In countless ways, through the State merchant representative, the subject of food conservation was brought to the attention of the public and made the subject of every-day conservation in all parts of the State.

The work of the Massachusetts retail merchant representative received strong approval from Washington, and his methods became a very important part, perhaps the basis, of plans recommended by the United States Administration to the other States. In February, 1918, at a general meeting in New York of merchant representatives from the State administrations of the whole country, Mr. Powers was present, and described and illustrated his methods of organization and publicity. It was reported as the general sense of the meeting that Massachusetts had proved herself the leader in this important department of the work.

### (g) Food Administration Bulletin

In December, 1917, a committee was appointed with reference to a weekly bulletin which would carry to the members of the Food Administration staff and to the general public such messages as were deemed necessary. New rules and modifications of earlier regulations constantly issued had called for frequent circular letters to the various trades which could now be included in a regular weekly publication. The first issue of this bulletin was on January 21, 1918, and it was continued weekly until January 16, 1919. The design was both to publish requests, rules and regulations of the United States Food Administration, and at the same time to furnish such material as would be useful to speakers, teachers and leaders, as well as to householders generally.

When the Price Division began to publish fair retail prices, the bulletin proved to be an excellent means of disseminating this information, and was highly valued by a large body of consumers.

Many complaints in matters of enforcement arose from time to time from various licensees, who said that they had not been informed of the rules that were in force. To overcome this the name of every licensee was placed on the mailing list of the bulletin. The plea of ignorance was not accepted.

The publication was sent to all newspapers of the State; to all county, city and town food administrators; to all chairmen of committees on food production and conservation; to all public libraries; to the heads of fraternal orders; to all licensed dealers in food and feedstuffs; and to a still larger list of dealers who were not licensed but were subject to the general rules of the Food Administration. There were also many individuals on the list. Before long the mailing list grew to be upwards of 30,000.

When the general work of the Food Administration came to a close, the Price Division insisted that it could not do

without the bulletin. It was therefore continued into January, 1919, when final orders came for the discontinuance of the Price Division work.

#### **(h) Literature Division**

As much of the work of the Food Administration had to be performed by distributing printed material, a division for this purpose was early created under the charge of a volunteer officer with assistants. All Food Production and Conservation Committees, all food administrators, the press, libraries and many other agencies were supplied with quantities of various publications adequate for the groups to be reached.

Some further account of the methods of this distribution has been already given in connection with the description of the work for home economics.

#### **(i) Fair Exhibits, 1918**

In the summer of 1918 the Food Administration and the Agricultural College prepared plans for exhibits to be shown at various agricultural fairs in the State, Prof. W. D. Hurd being appointed for this purpose representative of both organizations. Three distinct sets of material were required, as the fairs were held simultaneously in various parts of the Commonwealth. The two larger exhibits were moved by auto truck; the third by common carrier.

The exhibits at the first of the fall fairs attracted a great deal of attention and much favorable comment. The work was cut short by the influenza epidemic and the cancellation of the fairs. Even the tents which were used to house the exhibits, together with other tents owned by the Agricultural College, were diverted from this work to hospital purposes, and turned over to the Emergency Health Committee.

The use of fairs more intensively for educational purposes and food matters is a field which may well be de-



veloped in peace time. The county farm bureaus, together with the Extension Service at the Agricultural College, the State Department of Agriculture, State Department of Health and the State Board of Education might well combine to furnish collections of materials and promote such exhibits during the season of fall fairs.

## CHAPTER V

### REGULATION OF FOOD TRADES

#### (a) License Division

##### HISTORY OF ORGANIZATION

The License Division (see Appendix, page 569) was the first division of the Massachusetts Food Administration to be established for the special purpose of dealing with food trades and industries. It was created, as the name implies, when the first general licensing proclamation of the President, dated October 8, 1917, was published. Up to this time the Food Administration had had numerous dealings with the food trades, such as commercial bakers, milk suppliers, fish dealers, hotel and restaurant keepers, etc., but such negotiations had been carried on by Mr. Endicott and his assistants as a part of their general work in promoting production and conservation of food.

About October 15, 1917, Paul J. Sachs of Cambridge, professor of fine arts in Harvard University and a former banker, was secured as a volunteer to give his whole time to the administration, supervising the activities relating to licensed trades. By January 1, 1918, the scope of the License Division had been enlarged to include all regulation of trade, including unlicensed dealers and manufacturers, and also to carry on all enforcement of Food Administration laws and regulations, even against private persons. As one after another commodity or trade assumed special importance, subdepartments within the License Division grew up, which departments became divisions independent of the License Division and under the general supervision of Assistant Administrators Ratshesky and Phelan. In this way, successively, the Sugar, Baking, Enforcement, Cereal, Transportation and Perishables, and Price Divisions were

formed by May 1, 1918, — all being offshoots of the original License Division.

The Fish, Poultry and Ice Division originated independently of and prior to the License Division, and was always interested in furthering conservation rather than as a regulatory division. Also, the original milk committee of Massachusetts and the New England Milk Commission were formed to deal independently and directly with the milk producers and distributors. Their work lay more in arbitration than in administering regulations.

After these various commodity and trade divisions had emerged from the License Division, the latter's activities were restricted to the routine of keeping records of licensees and files of license regulations; of publication of new regulations as they were received from Washington; and of administration of the regulations governing the less important trades for which separate divisions had not been found necessary. Such was the work of the License Division from about May 1, 1918, until the close of the Massachusetts Administration.

Mr. Sachs, having gone overseas about July 17 for duty with the Red Cross, Mr. Z. C. Dickinson succeeded him as head of the division.

#### GENERAL VIEW OF FOOD ADMINISTRATION LICENSING SYSTEM

The licensing system of the United States Food Administration was created and administered under authority of the act of August 10, 1917 (the Lever Act), which authorized the creation of the United States Food Administration, and further provided: —

whenever the President shall find it essential to license the importation, manufacture, storage, mining or distribution of any necessities, in order to carry into effect any of the purposes of this Act, and shall publicly so announce, no person shall, after the date affixed in the announcement, engage in or carry on any such business unless he shall secure and hold

a license issued pursuant to this section. The President is authorized to issue such licenses and to prescribe regulations for systems of accounts and auditing of accounts to be kept by licensees, submission of reports by them with or without oath or affirmation and the entry of and inspection by the President's duly appointed agents of the place of business of licensees.

It was further provided in this act that the penalty for failure to procure a license when required by presidential proclamation should be a fine of not more than \$5,000, or imprisonment not to exceed two years, or both.

The Food Control Act, moreover, prohibited hoarding of necessities under similar penalties, and also prohibited unreasonable charges for distribution or storage of foodstuffs. But the main body of detailed restrictions on the food trades during the war between the United States and Germany are to be found in the multitude of regulations prescribed by Mr. Hoover in behalf of the President, as conditions for the holding of the Food Administration licenses. Licensees were obliged to conform to these special regulations under penalty of losing their licenses, and could thus be compelled to stop business in case of failure to comply.

It should be noted, however, that the Food Control Act made certain exceptions to those classes of persons who might be subject to license by the President. The most important exceptions were farmers or gardeners, with respect to the products produced by them, and retailers whose gross sales of food commodities did not exceed \$100,000 a year. These classes, although subject to the statutes, were not directly bound by any special license regulations prescribed by the Food Administration. Various classes of dealers, and of storers and manufacturers of "necessaries," were put under license by presidential proclamations issued from time to time between August 10 and the close of the United States Food Administration in 1919.

The first classes put under license were wheat and rye elevators and millers (proclamation of August 14, 1917). Three very important classes came next, viz.: (1) sugar

refiners (proclamation of September 7, 1917); (2) distributors of about thirty staples, such as flour and other cereal products, dried beans and peas, animal and vegetable fats, fresh, canned or cured beef, pork or mutton, poultry, eggs, fish, fresh fruits and vegetables and certain canned goods, as well as other miscellaneous classes (proclamation of October 8, 1917); and (3) bakers (proclamation of November 7, 1917). A good indication of the final extent of the licensing system may be gathered from the subjects of the pamphlets of special rules, which are as follows: —

*Pamphlets of Special Rules*

Wheat and Rye Elevators, Dealers and Millers.

Corn, Oats, Barley — Elevators, Dealers and Millers.

Maltsters, Malt Dealers and Near Beer Manufacturers.

Rough Rice and Rice Millers.

Sugars, Syrups and Molasses — Manufacturers and Refiners.

Canners and Packers — Vegetables, Salmon, Sardines, Tuna, Milk.

Dried Fruits — Packers.

Cottonseed, Peanuts, Soya Beans, Copra, Palm Kernels and their Products.

Manufacturers of Lard Substitutes and Oleomargarine.

Wholesalers, Jobbers, Importers and Retailers of Non-perishable Food  
Commodities.

Brokers and Auctioneers of Non-Perishable Food Commodities.

Bakers.

Manufacturers of Miscellaneous Food Commodities.

A. Products containing wheat or wheat flour, other than bakery  
products.

B. Manufacturers and mixers of mixed flour.

C. Syrup mixers.

Fresh Fruits and Vegetables.

Fresh and Frozen Fish Distributors.

Salt Water Fishermen.

Poultry.

Eggs.

Butter.

Cheese.

Raw Milk.

Meat Packers and Manufacturers of Lard — Distributors of Fresh Meats.

Cold Storage Warehousemen.

Feeding stuffs.



Among the regulations prescribed may be distinguished three general types: those designed to prevent hoarding, those restraining profiteering, and those requiring certain technical practices which reduce waste. Speculation, so far as obnoxious, violated both of the first two regulation types. Instances of the last-named type are the requirements of standard weights for bread in baking, of higher extraction of flour in milling, and of minimum carloads.

To prevent hoarding, or the withholding from use of vital but short supplies in view of an expected rise in price, the general penal clause in the act of August 10 was supplemented by special license regulations binding on all manufacturers and handlers of non-perishable foods, prohibiting them from owning under any guise a supply greater than the requirements of their business for thirty or sixty days. Licensees were also forbidden, knowingly, to sell to any customer more than enough to give him a thirty or sixty days' supply.

The second type of regulation restrained profiteering, and also discouraged speculation and hoarding. Practically all licensees were required to limit their prices to actual purchase cost of the particular goods sold plus a reasonable profit, the latter being defined as the average pre-war profit, *on an even market*. Though the wholesale price might have doubled in the interval between purchase and sale, the merchant must sell on the basis of his actual cost, thus underselling his competitor, who had bought later than he at a higher price. This regulation was designed to prevent middlemen from taking undue toll from the consumer on account of the generally rising war market, and at the same time to remove the incentive to hoarding and speculation by making it of no advantage to the owner of food that the market advanced. A quick turnover, and small aggregate stocks in trade, was thus to be expected.

This rule of "cost plus reasonable profit" created much unavoidable hardship throughout the administration's existence. Of course it was not universally obeyed, but it was

sufficiently respected so that many concerns had their average profits diminished. For, although the government restricted the dealer's profit if the market rose while he held the goods, it could not enable him to get his original cost back if the market declined. His profits were limited, but not his losses. In normal times the unusual gains offset the unusual losses. During the war period all food markets advanced more than they declined, but a number of sharp declines took place which brought losses unrecoverable because of this rule.

Without these anti-speculation rules much greater inflation of food prices would undoubtedly have taken place, and the "cost of living" problem would have been even more serious than it was.

#### ADMINISTRATION OF LICENSE REGULATIONS

The first task of the Massachusetts Administration's License Division was to give notice to the large number of persons within the State affected by the important proclamation of October 8, 1917, that they were subject to license, and that severe penalties were provided for failure to secure a license. About 20,000 circular letters were accordingly printed and sent to Massachusetts wholesale and retail grocers, provision dealers, bakers, grain dealers, etc. A number of applicants were assisted by personal interviews and letters to make their applications in proper form, and many rulings were made in the food office on line cases where there was uncertainty whether or not the concern was required to have a license. The circularization revealed the considerable shifting which is always taking place in the trades, since a large number of letters were returned unclaimed.

As the duplicate card catalogues of licensees within the State were sent from Washington, a comparison was made with trade lists to detect concerns which had evaded license. One could never be certain that every such wrongdoer was

actually detected, because of the magnitude of the task compared with the size of the organization and the time at its disposal.

Two license regulations assisted greatly in this respect. The first required every licensee to display his license number on various documents and quotations issued by him. The other prohibited licensees from dealing knowingly with a culpably unlicensed person or concern. Through the co-operation thus secured from the trades, and through inspections, complaints and follow-up letters, it is believed that substantially every concern in Massachusetts required to be licensed was put under license. The total list of licensees in the State as of record, 1918, was approximately 10,570. This included 1,870 bakers, and about 5,000 salt-water fishermen the licensing of whom was a rather minor incident. The absence of fee for the license, and the leniency of the regulations compared with the stringent penalties for failure to comply, made it of no object to evade licensing. Moreover, as time went on a slight distinction was drawn between licensees and non-licensees in the enforcement of the license regulations, under the assumption that the purposes of the Food Control Act, which was binding on every one, were to be carried out by universal observance of the license regulations. The elaborate and cumbersome reports at first required by the Washington License Division of all licensees were onerous to the trade, but these reports were greatly simplified by the middle of 1918.

Monthly reports to Washington on the quantities of goods handled, and the average profits and prices, with a duplicate to the Massachusetts office, were for several months required of substantially all licensees. These reports made such an accumulation of papers that the organization, small as it was, and lacking in technical experience with the food trades, was unable to derive much assistance therefrom; but a member of the staff partially audited the reports, and in this way a few irregularities were discovered and

stopped. The quarterly financial statements required of feed dealers in 1918 promised to be of value in detecting profiteering in those special trades.

Another part of the work during the whole period was notifying the trades of regulations prescribed for them by Mr. Hoover. The notices of changes in regulations sent directly from Washington to the licensees affected were frequently late and often miscarried, and were not sent to unlicensed dealers such as the small grocers. Finally, to remove all doubt of due notice, the weekly "Food Administration Bulletin" was sent to every food dealer in the State. Up-to-date lists of such dealers were secured through the local sealers of weights and measures, by the kind co-operation of Commissioner Hanson. The successive issues of the Bulletin contained a section devoted to the new license regulations and changes of rules, together with important interpretations and rulings issued either by Washington or by Mr. Endicott. This caused an edition of 16,000 or more copies and an expense of about \$200 a week, but it was fully justified.

The existence of so large a body of detailed regulations brought numerous appeals for interpretations on special cases, and a considerable part of the work of the License Division consisted in answering inquiries from licensees about rules. When the Commodity and Trade Divisions separated from the License Division they gave out interpretations of the rules relating to their own subjects, such as sugar and baking. As mentioned above, questions on miscellaneous commodities and trades were always referred to the License Division.

The office was exposed to a multitude of complaints as to the hardships entailed by various regulations. Licensees usually knew that the rules were made and changed in Washington, and not by the Massachusetts Administration, but, believing that the latter was able to understand their problem better than the Washington officials, counted on it to intercede for them. In some cases Mr. Endicott or



members of his staff asked the Washington office for changes in rules because of injustice to the dealers. An instance was the prohibition of use of milk by bakers in bread. When enough pressure of the same sort had come from other States, the rules were usually canceled or modified throughout the country. The National Administration seldom found it feasible to make regional or local regulations.

Another phase of the regulation of trade was the granting of special dispensations or permits for individual temporary failure to observe the rules. Discretion to give such permits was vested by Mr. Hoover in Mr. Endicott. For instance, when the 50-50 substitute rules were announced from Washington, Mr. Endicott made a temporary ruling that grocers in Massachusetts might sell only 25 pounds of substitutes to 75 pounds of wheat flour until the situation should warrant full requirements of the 50-50 formula.

The relation of the county food administrators to the State Administration, after their appointment early in February, is explained elsewhere; and in the regulation of trade they carried on the same work within their territory as did the License Division and the Commodity Division in the State House. The State office, however, issued most of the notices to dealers simultaneously throughout the State, and special information, interpretations and permits were given by both the county administrators and the State House, according to whether the matter was local or of State-wide importance.

## ENFORCEMENT AND REVOCATION OF LICENSES

One main reason for the establishment of the county food administrators was the evident need of better enforcement of the rules. Few penalties were inflicted during the first six months. The administration held itself ready to follow up complaints, but these were not numerous; and it was usually felt that if the co-operation of violators could be secured for the future, no drastic penalty for the past was



needed. Following Mr. Endicott's general policy, the License Division always endeavored to enlist the sympathetic co-operation of dealers and consumers. Persuasion, personal influence and appeals to patriotism were used with good effect.

The cases handled by more stringent process dealt chiefly with alleged hoarding and with supposedly extortionate prices, with a few violations of special license regulations. Complaints of hoarding were occasionally brought against private individuals; and during the flour shortage, at the beginning of 1918, several persons found to have excessive amounts of flour or sugar were informed of the penalties of the law, and were induced to dispose of the hoarded goods according to the administration's suggestions.

During the campaign preceding the election of 1917, charges were made in the public press that the storage warehouses within the State were bulging with foodstuffs held for speculation. This led to an investigation of food storages by Messrs. R. M. and H. C. Everett, Jr., and to the installation of a system of regular reports to them of all warehouse transactions.

After the sugar shortage developed, in the latter part of 1917, numerous complaints were received of unfair distribution and of extortionate prices on the part of dealers. Some penalties resulted later from investigations begun in this way. Several apparent violations of license rules were brought to the administration's attention by Washington and otherwise, but up to March, 1918, no cases presented themselves which seemed to call for drastic action.

On March 7, 1918, the first suspension of license in Massachusetts was ordered for sales of sugar at exorbitant prices. On March 25 the next announcement of penalty was made in the "Food Administration Bulletin," a dealer having been required to take back an excessive amount of flour sold to a customer. On April 6, for the first time, a bake shop in Massachusetts was closed temporarily for failure to use the required cereal substitutes.

By March 1, 1918, the members of the License Division had become convinced that their organization, concentrated in the State House, was not sufficient to enforce the food regulations properly. Hitherto it had been proper to depend chiefly on persuasion, and to hold Mr. Endicott's great legal powers in reserve, the latter constituting in addition to persuasion a background of potential coercion. At this later period, however, it began to appear that many violations were occurring which never came to the administration's attention, and that this situation was encouraging would-be violators while penalizing more conscientious members of the trades. The License Division accordingly welcomed the appointment of county administrators who could take responsibility for enforcing food regulations within their territory. As soon as the county offices were established, in late March and early April, 1918, the number of violation cases handled by the administration substantially increased, and penalties became much more numerous.

Also, about the middle of April, W. Rodman Peabody was asked by Mr. Endicott to head a new Enforcement Division of the Massachusetts Administration, and with this specialized department systematic investigations and hearings were carried on daily, resulting in frequent drastic penalties, usually connected with the power of suspending or revoking licenses. The record of such suspensions appears elsewhere in the report of the Enforcement Division.

Another means of securing fuller observance of the emergency food rules was the development of inspection staffs by several of the regulatory divisions. Thus the Sugar, Baking, and Price Divisions each acquired field agents especially trained to detect violations of the particular regulations in the charge of their divisions.

The total result was that, in the latter months of 1918, the Food Administration organization in Massachusetts, volunteer and paid, was large enough to detect and punish such a percentage of all violations that thereafter not only

patriotism but fear of punishment deterred the vast majority of members of the food trade from profiteering and other unfair practices.

### **(b) Division of Enforcement**

The work of enforcement was first included in the work of the License Division. Violators of rules were called in for warning, and from the beginning of work until April, 1918, the head of the License Division performed all judicial work, referring penalty cases to the Washington office. In the earlier days of the License Division, Mr. Endicott or Mr. Ratshesky usually sat as final authority in cases requiring penalty.

In April, 1918, the Division of Enforcement (see Appendix, page 569) was separated from the License Division and placed under the charge of W. Rodman Peabody, who gave his full time to the work and acted as trial officer, ably assisted by Isaiah R. Clark and James E. Hannigan. From this time the License Division did no enforcement work, but confined its activities to the interpretation and publication of rules. The Division of Enforcement became a tribunal to hear and act upon cases of violation presented to it by other agents of the Food Administration. The policy of the head of the division was, as far as possible, to draw a line between administrative (including detective) and judicial functions, leaving the preparation of cases to others. The wisdom of this course became increasingly evident as time passed.

The power of the Enforcement Division was based upon the Federal Food Control Act, and upon the Commonwealth Defence Act. The powers of the Federal Act were in most cases sufficient, but the additional powers granted under the Massachusetts law were a valuable supplement. The Federal act regarded distributors of food as agents for the public, whose duty it was to effect distribution to purchasers at fair prices and in reasonable quantities without waste. If a distributor failed to perform his duties toward

the public he was unfit to act as a Federal licensee, and his functions should be assigned to others. Food is the prime requisite of the people, and in time of national crisis no one, it was assumed, has a right to handle food unless consideration for the welfare of the entire people is the principle by which he conducts his business.

The intent of the Division of Enforcement was primarily to secure observance of regulations, not to punish violations. All cases were approached with the hope that compliance could be secured without penalty. Extreme forms of punishment were ordinarily inflicted only in the more flagrant cases, where the defendant deliberately disobeyed. First offenders were given friendly warning, usually without penalty. In some cases the posting of a sign in a prominent place in the establishment of the offending dealer informed the public that he had violated the rules, but had promised compliance in the future. In cases where restitution of excess profits was possible, this was insisted upon; in a few cases, particularly of retailers, such restitution was out of the question, and contributions to war charities were accepted in lieu of restitution. This, however, was always treated as the proposition of the offender, and not exactly imposed as a penalty of the Food Administration. In the case of unlicensed dealers, of whom over 13,000 existed in Massachusetts, the most effective procedure was that of the "unfair order," which prohibited licensed wholesale dealers from furnishing supplies to the offending non-licensed retailers. In the case of licensed dealers, suspension or absolute revocation of license was possible, and in some cases was used. In no case was it necessary to resort to prosecution in criminal action by the Federal courts, although this was possible under the act. Publicity proved, on the whole, the most satisfactory deterrent. Reports of all penalty cases were given to the press, and were published in the weekly "Food Administration Bulletin," thereby reaching every dealer in foods, — a total mailing list of 31,000. Next to this the posting of premises was most dreaded by dealers.



The complaints acted on came to the Division of Enforcement from the several departments of the office, especially those of Baking, Sugar, Transportation and Price; from the United States Food Administration, county food administrators and from individuals. They related to almost every branch of food production and distribution carried on in Massachusetts. A large portion of the time of the Enforcement Division was taken up by complaints in regard to the use of flour without substitutes (selling and baking); the improper use of sugar; arbitration cases; refusal to unload cars and to accept contents of cars; and profiteering.

The Division of Enforcement later became in large measure a court of appeal. The county or city administrator gave a first hearing, and hundreds of cases were thus settled. Only where compliance was not secured by friendly persuasion of the local authority was the matter referred to the State House for hearing, or to the local administrator authorized to impose a minor penalty.

Inspectors of the various divisions of the Food Administration and those attached to the county administrators were of great service in following up complaints and securing data. The intelligence service of the Adjutant General's office and of the United States Treasury was used in some cases where immediate and secret action was necessary. Certified public accountants were employed at the expense of the defendants to secure evidence from the books of concerns under suspicion. It was the consistent policy of the division to penalize no cases except upon evidence which would satisfy a reasonable court of justice. The most serious cases were referred to the Division of Enforcement in Washington for confirmation before penalty was imposed, and all matters of policy in respect to penalties were worked out carefully with the Federal authorities.

When complaints were received which seemed well founded, a conference, friendly or formal, was held with the accused. Each defendant was given opportunity to be heard both in person and by witnesses, and also had the



privilege of being represented by counsel. The head of the Division of Enforcement made trips into the various counties, and many cases were heard at the offices of the county administrators. This procedure by circuit, especially in the western part of the State, brought the regulations home to the dealers of the district more forcibly than a distant hearing in Boston. All told, over 500 cases were given formal hearing, and many more were disposed of informally.

A perplexing question was that of procedure against consumers who violated rules. Because of the insistence of Mr. Hoover that the approach to the public must be kept on a voluntary basis, the Enforcement Division was used against householders in only a few peculiarly flagrant cases. In general, it was sufficient to make it dangerous for dealers to connive with householders. Public opinion was the chief deterrent in this field, and without its support success would have been impossible.

The first large group of offences arose in the matter of wheat substitutes. A Bakers' Committee was organized for the policing of bakers by bakers. A similar committee of grocers was formed, and where correction of wrong practices was possible, cases were not brought to the Enforcement Division. These two groups of food distributors — bakers and retail grocers — included many ignorant and untrained persons, and it was difficult to make sure that they understood the rules. Some of them wilfully used ignorance as a shield of disobedience. In the baking industry analysis of the product was very difficult, and the improper use of substitutes could be checked only by inspecting the bakers' purchases of ingredients.

The small retailer could be kept in line only by insisting that he purchase due amounts of substitutes with his flour, and that he make the required combination sales. Wholesale grocers were of great assistance here by refusing to sell white flour without the required substitutes, and by reporting cases of violation by retailers. The grocery trade, as a whole, gave full co-operation to the administration, and

the problem of enforcement was reduced to a minimum by frank dependence upon trade committees to secure compliance before cases reached the stage of prosecution.

The problems of wheat substitutes had hardly been solved, and the trades brought into line, when the shortage of sugar compelled drastic rules concerning its use. The difficulties of making an equitable distribution of sugar had never before been forced upon the trade by an insufficient supply, and it is not strange that much confusion and many honest errors resulted. During the months of July, August, September and October, 1918, most of the time of the Division of Enforcement was devoted to sugar cases. Many dealers and consumers who would have scorned to permit themselves unpatriotic action with reference to wheat substitutes seemed devoid of conscience in the case of sugar. In fact, the enforcement of sugar rules was in many respects the most difficult matter which came before the Division of Enforcement. The sugar problem also appeared in hotels and restaurants, and because they were not under license proved much more difficult. Here, again, appeal to the patriotism of owners and proprietors, and the spur of public sentiment, were the most efficient instruments of enforcement.

Another type of case came from the Division of Transportation. A board of arbitration had been set up to secure the prompt unloading of cars. Delay, due to the refusal of consignees to accept shipments, hampered transportation and tended to cause waste of perishable foods. In the greater number of the 400 cases handled, report to the Enforcement Division was not necessary. In a few cases one or both parties refused to accept arbitration, and proposed to fight the matter out, leaving the foodstuffs to deteriorate. The Division of Enforcement was then able to require that the shipments should be put into channels of distribution before the food spoiled.

In January and February, 1918, transportation difficulties were so great that some question arose as to whether adequate stocks of Hebrew passover bread, or matzoth,

would be received in time for the feast of Passover. The matter was taken up with the transportation companies, and ultimately a supply arrived in due time. It then appeared that because of the shortage of supply and a virtual cornering of the market some dealers were profiteering. Such were promptly taken to task by the Food Administration and the proper penalties inflicted, with the result that the unlawful practice was speedily checked.

### **(c) Cold Storage and Flour Stock**

From every public or private cold-storage warehouse in the State, a monthly report was required by the Food Administration showing the quantity on hand of certain leading foodstuffs. By means of these, and through comparison with amounts in storage the preceding year, cases which looked like hoarding could be easily detected. Summaries were also drawn up which made it possible to see tendencies toward shortage of supply in each kind of food.

As a further protection to the public against holding food for a rise in prices, the chief individual concerns carrying edible commodities in storage were obliged to file a similar monthly report, and by studying their financial rating any improper speculative operations could be discovered. After six or eight months these latter reports proved unnecessary, and were dropped, partly because most of the concerns were licensed and made similar reports to Washington.

From November, 1918, every railroad entering Boston sent in a daily report of flour received in that city (other than for export), with the name of all consignees. The information was thus in hand for adjusting, when necessary, the shipments to Boston from flour mills.

These departments of the work were in charge of R. M. Everett and H. C. Everett, Jr., who kept at all times a complete body of information available which would have been indispensable if emergencies had arisen.

#### (d) Price Division

The publication of prices, a task at once onerous and exacting, was put in January, 1918, into the hands of Richard M. Everett and Henry C. Everett, Jr., and carried through by them uninterruptedly until the Committee on Public Safety dissolved. The work of the division covered both wholesale and retail trades. A Trade Committee, consisting of the following persons, met every few days and rendered indispensable services: —

C. F. Adams.

C. O. Blood.

James D. Casey.

Henry S. Potter, Jr.

Leonard H. Rhodes.

H. A. Spinney.

Charles S. Tenney.

With the Committee, besides R. M. and H. C. Everett, Jr. (joint chairman), met regularly J. Frank O'Hare of the Committee on Public Safety, Mrs. W. M. Wheeler of the Women's Municipal League, Mrs. E. W. Holst, and Miss Bertha R. Eastman. In the price publication work an important part was played by the existing organization for price investigation of the Women's Municipal League under Mrs. Wheeler.

An elaborate system of reports from wholesale dealers was maintained. From these it was possible to follow the prices charged to retailers, and to know the gross profit of the wholesaler. They were checked with the margin allowed by the United States Food Administration, and where excessive profits were found, inspectors made careful and thorough investigation from the dealers' books. The chief work, however, of the division was to publish fair prices, which were determined by means of the weekly wholesale reports through the aid of the Trade Committees. The prices on a selected list of commodities, published weekly, included both prevailing prices paid by retailers and fair prices to be charged to consumers. Copies of this weekly statement were furnished from the outset to every



newspaper in the State, and eventually, under pressure from the public, a large number of newspapers carried it regularly.

It was also regularly published in the weekly "Food Administration Bulletin." This systematic publication of prices is believed to have protected consumers against improper prices, and at the same time to have protected dealers against adverse public criticism of their necessarily high but not unfair prices. After careful study of local conditions it was found that two sets of prices would be sufficient: one applying to the western counties, — Berkshire, Franklin, Hampden and Hampshire, — and the other to the rest of the State.

From nearly 700 consumers throughout the State, organized by Mrs. W. M. Wheeler, regular sheets were received showing prices actually charged by local stores. These proved of great value as a check on other methods of regulating prices, and as a means of discovering individual profits above the allowed margin.

Consideration was chiefly given to grocery prices, but prices of fruit and vegetables were also published. Questions relating to the prices of fish are dealt with in another section. The most difficult problem encountered by the Price Division was that of determining a fair price for meat, especially beef. For the purpose of regulating prices a standardization of cuts seemed to be necessary.

The chairmen of the Price Division Committee agreed that the public during the war was too much disposed to blame the retailers for the prevailing high prices. Great numbers of cases were investigated, and many retailers were reproofed; but the chief cause of what seemed to be blameworthy action on their part not infrequently turned out to be ignorance.



## CHAPTER VI

### PUBLIC EATING PLACES AND BAKERS

#### (a) Hotels and Restaurants

On July 13, 1917, Mr. Hoover, following suggestions from the hotel associations of the country, appointed a Hotel Men's Conservation Committee of five. On this Committee the New England representative was Frank C. Hall of the Hotel Somerset, Boston. Early in September a hotel committee of the Massachusetts Food Administration was organized (see Appendix, page 571), with Mr. Hall as chairman, who thus became a member of Mr. Endicott's staff.

As early as August 1, 1917, a conference of hotel men at Washington had worked out the main lines to which conservation endeavor in hotels ought to be directed, with a view to the saving of wheat, pork products, butter and all fats, and beef, and to a greater use of sea food, fresh vegetables and fruits.

The first step in Massachusetts was the "No white bread week" of August 6 to 12, 1917, recommended to the public and especially to hotels by Mr. Endicott after a conference, July 31, with representatives of the New England, Massachusetts and Boston Hotel Associations. The voluntary response from all sides to this request was highly gratifying, and gave full ground to believe that public eating places, and the public which they served, would render complete support to the many and varied measures which, it was foreseen, must follow.

In September, Tuesday of each week was made a beefless day for public eating places. In October Mr. Endicott felt that the assured fish supply made it possible to request that Tuesday, in addition to the already customary Friday,

be observed as a fish day, and the hotel committee circulated pledge cards and posters to that effect. The administration also furnished at this time, and for some months subsequently, menu blanks on which extended instructions and appeals regarding food were printed, with one page left blank for the menu itself. For the waiters and employees a pledge card was also provided.

At about the same time an inspection began of monthly reports of meat and wheat saved and of fish used, and Mr. Hall started a collection of actual hotel and restaurant menus. Wednesday and Thursday were designated as "wheatless days."

In November, with the possibility ahead that all public eating places would be put under license, renewed efforts on a large scale were put out to secure voluntary compliance with the request for two wheatless days and two no white bread days. It had already become evident that unfair competition by the unscrupulous made the position of the loyal almost impossible, unless uniformity could be attained. The monthly reports already showed a great saving of meats and white flour, and also of sugar, in all public eating places.

In December many hotels and restaurants came under the rule requiring bakers to be licensed, and thereafter these large eating places were regulated by law. The aid of commercial travelers and of the fraternal orders was available in many phases of the work. Constant pressure was kept up by address and appeal, by instruction and advice, as to the best methods of making the many inconvenient changes involved. All sorts of questions arose as to sandwiches, sellers of "hot dogs," the composition of "frankfurters," the possibility of using substitutes in doughnuts, crackers and cake, and countless other things, and the members of the office force not previously conversant with these subjects acquired much interesting information about the food they had previously merely eaten. Many ingenious methods were devised by the technical employees of hotels and bakeries, and many things deemed impossible

proved not beyond human power. One of the great achievements, but by no means the only one, was a war oyster cracker containing 55 per cent of rye.

The "general plan" issued in January, 1918, gives a good idea of the whole subject. In detail, however, the changing seasons brought changing applications of the general principles, especially in relation to meat and poultry; and these changes were necessarily so many that the Massachusetts office found it extremely difficult to keep up to date its general summaries of rules, even though frequently issued at large expense. The plan referred to was as follows:—

#### GENERAL PLAN

*Our problem* is to feed our Allies this winter by sending them as much food as we can of the most concentrated nutritive value in the least shipping space. These foods are wheat, beef, pork, dairy products and sugar.

*Our solution* is to eat less of these and more of other foods of which we have an abundance, and to waste less of all foods.

#### *Bread*

Serve breads or rolls made from corn, rye or from mixed flour. Use breakfast food and hot cakes composed of corn, oatmeal, buckwheat, rice or hominy. Under European plan, give individual service of bread and butter of uniform weight, rolls or slices to weigh not more than 1½ ounces. Serve absolutely no toast as garniture or under meat, etc. Serve war bread. Do not serve bread and butter before the first course. People eat them without thought. Where a charge is made for bread, a higher charge should be made for white bread. If white bread is demanded, charge for it.

#### *Meat*

Use more chicken, fish, hare, rabbit, duck, goose, lobster, oysters, clams, sea foods and egg dishes of all kinds. Use less beef, mutton and pork. Serve smaller portions of these. Have fewer of these items on the menu. If you must include one of the three, use mutton in preference. Serve "per person" portions of these meats, of moderate size, and charge accordingly. War portions at reduced prices may be served. Provide more entrées and made dishes. Beans are most useful, as they contain nearly the same nutritive values as meat. Serve bacon only as a dish, not as a garniture.

### *Fish*

Tuesday and Friday are fish days. Serve larger variety on those days. On other days also be sure to serve enough kinds. Fish, either fresh, salt or smoked, forms an excellent substitute for meat. It has high food value and can be made extremely palatable. Special attention given to the fish on your menu will be worth while. New kinds of fish, such as whiting, gray fish, pollock, are being introduced. Try them.

### *Milk*

Use it all. Economize on milk and cream except for children. Serve buttermilk. Serve cottage cheese regularly in varying forms; it is especially nutritious. Use skimmed milk in cooking. A great quantity of it goes to waste in the country. Use cheese generally. The children must have whole milk; therefore, reduce the use of cream.

### *Fats*

Serve as few fried dishes as possible so as to save both butter and lard, and in any event use vegetable oils for frying, that is, olive oil, corn oil, cottonseed oil, vegetable oil compounds, etc. They are equally good. Serve all butter in standard pats, for guests and employees. A butter pat machine promotes economy. Trim all coarse fats from meats before cooking, and sell the waste fats to the soap maker, thereby increasing supply of soap and glycerine. We are short of soap fats, as our supplies of tropical oils for soap making are much reduced. Do not waste soap.

### *Sugar*

Use less candy and sweet drinks. Use honey, maple syrup, molasses and dark syrups with hot cakes and waffles in order to save butter and sugar. Use also all classes of fruit preserves, jams, marmalades and jellies. Use brown sugar in cooking, and economize by the use of granulated sugar on the table. Do not frost or ice cakes. Use honey for sweetening pastry and cakes.

### *Vegetables*

Use more vegetables and potatoes. Make fruits and vegetables into salads and attractive dishes. Feature vegetable dinners and vegetable salads of all kinds. Encourage the use of cheese with salads. We have a great surplus of vegetables, and they can be used by substituting them for staples, so that the staples most needed will be saved.

### *General*

Use local and seasonal supplies. Do not require abnormal use of the railways to transport products from far afield, now that we need all cars possible for war purposes.



All waste food should be saved to feed animals or for reduction to obtain the fats. No food should be burned.

The encouragement of *hors d'œuvre* of vegetable salads, fish and sea food at the start of the meal, and of cheese, fruit and coffee at its end, will save greatly in all staples, and permit the effective use of many available foods. Reduce the number of courses served which contain the staples that must be saved for export. This means beef, pork products and wheat.

*Table d'hôte* service, unless very carefully supervised, results in waste in eating and preparation, and should be discouraged in larger hotels and restaurants wherever conditions will permit. In circumstances requiring *table d'hôte* meals, articles of food not required for export to our Allies should be served. The American plan hotel or restaurant should require its guests to choose specifically in writing from the items offered, as in the European plan, so as to avoid waste.

The cafeteria system is recommended for employees wherever possible, as it facilitates service and eliminates waste.

NOTE. — Under various circumstances and with varying conditions advisable modifications of our plan and other opportunities for food saving will suggest themselves to you. The essential is a sincere and patriotic will to save, and thus serve the country.

HENRY B. ENDICOTT,  
*Food Administrator.*

In late January, 1918, by proclamation of the President of the United States, the plan was modified by asking for one wheatless meal a day in addition to the two wheatless days, and by other changes which only partly conformed to the needs of the Massachusetts situation. At about the same time a more complete organization was effected by Mr. Hall, with six "zone captains" for the city of Boston, and three hundred "town captains" in the other counties of the State. Under Mr. E. H. Ansell of the New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, industrial and school restaurants feeding 200,000 persons daily were covered by pledges and inspection service.

It would be impossible to trace in detail the development of rules and of methods of appeal and enforcement which were part of the plan for reducing by 30 per cent the total consumption of wheat in the country for the crop year



1917-18. The culmination came in the dramatic occasion on March 29, when a large body of leading hotel and restaurant men gathered at Washington and responded with full heart and voice to Mr. Hoover's statement of the extreme anxiety of the public crisis, by pledging themselves to conduct their establishments without the use of any wheat products whatever. The effect of this action directly, and also indirectly, by bringing the urgency of the situation home to householders and setting them an example, was great and far-reaching. The hotel and restaurant keepers most sincerely tried to keep their pledge, and to a large and highly honorable degree did so, until the supply from the new crop permitting, they were released by Mr. Hoover on August 1, 1918. The task required much earnest effort and patriotic endeavor. As one looks back on the incident, the significance of the ringing reply which these men gave without hesitation or reserve can hardly be overestimated.

As an example of the work of the hotels and restaurants the following table is interesting. It gives the saving of various articles in public eating places in Massachusetts in the months of April, May, June and July, 1918, as compared with the corresponding period of normal times.

	Pounds
Meats, . . . . .	9,546,272
Flour, . . . . .	5,929,396
Sugar, . . . . .	3,373,436

On the general subject of meat saving, it is significant that a committee of wholesale packers and representatives of meat houses complained bitterly to the administration that their sales of beef had fallen to 25 per cent of normal, and their sales of other kinds of meat to less than 50 per cent. Nothing, however, shows the willingness on the part of the people of Massachusetts to do everything in their power to help our suffering Allies more plainly than their action when told of the great need in Belgium, France and England for meat. A letter sent to Mr. Endicott from

Washington by Mr. John E. McBowman, chairman of the Hotel and Restaurant Division, showed that *Massachusetts saved over one-tenth of all the meat saved in the entire country.*

The supervision of conservation in hotels, restaurants and clubs reflected on every side the complex and successive phases of the administration's efforts for conservation. Many recipes, especially adapted for public eating places, were considered, experimented with and issued to the public. Much attention was given to the problem of making general bakery products with the least practicable use of wheat; if possible, with less than the government regulations permitted. The increased use of milk and of potatoes, economy through simplification of menus and by diminished use of fats, carefulness in wastes and in disposal of garbage, and the collection of fruit stones for gas-mask charcoal were all earnestly promoted. Open sugar bowls were abolished.

On December 23, 1918, restrictions on public eating places in Massachusetts were removed. It may be said in conclusion that no body of persons in Massachusetts worked harder and with better spirit and truer patriotism in the civilian support of war measures, and made more fully the sacrifices necessary for the war, than the proprietors of public eating places, under the general supervision of Mr. Hall.

### **(b) Baking Division**

Questions relating to bread arose in the summer of 1917, and in conference with the leading bakers of Massachusetts, Mr. Endicott began work looking to a possible reduction in the already high price of bread, and also to the abolition of the bakers' customary practice of allowing grocers to return to manufacturers stale bread and cake. When the Baking Division of the United States Food Administration came into full activity in the early autumn, the relation of the Massachusetts Food Administration to the whole baking industry of the State became close, and touched many subjects.

Some 40 to 50 per cent of all bread eaten in the United States is baked in commercial bakeries, and this bread offered an immediate point of attack for the conservation of wheat. In solving this problem it was necessary to secure the co-operation of the bakers, and, as well, voluntary self-denial on the part of purchasers, without which the bakers would have been almost helpless. The questions related to wheat, sugar (both as an ingredient and in shortening) and fats.

Until December the work with bakers was on a voluntary basis, and in that period some considerable progress was made, especially in establishing mutual confidence between the administration and the trade. Early in December all bakers (including hotels, restaurants and clubs) using not less than ten barrels of flour or meal a month were put under license, and thereafter a succession of rules was put out by the Food Administration which the Massachusetts Administration had to interpret and enforce. The principal rules related to the weight of bread (in order to secure uniformity in weight and so in price), to the return of stale bread by grocers, and to the amount of sugar, shortening and milk permitted in bakers' bread. The rule about price was at this time limited to the principle that bakers must not take greater profits than had been their practice before the beginning of the war.

From the outset the administration received much aid from Mr. Thure Hanson, State Commissioner of Weights and Measures. Mr. Hanson's previous experience in investigating the price of bread sold in the State, and especially his large staff of local sealers of weights and measures scattered throughout Massachusetts and in constant contact with grocers and provision dealers, made it possible for the administration to call on him over and over again. It repeatedly happened that instructions from Washington to furnish immediate statistical information could hardly have been met at all without his efficient aid.

One of the problems was to make sure that foreign-

speaking bakers understood the regulations; and translations of the rules were published in four languages and distributed to foreign bakers, and then discussed at meetings held with them. In the end but little difficulty was found even here in enforcing the rules.

In January, 1918, the gravity of the wheat situation was made known, and it became evident that drastic measures for conservation of wheat would soon be adopted. Before the rules were finally formulated Mr. Endicott invited all the 1,800 bakers of the State to meet at the State House. Several hundred attended the meeting, heard Mr. Endicott's explanation of the situation, and recognized that a large proportion of substitutes would certainly be required in all bakers' bread and other products. The task before the bakers was a difficult one, but they accepted the situation promptly, and immediately began experiments in the necessary change of technical processes. On January 27 the wheat conservation rules were announced, and all licensed bakers were required to use 20 per cent of substitutes in their bread. This proportion was later increased, but it proved impossible to require of bakers as great a proportion of substitutes as could be safely used in bread baked at home for immediate household use.

The organization for the administration and enforcement of the regulations for licensed bakers constantly grew in the number of persons employed and in the variety of its tasks. The public demand for bread of white appearance, and the relatively low price of wheat, increased the temptation of bakers to include less than the required substitutes, and violation of the rules was difficult to detect because no scientific method existed for determining the proportional amount of wheat flour contained in mixed bread. The work would have been impossible but for the organization of the industry itself and the patriotic efforts of the leading bakers. In its later labors the Baking Division was much concerned with prices, which in the end were virtually fixed by the administration. The limitation of the use of sugar



in bread and cake, including frosting, was also an important aim during most of the war.

The division was able to co-operate with the bakers in sending out important scientific information relating to the prevention of the bread disease known as "rope;" and in this connection, through local officers, tried to secure an improvement in the cleanliness of bakeries. Valuable aid was received on the scientific side from Prof. Lawrence J. Henderson of Harvard University.

The routine work of the Baking Division, very ably handled by Mr. Arthur N. Milliken, its chief, was heavy, and engaged a number of persons. The monthly and weekly reports which were essential in the enforcement of the substitute rules, correspondence with the county food administrators, and conferences every day with bakers who found difficulties in complying with the rules or had misunderstood them, or who came to complain of unfair competition, occupied a great amount of time.

The very large saving of wheat effected in bakers' products was due to the friendly and cordial relations which it was possible to maintain with the trade, and to the efforts of the more experienced bakers in helping the less-informed to a knowledge of how to observe the regulations without spoiling their product. The bakers of Massachusetts cheerfully submitted to restrictions, and voluntarily co-operated in methods of doing their business which meant great inconvenience, diminished returns, and in many cases actual loss. They fully earned the right to say that they had put patriotism above self-interest.



## CHAPTER VII

### FOOD COMMODITIES

#### (a) Cereal Division

##### WHEAT FLOUR AND CEREAL "SUBSTITUTES"

The relations of the Food Administration with the cereal trades began with the approach of winter in 1917, at which time Mr. Endicott laid on Mr. Ratschesky the responsibility of securing adequate flour supplies for the State, and of regulating its distribution.

The United States Food Administration, within a few days after its organization in August, had licensed the millers of wheat and rye flour and had limited their profits to the pre-war level. The maximum profit permissible to the miller, over the actual expenses, was 25 cents per barrel on flour, and 50 cents per ton on the by-products, *i.e.*, wheat mill feeds. The millers were allowed to adjust their prices on flour and feed in accordance with the relative supply and demand of the two together, provided the total profit on both classes of products did not exceed the maximum above named. The millers were also required by the administration, beginning in the fall of 1917, to extract a larger proportion of the wheat kernel in the form of flour than had been the trade custom.

In October, 1917, all wholesale distributors and the larger retailers of flour were licensed, and their profits also were restricted, supposedly to the pre-war level. The Washington Administration soon gave the trades to understand that it regarded any margins in excess of 50 to 75 cents per barrel for wholesale transactions, and \$1.20 per barrel for retail transactions, to be larger than the average pre-war rate, and consequently cause for revocation of license. Measured by percentages, however, there are some indications that these figures were actually somewhat lower than

the average pre-war rate of profit in these trades, since the price of flour had greatly increased since 1914.

The commercial bakeries were put under license by December 10, 1917, and their profits and practices controlled by the Food Administration; the prices of wheat had been stabilized through the operations of the Food Administration's Grain Corporation; and drastic penalties were provided for hoarding by any individual. Therefore the use of the most vital foodstuff, wheat, was regulated in substantially all of its phases. Yet the exemption of the multitude of small dealers from license by the terms of the Food Control Act seemed likely to impair somewhat the administration's power to control distribution.

### DIFFICULTIES FROM THE THIRTY-DAY RULE

One of the main pillars in Mr. Hoover's food control system was the license rule forbidding any distributor of flour (and of nearly all other staples) to hold in his possession, or under control by contract, a larger supply than would be sufficient for his ordinary business requirements for thirty days. This rule was designed to prevent speculation and also to reduce hoarding.

It was apparent to the Massachusetts Administration at the beginning of the winter that this thirty-day rule on flour, which had been made applicable to the whole country, would jeopardize New England's necessary supplies for the winter. Distributors near the mills could operate on thirty-day reserves; but New England distributors, depending on two railway lines from the West, would find their reserves exhausted in case, on account of winter weather, the running time of flour from the mills should slow down from the usual two weeks in good weather to two months. Such a slowing down did, in fact, occur, and due to the unusual severity of the winter, as well as to other impediments to transportation, abnormally slow movement continued for about four months.

This possibility of a flour famine in Massachusetts, with

attendant unrest among the foreign population, was foreseen by a number of the flour dealers and brought to the attention of the administration. After a meeting with the dealers in the latter part of November, 1917, Mr. Endicott gave the distributors and bakers special permission to accumulate more than thirty days' supply before the transportation troubles should fully develop.

In the following January and February, when cars from the West were being held up all along the line, the wisdom of this action was made clearly evident. The administration was approached nearly every day by bakers, dealers and some important public and private institutions for assistance in securing the minimum of flour necessary for their current use. Not less than one hundred such applications were received, and in every case means were found to help the applicants. It was often necessary to ask the dealers, who had been allowed to obtain larger than thirty-day reserves, to go out of their accustomed channels in order to provide supplies. During this period Mr. Ratshesky was assisted by Mr. C. O. Blood of Lynn. Mr. Blood, anticipating still greater difficulties to come, held conferences with distributors on the possibility of adopting flour ration cards, similar to the grocers' sugar cards which had been installed in many places. The necessary complexity of such a system was surprising. The mere fact that the people would always be getting a part of their flour in the form of bread, or other baked goods, suggests the difficulty inherent in a rationing program. But the shortage of flour supplies never became sufficiently grave to call for such extreme measures.

### PREVENTION OF HOARDING

Throughout the nine months from November, 1917, to August, 1918, the administration was keenly alive to the danger of private hoarding likely to result from reports of flour shortage, which, if it became widespread, was certain to intensify shortage. The conspicuous sugar deficiency in

October, November and December, 1917, had shown what happens when an important article of food becomes uncomfortably scarce. At the first sign of scarcity of flour, a multitude of people would have remembered the sugar experience, and have tried to protect themselves on flour. An absurd run on salt for a few days in the Boston stores showed how easily a panic may arise, even without the slightest foundation.

The suggestion of danger, however, would have itself tended to bring on a perilous situation. Accordingly, the first cases of unreasonably large supplies of flour in the hands of individuals which came to the attention of the administration were dealt with privately by patriotic appeal, and no publicity was given.

Early in December, 1917, Mr. Endicott addressed a circular letter to all the retail grocers in the State, strongly impressing on them their duty to prevent hoarding, and asking them to sell only a small quantity to a customer at a time, preferably as low as one-eighth barrel. By the 1st of February the license regulations compelled all licensed retailers to sell small quantities to consumers, and by this time the compulsory use of cereal "substitutes" with wheat flour had been inaugurated. It then became safe to talk publicly about the wrong of hoarding flour, and reported cases of hoarding were dealt with more sternly. Several women who had purchased barrel lots were obliged to return to the grocer their excess over one-eighth barrel. The grocer in each case was also summoned and made acquainted with the penalties for connivance at hoarding. The county administrators dealt with a number of individual cases by similar methods, and publicity was given to the cases, together with reports of penalties inflicted in other States.

### REPORT ON FLOUR CENSUS

In the latter part of March and early in April, 1918, the very great need of flour for export to our soldiers and Allies was impressed upon the State Food Administrators by Mr.



Hoover. To bring this need as forcibly as possible before the public a flour census was deemed advisable. This measure had the further advantage that, if it should appear that any considerable stocks were being hoarded, proper steps could be taken to use the stocks and, if necessary, to punish the hoarders.

It was evident from the beginning that the stocks in Massachusetts would not be available in large enough units, nor in proper packing, to be exported to Europe. It was hoped, however, that the inflow of flour into Massachusetts might be checked, and our stocks on hand made to last until the next harvest, and assistance was asked from wholesalers, retailers, hotels, bakeries, institutions and households. The wholesalers were requested to send in a card showing their stock on hand, and if they had over thirty days' supply to obtain a permit to retain the same, with an agreement on their part to hold it subject to the orders of the Food Administration. Retailers were required to make return of their stocks, and if these appeared to be considerable and to amount to more than a thirty days' supply, they were also required to obtain a similar permit, as were likewise the hotels and the bakers and private institutions.

The directors of public institutions were called together and the situation explained to them, and they unanimously pledged themselves to reduce to a minimum their use of wheat flour, and to hold their excess subject to the order of the Food Administration.

The householders' canvass, which involved enormous work on the part of the county food administrators, was also of the greatest value, and brought home to the householders the seriousness of the situation and the need of individual effort on their part. Householders who had over a barrel of flour, where a barrel was more than a thirty days' supply, were as a rule required to hold their excess stock subject to the order of the Food Administration. A few cases of criminal hoarding were punished in other ways.



At the same time, appeals were made, chiefly through the women's organizations, for signatures to a householders' roll of honor pledge, by which a large number of householders pledged themselves to use no more wheat flour until the arrival in Massachusetts of flour from the next harvest, due about September 1, 1918.

The campaign, which was in charge of Mr. W. L. Putnam, was concluded at Mr. Hoover's request about the end of July, by which time enough flour had been conserved to answer the purpose. As a result of the efforts made, imports of flour into the State decreased from 44,000 barrels for the week ending April 13 to 16,000 barrels for the week ending June 22, and the amount continued small for several weeks after this. This decrease was accomplished in spite of the fact that it was necessary for the Food Administration to supply flour to a large number of transports sailing with troops from Boston and other New England ports. The receipt of flour in Boston in normal times is about 65,000 barrels a week.

The information contained in the flour return cards from individuals was in most counties not tabulated, although the cards were all scrutinized for cases of hoarding. The result of the tabulation in one large and representative county (Middlesex) is of considerable interest. These returns were from 54 towns and cities, and the total of cards was 36,151. Of this total, only 5,325 cards showed possession of more than one barrel. The number of cards between one and two barrels was 4,863. The cards of two barrels or over totaled 462. If we reckon at one and a half barrels the amount held by the group between one and two barrels, there was in the hands of this class 7,294 barrels of flour. If the second class be reckoned, at two and a half barrels, it represented 1,155 barrels. The total of flour in these two classes is not much more than two days' supply for metropolitan Boston in normal times.

## COMPULSORY USE OF CEREAL "SUBSTITUTES"

The program of the United States Food Administration for the conservation of wheat flour by the compulsory sale and use of other cereals in combination with it was launched on Sunday, January 27, 1918. The fundamental provisions were that a wholesaler should not sell flour to a retailer, nor a retailer to a consumer, unless the customer bought at the same time one pound of authorized wheat flour "substitutes" (certain products of corn, oats, barley, rice and a few other foods) for each pound of flour; and that all commercial bakers must mix 20 to 25 per cent of these same substitute cereals in all bread. The pound-for-pound rule in the family trade was not made effective immediately, as sufficient supplies of substitutes were not yet available in Massachusetts, so Mr. Endicott authorized the sale of three pounds of flour with one pound of substitutes until February 10. Even by this time the supply of substitutes was small, and by permission from Washington potatoes were for some weeks continued as a substitute. The great and unsatisfied demand for substitutes in this period of scarcity resulted in very large orders being immediately placed with the western mills, and later in an enormous oversupply of cereal products in the Massachusetts market. The measures to which this gave rise are described below.

Considerable criticism was expressed in Massachusetts, as doubtless elsewhere, of the different treatment of bakers and of household users of flour. The answer was that bakers' bread could not be made with more than 25 per cent of substitutes, if it were to stand the necessary handling before reaching the consumer. The housewife, on the other hand, could use her 50 per cent of substitutes in various quick breads containing little or no wheat, and also in dishes other than bread, such as puddings and porridges. The question was complicated by the ruling allowing public eating places to obtain flour on the 3 to 1 basis because they held bakers' licenses. The public eating

places appeared to have all the facilities of the householder for using 50 per cent of substitutes, but the Food Administration treated them as bakers, since it had required them to be licensed as such.

As was to be expected, a number of violations of the substitute regulations were soon reported to the Massachusetts Administration. A number of these proved upon investigation to be the result of ignorance, and in a large percentage of all the cases it was impossible to secure satisfactory evidence. Some complaints, a comparatively small number, turned out to be deliberate violations, and the wrongdoers were punished.

The weekly "Food Administration Bulletin," containing the rules in full and all the changes and interpretations made from time to time, was sent to all retail grocers in the State, and likewise some 15,000 large posters summarizing the flour and substitute regulations.

After a few weeks the complaints coming to the State House diminished perceptibly in number, partly because of a great decrease in violations, and partly because of the increasing share of the county and local administrators in the work. The small retailers who were exempt from license were compelled to obey the substitute regulations under penalty of having their supplies from the licensed wholesalers cut off. A number of wholesale flour dealers were brought before the county administrators in April and the following months, and some suspensions of license, as well as large money contributions to war charities on account of sales of flour without substitutes and of excessive prices, followed.

The wheat conservation program of the Food Administration was on the whole a distinguished success. As indicated above, the people of Massachusetts, as also of the other States, took it in good part. The rules were effectively enforced by a very small body of officials, and the sales of flour throughout the country were shown to have decreased 50 to 60 per cent for several continuous months. The

necessary quantities of wheat were sent to Europe, and there was no bread shortage at home, although we were tided over to the 1918 harvest by the narrowest of margins.

On September 1, 1918, the proportion of substitutes required was reduced for bakers and wholesalers to 20 per cent, *i.e.*, 1 pound of substitutes to 4 pounds of wheat flour. The list of substitutes was also somewhat reduced, substantially to corn meal, corn flour, rye flour and barley flour. This program was based on the assumption that the war would continue until the harvest of 1919. Immediately after the signing of the armistice, on November 11, the substitute regulations were all repealed and the use of straight white flour again permitted. The considerable conservation which the 80-20 rules had accomplished during these months, together with the abundant wheat harvest of 1918, had already resulted in a great accumulation of wheat flour, the handling and financing of which was very difficult for the government as well as for the dealers. By the end of 1918 the flour situation in Massachusetts was the reverse of that of 1917, every distributor and consumer having provided himself with large stocks.

#### THE FOOD ADMINISTRATION'S PURCHASE OF SURPLUS CEREALS FOR EXPORT

In May, 1918, the glut of substitute cereals already referred to took place in the markets of Massachusetts, the same as elsewhere on the Atlantic seaboard. Among the causes of this condition may be distinguished the following. In February and March, when the rules were first made, a great demand arose for the substitutes. These coarse grain products are manufactured chiefly in the central part of the United States, so that in addition to waiting for the production to readjust itself, the eastern markets were compelled to wait for transportation. The short available supplies and the large demand naturally resulted in a rising market, and numerous speculative purchases were made



besides those from actual consumers. The rising prices of the substitutes were the occasion of much criticism, and caused great anxiety to the Food Administration, which had no legal authority to limit the farmers' price for their grain. The release of transportation also resulted in the sudden arrival, all at once, of supplies previously ordered. Another contributing factor was the diminished consumption of all breadstuffs, due to the unpalatable nature of the substitute mixtures. The orders for cereals had apparently been placed on the assumption that the total amount of bread used would be about normal. A less important cause was the removal on April 1 of rye flour and meal from the bakers' substitute list. The Washington Administration believed that the stocks of rye must be protected in that way for the foreign populations who depend upon rye bread. In Massachusetts, in spite of the displeasure of Washington, permission was given to bakers to use rye until May 1; but this relief was not sufficient, and when the glut of cereals first arose there were very large inactive stocks of rye products.

Early in May the Massachusetts Food Administration became concerned about the dangerous condition of the flour trade. The increasing number of complaints of rejections of substitute arrivals by consignees was one symptom, and many notes of alarm were heard from the trade as to how the flood of cereals which was about to come in could be taken care of. Clearly, much of the corn meal, rye meal, barley flour, and perhaps of the other substitutes, could not be carried through the summer, because in hot weather these commodities become rancid from the fat they contain, or contract weevils. The poor quality of much of the milling, due to the attraction of many inexperienced concerns into the field, was a large element in the situation.

Mr. Ratschesky gave the matter almost his entire attention for several weeks. Careful inquiry showed that at least 80,000 barrels of cereals should be taken out of the market entirely, in order that the balance might be handled



before the warm summer weather would cause it to spoil. Several remedies were discussed. These were the possible export of barley or rye flour through the Wheat Export Company (the Allied purchasing agency); educational measures in the trades as to the best methods of storage, and as to using in the first instance the more perishable goods; embargo of further shipments into Massachusetts from the mills; and the stimulation of consumption of the more perishable goods by temporary change of the baking regulations, as well as by instruction to consumers. To restore rye flour and meal to the bakers' list of substitutes would have merely improved the position of the rye holders at the expense of the owners of corn meal, since the bakers would have used rye products instead of corn meal or other substitutes which were likewise superabundant.

A corn meal campaign was immediately started through the household conservation and publicity agencies, reminding the people that corn meal was good food and abundant, and that the price had become relatively low. The Food Administration at Washington was also urged to take action, either through the bakers' rules or otherwise, in order to take care of the great surplus. Under this pressure and similar appeals from other New England States, and from New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and other points, the purchase was authorized about May 1 of several cargoes of substitute cereals by the Food Administration Grain Corporation, for export to neutral countries of Europe. A steamer was to be furnished at Boston by the Grain Corporation, and in order to adjust the cargoes to the tonnage allotted, the entire purchasing for New England was to be done through the Massachusetts office. A 5,000 ton steamer was in Boston Harbor almost before the arrival of final instructions to purchase, but the administration's information as to the location of stocks was so adequate, and the help given by certain members of the trade so efficient, that it was possible to load the steamer within eight or ten days after she reached the dock.

Although by this means 50,000 barrels had been removed from the market, an embarrassing surplus still remained in New England, and the Grain Corporation was prevailed upon to make further purchases and furnish three more steamers. The total quantity of cereals thus purchased through the Massachusetts Food Administration in New England for export was over 200,000 barrels, and the sellers received more than \$2,000,000 from the Grain Corporation for the goods. Nearly three-fourths of this total for New England came from Massachusetts concerns. The undertaking was all accomplished by July 8, 1918, and the course of the market thereafter showed that the enterprise had been entirely beneficial. No shortage of substitutes developed, and corn meal remained abundant. There was almost no complaint of inequitable treatment, and the four cargoes took virtually all the exportable goods that were offered in New England.

Two other difficulties with cereals may be mentioned as illustrating the complexity of the breadstuff rearrangements which the Food Administration was compelled to undertake. At the time of the glut of corn products, rye flour, etc., just mentioned, a surplus of graham and entire wheat flour was also reported from many concerns. These commodities had been popular during the period of voluntary wheatless days and wheatless meals, and the trade had been supplying unusually large quantities. The compulsory regulations for substitutes almost put an end to the use of entire wheat and graham flour by householders, and the wholesale and retail grocers were left with a number of carloads on hand, which were in danger of spoilage or weevils before the summer was over. It was out of the question to allow a pure wheat product like graham and whole wheat to be used as a wheat flour substitute. For a long time the Federal Administration at Washington refused to let Massachusetts give special permits for the sale of graham flour to householders without substitutes. An attempt was then made to get the bakers voluntarily to use up the stocks of

graham, but they reported they could not increase their sales of graham bread. The administration published some graham propaganda for householders, but no appreciable relief was given until about the middle of August, when the Food Administration relaxed its rules and permitted existing stocks to be sold to families without substitutes.

A somewhat similar situation occurred in the case of plain white corn flakes, one brand of which is called "Cream of Maize." This product was put on the market during the period of the 50-50 substitute regulations, and as it appeared to be useful only in baking, was allowed as a substitute for householders. It gained considerable vogue, and a number of carloads were in process of distribution through the State by the 1st of September, when the substitute rules were changed; plain corn flakes were pronounced to be no substitute, and the market for them as a human food was gone. An effort was made to secure special dispensation from Washington for this product, but without success. About the 1st of November permits were given for such stocks to be sold as a substitute, but soon after all substitute regulations were abolished, and so the product was still unsalable. As it could not be exported, apparently the only disposition left for it was for animal feed.

A second export of surplus substitute cereals was undertaken by the Food Administration through its Grain Corporation in November, 1918, when the armistice and the great wheat crop of 1918 led to the abolition of the substitute requirements. This export, instead of being confined to the eastern seaboard, was undertaken throughout the United States. The consumers and trades were urged to consume the substitutes as far as possible, and the inducement for them to do so was strong, because the prices were usually favorable compared with wheat flour. At this time the Grain Corporation secured a special representative for New England, Mr. A. I. Merigold, and placed him in the Massachusetts office. The Food Administrators of the other States were called in for conference, and a plan of procedure

worked out for securing offers. Ships were secured which took substantially all offerings of proper quality from New England, as follows:—

	Sacks	Barrels
Corn products, . . . . .	143,715	73,305
Barley flour, . . . . .	33,441	17,432
Rye flour, . . . . .	17,660	9,399
Victory flour, . . . . .	8,343	4,698
Wheat flour, . . . . .	16,560	9,998

### (b) Grain and Feed Division

In the spring of 1917 prices of all feeds were advancing sharply, following the advance in the price of wheat, and dealers were uncertain of supplies. Consumers on their part were suspicious of the grain dealers. The first work of the Committee on Food Production was, therefore, to assist in securing the delivery of shipments of grain, particularly cars consigned to co-operative associations. The Committee also urged a larger home production of corn and oats.

The second phase of the work in grain and feeds came in August and September, 1917, and concerned the manner of transacting business. One difficulty was that the same jobber varied his practice in this respect in different localities.

The evil to be remedied is made sufficiently clear by the following circular letter, which was sent out after a conference with the jobbers, in which their attention was called to the provisions of the Food Control Act and to other legislation:—

OCTOBER 5, 1917.

*To Feed Manufacturers and Wholesale and Retail Feed and Grain Dealers.*

The attention of the Federal and State Food Administration has recently been called to the fact that it has been more or less difficult for farmers' co-operative associations and also large farmers who have the



facilities for taking care of carload shipments of feed and grain (both as to finance and to storage) to buy grain and feed at wholesale prices.

The Federal and State Food Administrator feels that our State and national welfare demand that it be possible for the large producer, who is in this case the farmer, to purchase his feed and grain at the same prices and under the same conditions that the retail feed dealer buys, in order that he may, in turn, produce his dairy and other products at a minimum cost.

In order to assist in accomplishing this object, the Administrator is asking all feed manufacturers and all wholesale feed and grain dealers to sell all consumers, who can purchase as outlined above, at the same price as they are selling the retail feed dealer.

It is not the desire of the Administrator to disturb any present methods of transacting business where those methods perform a necessary public service. It is not his desire or intention, where it can be avoided, to suggest any plan of operation which will work any material hardship on any retail feed dealer who is performing his function properly.

Very truly yours,

H. B. ENDICOTT,

*Federal and State Food Administrator.*

The majority of the grain and feed trade willingly complied with the request of this circular as soon as it became evident that all must come under it alike. Such firms as refused were warned that continuance of their practice would lead to their retiring altogether from business with farmers.

In November, 1917, difficulties about the supply of feeds began to arise, due to a variety of causes. Transportation facilities were congested and arrivals badly delayed. The Federal wheat saving campaign had led to a diminished output of wheat feeds, since a larger proportion of the berry was applied to human consumption. Of the by-product feeds made from corn, oats and barley the value was little known. Millers were limited to a fixed margin of profit per barrel of flour, and were required to take a profit of 50 cents per ton on feeds.

A still further difficulty came from the limitation of stocks which dealers might have on hand or under control. In order to make possible a due supply of grain and feed in



New England in the face of winter transportation risks, the Massachusetts Food Administration had to secure for New England dealers exceptions to the new regulations, even at the cost of some incidental increase in prices.

A larger ordering of stocks was permitted; and had it not been for the courage of New England jobbers in making large calls on western supplies, it is probable that much live stock in New England would have suffered and some have perished.

In December and January various classes of grain and feed dealers were placed under license, and a fixed price placed on wheat feeds. The relatively high price of other grains led western hog and beef feeders to sell corn and oats, and purchase wheat feeds, at the same time that the normal production of wheat feeds was diminished. Thus a variety of circumstances, together with the most difficult winter for transportation known for many years, left New England with almost no stocks of wheat feed and no prospect of getting any. Corn, oats, and barley feeds, too, were hard to get, and in the months of January, February and early March live stock were threatened with famine. At many times the supply of oats available to feed Boston's 20,000 team horses was not adequate for more than three days. An arrangement was made with the Food Administration Grain Corporation, so that if an actual failure of supply took place the stock of oats in the Mystic, Hoosac and Albany elevators awaiting shipment to Europe could be drawn upon. The committee of dealers agreed that such stocks as were available should be divided among them in order that each might take care of his local trade.

In February, 1918, after a series of conferences in Boston and New York with wholesale and retail dealers, rules were issued relating to profits and to resales; and in March a report of licensed grain dealers began to be required. Sworn statements showed the inventory at the beginning of the quarter, amounts expended for purchase of grains, amounts expended in the transaction of business, the inventory at

the end of the quarter, and the total amount received for sale of grain and feed and from other revenue. From the first report, March 31, 1918, it was evident that many grain dealers had taken very large profits. The most flagrant cases were dealt with directly; others were warned that if continued such profits would be regarded as excessive. In the majority of cases it was felt that it would be unfair to judge the business by the profits of a single quarter. After various changes in the rules about prices and margins of profits, the Federal Food Administration fell back on the principle that the net profits of wholesalers should not be greater than 4 per cent per annum, and that for retailers 6 per cent per annum would not be considered unreasonable; and that 15 per cent should be the maximum margin in the case of any sale of any commodity. The sworn report of grain dealers at the end of the second quarter, June 30, showed that many dealers who had made substantial profits in the first quarter of the year had suffered a substantial loss in the second quarter.

During the latter part of March and April the shipments delayed in transit by the winter's congestion arrived all at once; and the market for many commodities broke, with serious loss to the trade, — a loss in many cases of as much as \$25 a ton on corn products. The government gave relief by allowing retailers for all feeding stuffs, except wheat feeds, a margin on a percentage basis instead of as a fixed charge, and thus made it possible for most dealers to carry through their year's business at a reasonable (although strictly regulated) profit.

On July 1 a new schedule of wheat prices was announced, reducing the delivery price of feeds to a figure much lower than before. The differential between various grades of feeds was reduced at the same time. These changes were beneficial to the interests of eastern cattle feeders.

The further depression, however, of wheat feed prices caused heavier purchasing by western farmers, with the result that New England could purchase no wheat feeds

at all, and again the Grain and Feed Division had to present to Washington the needs of New England. Help was given from Washington, and later a rule was made requiring that wheat feeds be distributed at the same ratio as in pre-war times, although the rule was so difficult of enforcement that not until the close of the war was New England able to secure adequate supplies of wheat feeds.

Another work of the division was in getting local dealers to install segregated accounts. It was found that many retail grain dealers combined the grain business with a coal or lumber business, or with a general store. Commonly these dealers had no certain knowledge as to what return such department of their business was bringing in. The reports required by the Federal Food Administration made necessary some basis of segregated costs, and many conferences were held in the office of the Food Administration in assisting grain and feed dealers in this direction.

In conclusion, the head of the division reported that in his opinion, during the war very few of the grain dealers of the State were making excessive profits on their business, although many of them were charging very high prices. This situation was due to excessive credit given; to unwillingness to make a reduction for cash, and for delivery direct from the car on arrival; and to lack of capital.

The inability of small dealers to meet the needs of cash-paying customers was the real reason for the development of co-operative organizations. It seems also probable that chain grain stores, parallel to chain grocery stores, will arise and be economically advantageous.

#### MILLING OF MASSACHUSETTS-GROWN WHEAT

Before the outbreak of the war and the food production campaign of 1917, in the State of Massachusetts hardly 250 acres were planted with wheat. In 1918 at least 2,500 acres of wheat were planted. When the product of these new wheat fields was threshed, the question of milling immediately arose.

The Food Administration milling regulations were strict, requiring full reports as to percentage of extraction and the separation of by-products, and were suited only to wheat-producing areas. Realizing this, the Massachusetts Food Administration authorized county food administrators to issue permits to local millers for the milling of Massachusetts-grown wheat, to serve in lieu of the milling licenses. In this way mills of the State capable of producing entire wheat flour, and the few small mills capable of producing white flour, were enabled to take care of the output of the farmers' wheat. Had the Federal rules been rigidly enforced, the wheat would have been fed to the animals of the farmers who had raised it.

### (c) **Potato Committee**

The earlier efforts regarding potato production have already been described. In July, 1918, the newly created Food Administration took up the subject with reference to the 1918 crop. A conference of representatives from all New England was held on July 30, and a Potato Committee, including the president of Harvard College, a labor representative, and a leading banker, with members from other States, began active work. The distribution problem was found to center in the provision of sufficient storage facilities, since the delivery to market of the Maine crop was the responsibility of the railroads, particularly of the Bangor and Aroostook Company.

The Committee feared hasty sales by farmers at low prices, with resulting fluctuation and speculation, subsequent high prices, small profits and discouragement of production for 1918. The Committee was, therefore, prepared to buy with the aid of private capital large quantities of potatoes for storage, and so to stabilize the market. Elaborate plans were also made for local storage throughout the State.

The crop, however, proved smaller than had been anticipated, fair prices ruled, and intervention by the Committee was not needed. In the spring of 1918 a very energetic



and interesting campaign for the increased use of potatoes was made at the instance of Washington by the women's office, but it was hardly necessary in Massachusetts. The production conditions for 1918 were normal.

#### (d) **Federal Milk Commission for New England**

The price of milk has always been a subject of discussion and a source of irritation to producers, dealers and consumers. Early in the year 1917 the Food Production Committee saw that the price of milk would surely advance with advancing costs of feed and labor. The advance might be excessive if too large a shortage developed and demand exceeded supply; or, on the other hand, it might be insufficient to insure the continuance of dairy production. Because of these dangers the Food Production Committee, as elsewhere described, provided funds for the making of a survey of the costs of milk production.

When the Food Administration was organized in July, it was hoped that the subject of milk might be avoided. In August, however, announcement was made that on a given date prices would advance, the reasons given being the advance in the cost of processing and delivery, and the increased price paid to producers. Representatives of consumers immediately protested. A conference of several of the larger dealers was called, and the matter carefully discussed between them and the Food Administration. As a result of the recurrence of these difficulties, the matter of price was taken up at a larger conference of all the dealers who could be reached, together with the officers of the New England Milk Producers' Association, who had announced that producers must secure larger returns for milk or go out of business. A Milk Committee was appointed from the personnel of the Food Administration, as follows: —

Philip R. Allen, *Chairman*.

A. Lawrence Lowell.  
Robert Winsor.

| Joseph B. Russell.  
| J. Frank O'Hare.



This Committee held conferences with producers and consumers.

The figures which had been secured by the survey previously mentioned were available for the Committee, and on the basis so obtained the demands of producers were approved as reasonable. The price agreed upon for the months of August and September was 8 cents per quart delivered in Boston, subject to deductions for freight, country plants and can rental. At the same time, consumers' prices were discussed with dealers, who argued impending bankruptcy unless they could be given relief.

Another relief measure suggested was that milk stations be opened at various points in the city. One of the large firms agreed to supply milk at a cost of 10 cents per quart, provided storekeepers who furnished stations would resell without profit. At the same time, prices to retail and wholesale trade were approved. Prices agreed upon at this time were as follows: to producers,  $7\frac{1}{2}$  cents per quart, f. o. b., Boston; retail price, 14 cents per quart.

The milk stations were opened with much advertising, and their business for the first few days was enormous. But new developments came in to upset the original calculations. Storekeepers who were not receiving milk at the same price as the low-price stations complained of discrimination. Other concerns went into the field, and for many days a cut-throat milk war was waged which threatened bankruptcy to all concerned.

In the meantime Massachusetts was not the only State suffering from milk problems. New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio and other communities were involved in more or less violent dissension, producers claiming ruinous losses, dealers claiming ruinous costs, and consumers claiming prohibitive prices.

A conference was then called in Washington, and representatives of several States, including Massachusetts, expressed the belief that regional milk commissions should be established by the Food Administration. It was urged that

New England be treated as a unit, because while the large consuming markets are in the three southern States, the large producing areas lie in the three northern ones.

Meanwhile the dealers, who were engaged in disastrous competition, appealed to Washington for help, and agreed to the idea of a milk commission. Price levels were established which were to hold until the commission could review the evidence of costs. The contracting parties to this agreement were the New England Milk Producers' Association and the larger distributors, together with representatives of the Independent Milk Dealers' Association. It was further agreed that if either party had sustained losses by the continuance of the price agreed upon at the time of signing the agreement, these losses should be recouped in the period for which the commission fixed the price.

In accordance with this plan a New England Milk Commission was appointed by Mr. Hoover:—

Philip R. Allen, *Chairman*.

A. W. Gilbert, *Secretary*.

George F. Morris, New Hampshire.

Elbert S. Brigham, Vermont.

Robert Scoville, Connecticut.

John S. Murdock, Rhode Island.

Walter H. Sawyer, Maine.

Robert Winsor.

A. Lawrence Lowell.

Joseph B. Russell.

J. Frank O'Hare.

James O. Jordan.

Reginald W. Bird.

Henry B. Endicott.

Dudley N. Hartt (assistant secretary for a time).

John D. Willard (secretary for five months).

To this Commission was given power to ascertain the costs of production and distribution of milk in Boston, and, if it seemed advisable, in other New England cities, and on the basis of these determined costs, to fix prices to producers and to consumers which would yield a reasonable profit to both producer and distributor.

With this task before them the Commission held hearings in the latter part of December, 1917. Evidence was heard from specialists who had made the survey in the various States on the cost of production. The method of procedure

was outlined, and the figures resulting from this survey subjected to analysis and question. As these were published in pamphlet form by the Boston Chamber of Commerce in a complete report, it is unnecessary to discuss them in detail here. On the basis of the findings of the Commission, prices which dealers should pay to producers were fixed for the period from January 1 to April 1, 1918 (see Appendix, page 567).

Evidence was then taken concerning the costs of distributing milk. An audit had been made of the accounts of distributors, both large and small, under the direction of the Attorney-General of Massachusetts. Thanks to his cordial assistance the Commission was enabled to use the results of this survey, and on the basis of these figures a price was set for the retail and wholesale trade.

It was found that in previous experience surplus quantities of milk had caused competitive underbidding on the part of milk distributors to wholesale, or can, trade. The losses sustained in such sale of milk, at less than the cost of distribution, were met by the price to householders. The same was the case with regard to bottled milk delivered to stores.

At this stage of the work the Commission was swamped by complaints, especially with regard to irresponsible dealers, who, by slighting sanitary precautions and by failure to pay farmers, succeeded in cutting under the established price. Further trouble resulted from the difficulty of coercing unlicensed distributors doing a business of less than \$100,000, and who did only a retail trade. The case of farmers who retailed their own product was not touched by the Commission. Neither did the Commission attempt to fix prices for special grades of milk (certified, inspected, etc.).

As the end of the first three months' period drew near, the dealers began to complain bitterly of surplus, a term the meaning of which is explained below, and of the fact that the price to farmers must go down as surplus increased.

The Commission tried to devise a means of determining a price for surplus, and assessing the loss occasioned therefrom upon those who caused it. It was conceded by all parties that surplus had been a stumbling block as between dealers and producers in time past, but no agreement in regard thereto had ever been reached. So much did the surplus involve, that the Commission was prepared to withdraw unless both parties — producers and distributors — agreed to assist in working out some sort of surplus plan which would determine the loss, and assess that loss on those producing it.

The surplus plan was finally adopted and became effective May 1, 1918, when Philip R. Allen was appointed Milk Administrator for New England. It was his task to supervise, under the control of the Food Administration, the work of the distributors and producers in the matter of record systems and cost determination:

Under the so-called surplus plan the Milk Commission fixed prices for milk for both farmers and dealers. The milk product supplied by the farmers was held to consist of two parts: first, that milk which the dealers were able to resell to the public as whole milk, either at wholesale or retail; secondly, the "surplus milk," that is, milk taken over by the dealer but which he was unable to resell as whole milk, and which, consequently, went into manufactured by-products. For dealers, wholesale and retail prices to be charged to the public were fixed by the Commission. For farmers, a fixed price was established for the resold milk, as defined above. For surplus milk (not resold as whole milk), the price to be paid to the farmer was to be on the basis of the return received when this portion of the milk product was made into manufactured by-product, the dealers having agreed to manufacture these by-products without profit to themselves. During the spring months the quantity of surplus milk is usually large, but diminishes rapidly during the summer and fall, and in the latter part of the year there is no surplus; in fact, during these months



dealers usually have to search for sources of milk to supply their trade.

Under this plan the Milk Administrator was to receive sworn statements from milk distributors each month, stating the exact disposition of all of the milk which they had received from producers, and to determine market prices for the various surplus products. The price paid to farmers was made up by the price fixed by the Commission for whole milk and the prices received for surplus by-products. This plan enabled the Commission to fix prices for milk which entered regularly into the wholesale and retail trade without regard to manufactured by-products. The plan proved so successful that it was adopted quite generally throughout the United States by dealers and producers, and was continued by dealers and producers in New England since the expiration of the term of the Commission.

The Milk Commission continued to hold hearings, and fixed prices usually for one month at a time. These prices were based upon sworn evidence from producers and dealers. The secretary of the Commission, Dr. Gilbert, was authorized to send at intervals questionnaires to thousands of milk producers throughout New England for the purpose of receiving sworn evidence as to the actual labor and feed costs prevailing.

In order to get accurate information in regard to the cost of distributing milk, the Commission, with the aid of accounting experts, formulated a uniform method of reporting costs, which was used by the various dealers and resulted in bringing the data concerning costs before the Commission on a uniform and comparable basis.

The prices fixed by the Commission were generally acceptable to all parties. The producers evidently continued their business without diminution, and with possibly a slight improvement in country conditions during the year. The milk dealers received a return which might be considered fair under war conditions, although not as large as that received by most business concerns, nor as large as



would be considered sound business in normal times. The consumers were generally satisfied with the prices, as is evidenced by the steady increase in the consumption of milk.

When the armistice was signed, the work of the Commission had been so generally acceptable to all parties that, because of existing agreements between the Commission and the producers and dealers, it was allowed to continue its activities until April 1, 1919.

In conclusion it may be said that the work of the Commission served several useful purposes: first, the prices fixed, based on careful study, seemed to be fair ones, and as a result of these the industry was continued without disorganization throughout the war period; secondly, the work of the Commission brought about a stability, and created a confidence which was indispensable; thirdly, the surplus plan and the system of uniform cost reporting are notable contributions to the milk business, valuable not only in New England in war time, but throughout the country during peace times, as well; and fourthly, the Commission under its warrant was also able to bring about certain economies in the production and distribution of milk which helped materially to prevent costs from rising to unusually high figures.

The whole question of milk, its production and distribution, was seriously handicapped by the surprising ignorance met by the Commission at every turn. A facetious illustration of this will be found in the point of view entertained by a certain sergeant stationed at one of our military camps. The strictest orders had been issued against the infringement of any of the farmer's rights, when the sergeant caught one of his men, *in flagrante delicto*, milking one of the farmer's cows, and the pail half full. After much pleading on the part of the culprit the sergeant agreed not to report him, adding: "But see to it that every drop is put back."

### **(e) Campaign for Wider Use of Dairy Products**

Believing that the value of milk and milk products had never been fully realized by the consuming public, the Food Administration co-operated with the Massachusetts Agricultural College and the State Department of Agriculture in various campaigns to promote the use of dairy products. In the late summer and fall of 1917 an illustrated circular was prepared urging the wider use of dairy products. This was issued by the Food Administration and the Dairy Bureau of the Massachusetts Department of Agriculture in very large quantities, urging particularly the use of sufficient milk for children and invalids. Posters setting forth the value of milk as a food were also endorsed by the Food Administrator.

In the summer of 1918 a campaign was carried on at the instance of Washington to increase the use of cottage cheese. Specialists gave demonstrations in many parts of the State. Several interesting menus were worked out in which the entire meal was based on milk and milk products. The result of all this was that the market demand for cottage cheese through retail stores was materially increased. Although at that time the supply of milk was diminishing in consequence of the demand for export butter and the resulting diversion of milk to butter factories, yet enough was accomplished to prove that soft cheeses have great possibilities in the markets of the future, and to convince many householders that their home manufacture is neither difficult nor unprofitable.

Special milk consumption campaigns were also undertaken by the Federal Milk Commission for New England.

### **(f) Committee on Fish**

One of Mr. Hoover's first announcements was a statement that meat of every kind, especially pork, beef and mutton, were most seriously needed by the Allies, and would be in still greater demand for our own armies when they reached Europe. Following the example of Canada the

Massachusetts Food Administration accordingly appointed a Committee on Fish, in the belief that an increased use of fish would decrease the consumption of meat, and thereby effect a substantial saving of the latter. The Committee consisted of —

James J. Phelan, *Chairman*.

Matthew Luce, *Secretary*.

George H. Lyman.

John F. Stevens.

It seemed to the Committee that Massachusetts, traditionally the largest fish consuming State in the Union, and with an increasing fish business, was in a position to lead the way in such a change. A meeting of the New England, Boston and Massachusetts Hotel Men's Associations was called, and the increased use of fish in public eating houses thoroughly discussed. It was agreed by all parties that, provided the fish supply were augmented, hotels and restaurants would be able to set a pace that would furnish an excellent foundation for appeals to consumers in private households.

The Committee was at once confronted with a demand that the fish industry be investigated by the Food Administration for the purpose of more stringent control. As both the Federal and State governments had this in hand, it seemed not only unnecessary but very unwise for the Food Administration to duplicate efforts, and so create confusion and a natural feeling of resentment on the part of other agencies already in the field.

The Food Administration believed that its appointed task was rather to bring about a proper distribution of supplies and effective conservation of exportable foods, and that it should concern itself with four major problems: —

1. An increase in the catch of fish.
2. A larger consumption of fish by an instructed public.
3. An educational campaign relative to the proper cooking and utilization of fish.
4. Assistance in the matter of transportation.

It was evident, with the prevailing high prices and a demand outrunning the supply, that nothing could be done to stimulate increased consumption unless anticipated by increased production, and the Committee bent its efforts to that end. Of the fleet of 17 trawlers which were in service at the beginning of the season of 1917, the United States government had commandeered 13, 8 going to the United States Navy, 2 to Canada, and 3 to Russia. The productive capacity of these 13 trawlers was not less than 50,000,000 pounds per annum, at the most conservative estimate. Several trawlers were on the ways in process of construction, and in addition a large number of schooners and small boats were being completed for service. About 400 schooners and 1,000 smaller boats had composed the fishing fleet in 1917. As the government had already taken measurements of schooners and trawlers on the ways, it was expected by their owners that as soon as the boats were launched they would be requisitioned. This acted as a serious deterrent to the men who had been counting on their use.

The Committee immediately took up with the Washington office of the Food Administration and with the Navy Department the return of these boats to the fishing service. Mr. Phelan, after visiting the authorities at Washington, in behalf of the Committee, was convinced that the return of boats already taken was out of the question. He was able, however, to urge that the government must release its claim on boats in process of construction, and especially on schooners and lighter craft which had been measured and were under consideration for the navy. The result was that no more trawlers were taken from the fleet during the season of 1917. The new boats added to the fleet were of the more modern type, and their catch reached at times over 300,000 pounds a trip per boat.

In the season of 1918 the government again depleted the fleet by taking four more trawlers, but in the meantime the entry of many more small boats into the fishing service partly offset this depletion. It is probable that the loss of



these last boats requisitioned did not seriously reduce the amount of fish coming into the market as much as did the taking of the first thirteen trawlers in 1917.

One of the last activities of the Committee on Fish was to take up with the Navy Department the matter of adequate protection for both steam and sailing vessels. After submarine attacks had begun on the Banks, it was but natural that owners and crews should hesitate to venture out unless they were given armament or protection by naval patrol craft. This proved satisfactory to both owners and crews, and thereafter fishing continued without serious interruption.

The second problem was that of the losses sustained by crews from enlistment in the navy. The Committee urged that men be encouraged to stay in the fishing service, as this method would in the end better subserve the country's needs, but deemed it unwise to ask for the return of men who had already enlisted. While loss of men to naval and merchant marine service was continuous during the war, the Committee remained convinced that the work of skilled men in the fishing fleets was quite as necessary to the desired result as service in the armed forces.

Again, early in the year 1918, the fishing industry was seriously crippled because of dissensions between owners and fishermen's unions. Indirect labor problems also came up, due to the fact that fishermen generally work on what is termed a "lay," or interest in the catch, so that their returns are in part based on a percentage of the total profit of the trip. The men strongly maintained that the prices paid fishermen were too low, at the same time charging distributors and middlemen with making excessive profits.

On the other hand, the Food Administration knew that if prices advanced it would be impossible greatly to stimulate the consumption of fish, but as no data were at hand to guide in settling the controversy, this phase of the matter had to be allowed to adjust itself with what little assistance the Committee could offer. Mr. Endicott, as already seen, succeeded in arbitrating these troubles, and the actual



interruptions in production resulting therefrom were not extensive.

The consensus of opinion is that no one can become a skilled fisherman in less than six months' time. Because of the frequent losses of men by enlistment, and the attractiveness of higher wages elsewhere, the fishing fleet had to be manned during the entire season of 1917 with too large a percentage of unskilled hands, a condition the natural result of which was to reduce production.

In spite of all these handicaps the total take of fish in 1917 was greater than the average catch during the years immediately preceding. Fishing conditions seemed ideal. Not only was the supply remarkable, but the amount of bait obtainable unusual. These two factors contributed much to the final success of the Committee's efforts.

As soon as the Committee felt assured that the supply would warrant the request, appeals were given out urging consumers to make greater use of fish as a substitute for meat. The hotels, clubs and eating houses promptly accepted this program, and through their menus, and the reaction of these on householders, a good start was given. In September, 1917, the New England hotel and restaurant proprietors were called in to discuss various matters, and among them the question of having two fish days each week instead of one. While an agreement was not reached as to details, the general program was believed to be wise, and Massachusetts proceeded with a clear-cut campaign for increased consumption. It was the intention to secure, first, the universal observance of Friday for fish day all over the State; then to secure the observance of Tuesday as a second fish and meatless day; and finally to encourage the use of fish at all times in the week by those who had a liking for this kind of food.

Obstacles at once appeared, for it developed that many people had no taste for fish, and after a little inquiry the Committee were convinced that this distaste in many instances resulted in improper preparation. To meet this,

educational work was necessary, and at once the Committee made ready a booklet giving various forms of recipes for cooking and serving fish. One section of these recipes was passed upon by chefs of clubs and hotels; the ingredients of another section were censored by experts in home economics, in order that the least possible call might be made for fats, wheat and other commodities more particularly needed abroad. When the book was ready, 40,000 copies were distributed through women's committees in cities and towns, and fish dealers had 50,000 more printed and distributed over their counters to customers. The request for the booklet soon exceeded the supply, and a further issue might well have been circulated.

In the propaganda for larger consumption of fish, the Sub-Committees on Public Safety and Food of the various cities and towns were of very great service. The press and various organizations of the State also took up the campaign, with the result that for some months the two fish days were regularly observed.

One of the greatest obstacles which the Committee encountered in its efforts was the constantly increasing retail price of fish. This was due, unfortunately, to the fact that with the national growth of the movement for a greater consumption of fish, a constantly increasing demand fell on the Boston supply, thus reducing the quantity which went into that city's markets. The Committee made a study of the cost of distribution, and found that the fish dealer who was not also a provision or meat dealer had to maintain his establishment six days a week, with only a day and a half (Thursday afternoon and Friday) of really good business.

The extra fish day naturally helped the situation; but distribution of fish is always accompanied by a high percentage of waste and spoilage, while, moreover, the overhead expenses of the fish dealer advance in proportion to the volume of business, by reason of the forced idleness of men and equipment on other than fish days. When fish is

handled by meat or provision stores, the increased purchase of fish is offset by the decreased purchase of meat. The store, therefore, works at about an even capacity every day of the week, the same employees selling fish on Thursday and Friday, and meat the rest of the week. Likewise, delivery equipment, in a fish market idle much of the week, is uninterruptedly employed by the general market dealer.

The county food administrators and the public in general were impressed with the necessity of watching market reports on fish as given in the various newspapers, and confining purchases as far as possible to those fish advertised as more plentiful. It was also pointed out that several kinds of fish were caught in abundant quantities in their proper seasons off our own shores, which had previously been consumed very little, if at all, in Massachusetts, although popular in other States. The public were accordingly urged to use these less known and cheaper fish, equally good and palatable as food, but not so fashionable. The Committee was successful in increasing the consumption of gray fish, skate, whiting, squid, shark, dog fish, etc. A drive was also made early in 1918 for whiting, by means of which the public of Massachusetts were induced to consume about one-quarter of a million pounds of frozen whiting, at a cost of about 8 cents per pound to the consumer. Heretofore the consumption of this fish in Massachusetts was practically nil.

It was also evident that waste in transportation was no small factor. The combined shipments of small lots of fish by various individuals might amount in total to a car lot, but transportation was at small-lot rates. The Committee, therefore, worked with the fish wholesalers to secure maximum car lot shipments wherever it was possible, and with successful results. This was particularly worth while in the case of shipments going out of the State. Cars had often been loaded with not over 15,000 pounds, where 30,000 pounds would not have taxed the capacity of a single car. The maximum utilization of car space both diminished the

number of cars in transit at any given time, and made possible quicker handling. In the same way the Committee arranged the shipment of fish in large lots to various centers, as in the case of Springfield and Worcester.

A conference was held with the representatives of the various railroads and trolley lines radiating from Boston, whereby better attention was given to the quicker movement of fish, while the amount of waste and spoilage in transit was lessened.

The Committee noticed that the Fish Pier in South Boston had no rail connection. It was further discovered that plans had been formed some six years before, and part of the track equipment secured, to extend the tracks of the Boston Elevated to the pier in order to facilitate direct loading, but no further progress had been made. This subject was taken up by Mr. Phelan with the authorities responsible for the pier control, with the Elevated Railway, and with the Waterways Commission, and eventually the spur track was completed and opened for service.

The Committee also took up the question of shipment facilities in the South Boston terminals. It appeared that on one occasion teams laden with fish had waited until the close of the day for access to express freight cars. The cars assigned for the movement of this fish were spotted behind platforms piled high with heavy hardware, and loading was impossible. At the end of the day, therefore, it was necessary to take the fish to the Adams Express Company, and ship it by express, the ultimate consumers being, of course, obliged to pay a higher price to cover the cost. The railroads co-operated as far as the existing conditions of pressure and congestion permitted, and promptness of shipment was greatly improved.

The work of the Fish Committee was practically over when the restrictions regarding the consumption of beef were removed, and our people permitted to resume their normal habits in the use of food. In the meantime various inquiries, both State and Federal, were being conducted



regarding the fish industry as a whole. In these the Committee did not feel itself called upon to take part, but, having done what it could to promote increased production and a wider distribution of fish, for the sake of which they had been appointed, ceased further activity.

### (g) Poultry and Eggs

In July, 1917, the following Committee on Poultry and Eggs was appointed:—

James J. Phelan, *Chairman*.

Matthew Luce, *Secretary*.

George H. Lyman.

John F. Stevens.

It presently held conferences with the various interests connected with the poultry business, and found that in New England poultry was not moving at all, and this, notwithstanding that the amount of poultry in cold storage was probably the largest ever known. As of July 1, 1917, it was estimated that some 56,000,000 pounds of poultry of all kinds was in cold storage throughout the country, as against what might be considered a normal amount of 25,000,000 pounds.

The question of price lay at the bottom of the failure of poultry to sell. The consumer was indignant at the charges made him, and yet investigation proved that birds coming into cold storage the previous autumn (1916) were put in at rather high prices, which, with the added expense incident to carrying them for a period of six to eight months, greatly increased the cost to the owners. Nevertheless, the Committee pointed out to both wholesalers and owners that the poultry in storage was still on hand, and was not moving, and that in order to move it a material reduction in price would probably have to be made. The Committee further promised that if assured that prices should not be further advanced, but would rather tend downward, it would recommend to the public as a patriotic duty the consumption



of poultry in order to conserve beef, pork and other meat necessary for our army and the needs of our Allies.

This proposition met with the hearty co-operation of the wholesalers, and so far as Massachusetts and New England generally was concerned, and to a certain degree throughout the country, a decided reduction took place in the amount of poultry on hand. But the amount in cold storage on October 19, 1917, was still large, as indicated by the government reports, which showed some 51,000,000 pounds on September 1, and on October 1 upwards of 42,000,000 pounds, of which about 4,300,000 pounds was in New England. The greater part of this consisted of turkey, and was substantially taken care of at Thanksgiving.

Another drive was made, with the express approval of Mr. Hoover, to advance the consumption of poultry, with the understanding that no advantage in the way of higher prices should accrue either to the producer, the wholesaler or the retailer. Indeed, there was no good reason why prices should advance. On the contrary, by reason of the large supply of frozen birds, augmented as it was by an immediate increase of freshly killed poultry, the price of all kinds of poultry should have declined.

The November drive was very successful, and resulted in a decided conservation of beef, pork, mutton and other meats necessary for foreign shipment. During the remainder of the year 1917, and well into 1918, the supply of cold-storage poultry rapidly decreased. On October 4, 1917, the leading dealers met with the Committee, and at the latter's suggestion it was agreed that one-half of the stocks of poultry already in cold storage for a year were to be withdrawn within one month, and the other half in four months. Through this understanding the surplus supply was further and materially reduced.

The custom in Massachusetts has been to allow cold storage permits for one year, with a renewal up to another six months if the supplies are found in good condition on examination. In accordance with representations from the

Committee, the board of health extended this time in some cases where conditions warranted.

On account of the high cost of grain and feed, the poultry situation in New England, and especially in Massachusetts, was bad, and most of the large poultry farms in the Commonwealth were forced to shut down. Unlike poultry raising in the West, where birds run at will over large farms, the flocks in Massachusetts were practically entirely dependent on feed purchased by their owners. Hence in the early part of 1918 Mr. Endicott issued a circular letter to all boards of health in the various cities and towns in the State, asking them to make as liberal an interpretation of their laws as possible, in order to encourage the raising of backyard flocks of poultry.

In February, 1918, a rule directing that hens should not be killed was announced from Washington, — a restriction which worked considerable hardship to the poultry raisers in Massachusetts on account of the existing high price of feed. Various meetings were held by the Committee with poultry owners and raisers and the kosher killing trade, and with the consent of the Federal Administration arrangements were made relaxing the rule in some instances.

During the late fall of 1917 a large stock of eggs also was in cold storage. Mr. Phelan, with Mr. Priebe, head of the United States Poultry Division, produced a plan satisfactory both to the egg dealers and to Washington. By this arrangement eggs which might lose their food qualities by remaining too long in cold storage were successfully disposed of in proper condition, and speculation thereby largely eliminated.

Owing to the general shortage of poultry throughout the United States in the early spring of 1918, and the high price of feed, there was no further difficulty with stocks in cold storage, whether of eggs or poultry. The rule against killing hens expired on April 1, 1918. The industry in New England, and especially in Massachusetts, however, was unquestionably very hard hit.

Many meetings on the poultry and egg situation were held by the Committee with leading dealers and exchanges interested in the matter, and often the railroads and express companies in consultation with the Committee were able to adjust difficulties involving transportation.

The subject of egg breakage was also thoroughly examined. Orders from Washington restricting the use of certain kinds of packing cases were received, and instructions in accordance therewith given to the trade. It would seem, however, that heavy loss from egg breakage is likely to remain.

### (h) Sugar Division

During the whole life of its activity, Mr. Ratschesky had the directing control over this division. Any questions of policy and other important problems were often referred to him for final decision, and his judgment proved of great assistance.

In October, 1917, dealers and consumers throughout the Commonwealth began to complain of serious difficulty in obtaining supplies of sugar. Therefore in December Mr. Endicott, who had in the meantime put Mr. Edward Wigglesworth in immediate charge of the Sugar Division (see Appendix, page 569) appointed the following Emergency Sugar Distribution Committee, which included in its membership twelve wholesale dealers and large users of sugar:—

W. H. Logan, *Chairman*.

W. C. Adams, *Secretary*.

B. H. Bain.

E. R. Sherburne.

Walworth Pierce.

H. A. Johnson.

George F. Schrafft.

Charles F. Adams.

H. J. McMackin.

W. F. Potter.

H. B. Johnson.

James B. Clark.

Under the guidance of this body complaints from towns and from dealers unable to procure sugar were taken up with those wholesalers who had supplies, and an equitable distribution among them made it possible for the various com-

munities of the State to secure small supplies with such frequency that little hardship resulted. Grocers were forbidden to require combination sales of other commodities with sugar, and retail prices for sugar were fixed by the Food Administration. Grocers were also requested not to sell to any person other than a regular customer, nor to sell to children.

The License Division, then handling matters of enforcement, considered a great many complaints, the majority of which proved to be groundless. In the few cases which seemed flagrant enough to demand action, penalties were imposed. The shortage continued acute through November and December. Toward the latter part of January the new crop of Cuban sugar began to arrive, and the situation rapidly improved. A slight shortage continued, however, until about the 1st of March.

The second stage of the Sugar Division's work came with orders from Washington on May 7, that all manufacturers requiring sugar be rationed on the basis of their own statements of their normal consumption. Two classes were recognized: Class A, including all the so-called less essential industries, and Class B, known as essential industries. Manufacturers listed in Class A were allowed 50 per cent of their normal supply; those in Class B, 100 per cent. It now became necessary to employ a much larger staff for sugar work, as statements were required from all manufacturers, including drug stores, while 50,000 certificates were issued by the Sugar Division for June alone. These certificates entitled manufacturers to purchase from wholesalers or refiners the amount certified. Manufacturers were prohibited from purchasing without certificates, and dealers were subject to revocation of license if they sold to manufacturers except upon surrender of their certificates. This arrangement became effective May 15.

From July 1 onward the third phase of sugar control developed. Five classes of sugar users were tabulated, as follows: Class A, less essential manufacturers; Class B,



essential manufacturers; Class C, public eating places; Class D, bakers; Class E, retail grocers. To each one of these classes a stipulated amount of sugar was allowed: to Class A, 50 per cent of that used during the first half of 1917; to Class B, 100 per cent; to Class C, 3 pounds of sugar for every 90 meals served, using as a basis the meals served during July, August and September, 1917 (or the amount used in June, 1918, multiplied by 3); to Class D, 70 per cent of the sugar used during July, August and September, 1917 (or in June, 1918, multiplied by 3); to Class E, 100 per cent of the sugar sold by them during April, May and June, 1917 (or June, 1918, multiplied by 3). The supply so apportioned was for the three months of July, August and September; but certificates were issued in monthly installments, since it was feared the issue of certificates for three months would cause so great a demand on wholesalers and refiners that immediate shortage would follow.

Again the staff had to be greatly increased, to more than one hundred, in order to keep pace with the volume of work. Statements were printed and furnished to over 30,000 purchasers, and when filled out and returned were tabulated and corrected. On the basis of these statements 250,000 certificates were issued monthly. As might be expected, an enormous amount of misunderstanding arose, due in part to the necessary complexity of the system, but in still greater measure to the ignorance, carelessness and cupidity of purchasers.

Certificates were issued on the basis of instructions received from Washington; and when the apportionment for the State of Massachusetts was announced, about the middle of July, it was discovered that the certificates called for more than twice the available supply of sugar. The allotment to all users was cut in varying degrees, according to the different classes, and by this means the amount of over-issue was greatly reduced. This caused severe hardship to those who had made their statements honestly, while those who had overstated their needs in the first instance profited



in proportion. Readjustment of allotments necessitated the immediate establishment of an inspection service, and for a long time the Division of Enforcement was overworked with cases of fraudulent statements made to the Sugar Division. To meet the congestion and multiplicity of cases, the refiners and various firms who were large handlers of sugar gave the services of men from their own staffs, with whose assistance it became possible to help those who had been left with too short a supply. To add to the confusion, the home canning season was at its height; but special provision was made for the issue of supplies to householders, in order that fruit products might not be wasted. The issue of these canning certificates opened the door for enormous misrepresentation, which required the greatest care to hold down to a minimum. Nevertheless, it was the universal conviction of all administrators by whom certificates were issued, that the gain in the saving of foodstuffs far offset any loss through unfairness of would-be canners, and that the percentage of dishonesty was much less than was to have been expected.

In September a careful estimate of the sugar needs of each town was made on the basis of two pounds per person per month, and a proportionate quota allotted to each local grocer.

After the sudden collapse of hostilities, word was received about Thanksgiving time that the December issue of certificates would be the last, and instructions were given for the dismissal of all Sugar Division employees.

In fact, within two days the most highly organized division of the Massachusetts Food Administration disappeared, and all that was left in the first week of December was a few clerks completing the systematic filing of records and answering the inquiries which still came in. By the middle of December the doors of the Sugar Division were locked, and early in January the records were shipped to Washington.

No branch of the Food Administration work illustrated more clearly the policy which Mr. Hoover adhered to through-

out the life of the Food Administration. As far back as the fall of 1917 calls came from consumers for a rationing system, and it is interesting to note that these calls were from the wealthy rather than the poor, the former claiming that if rationing were adopted they would be the first to live up to the mark. As Mr. Hoover was always adverse to the system of rationing, he sought to control distribution only up to the point where the commodity left the hands of the retailer and passed into the possession of the consumer, and to place no coercion whatever on the latter. The single deviation from this policy was in the case of canning supplies, which were rationed through the county administrators to the applicants who wished to undertake canning work. During the critical shortage of midsummer 1918, calls again became very insistent from many quarters for a full and extensive rationing system, but Mr. Hoover refused to consent to any deviation from his established policy.

The Massachusetts Food Administration also furnished assistance, in the way of advice, to grocers, who organized grocers' distributing committees in the various cities, on the basis of population. In some cases, where the grocers' organization was adequate, the entire block of certificates was turned over to the grocers' committee for apportionment to the grocers in their respective communities. The Massachusetts Administration felt this to be justified, because the plan came in the form of urgent requests from consumers, and also because it was concurred in by the trade actually handling the commodity. While the administration still refused to become a party to the program, it placed no obstacles in the way of its development, and referred inquiries to such communities as had made a success of the venture.

It was noticeable that in those places where sugar coupons were used, the Food Administration received little, if any, complaint, this proving clearly that the coupon or card system of rationing was as acceptable to the people of the Commonwealth as it was equitable.

While it is idle to conjecture to what price sugar might have risen as the result of profiteering, there is no doubt whatever that supplies would have been absolutely withheld from a large part of the people, and that the price would have risen to prohibitive heights, except for the intervention of the Food Administration.

During July, 1918, the most strenuous month of shortage, two pounds per capita were allowed, thereby making a saving in that month alone of at least \$800,000. Taking the time covered by the whole period of the sugar shortage, and based on a total household consumption of 60,000,000 pounds in Massachusetts, it is not unreasonable to assume that upwards of \$5,000,000 was saved. This saving was also probably duplicated on the 100,000,000 pounds which passed through the manufacturing and restaurant trades during the period of definite control.

#### (i) **Committee on Ice**

In November, 1917, a committee from the Massachusetts Ice Dealers' Association inquired if they could in any way be of assistance to the Food Administration. Mr. Endicott asked them to harvest an extra large crop of ice during the winter of 1917 to 1918, so that there might be no risk of a shortage during the succeeding summer, and later appointed a Committee to work with them, consisting of James J. Phelan, *Chairman*, and Matthew Luce, *Secretary*. Early in 1918 a letter was sent to all ice companies, except those making artificial ice, instructing them as stated above.

At the outset the Committee found that owing to the probable shortage of ammonia (the Federal government having an option on the entire ammonia supply) the manufacture of artificial ice for public consumption must come to an end. Since artificial ice had heretofore constituted 10 to 15 per cent of the ice consumed in the State, the natural ice crop, which promised well, needed to be increased above normal by that amount.

It was apparent that transportation entered largely into the question, and the Committee held meetings with the representatives of the Boston & Maine, New Haven, and Boston & Albany Railroads, both steam and electric. They all gave assurances of full and interested attention to the matter, and kept their promise. The street railways had not heretofore been accustomed to handle ice, but at the Committee's suggestion they ascertained the number of ice plants located on their lines, studied the methods of distributing ice, and, so far as they could, aided loyally in its transportation.

Considerable duplication, with resulting increase in expense, was found in the handling and distribution of ice to consumers throughout the State, especially in the cities. This was largely relieved by dividing territory on the basis of volume of business done for the previous two, three or more years. The plan, systematically worked out, released many men and horses, and to that extent the cost of handling was reduced.

Much saving was also effected by the co-operation given by consumers. Purchasers who could afford to do so were asked to fill their ice box as full as possible at each delivery, and if necessary, to have larger ice boxes installed, with a view to reducing the number of deliveries of ice.

The best results in refrigeration can only be obtained by putting in a large piece of ice, for the reason that in building all refrigerators the capacity of the food chambers is calculated strictly in accordance with ice capacity. If only one-half of the amount of ice intended by the refrigerator manufacturers is used, refrigeration will be reduced to that extent, and a consequent increase in the waste or consumption of ice must necessarily follow. Two small pieces, put in at different times, will not do the work of one piece twice the size put in half as often.

Thus, by the more intelligent use of ice, the cost to the consumer was undoubtedly reduced; and these emergency

methods are likely hereafter to continue as a regular practice in the interest of thrift and economy.

The Massachusetts Ice Dealers' Association informed the Committee that, according to the unanimous opinion in the trade, the increased cost of doing business in Massachusetts for the year 1918 would be more than 30 per cent over that for 1917; and that if the increase in freight rates, granted to all railroads, were applied to ice, the percentage of increase would be still greater; at the same time, it was shown that wages had increased 20-35 per cent, and fodder 50-100 per cent. In further illustration of the increased cost of doing business, the association tabulated a few of the more important expenses for 1913 and 1918, as follows:—

	1913.	1918.
Oats, . . . . .	\$0 37 to \$0 48½	\$0 98 to \$1 01
Corn, . . . . .	71	1 94
Roofing felt, . . . . .	37 00	68 00
Stable brooms, . . . . .	4 50	11 50
Horseshoes, . . . . .	4 00	6 75
Spruce lumber, . . . . .	26 00	46 00 to 50 00
Soft steel, . . . . .	2 10	5 50
Tire steel, . . . . .	1 66	4 15
Wagon scales, . . . . .	1 75	3 00
Horse blankets, . . . . .	8 00	15 00

These figures were taken from the actual records of one of the largest ice companies, which had an experienced buyer who purchased in such quantities as to obtain the most favorable prices. Among the smaller dealers it was stated that the percentage of increase was even greater.

In connection with the above statement the association recommended that they be permitted to put into effect the following prices:—



	1917.	1918.
Yard prices on bridge, . . . .	\$3 to \$3 50.	\$4 50.
Iceing cars at railroads, . . . .	4 50.	5.
Wholesale prices, 300 to 600 pounds, at one delivery.	0 25 per 100 pounds.	First 600 pounds of any delivery at rate of 35 cents per every 100 pounds; balance at rate of 30 cents per 100 pounds.
Family prices, delivered to householders —		
100 pounds, one delivery, . . . .	\$0 35 to \$0 40.	\$0 50.
50 pounds, one delivery, . . . .	0 20.	0 25.
25 pounds, one delivery, . . . .	0 10.	20 pounds for 10 cents. 10 pounds for 5 cents.

It will be noted that for the smaller quantities there was no increase in some cases, and in others it was small. In no case was it greater than 25 per cent. For the larger quantities the increase was slightly in excess of 30 per cent. In other words, the association in its recommendations endeavored to carry out the idea which the Committee had carefully impressed upon it, that the chief burden of the increase should fall on the large rather than on the small consumers.

As a result, family prices in Massachusetts compared favorably with those put into effect by the New York Food Administrator in the early part of 1918. The bridge price in Massachusetts is 10 cents per ton greater, while the wholesale prices of 30 cents per 100 pounds corresponds with the New York price of 40 cents per 100 pounds. In making a comparison of prices it should be noticed that the cost of delivery in New York is less than in Boston, because the New York season is about forty-five days longer than in Massachusetts. Also, taken as a whole, the routes in New York City are more compact than those in Boston and some other Massachusetts cities, so that a larger percentage of the wagons, it was claimed, were working to maximum efficiency.

The prices above given were approved both by Mr. Endi-

cott and Mr. Hoover. It was distinctly understood, however, that in no case and under no circumstances should the profit be any greater than an average profit in a normal market during the pre-war years of 1911, 1912 and 1913.

In May, 1918, the Boston Ice Company, Independent Ice Company and Winter Hill Ice Company, at the request of the Committee, arranged to carry into effect the Committee's plan of furnishing cheaper ice in the congested districts of Boston. Six to twelve stations were established in public squares, parks or vacant lots in a number of districts, and ice was there sold during the summer months on a cash and carry plan of 25 cents per 100 pounds, 20 cents per 80 pounds, 15 cents per 60 pounds, 10 cents per 40 pounds, and 5 cents per 20 pounds. These prices were below actual cost, without considering shrinkage. This enabled many people to use ice freely during the warm weather, and helped to conserve food. It was understood that if the loss due to operating these stations at the prices above given should prove too heavy a burden, the Committee of ice dealers reserved the right to ask for relief; but this did not become necessary. The ice dealers also patriotically agreed to furnish from these stations ice in limited amounts, without charge, wherever it was required for sickroom purposes and upon order of the attending physician, and to carry out this offer suitable blanks were provided. The stations also were prepared to furnish free ice to individuals upon the order of any recognized charitable institution. The mayor of Boston gave permission for the location of the stations in parks or public squares, and assisted in every way, as did the Police Commissioner, Mr. Stephen A. O'Meara.

Volunteers were called in to assist in taking charge of these stations. The ice companies provided a man to cut the ice, and a volunteer took charge of the station, with a woman as cashier. At each location a platform was built, in the rear of which a team would back up, and the ice when weighed was distributed by the man in charge of the station. The county food administrators were notified of these cash and

carry ice stations, and much ice was sold in other cities on this plan.

Mr. G. H. Voter, vice-president of the Massachusetts Ice Dealers' Association, personally took charge of all the stations, and the success of the work was mainly due to his untiring efforts.

### (j) **The Banana Episode**

On September 24, 1917, a United Fruit Company steamer from Port Limon, Costa Rica, docked at Long Wharf with a cargo of 35,000 bunches of ripe bananas. Owing to faulty refrigeration these had not come through the voyage green, and were in too ripe a condition to go into commercial channels. As they were edible if used immediately, the city department of health refused to give a permit for their destruction. The company was confronted with a perplexing problem. The fruit would perish if not used within twenty-four hours, and handling or exposure would cause immediate decay. The fruit could not be sold, and without organization of consumers it was a physical impossibility even to give it away, although it was suggested that vast quantities of bananas might be fed to local cows without permanent serious consequences to their digestion.

Early on the morning of September 25 the situation came to the attention of the Food Administration. The officials of the company explained their desire to dump the cargo into the outer harbor, on the ground that it would require too long to give the fruit away, and that the boat was needed at once to take on a waiting cargo for the return trip. A member of the Food Administration staff inspected the bananas in the hold of the vessel and confirmed the statement that the fruit could not go into trade channels, but was fit for immediate use. The Food Administration, therefore, undertook to find an outlet for the fruit, and the company agreed to give it to those who would call for it.

Telephone notice was at once given to various charitable institutions of the city, eight carloads of the fruit were dis-

patched to Camp Devens at Ayer, and many boatloads sent to the Charlestown Navy Yard, to the United States Receiving Ship at Commonwealth Pier, and to the harbor forts. The traffic on Long Wharf was organized so that every teamstand was continually occupied, and in two days the bulk of the cargo of bananas had been removed from the hold of the vessel. Such portions as were too far gone to be eaten were loaded directly from the hold into a scow and dumped. The greater part of the bananas reached consumers in edible condition, and \$75,000 worth of foodstuffs was saved from total loss.

## CHAPTER VIII

### TRANSPORTATION AND ADJUSTMENT DIVISION

This Division of the Food Administration in December, 1917, consisted of Messrs. George H. Lyman, A. C. Ratschesky, Charles H. Cutting and later Mr. George M. Flint. At this time, practically the entire effort of the Committee was directed towards securing a prompt unloading of produce cars, the Committee using as a working basis the daily reports received by the Boston & Maine Railroad of cars containing perishable goods. From this list such cars were picked out as had been on hand for the longest time, and the consignee then communicated with. The Food Administration's regulations were not sufficiently clear to give full moral support to these endeavors, or to be used as a force to gain the required ends, and no cases as yet had been submitted to arbitration.

The severe winter demoralized the transportation service, and the chief effort was directed to tracing carloads of those foodstuffs of which the supply was seriously depleted. This condition soon applied to a greatly increased list of articles, so that the tracing of carloads occupied three-quarters of the time spent. In consequence, for the daily reports of cars containing perishables were substituted reports of cars of foodstuffs delayed in track seventy-two hours. These reports were at once followed up. Letters were then written to the presidents of the three major New England railroads, outlining the work undertaken and asking assistance through their subordinates. The aid so requested continued from that time to be freely and consistently given.

In February, 1918, Mr. Lyman turned over his work in this Department to Mr. William L. Putnam (see Appendix, page 571), who, at the request of a committee of the Produce Exchange, inaugurated a plan for the arbitration of disputes



and consignee, this being one of the principal causes why cars of vegetables were detained on the track at destination.

A printed statement of the rules of the Food Administration under the Massachusetts statute was also prepared, and over a thousand copies posted in conspicuous places by the railroads and the Produce Exchange.

The plan adopted for arbitration quickly assumed far-reaching proportions, and the cases multiplied to such a degree that a Federal adjuster was appointed to handle all cases for metropolitan Boston. Through the courtesy of the Fruit and Produce Trade Committee, the Committee was able to secure for this purpose the highly valued services of Mr. A. W. Otis. Similar cases were constantly arising in other parts of the State, and letters were sent to the county food administrators defining the procedure they were to follow. The Committee also assumed the duties of an information bureau for Food Administration regulations relating to transportation matters of various kinds.

An earlier effort resulted in securing a steamer for the transportation of about one hundred cars of seed potatoes, which were held on track at Boston for lack of storage space, and stood in imminent danger of freezing while awaiting movement to southern points. Again, a large number of refrigerator and heater cars, for the movement of onions from Connecticut Valley points, were assembled at a time when intense cold threatened to freeze even the stock in warehouses.

Coincident with the unsatisfactory transportation connections during the winter of 1917-18, permits were necessary to secure movement of freight, and the Committee exerted itself in behalf of Massachusetts shippers in obtaining them. Also, in cases where railroad embargoes affected the movement of perishable goods, assistance was given to secure prompt connection, by which it was made possible for highly perishable products to reach their market without serious loss. For example, when in the spring of 1917 the grain dealers of Massachusetts were without stocks of grain

and oats, and intimations were received that live stock was being slaughtered for lack of feed, permits were obtained through the instrumentality of the Committee, the movement of the necessary grain brought about, and disaster averted.

Following the winter's shortage an enormous surplus of certain lines of goods reached our markets, and our store-houses, filled with the abnormal freight of war time, could not take in the large amounts daily arriving. In this situation the Committee was able to be of temporary assistance, until finally the basement of Mechanics Hall was secured by one of the large warehouse companies and the congestion relieved.

As an aftermath of this accumulation of excess stocks, it was agreed that the Grain Corporation should buy some of the accumulated supplies of the cereal and flour substitutes, and the Committee ultimately solved the serious and difficult problem of finding warehouse and docking space combined, by securing for the Grain Corporation Pier No. 4 of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, at which point the largest of our boats were enabled to handle their cargoes more expeditiously.

The Committee also brought about a prompter settlement of freight claims on the part of transportation companies; and successful efforts were made to improve the service of the Union Freight Railroad, connecting the terminals. Also increased protection against fire was secured for the cold-storage warehouses.

The volunteer services rendered in these general matters by Mr. O. M. Chandler, Mr. Davenport Brown and Mr. F. T. Lamour, freight traffic manager of the Boston & Maine Railroad, were of inestimable help to the Committee.

## CHAPTER IX

### FUEL SUPPLY FOR FOOD INDUSTRIES

During the fuel shortage of the winter (1917), the United States Fuel Administration was instructed to permit fuel supply on "heatless" days only for such industries as required the same for the maintenance of public safety. Among such industries were essential food producing or food handling establishments. The approval of requests from these industries was delegated to the State Food Administration, and Mr. Paul J. Sachs, chief of the License Division, and Mr. B. Preston Clark were appointed to pass upon all such applications. In a single day over eighty establishments were given conference and decisions rendered in their cases. All told, several hundred industries were affected.

This work was largely confined to a short period, but was strenuous while it lasted. The question to be determined in every instance was whether the food equity was such as to entitle the applicant to fuel. The cases where food was directly produced were easy of decision, but when the relation was somewhat removed from actual food, and concerned only food containers or similar articles, careful judgment was necessary as to whether the temporary cessation of production of subsidiary materials would actually result in the decrease of food supply.

## PART VI

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### FUEL ADMINISTRATION

#### New England Coal Committee

At the final meeting of the Committee on Public Safety Mr. Endicott said in part:—

Mr. Storrow, as you all know, was appointed Fuel Administrator for New England. As soon as he was appointed he realized the seriousness of the situation here, — one more serious, I believe, than in any other part of the country. He went to Washington and took the matter up vigorously with the “powers that be,”— so vigorously that I think he was decidedly unpopular; but that apparently did not discourage him, because he spent most of his time between here and Washington, or in Washington for a long time, until finally it dawned upon the people there that what he had been telling them was absolutely true, with the result that to-day they hold up the New England Fuel Administration as a model to the entire country. I know that he has made himself at times personally responsible for \$10,000,000 worth of coal; I know that he has been working here night and day; I know that if it had not been for him some of us would have been cold last winter in our homes; and I know that in all probability but for Mr. Storrow’s organization the thousands of factories in New England would have had to close. He has such an organization that he knows where every barge is, every pound of coal that is being shipped, and nearly every pound that is wanted. It is my judgment that there are more thanks due to Mr. Storrow throughout New England than to any other single man in this part of the country.

Within a few weeks after the appointment of the Committee on Public Safety it was perceived that the fuel situation was to be one of New England’s most serious war problems, and it therefore began to receive the attention of the Committee. On account of the technical nature of the work it seemed advisable to organize a separate committee which would concentrate all its efforts on improving fuel conditions in the State, but which would at the same time

be closely affiliated with the Committee on Public Safety. Accordingly, early in May, 1917, Governor McCall appointed the Massachusetts Coal Committee, and made Mr. Storrow chairman, who continued to serve also as chairman of the Committee on Public Safety, but from this time on directed the larger part of his effort to the fuel work. On May 28, 1917, he was elected chairman of the New England Coal Committee at a joint meeting of the coal committees which had been appointed in each of the New England States at the suggestion of Governor McCall. On October 9, 1917, the President, upon the recommendation of Dr. Harry A. Garfield, National Fuel Administrator, appointed Mr. Storrow Federal Fuel Administrator for New England, and also Federal Fuel Administrator for Massachusetts. As the Commonwealth Defence Act, which had been passed by the Legislature in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee on Public Safety, contained important provisions relating to fuel, the Governor intrusted Mr. Storrow with the authority relating to fuel created under this statute.

It became so clearly evident, however, that the fuel problem was national in its scope, and could only be handled adequately by the national government, that Mr. Storrow's office, after his appointment by Dr. Garfield, was conducted wholly under the authority of the Federal Fuel Administration, and no occasion arose calling for action under the Defence Act of Massachusetts.

### **Causes of Coal Shortage in New England**

It will be of assistance in understanding the work of the New England Fuel Administration to briefly review the underlying causes of the coal shortage in New England during the winter of 1917-18.

The entrance of this country into the war made necessary an immediate speeding up of our factories in order to produce, on the vast scale required, supplies and equipment for our own troops and for those of our Allies.



As the government's war program enlarged, it became evident that the huge industrial task laid upon New England's factories and workshops would require a much larger consumption of coal than ever before in its history. The tremendously overburdened condition of the railways, as the rapidly rising volume of raw materials and finished munitions began to flow into and to be shipped from the industrial plants, quickly rendered the successful mining and transportation of even the normal volume of coal increasingly difficult, if not almost impossible. For this greatly added burden the preceding years of railroad starvation proved a poor preparation. The railroads, with their tremendous new obligations, were short of cars, locomotives, tracks and terminals. The shortage grew rapidly worse, and soon the scarcity of men added still further to the difficulty.

Nearly all sections of the country had their transportation problems, but as the eastern seaboard was approached, especially to the east of a line drawn north and south through Pittsburg, and embracing the States of Maryland, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, New York and New England, a zone of transportation congestion was encountered which far transcended anything else of the kind in the country.

It is also to be noted that the fueling of New England under these conditions presented a much stiffer problem than in the other States within this congested zone. Most of the industrial plants in the Central Atlantic States are within twenty-four to forty-eight hours of a coal mine. New York City itself, which is on the extreme eastern edge of the Middle Atlantic States, can be reached by a train of coal cars in less than three days. In New England it is every winter's experience that coal in transit averages from three to five weeks, according to weather conditions. New York State draws practically the whole of its fuel supply from the adjoining State of Pennsylvania. New England, on the other hand, draws a large part of its coal from the mountains of West Virginia, where the initial stage of the journey, from the mountains to the southern loading port

alone, is much greater than the average distance for all coal needed to fuel such States as New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware and New Jersey.

Moreover, this water transit from the southern ports to New England encountered many super-difficulties as the war progressed, entirely unknown to the Middle Atlantic States. The government did not go to the sources of coal supply of the Middle Western States for any appreciable amount of coal on its own account, but it went into New England's sources of supply, and especially the Pocahontas and New River districts of West Virginia, for many millions of tons in direct competition with New England's needs. Still further, the coal-loading piers of the southern ports, which could not suddenly be increased, and which in fact were not increased during the war, were utilized more and more by the government. New England colliers were obliged to lie waiting at anchor in the stream at Hampton Roads, while a continuous succession of government war vessels or transports moved into the pier ahead of them. Finally, the government began taking for its trans-Atlantic needs one New England collier after another, until six months before the war ended not a single one was left on our shores. Less important, but accentuating the difficulty, was the fact that the government was obliged to take a large proportion of the ocean-going tugs used in towing coal to New England.

It is not worth while to enumerate all the peculiar disadvantages under which New England struggled; but when the demand for coal is intense and railroad equipment is scarce, a coal mine will naturally sell its coal as near home as possible. If it can send coal to a point in Pennsylvania, New York, Delaware or New Jersey and get the car back to fill again in a week, it is much more attractive business for the mine than sending it to New England, where it is certain not to be back for at least a month, and probably, under the average winter conditions, not for at least six weeks. In the past, New England overcame this advantage

in difficult times by simply paying more for the coal, thus securing its needs; but just as soon as the Coal Production Committee organized by the Council of National Defense, of which Francis S. Peabody was chairman, set a flat price of \$3 per ton for soft coal, New England began to suffer acutely from this cause. Canada was not subject to the Peabody committee, and felt free to outbid New England, which it did day by day, while the coal naturally flowed to the nearer destinations in preference to New England at the same price.

Thus for many months the interference of the national government injured rather than helped New England, and it was not until the spring of 1918, when the zoning and distribution system of the National Fuel Administration was perfected and became really operative, that the difficulties of New England, at first enhanced by the government, were removed and counteracted, and the coal distributed according to the law of necessity rather than the rule of distance.

### **Organization of New England Coal Committee**

About the 1st of May, 1917, the Council of National Defense, becoming aware of the close relation of adequate coal production to the Nation's war plans, appointed a Sub-Committee on Coal Production, of which Francis S. Peabody of Chicago was made chairman. Mr. Storrow was appointed a member of this committee to represent New England.

Immediately following the organization of the Committee of the Council of National Defense, Mr. Storrow, at a conference of all the Governors of the New England States, called by Governor McCall, presented the dangers of the New England fuel outlook and the necessity for co-operative action by the New England States, and at his suggestion the Governor appointed the Massachusetts Coal Committee, which was followed by the appointment of coal committees by the Governors of the other New England States; and on

May 28 the New England Coal Committee was organized, composed of the several State committees, and executive offices were established at the State House, Boston.

It was agreed from the outset that the New England fuel problem should be treated as one affair, and that the rapidly rising war impediments, threatening alike all the New England States, should be dealt with by one common management for the benefit of all the New England States. It was clearly seen that to try to chop the fueling of New England into six separate sections would lead to almost inextricable confusion and cross purposes, whether dealing with the sources of supply at the mines, railways outside of New England, home railways, shipping interests, barge operating interests, or with the numerous branches and services of the Federal government whose interest and help it was necessary to secure.

When the Federal government finally created the Fuel Administration to handle fuel, the precedent had already been made of treating New England as a unit, and the habit and method of co-operation by the New England States in dealing with all questions relating to coal had become strongly established.

One of the most important consequences of the establishment of the New England Coal Committee was that it resulted in an early beginning being made in the education of the various governmental agencies in Washington as to the dangerous condition which threatened New England.

It should be borne in mind that the Federal Fuel Administration was not organized until October, 1917, so that during these spring and summer months there was no governmental agency which had any authority or responsibility regarding coal. The career of the Peabody committee was cut short very early by the public attack of one member of the Cabinet upon another member for approving the voluntary \$3 maximum price, and the committee from that time ceased to be a factor in the situation.

Inasmuch as New England's coal supply was to a great



extent dependent upon the transportation conditions, both by the railroads and by water, the possibility of relief for New England, pending the appointment of any governmental body with authority to direct the distribution of coal, lay largely in the hands of the Shipping Board and the Railroad War Board.

A brief description of transportation conditions, as they affected New England's coal supply during the summer of 1917, will perhaps give a better understanding of the necessity for the almost constant presence in Washington of Mr. Storrow as chairman of the New England Coal Committee during this period.

The railroad situation was very bad on the New England lines, where the embargoes were continuous during the summer, as also for much of the time on the New Haven Road. There was also great congestion on the railroads all through the eastern territory, and it was especially acute on the coal carriers. The Pennsylvania, Baltimore & Ohio, Norfolk & Western, and the Chesapeake & Ohio, had thousands of loaded coal cars standing on the rails for weeks at a time which they were unable to move. At the great railroad piers at Hampton Roads, over which a large part of New England's coal supply must pass, the conditions were also very adverse. There was no co-ordination in the work of the three railroads — the Norfolk & Western, Chesapeake & Ohio, and the Virginian — which bring coal down from the West Virginia fields. At times there would be great congestion at one of the piers, while the other pier had no coal and was scarcely operating.

The coaling of naval vessels and transports also kept New England's coal vessels away from the loading piers for days at a time. No steps were being taken for bunkering in the stream troop and munition transports, which would have greatly relieved the situation. A transport would generally require longer to take on a few hundred tons than a specially built New England collier to receive as many thousand.



A large part of Mr. Storrow's time in Washington, during the summer and fall, was spent before the Railroad War Board and the Priorities Committee of the Council of National Defense. Strong efforts were made to obtain general priority orders for the shipment of coal to New England, for additional motive power for the New England railroads, and for the necessary steel to complete the New London bridge on the New Haven Road. But in those days nearly all the governmental policies were in the making, and prompt effective action was unobtainable. In the last few days of the Railroad War Board a plan was put into effect separating the eastern territory into various operating districts. The headquarters of the eastern district was located in Pittsburg. The day following the announcement of this new arrangement Mr. Storrow was in Pittsburg and appeared before this new committee, appealing again for decisive action from the railroad authorities to relieve the New England situation. Relief was not granted, and in a few more days the committee went out of existence. In the meantime the situation of the railroads was constantly growing worse instead of showing improvement.

As the government was hard pressed for vessels for overseas work, the navy and the Shipping Board were almost every day announcing their intention of taking more of New England's colliers, and more of the tugs used to tow our coal barges. This necessitated weekly and almost daily representation before the war, Navy and other government departments, and before the Shipping Board, of the critical shortage of New England's coal-carrying fleet, and the effect upon the war program in New England if further takings were made.

During the summer a number of conferences were held in Washington by the Executive Committee of the New England Coal Committee with the senators from the New England States, and the latter gave the heartiest co-operation at all times to the committee's efforts to obtain relief in Washington. In August the Executive Committee, after

having exhausted every resource in Washington, sought and obtained an interview with the President, and, with the aid of a large committee of representative men coming from every State in New England, placed before him personally the critical situation, and the necessity for decisive action by the government if New England's production of war materials was not to be crippled.

The New England Coal Committee gave its constant attention during the summer of 1917 to the anthracite situation. The grave danger of an anthracite shortage in New England became early apparent, and an effort was made with the anthracite operators to secure increased shipments. The congestion on the railroads presented serious difficulties in the way of an increased movement. It was therefore suggested by the New England Committee that the anthracite operators should run solid trains of anthracite to various natural distributing points in New England, the trains not to be broken up until reaching their destination. In this way anthracite might be brought into New England in spite of embargoes against the New England railroads. This movement was started about the 1st of June, and was pushed with energy throughout the summer and fall. As a result, New England secured many additional thousands of tons of anthracite.

Within a few weeks after its organization, the committee began a campaign to secure prompt unloading of coal-carrying equipment by consignees. It obtained from each of the New England railroads, every week, the name of each consignee who had held a car of coal beyond the free time. The attention of each delinquent was called immediately to his delay, and he was asked to unload and release the car at once. A careful card catalogue was kept, and a representative of the committee visited every consignee whose name recurred on the lists.

Early in the work of the Committee it was found that the carrying capacity of our coal barges was not being utilized with the greatest efficiency, on account of the method of

individual operation by each owner. A particular ocean-going tug would make a trip pulling less than its capacity of coal barges, since the company owning the tug on that day might have only a single barge of its own going to the port of destination; or a tug might lie in port waiting for its owner's barge to take its turn at the pier, to be loaded or unloaded.

To remedy this condition a plan for pooling all the ocean-going tugs was worked out by the committee, and a voluntary association of the owners of all ocean-going barges and tugs, known as the New England Coal Barge and Towers' Association, was formed with the help of the Shipping Board.

Mr. Storrow was made chairman of the Executive Committee of this association, and rules were framed and rates established for towing each other's barges, to the end that every ocean-going tug should be kept moving all the time without waits at either end for empty or loaded barges, and always to the full capacity of the tug. A central office was opened at 148 State Street, Boston, and the movement of all the ocean-going tugs and barges was put in charge of Capt. Arthur L. Crowley, who, by the aid of complete, accurate daily and hourly information, and a dispatching board showing at a glance the location every hour of every tug and barge scattered along the coast from Hampton Roads to Eastport, controlled and dispatched these tugs and barges so as to greatly increase their efficiency and carrying capacity.

A similar association of the owners of the smaller tugs and smaller box barges plying along the Sound, especially to Connecticut and Rhode Island ports, known as the Long Island Sound Barge Operators' Association, was formed a little later, with headquarters at 1 Broadway, New York. This substantially improved the dispatching and efficiency of the smaller tugs and barges, and a member of Mr. Storrow's staff went to New York and became the executive secretary of the association.

With the help of the Shipping Board the necessary barges and bunkering machinery were obtained and towed to Hampton Roads, so that slow-loading merchant vessels requiring only a few tons of coal could be bunkered in the stream, instead of adding to the congestion at the piers.

During the summer there grew up a general expectation throughout the country that the government would reduce the price of coal, which, in fact, it did, together with the price of many other commodities; but the New England Coal Committee plainly warned New England consumers that the situation was too critical to make it safe for them to wait in order to get their coal at a cheaper price. On July 24 a printed circular (see Appendix, page 582) warning New England consumers of the fuel danger, was sent to all manufacturers and public authorities throughout New England, and given wide publicity in the daily press. Under the heading "Fill the Bins Now" this circular said:—

We are not now discussing the question of price, though we fully appreciate the oppressive burden which has been borne by New England in this respect during the last twelve months. We are pointing out that if New England is to get through next winter with the coal it must have, and thus avoid hardships much greater than even the exorbitant prices of last winter, our people must take coal and keep taking coal every day to the limit of the New England carrying capacity.

This duty to keep our carrying capacity working to the full limit during the next ninety days falls especially upon our larger corporate units, which have the financial resources and the storage capacity required to accumulate now a large proportion of their next winter's supply. The obligation, however, rests with equal force upon the individual, whether householder or manufacturer, who has the financial resources and storage capacity to take in his next winter's coal at the present time. In our judgment the householder of means should now make sure that his bins are full, so that his competition with the poor man during next winter's crisis shall be at the minimum.

## **Organization of the New England Fuel Administration**

During the summer Congress began debating the fuel situation as a sort of tag end to the Lever Act, a very comprehensive measure which had been introduced to deal with the



food situation. Unfortunately, the references in this act to fuel were added rather as an afterthought, and had not been as carefully worked out as the provisions covering the Food Administration.

The Lever Act was passed August 10, 1917. The first action taken by the President under the fuel section of the law was on August 21, when he issued an executive order fixing the price of bituminous coal at the mine at \$2 a net ton, which was \$1 lower than the voluntary maximum price of \$3 which the Peabody committee had secured by the voluntary action of the operators, and endeavored to make effective. This was followed on August 23 by the appointment of Dr. Harry A. Garfield, president of Williams College, as Federal Fuel Administrator.

On October 3 Dr. Garfield, as has already been stated, appointed Mr. Storrow, the chairman of the Committee on Public Safety, Federal Fuel Administrator for New England, and also Federal Fuel Administrator for Massachusetts. At the same time he appointed a fuel administrator for each of the other New England States as follows:—

Maine,	James C. Hamlen.
New Hampshire,	Charles M. Floyd.
Vermont,	H. J. M. Jones.
Connecticut,	Thomas W. Russell.
Rhode Island,	George H. Holmes.

Mr. Floyd later resigned on account of ill health, and was succeeded by Mr. Hovey E. Slayton. Mr. Holmes was also compelled to resign for personal reasons in the spring of 1918, and was succeeded by Mr. Malcolm G. Chace. All of these men served their States with notable fidelity and ability.

The habits of co-operation between the New England States, which had been firmly established as the result of the work of the New England Coal Committee, bore splendid fruit in the work of the New England Fuel Administration. It would not have been difficult to create differences



of opinion as to whether a car of coal appearing at Mechanicville should move over the Boston & Maine system to a destination in Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire or Maine; or whether a barge at Staten Island pier should move to a port in Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire or Maine; or whether a collier leaving Hampton Roads should proceed to Providence, Boston, Portsmouth or Portland. But the spirit of mutual co-operation and confidence had been firmly established, and during the dangerous and trying days of the winter of 1917-18 the broad spirit of mutual helpfulness displayed by the State Administrators went far toward pulling New England through the winter without a domestic and industrial catastrophe.

The work of local organization in Massachusetts and in the other New England States was pushed energetically. Dr. Garfield announced, the last week in October, that retail prices for coal should be fixed in every community, and directed the State Fuel Administrators of New England to undertake the task, subject to his revision.

A committee of three was established in every city and town in Massachusetts in which there was a coal dealer, the total number being 312 committees. These committees were appointed in almost every instance on the recommendation of the local Committee on Public Safety. No coal dealer or any one with an interest in the coal industry, was eligible for appointment. These local committees everywhere established maximum retail prices, which were based upon a careful study of all the factors entering into the retail price, including the cost at the mines, the cost of transportation by rail and by water, and the cost of doing business, with the various items entering into the same, such as discharging, wastage, delivery, overhead and net profit. Retail prices for its locality were recommended by each committee, and after careful scrutiny and analysis were finally approved by the State Fuel Administrator, subject to the approval of the Federal Fuel Administrator in Washington.

This method proved very effective. If the price had been left to the effect of supply and demand, in the critical shortage coal would undoubtedly have sold as high as \$20 a ton, and the poor, and those even in moderate circumstances, would have been unable to secure a supply. The fixing of prices undoubtedly saved many millions of dollars to the people of New England, while at the same time it allowed a reasonable profit to the dealer. It is gratifying to state that there were very few instances where attempts were made to evade the price restrictions.

At the beginning it was believed that once the local retail prices had been established after careful investigation, the activity of the local committees would be more or less normal; but as events developed, and the necessity for organized action in nearly every community in the State became necessary on account of the critical shortage, the work of the fuel committees became more burdensome, more detailed, and more fraught with responsibility than the work of most other local war agencies.

In States outside of New England the work of the State Fuel Administrator was chiefly delegated to a county committee or sub-administrator; but the bedrock foundation on which the whole organization of the New England Fuel Administration was built, and to which it chiefly owed the very great efficiency it possessed, was the local fuel committee established in each city and town. Probably few communities realized the anxious and laborious tasks performed in their behalf by their fuel committee, but unquestionably the towns and cities of Massachusetts were face to face with one of the most critical and menacing situations ever encountered in the history of New England, and the local fuel committees were the chief instruments in providing for their protection. A list of the chairmen of these committees in Massachusetts is given in the Appendix, page 592.

## Bituminous Shortage during Winter 1917-18

Receipts of bituminous coal in New England in 1917 were actually less than in the previous year, although the speeding up of New England's factories, to comply with the government's ever-expanding war program, brought about a great increase in coal consumption, as has already been mentioned. The result was that New England went into the winter practically without any reserve coal supply, whereas it has always been customary for the New England public utility and manufacturing plants to start the winter with a supply of coal in storage sufficient to carry them for three or four months, because experience had shown how the winter weather ties up the carrying capacity of our railroads, colliers and barges.

By the first week in December, 1917, the seriousness of the fuel shortage in New England, which Mr. Storow had presented with great ability and persistence before all the government agencies which in any way had authority to furnish relief, including the President, every day became a bitter reality. The winter of 1917-18 was of unusual severity. All through the eastern section of the United States there was terrific cold; Boston Harbor was frozen solid; at times even the southern coal piers at Hampton Roads were completely frozen up. Philadelphia and Baltimore harbors were frozen in, but as the result of Mr. Storow's urgent pleading they were broken out by the Navy Department with battleships in order to release coal-bearing steamers for New England ports. Staten Island Creek, where a good deal of our anthracite is loaded on barges, as well as Long Island Sound, were frozen, and for a period of several weeks at a time no tug or barge was able to move. The coal was frozen in the cars at the piers and could not be dumped, and on railroads and piers the intense cold on some days stopped the movement of freight, as the crews were unable to work. The vital truth of the fact which Mr. Storow had been endeavoring to present to the minds of the authorities in Washington, most of whom were un-

familiar with New England conditions,—that New England's ability to receive coal in winter was greatly limited by weather conditions, therefore making it necessary to push the maximum amount of coal possible during good weather conditions in the summer and fall months,—was borne out to the letter.

The New England Fuel Administrator during the critical days of December and January was spending practically all of his time in Washington in a continuous campaign before the government bureaus and departments, seeking to obtain action that would bring relief. Directly William G. McAdoo was appointed Director-General of Railroads, Mr. Storrow sought his interest and help, and an appointment was granted him on the succeeding Sunday afternoon to explain New England's plight. Mr. McAdoo decided at once that immediate and drastic action was required, and after a conference with Dr. Garfield issued an order for the shipment of 500 cars of coal a day to New England, to be distributed by order of the New England Fuel Administrator, in order to relieve the situation. This prompt action on the Director-General's part was the first step taken for the relief of New England by any government agency.

The order provided that cars should be placed by the railroads at the mines designated every day for this movement, which it was contemplated should be in addition to the normal movement to New England of coal under contract. For the purpose of cutting red tape and securing immediate action, Mr. Storrow pledged his personal credit for the coal so shipped. The order provoked a great deal of opposition in other Atlantic States which the coal had to traverse to reach New England, but Mr. McAdoo stood firmly by the order. The order was not strictly adhered to, especially in the case of the Pennsylvania Railroad, but the shipments, nevertheless, were large, and the relief furnished thereby was most important, because it furnished the Fuel Administration a liquid supply of rail coal which could be effectively used in rendering quick relief in emergency cases.



A few days previously, in the last days of the old Railroad War Board, the New England Fuel Administrator had obtained from the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad a thousand cars bound for the West, which had been standing on the rails for days, unable to move on account of congestion. These cars were reshipped, or diverted, to New England by all-rail routes, instead of to their original western consignees, and were all consigned to the New England Fuel Administrator.

Within a few days after the 500-car order was obtained, Mr. Storrow secured the diversion to New England of the Panama collier "Achilles," loaded with 12,500 tons of coal for the Panama Railroad. Following this trip the "Achilles" and her sister ship the "Ulysses" were for many months regularly loaded for the account of the New England Fuel Administrator with emergency coal, and gradually other vessels were added to this service.

The relief furnished by these emergency shipments came just in time to save New England from a catastrophe. By breaking them up into very small units, as no more than a few days' supply could be furnished any consumer, New England came through the crisis not only without a breakdown, but even without substantial suffering. Railroads, street railroads, electric light and power plants, gas plants, municipal water and sewerage plants, and many important munition plants, as well as domestic consumers, were on many occasions only carried through by means of emergency coal furnished by the New England Fuel Administration.

A description of a few of the more serious cases will well illustrate the general condition throughout the six New England States.

The Maine Central Railroad, with a daily consumption of 2,000 tons of coal, was in a dangerous condition throughout the winter. For the two months of February and March the New England Fuel Administration, in order to keep this railroad open and the State of Maine from collapse, had



to find and send to the Maine Central over 1,000 tons of coal per day.

The Boston & Maine Railroad, with a consumption of more than 5,000 tons daily, was dependent during February and March on the New England Fuel Administration for 2,500 tons or more of coal each day.

The Bay State Street Railway Company, the largest railway system in New England, operating 525 miles of track and serving territory in eastern New England from Newburyport, Mass., to Newport, R. I., was on a day-to-day basis for its coal supply throughout almost the entire winter. Its consumption during the winter was 460 tons daily at its 14 power houses. On March 2, its largest power station, at Quincy, with a daily consumption of 139 tons, had but two days' supply on hand, of which 150 tons had been borrowed. At its station at Lynn, on the same day, it had three days' supply, and at its stations at Portsmouth and Chelsea, five days' supply. Its power station at Newport was operating on coal borrowed from the naval station.

The Boston Elevated Street Railway, although in common with other street railways in New England it had reduced its service to a minimum, found its coal supply during March so low that it required emergency assistance from the New England Fuel Administration to prevent a shutdown.

Many of the other street railways in New England found themselves during January, February and March with their reserves exhausted and unable to obtain coal, and had to be assisted by the New England Fuel Administration from its limited emergency supply. The following street railways were also among those which were furnished emergency coal in order to prevent shutdowns: —

Berkshire Street Railway.  
Norton, Taunton & Attleboro Street Railway.  
Brockton & Plymouth Street Railway.  
Blackstone Valley Street Railway.  
Northampton Street Railway.  
Blue Hill Street Railway.

Emergency coal for the Berkshire Street Railway and the Northampton Street Railway, located in the extreme western end of Massachusetts, had to be shipped all-rail from Boston, where it had been received by tidewater from Hampton Roads.

The reserves of practically all gas companies in New England were exhausted early in January, and in February and March many of the larger companies had to obtain their supply from the New England Fuel Administration's emergency shipments. A number of companies were entirely dependent on this emergency supply.

The Narragansett Electric Company, in Rhode Island, was on a day-to-day basis throughout the winter, and had to receive emergency coal from the Fuel Administration to keep in operation.

The Rhode Island Company, in Providence, came down to three days' supply, and the Fuel Administration had to furnish emergency coal to prevent it from shutting down.

Many important munition plants would have been closed if the New England Fuel Administration had not rushed in an emergency supply just in time to save them from a shutdown. Hospitals, municipal water and sewerage pumping stations, and hundreds of manufacturing plants all over New England, were also saved from closing by shipments of emergency coal.

The extreme danger of the situation is very concretely shown by the distribution order of the 12,500-ton cargo of the collier "Achilles," which arrived in Boston on January 17, 1918, with emergency coal consigned to the New England Fuel Administrator, to be distributed by him. The following is a verbatim copy of the order:—

CHARLES P. CHASE, 85 *Devonshire Street, Boston, Mass.*

The shipment of bituminous coal consigned to the New England Fuel Administrator, arriving by S. S. "Achilles," is to be apportioned as follows:—

NAME.	Post Office Address.	Freight Destination.	Tons.
Town of Middleborough water department.	Middleborough, Mass., .	New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.	100
Ware water works, . . .	Ware, Mass., . . .	Boston & Maine, Southern Division.	60
Town of Foxborough water department.	Foxborough, Mass., .	Care of Coal Company Sid-ing.	60
North Adams, Mass., water department.	North Adams, Mass., .	Boston & Maine, Fitchburg Division.	60
Metropolitan water works, .	Chestnut Hill, Brookline, Mass.	Brookline Station, Boston & Albany.	-
Cambridge water works, .	Cambridge, Mass., .	Fresh Pond; Boston & Maine, Fitchburg Division.	60
Boston State Hospital, .	Notify Mr. Merrill, State House, Boston.	Boston; Bird Street Station, New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.	60
Psychopathic Hospital, .	Notify Mr. Merrill, State House, Boston.	Boston; Harvard Street Station, New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.	-
Foxborough Hospital for the Insane.	Notify Mr. Merrill, State House, Boston.	Foxborough, New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.	200
State Farm, . . . .	State Farm, . . . .	Titicut, New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.	-
Massachusetts Hospital School.	Canton, Mass., . . .	Canton Junction, New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.	60
Lakeville State Sanatorium,	Middleborough, Mass., .	New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.	100
Attleboro Sanatorium, .	Attleboro, Mass., . .	New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.	60
Bay State Fishing Company,	-	3 trawlers, . . . .	-
Albion K. Parker, . . .	Chairman, Fuel Commission, Norwood, Mass.	New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.	30
C. M. Prouty, . . . .	Chairman, Fuel Commission, Spencer, Mass.	Boston & Albany Railroad,	60
Taunton municipal light plant.	Taunton, Mass., . . .	New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.	200
Bay State Street Railway, .	Chelsea, Mass., . . .	To be lightered, . . .	400
Bay State Street Railway, .	Quincy, Mass., . . .	To be lightered, . . .	550
Grafton County Electric Light and Power Company.	White River Junction, Vt.	Boston & Maine Railroad, .	60
Grafton County Electric Light and Power Company.	Lebanon, N. H., . . .	Boston & Maine Railroad, .	60
New England Power Company.	Uxbridge, Mass., . . .	Uxbridge; New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad via Boston & Maine, Worcester.	400
Town of Brookline water department.	Brookline, Mass., . .	Care of Highland Ice Company, West Roxbury Station, New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.	60
Town of Brookline water department.	Brookline, Mass., . .	Brookline Water Board, Brookline Station, Boston & Albany Railroad.	60
Gloucester Coal Company, .	Gloucester, Mass., . .	Boston & Maine, . . .	250

NAME.	Post Office Address.	Freight Destination.	Tons.
Leominster Coal Company, .	Leominster, Mass., .	New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.	100
Brookline Coal Company, .	Brookline, Mass., .	Brookline, Boston & Albany,	30
Framingham Coal Company,	Framingham, Mass., .	Boston & Albany, . .	30
City of Medford, . . .	Medford, Mass., . .	Boston & Maine, Western Division.	60
Lynn Gas and Electric Company.	Lynn, Mass., . . .	To be lightered, . . .	500
Malden-Melrose Gas Light Company.	Malden, Mass., . .	Boston & Maine, . . .	800
Pittsfield Coal Gas Company.	Pittsfield, Mass., .	Boston & Maine, . . .	200
Nashua Light, Heat and Power Company.	Nashua, N. H., . .	Boston & Maine, . . .	140
Wakefield municipal light plant.	Wakefield, Mass., .	Boston & Maine, . . .	60
Woburn Gas Light Company,	Woburn, Mass., . .	Boston & Maine, . . .	100
Milford Gas Company, .	Milford, Mass., . .	Boston & Maine, . . .	100
Salem Gas Light Company, .	Salem, Mass., . . .	Boston & Maine, . . .	400
Attleboro Gas Light Corporation.	Attleboro, Mass., .	New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.	160
Lawrence Gas Company, .	Lawrence, Mass., .	Boston & Maine, . . .	500
Westfield Gas and Electric Light Company.	Westfield, Mass., .	Boston & Albany, . . .	100
Rockland, Thomaston & Camden Street Railway.	Rockland, Me., . .	Boston & Maine and Maine Central.	100
City of Boston, . . . .	Pumping Station, Cow Pasture, Mass.	To be lightered, . . .	600
City of Boston, . . . .	Deer Island, Mass., .	To be lightered, . . .	600
City of Boston, . . . .	Long Island, Mass., .	To be lightered, . . .	600
Brockton Hospital, . .	Brockton, Mass., . .	New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.	30
City of Boston Consumptives Hospital.	W. W. Kee, City Hall, Boston, Mass.	Care of City Fuel Company, Milton, Mass., New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.	100
St. Albans Gas Company, .	St. Albans, Vt., . .	Central Vermont Railway, .	30
D. W. Powers, . . . .	Marlborough, Mass., .	Boston & Maine, . . .	60
City of Everett, . . . .	Care of Wm. E. Weeks, Mayor.	West Street Station, Boston & Maine, Everett.	100
American Sugar Refining Company.	South Boston, Mass., .	To be lightered, . . .	1,000

Balance of "Achilles" cargo, approximately 3,000 tons, to be divided equally between Boston retail dealers, as follows:—

City Fuel Company, Albany Street, 1 lighter. Staples Coal Company, Albany Street, 1 lighter. Warren-Bradford Coal Company, Albany Street, Wellington-Wild Coal Company, Charlestown, Mass., and Massachusetts Wharf Coal Company, East Boston, Mass., lighters to be furnished by Maritime Coaling Company.

Suffering was prevented in many communities during the winter by the wholesale use of wood for fuel, not only for the purpose of heating dwelling houses and apartments, but also office buildings and hotels. In a number of cases it was used in factories for the production of power. One factory in Worcester, unable to obtain coal, burned 30,000 cords of wood in order to keep in operation.

Fortunately the New England Fuel Administration, almost immediately after its organization, had started an energetic wood-cutting campaign throughout the State. The result had been an enormous increase in the amount of cord wood cut during the fall and winter, and thousands of cords of this green wood were burned during the shortage where coal had ordinarily been used. During 1918 the wood-cutting campaign was continued vigorously under the leadership of Mr. Jerome R. George of Worcester.

The coal shortage was so dangerous in January that it was necessary to put into effect very stringent conservation measures. These provided that stores and office buildings should not open before 9 A.M., and must close at 5 P.M. All theatres and moving-picture shows were closed at 10 P.M. On two occasions in Boston it was necessary, for a period of several days, to put an embargo on the delivery of coal to factories, stores and office buildings, as the supply in the dealers' yards was so low that it was absolutely imperative to save it for use in heating dwelling houses and hospitals, pending the arrival of new shipments. The severe measures which had to be taken were in all cases cheerfully complied with by the public, with the result that the crisis was passed throughout the State without suffering.

In this connection mention should be made of the Federal five-day closing order, followed by the so-called "heatless Mondays." On account of the dangerous congestion of the railroads — which had become so critical that a large number of vessels were tied up in New York Harbor loaded with much-needed supplies for our army and the Allies, and had been waiting for weeks without being able to get bunker



coal — Dr. Garfield decided that drastic action was necessary in order to bring relief.

Announcement was made on the evening of Wednesday, January 16, that for five days, beginning the following Friday, the consumption of coal in territory east of the Mississippi River would be forbidden to any industry except ship-building and food-producing plants, and a few principal munition factories. This meant that practically all factories except those specifically exempted, and all stores and office buildings, were to be closed; and it was further announced that for the five Mondays following there would be similar "heatless" days, unless there was an improvement in the fuel situation which would make it possible to revoke the order. The offices at the State House following the announcement of the closing days presented unusual scenes. People were already gravely concerned over the shortage of domestic fuel, for in many places it was on a bag-supply basis. The order suspending the work of the greater part of our population fell like a thunderbolt, and was notice, if further notice was needed, of the gravity of the situation. The corridors in the State House were thronged from morning till late at night with manufacturers, storekeepers and owners of office buildings, all asking for information and rulings on the closing days and heatless Mondays as applied to their establishments.

The time was so short, and the information with which to make rulings so inadequate, that these days were a great strain on the Fuel Administration, not only in Massachusetts but in the other New England States. In Massachusetts the work was greatly aided by a voluntary committee of Boston lawyers, under the chairmanship of Mr. W. Rodman Peabody, who made rulings night and day until all the questions brought in by letter, telephone, telegram or personal interview had been answered. The chairmen of the local fuel committees throughout the State, as well as the executive staff in Boston, were in many instances called out

of bed in the early morning to interpret closing rules for some anxious citizen. A fine spirit of patriotism and eagerness to help the government out of the emergency was everywhere exhibited by the public, and the order was observed throughout New England with the greatest respect.

As has already been mentioned, one of the principal purposes of the order, in addition to the saving of coal which might be effected, was to give the railroads an opportunity to get abreast of their freight. Unfortunately, the weather during the five closing days was bitterly cold, so that the hoped-for cleaning up on the railroads was much impeded; but considerable progress was made, especially in the way of bunkering the much-needed ships in New York Harbor.

In the weeks that followed, however, the railroads made marked progress, and as a result of the improvement in the situation the National Fuel Administrator suspended the heatless Mondays February 13, but gave authority for any State Fuel Administrator to continue them in his State for a further period if it seemed necessary. As the outlook continued very dangerous in New England it was necessary for the fuel administrators in the New England States to continue the heatless Monday for an additional week.

### **Distribution of Soft Coal by New England Fuel Administration**

To deal effectively with the critical shortage it had been necessary for the New England Fuel Administration to take complete control of the distribution of every pound of coal which came into New England. An organization had to be built up almost overnight, not only to direct the distribution of all the coal entering New England, but also to handle the shipments of emergency coal, all of which were shipped to the order of the New England Fuel Administrator, and which placed him within a very few days in the position of conducting and being personally financially responsible for a very large coal business.

In order to exercise effective control over the all-rail shipments, an experienced railroad man was stationed, as representative of the New England Fuel Administration, at each of the four all-rail gateways, — Maybrook and Harlem River on the New Haven, West Albany on the Boston & Albany, and Mechanicville on the Boston & Maine. By means of these agents the orders for diversions given from the New England Fuel Administration office in Boston by telegraph or telephone were promptly carried out, and the movement of all-rail coal effectively directed.

A similar control was exercised over water shipments. Every shipment arriving at a New England port was distributed in accordance with the instructions of the New England Fuel Administration. Every cargo was distributed to relieve the pressing emergency cases of the moment, regardless of whether or not the consignees to whom the coal was shipped were customers of the particular concern which had shipped the coal.

It should be pointed out that while it is for the selfish interest of a coal shipper to endeavor to protect his customer in times of emergency so as to secure the customer's good will and business in times of competition, yet the New England shippers, practically without an exception, said, "Tell us what you want and where the coal is most needed, and we will make our shipments accordingly." Hardly a single request of the New England Fuel Administrator required a formal order or any show of authority. The New England shippers, both water and rail, recognized New England's crisis, and with the utmost loyalty labored with the Fuel Administration to avert danger and prevent distress.

For the more efficient handling of the business detail in connection with shipments of emergency coal, a separate business office for the New England Fuel Administrator was opened at 85 Devonshire Street, Boston. Starting with the shipments on the 500-car all-rail order of January 3, this business increased rapidly in volume, until finally a total of over 1,000,000 tons of emergency coal, representing a gross

business of over \$10,000,000, was transacted by the New England Fuel Administrator through the Devonshire Street office.

As soon as it became clear that the task of buying, distributing and collecting emergency coal had to be assumed by the New England Fuel Administrator, the president of the New England Wholesale Coal Dealers Association, Mr. Borden Covell, was called upon for assistance, and under his supervision and direction the special emergency coal department at 85 Devonshire Street was organized and developed with the necessary assistance, which could only be afforded by men who had had experience in the coal business. It is fitting that special recognition should be given to the able and untiring help rendered by Mr. Covell and his assistants.

During the spring and early summer of 1918, when the outlook for the year still seemed dark, the New England Fuel Administration made a determined effort to increase the flow of box-car bituminous coal sent from Pennsylvania. This box-car coal was produced by small independent wagon mines. The owners of these mines were accustomed to be paid practically spot cash out in the mining region, instead of permitting their coal to come forward on the usual terms, and but little of it had previously been finding its way into New England. It is true that in many cases this coal was not as carefully prepared as the coal of the larger operators, but at the time this increased movement was arranged — early summer of 1918 — the shortage in New England was still serious, and there was an overwhelming demand for anything that would burn, while the outlook for the future was still very uncertain. The New England Fuel Administration arranged to be represented at the mines, and to pay the owners of the wagon mines spot cash for coal to be shipped to New England for distribution by the New England Fuel Administration. This arrangement brought in a large additional tonnage.

As a result of Mr. Storrow's persistence in presenting



New England's critical condition, the Shipping Board came to the rescue. Due to the effective help of Mr. E. F. Carry, director of operation, and particularly to the experience and ability of Mr. P. A. S. Franklin, chairman of the Shipping Control Committee, New England's coal fleet grew rapidly in carrying power, until on August 1, 1918, it had risen to 111 steamers, capable of carrying 476,762 tons of coal at a single trip. The Shipping Board gave to Mr. Storrow authority to determine the charters, and to designate the destination and consignees, of these coal-carrying steamers which it turned into the New England coal trade.

A careful system of chartering and directing the movement of these steamers was worked out with the very able assistance and co-operation of Capt. Arthur L. Crowley, the New England managing agent of the Shipping Board, so that the steamers moved to the particular southern port and pier which, under the actual conditions on the day of their arrival, would give them the quickest loading. This system involved practically an hourly knowledge in the administration office of actual conditions at all the southern piers, and frequently of diversions of steamers *en route* to offset unexpected delays, breakdowns in pier machinery, or fluctuations in the coal or labor supply at the piers.

Similarly, to get these vessels unloaded as promptly as possible at the New England end, every New England port and pier capable of taking a steamer had to be served with coal continuously, and worked to its full capacity. Constant watch, by wire and telephone, was kept up and down the coast, and steamers were fed into each particular pier at Searsport or Portland, Portsmouth, Boston, Fall River, New Bedford or Providence as fast as the pier could take them, while every means was taken to encourage extra effort at our New England piers to increase their efficiency.

A very complete system for obtaining information of the daily shipments of coal to New England, both by rail and water, was built up at the office at the State House. It was there known, day by day, the amount of coal which had



the previous day been loaded for New England by water from every loading port; also its destination and the name of the consignee. The daily reports from the administration's agents at the all-rail gateways gave the same detailed information for every car of coal that entered New England by rail. With this information at hand it was not only possible to effectively control the distribution of the coal shipped into New England, but it was also possible, at all times, to tell whether shipments were being made from the mines in accordance with the schedule established by the Federal Fuel Administration in Washington, and to show exactly where the deficiencies in shipments were occurring.

### **Improvement in Bituminous Situation**

During February and March, 1918, every effort was put forth at Washington to secure a definite budget of bituminous coal for the coal year 1918-19, in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar shortage the following winter. A careful statement of New England's requirements was placed before the Federal Fuel Administration and the Shipping Board, whose experts went over the data at first hand in order to reach a decision on the New England budget. At a meeting held March 14, in Washington, the New England budget of bituminous coal for the coal year beginning April 1, 1918, was set at 30,000,000 net tons by the Fuel Administration, the representatives of the Shipping Board and Railroad Administration concurring. As part of the budget a definite schedule was made for all-rail and water movement by barge from New York and Philadelphia, and by steamer and barge from Hampton Roads and Baltimore.

Shipments during April, May and June were much below the schedule, and up to September the situation continued to give great anxiety. Gradually, however, the full effect of the measures which had been put into effect to improve conditions began to be experienced, and by December 1 New England had received nearly 4,000,000 tons more of

bituminous coal than during the same period of the previous year. This amount might have been made even greater, so far as its handling and financing was concerned, if New England could have shown that its industries needed and were entitled to receive it; but by October 1 it became clear that any possible danger of a crisis had been averted, and after that time all direct consignments to the New England Fuel Administration were cut off, and the number of steamers plying in the trade was gradually reduced from week to week. In December the situation became so easy that Mr. Storrow announced there would be no further regulation of bituminous coal in New England, and the business was restored to its normal channels, except that the government's fixed prices were to be continued until they were canceled by the Washington authorities.

It will perhaps be of interest to briefly describe the causes which, within a period of less than a year, brought about this striking change in the Nation's bituminous coal supply. The effect of the "zoning system" was the most important single factor. The producing fields were divided into districts or zones, and shipments of coal from each of these zones were limited to certain States prescribed by the Fuel Administration. This caused the Middle Western States to obtain a larger proportion of their supply near home, from the unburdened coal fields of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Kentucky, thus taking pressure off the Pennsylvania and West Virginia mines, — the sources of supply for New England and the other eastern munition-producing States, as well as for the unprecedented demands of the army and navy. This "zoning" also reduced the average haul from mine to consumer, and so increased the available number of coal cars and locomotives. The "zoning system" was a constructive measure which reached the fundamental causes of the bituminous shortage of the preceding year and effectively cured the trouble. Its establishment was a great achievement, for which Dr. Garfield, the Federal Fuel Administrator, is entitled to the highest praise.

A further decisive action which had a very important effect was the taking of complete and effective control by the National Fuel Administration of all the bituminous coal produced. This was brought about by establishing a district representative of the Fuel Administration in each coal-producing region, and also by giving adequate authority to the State Fuel Administrators to make diversions of bituminous coal inside their States, in order that the coal might be distributed in accordance with the preference list as determined by the War Industries Board.

The remarkable improvement in the operation of the railroads under Director-General McAdoo was also a factor in the improvement in the coal situation, the importance of which cannot be overemphasized. On the New England roads, as well as upon the coal-carrying roads, this improvement was steadily experienced. At practically all times after April 1, 1918, the beginning of the new coal year, the New England railroads, in spite of carrying an unprecedented volume of freight, would have been able to carry more coal if it had been possible for the coal to have been furnished by the Fuel Administration. The constantly recurring embargoes of the previous year became entirely a thing of the past.

The Railroad Administration also greatly helped the coal movement to New England by the effective remedying of the obstacles to prompt loading at the great railroad piers at Hampton Roads and at Baltimore, and also by the efficiency with which these piers were kept fed with coal. This work was under the direction of Mr. Carl R. Gray, director of the Division of Operation, and his assistants, Mr. W. C. Tyler and Mr. Frank C. Wright, and was handled with unceasing energy and great skill.

The conservation work conducted by the New England Fuel Administration was of great value, and deserves special mention. A State-wide propaganda was conducted by means of the daily press, correspondence, speakers and display posters, urging the necessity of saving coal as a war measure.

Many practical methods of securing economy in the use of coal were put into effect; for example, elevator service in office buildings and stores was curtailed; unnecessary lighting was stopped in hotels, stores and public buildings; and street lighting was reduced to the absolute minimum required for public safety.

Under the leadership at first of Mr. A. S. Cobb, and subsequently of Dr. Ira N. Hollis, president of the Worcester Polytechnic Institute, a thoroughgoing movement for conservation in steam plants was pushed throughout the State. The manufacturers and other owners of steam plants were most cordial in their co-operation. Factory fuel committees were appointed in practically every plant in the State, and a thorough personal examination, both of the production and the use of the power after it was produced, was made by a board of excellent engineers, selected by an advisory committee, and among whom the State was districted. It is well within bounds to say that, under the able and experienced leadership of the Conservation Department, the State of Massachusetts effected a saving of well over a million tons of coal which otherwise would have been wasted.

### **The Anthracite Shortage**

Up to this point the account of the fuel situation in New England has been mainly concerned with soft coal, which in volume of consumption is by far the more important, there being almost three times as much soft coal burned in New England as there is anthracite. The story of the anthracite situation in New England during the war is in the main similar to that of bituminous coal.

Although by means of the solid train movement the New England Coal Committee had succeeded, in the summer and fall of 1917, in bringing into New England many thousands of tons of anthracite which otherwise would never have been received, the total shipments were inadequate. The severe winter, which made necessary a large increase in con-



sumption, also completely suspended for days at a time the movement of coal, both by rail and water, and brought about a most dangerous condition in many New England cities and towns. Most fortunately the local fuel committees, which had been organized in every city and town, were on hand to step into the breach. They took complete charge of the available supplies of anthracite in their respective localities, and serious suffering was everywhere averted.

In Boston, for example, on several occasions during the winter there was in the yards of the retail dealers not more than two days' normal supply of anthracite and bituminous coal combined. Early in January it became necessary to introduce a ticket system, and at one time there were 30,000 families with tickets which entitled them to obtain from a station 100 pounds of coal every other day. Eighteen delivery stations were established, covering all sections of the city. These stations were not only more convenient for the public, but also relieved the congestion at the retail dealers' wharves and yards. It was a daily experience to see long lines of men, women and children, people in limousines and boys with sleds, each consumer waiting to receive a 100-pound bag of coal. In several communities the domestic situation was only relieved by the shipment of cars of emergency bituminous coal consigned to the chairmen of the local fuel committees, to be distributed under their orders.

Lack of space forbids details of the conditions in other places. It is sufficient to say that many other towns and cities were also put on what was virtually a ration basis by their local fuel committees, consumers being limited to a bag of 25 or 100 pounds. It was only the courage, judgment, and unwearied diligence of the local fuel committees in Lynn, Medford, Lowell, Lawrence, Fall River, New Bedford and numerous other Massachusetts towns and cities which, without loss of life or even substantial suffering, brought their communities through the two months of zero weather which characterized the New England winter of 1917-18.



After the crux of the winter was over the New England Fuel Administration began to make plans for the coming year. A statement of the anthracite receipts during the previous three years was obtained from the local chairmen in every city and town. On the basis of this information, and taking into allowance the changes in population, as there had been large increases in several localities on account of great additions to shipbuilding or munition plants, the anthracite requirements of the entire State were determined.

The necessities of Massachusetts and the other New England States, if the people were to have enough anthracite coal to be kept from suffering in the coming winter, meant a very substantial increase in shipments of anthracite to this section as compared with the preceding two years. All reserves were gone. Never had the dealers' yards and the household bins been swept so bare. New England began the new coal year with practically no anthracite either in the homes or in the dealers' yards. New England plainly needed much larger shipments of domestic anthracite. But how was she to get it?

Mining conditions at the hard and soft coal mines on April 1, 1918, were very dissimilar. Although the number of soft coal miners had been somewhat depleted, it was believed by all that the better operating conditions on the railroads, which, indeed, were already beginning to be felt, would bring the cars back oftener to the soft coal mines and keep them more nearly in continuous operation. It was also known that the zone system would give relief to the Pennsylvania and West Virginia soft coal fields by causing the Middle Western States to work their home mines continuously during the summer. This would offset drawing a heavy tonnage from the more eastern mines, which must supply all the requirements of the army and the navy, as well as the abnormal demands of the Atlantic Coast States for intensive day and night production of munitions.

At the anthracite mines there was no such slack to be taken up. Located in eastern Pennsylvania as they are,

their employees were being constantly attracted into the steel plants, the shipbuilding yards, and the great near-by munition factories. They had lost relatively more men than the soft coal mines, and there was no promise that improved railway operation could be relied upon to increase their output for the coming year. The railroads serving the hard coal district of eastern Pennsylvania had been exceptionally strong in car equipment, and were also favored by the fact that they could pull a large proportion of their tonnage to destination without going through the worst congested spots on the railway map. They likewise seemed to have been operated better than several of the most important soft coal carriers. At any rate, the car supply at the hard coal mines had proved to be sufficient to keep them in continuous operation throughout the previous coal year.

The shortage at the soft coal mines had been due to insufficient cars, and on April 1, 1918, it was clear enough that this could probably be improved so as to increase the output 10 or 12 per cent. The shortage at the hard coal mines had not been of cars but of labor, and it was clear enough, on April 1, that the mines had fewer miners and less mine labor than on April 1 of the preceding year, and that if the war continued they would be obliged to go through the present coal year still shorter of help than during the preceding year.

There was no place for the New England householder to get more coal this year unless it was taken away from some other householder elsewhere, who wanted it, was anxious to get it, to pay for it and burn it, just as he had done during the preceding year. If New England said the householder further west could give up his hard coal and burn soft, the reply, when the matter was discussed at Washington and Philadelphia, was that the householder in the Atlantic States could burn the soft coal just as well as the hard. The merits of the case were close, but the Federal Fuel Administration finally decided to give a larger tonnage of domestic anthracite to the Eastern Atlantic States, includ-

ing Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York and the New England States. A little of this coal was picked up in warmer southern States, where obviously a few days of cool weather in winter do not give the kind of coal to be burned marked importance to the consumer. Some of the coal was taken from the far western States where the haul is really rather fantastic, and certainly could not be justified during war times. The balance of the domestic anthracite was taken from the near western States which had good grades of soft coal near at hand. This represented a clear economy of transportation and labor, so far as the supply for the householders of these western States was concerned; and it also represented an economy of transportation and labor at the eastern end, because the hard coal region lies well to the east of the soft coal fields, and is almost at the door of the householder in New York, New Jersey, Delaware and Pennsylvania, and represents the minimum amount of labor and transportation necessary to get any kind of coal to the New England States.

It was finally decided that the allotment of domestic sizes of anthracite for New England in 1918 would be 11,570,720 tons, as compared with a delivery in the normal coal year ending April 1, 1917, of 9,893,384 tons; and of this amount Massachusetts had allotted for the year 6,371,680 tons, as compared with receipts two years ago of 5,631,352 tons.

This schedule of increase gave New England 1,677,336 net tons more than in the normal coal year of 1916-17, and Massachusetts had her quota increased 740,328 tons over the receipts of that year.

The next task was to allot equitably between the different cities and towns in the State the 6,371,680 tons of domestic anthracite destined for Massachusetts. It was obvious that the increase of tonnage could not be distributed evenly all over the State. War conditions had brought about many changes which were daily being accentuated. In one city an industrial plant employing before the war less than 300

employees had expanded to over 12,000, and this was not an isolated case. The building up of the Fore River Ship Building plant, and the construction of the wholly new great Victory Destroyer plant at Squantum, had caused great changes in the distribution of population, which were typical of changes which had taken place on a smaller scale in other sections of the State. It was also true that the freezing of the Delaware River and the Staten Island Creek, from which came practically the entire anthracite supply of the seaboard cities, like Fall River, New Bedford, Boston, Lynn and other places on or near the coast, had made the shortage of the preceding winter at these places more acute than at interior all-rail points.

The local allotment figures were accepted by the Anthracite Committee, which undertook on behalf of the Federal Fuel Administrator to see that coal moved from the mines according to the allotment. But difficulties apparently beyond the control of the Anthracite Committee caused many inequalities and consequent shortage in receipts, up to the 1st of October, in a large number of cities and towns.

The New England Fuel Administration kept constant watch of the shortage, and consequently brought it to the attention of the Anthracite Committee and asked for relief. In many cases the Anthracite Committee was able to expedite shipments and provide the needed relief, but it was found early in the autumn that there were many cases of persistent shortage, which, for some reason, the Anthracite Committee did not seem able to cure. For this reason, on September 28 an order was obtained from the National Fuel Administration directing the Anthracite Committee at Philadelphia to begin shipping 50 cars per day of anthracite of domestic sizes, consigned and billed to the New England Fuel Administrator, to be used to care for emergency cases. All the local fuel chairmen were asked to advise of any dealer whose customers were in distress because he was out of coal. In November the distribution seemed to be still very irregular, and the National Fuel Administration gave a second order



raising the daily consignment to the New England Fuel Administration to 100 cars per day,—50 cars for Massachusetts, and 50 cars for the other New England States. Shipments of this emergency anthracite were continued until about February 1, 1919. Total orders for more than 4,000 cars were filled.

It should be noted that the government never took the same control of the anthracite distribution as it did of bituminous. The supply of bituminous coal was made absolutely liquid. The Fuel Administration had its own representatives at the mines, who took control of the coal and gave shipping instructions when it left the scales, and upon its arrival in any State the State Fuel Administrators had clear and definite authority to divert the coal if in their opinion it was necessary. As the anthracite situation was handled by the Anthracite Committee, composed of anthracite operators, the tendency was to follow the lines of normal trade channels, and the government had no representatives at the mines and did not have the same effective control of distribution; nor were the State Fuel Administrators encouraged to make diversions within their States.

In accordance with the order of the National Fuel Administration, the distribution of anthracite coal to household consumers was very strictly regulated throughout the Commonwealth. In order to obtain delivery of hard coal from any retail dealer it was first necessary for the householder to fill out a blank giving information as to the size of his house, the kind of heating plant, the number of rooms, amount of coal burned the preceding winter, and the amount required the present year. On orders for six tons or less it was permissible for the entire order to be filled by the dealer, but on all orders of over six tons only two-thirds of the order could be delivered until such time as two-thirds had been delivered on all orders in the community, and until the local fuel administration had granted permission for the final third to be delivered. As a matter of fact, coal came into many communities so slowly during the summer



months that the maximum delivery to any one consumer was in many places limited to a single load.

In addition, local fuel committees went over all the applications for coal in each locality, and in all cases which seemed excessive they suspended delivery on the order until an investigation had been made. In many cases the result of the investigation was to materially reduce the amount of the order.

Strong measures were also taken to conserve a supply of domestic sizes of anthracite for household heating, and the use of anthracite for the heating of factories, office buildings, stores, hotels, greenhouses and garages was forbidden. In many cases the use of soft coal by apartment houses was made compulsory.

The careful regulation of distribution, the conservation for domestic use, the care taken to distribute the supply coming into the State in accordance with the actual necessities of the different communities, the supply of emergency coal, the mild weather which reduced the consumption and at the same time prevented any serious interruption to transportation facilities, and the slight increase in the production of the anthracite mines, all contributed by the 1st of February to remove all danger of an anthracite shortage, and therefore the Fuel Administration at that time suspended all its regulatory measures, as they were no longer necessary.

It should perhaps be mentioned, in bringing to a close this account of the activities of the New England Fuel Administration, that the work was conducted without expense to the State of Massachusetts, except for the payment of \$2,844.29 on account of preliminary expenses incurred in the early stages of the New England Coal Committee. The subsequent expenses of the New England Fuel Administration were paid by the Federal government, each New England State contributing to maintain the central office at the State House out of its allotment from Washington. The total amount paid by the Federal government for the

expense of the Fuel Administration in Massachusetts during the eighteen months of its existence was \$134,693.98.

The expenses incurred in connection with the purchase and distribution of emergency coal were paid by means of a small commission added to the price of the coal to the consumer.

The administration of the finances of the Fuel Administration was handled with notable fidelity and efficiency by Mr. Edmund W. Longley, treasurer of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety.

The organization and personnel of the New England Fuel Administration will be found in the Appendix, page 587.

## PART VII

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### TREASURER'S REPORT

The task of the treasurer of the Committee on Public Safety was very exacting, and demanded peculiarly sound judgment with untiring patience. Yet notwithstanding the complex interests with which he had to deal, and the strict economy he insisted upon in every expenditure, Mr. Longley at all times retained both the good will and highest regard of his associates and the public.

Mr. Longley's letter to the contributors to the special fund for contingent expenses, together with his account as treasurer of the Committee, follows:—

BOSTON, MASS., June 25, 1919.

*To Each Contributor to a Fund "for the Contingent Expenses of the Executive Committee" of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety.*

The Treasurer of the Committee takes pleasure in sending you herewith a check for 32 per cent of the amount of your generous contribution, made in the spring of 1917 to the General Fund of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety.

The check represents your proportion of the fund remaining unexpended and unappropriated after winding up the affairs of the Committee and paying or providing for all expenses.

This General Fund amounted to \$101,022.85, and was given by 639 patriotic citizens. While the amount has been sufficient, it has been none too large.

By means of this fund the Committee has been able to make emergency payments promptly, and to advance wages each week to employees of the Committee and to those of the Federal Food and Fuel Administrations.

Reimbursement has been received from the Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for money advanced employees of the Committee and for other emergency payments, and Federal employees, upon receiving their pay from Washington, have returned their advances to this Committee. The fund has been a revolving fund, and has been used more than four times over.

Pay from Washington for Federal employees was necessarily slow under the government system of paying, and at times many weeks elapsed before Federal employees received their pay from the government. At

about the time of the signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918, so much of the fund had been advanced that the Treasurer believed it would be necessary to secure more money.

However, with the signing of the armistice, activities of the Committee were immediately lessened and soon ceased, and it was unnecessary to borrow or ask for further funds.

The fund has enabled the Committee to act freely, according to its best judgment, which would not have been always possible if it had been wholly dependent upon State or Federal appropriations.

Sixty-eight per cent of the fund has been expended for enterprises in connection with war work that in the judgment of the Committee were important, but of such nature that the costs might be more properly paid from private subscriptions than from State money.

The officers of the Committee have managed the fund with constant care. No member of the Executive Committee or general officer has drawn a salary, and none has received pay for personal expenses for as much as the cost of a luncheon or a cigar. Further than this, these gentlemen and ladies have spent their own money freely to relieve suffering and meet emergencies which in their opinions should not be paid out of a public fund.

Financial statements are herewith appended showing receipts and expenditures by the Committee in connection with this General Fund.

There are also given three other statements showing payments from funds other than this General Fund, raised for special enterprises, namely:—

Statement showing receipts and expenditures in connection with funds collected for the purpose of placing high school boys on farms in 1917.

Statement showing receipts and expenditures in connection with funds collected for the purpose of equipping and despatching over 350 men, 120 horses and 10 portable sawmill units from New England to Old England June 15, 1917.

Statement showing receipts and expenditures in connection with funds collected for the purpose of increasing the use of milk.

In addition to these statements of funds raised by private subscriptions, a statement is attached showing expenditures that have been made by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts upon recommendation of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety. These expenditures by the Commonwealth have all been made by the State Treasurer, no cash of the State having been requested or placed at the disposal of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, except in the way of reimbursement for pay-roll and emergency payments which it had advanced out of its General Fund.

Respectfully yours,

EDMUND W. LONGLEY,

*Treasurer, Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety.*





DISBURSEMENTS.

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Feb. 18, 1917, to June 18, 1919	Expenditures made from General Funds of Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety (see statement of expenditures in detail on pages 515, 516), . . .	63,858 18
June 21, 1919	Balance due on advance of \$100 made Aug. 23, 1918, to cover the purchase of seed rye, . . . . .	61 43
June 21, 1919	Cash returned to contrib- utors, being 32 per cent of amounts contributed as shown by statement on page 509, namely, . . . \$101,022 85 and 32 per cent of con- tribution received Sept. 20, 1918, . . . . . 50 00	
June 21, 1919	32 per cent of . . . \$101,072 85 Cash on hand retained: — A. To cover balance of appropriation made Apr. 4, 1919, to meet the cost of issuing a general report of the history and affairs of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, . . . . . B. To cover cost of printing financial statement and any claims against the Committee that may be presented, . . .	32,343 31           5,562 20  490 07
		\$519,159 99

Correct.

E. W. LONGLEY,  
*Treasurer.*

Boston, Mass., June 21, 1919.

STATEMENT OF SUMS COLLECTED AND DELIVERED TO THE STATE TREASURER BY THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMITTEE  
ON PUBLIC SAFETY, REPRESENTING THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Date.	NAME.	Nature of Collection.	Amount.	Sent State Treasurer.
Sept. 20, 1917	Jas. Shapiro & Son,	Sale of waste paper,	\$3 12	Sept. 20, 1917
Sept. 20, 1917	H. Kraft,	Discount on bills for uniforms,	16 21	Sept. 20, 1917
Sept. 8, 1917	Harding Uniform and Regalia Company,	Refund on express charges,	48 77	Sept. 24, 1917
Sept. 22, 1917	Jas. Shapiro & Son,	Sale of waste paper,	3 78	Sept. 25, 1917
Sept. 24, 1917	Harding Uniform and Regalia Company,	Refund of freight on uniforms and equipment,	165 28	Sept. 26, 1917
Feb. 15, 1918	Western Union Telegraph Company,	Refund,	1 28	Feb. 15, 1918
Apr. 27, 1918	W. Riebb,	Refund of bills paid twice,	321 59	Apr. 27, 1918
June 28, 1918	Bethlehem Ship Building Company,	Sale of buildings at Squantum erected by the Commonwealth to aid in training aviators,	20,000 00	July 3, 1918
July 6, 1918	F. J. Nevins Company, Inc.,	Sale of second-hand Ford car,	70 00	July 24, 1918
June 12, 1918	John A. DeVito Company,	Sale of waste paper,	4 78	Aug. 12, 1918
Sept. 26, 1918	Standard Oil Company of New York,	Refund of duplicate payment,	75	Sept. 26, 1918
Jan. 23, 1919	Andrew, Dutton Company,	Credit on goods returned,	479 75	Jan. 23, 1919
Dec. 6, 1918	Keystone Coin Controlling Lock Company,	Collections at Convenience Station at Ayer,	13 26	Jan. 23, 1919
Jan. 27, 1919	Conant & Co.,	Refund of duplicate payment,	3 75	Jan. 28, 1919
Dec. 3, 1918	Sparrow, Chisholm Company,	Credit for goods returned,	469 91	Jan. 28, 1919
Dec. 8, 1918	United States Sugar Equalization Board,	Return of cash advanced to employees of the United States Sugar Equalization Board,	3,241 59	Feb. 19, 1919
Feb. 11, 1919	Morrie T. Barker,	Return of cash advanced in anticipation of payment by the Federal government,	202 53	Mar. 4, 1919
Jan. 28, 1919	Alfred W. Otis,	Return of cash advanced in anticipation of payment by the Federal government,	340 50	Mar. 4, 1919
Mar. 26, 1919	New England Telegraph & Telephone Company,	Refund on bills,	23 56	Apr. 8, 1919
Apr. 22, 1919	E. F. Hodgson Company,	Refund for two gates not furnished,	8 00	Apr. 30, 1919

June 15, 1917	American Express Company, . . . . .	Reimbursement for loss of package, . . . . .	5 61	June 14, 1919
Apr. 4, 1918	John D. Willard, . . . . .	For sale of 400 Food Bulletins, . . . . .	1 20	June 14, 1919
Apr. 4, 1918	Jeremiah Smith, . . . . .	Personal telegram sent Oct. 8 to New York, . . . . .	54	June 14, 1919
Apr. 4, 1918	F. H. McCarthy, . . . . .	For difference between expenses collected from the Federal government on the <i>per item</i> basis and amounts paid by the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, . . . . .	5 84	June 14, 1919
June 18, 1918	Keystone Coin Controlling Lock Company, . . . . .	Cash collections in connection with Convenience Station at Ayer, . . . . .	2 70	June 14, 1919
July 2, 1918	Daniel A. MacKay, . . . . .	Sale of junk at Ayer, . . . . .	94	June 14, 1919
May 24, 1918	Warner & Childs Company, . . . . .	Repayment of personal telegrams, . . . . .	2 45	June 14, 1919
June 22, 1918	Jacob G. Green, Attorney, . . . . .	For transportation expenses of Maxwell Green at Camp Crane, who was recalled, . . . . .	5 00	June 14, 1919
July 6, 1918	Keystone Coin Controlling Lock Company, . . . . .	Cash collections in connection with Convenience Station at Ayer, . . . . .	5 12	June 14, 1919
Aug. 6, 1918	Keystone Coin Controlling Lock Company, . . . . .	Cash collections in connection with Convenience Station at Ayer, . . . . .	6 66	June 14, 1919
Aug. 7, 1918	Executive Manager, . . . . .	Personal expense in connection with voucher No. 2446 (\$5.88), . . . . .	1 00	June 14, 1919
Sept. 9, 1918	Keystone Coin Controlling Lock Company, . . . . .	Cash collections in connection with Convenience Station at Ayer, . . . . .	9 34	June 14, 1919
Oct. 8, 1918	Keystone Coin Controlling Lock Company, . . . . .	Cash collections in connection with Convenience Station at Ayer, . . . . .	13 04	June 14, 1919
-	- - -	Two miscellaneous pay-roll and voucher items, . . . . .	52	June 14, 1919
			\$25,478 37	

STATEMENT OF COLLECTIONS FROM NEW ENGLAND COMMONWEALTHS  
TO MEET PROPORTIONATE PARTS OF COST OF THE NEW ENGLAND  
FUEL COMMITTEE PAID BY THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS  
PRIOR TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A FEDERAL FUEL ADMINISTRATOR  
FOR NEW ENGLAND ON OCTOBER 3, 1917.

Date of Collection.	COMMONWEALTH.	Amount collected.	Date sent to State Treasurer.
Mar. 9, 1918	New Hampshire, . . . . .	\$354 09	May 3, 1918
Apr. 4, 1918	Rhode Island, . . . . .	381 32	May 3, 1918
Mar. 23, 1918	Vermont, . . . . .	550 00	Nov. 18, 1918
Aug. 12, 1918	Connecticut, . . . . .	926 07	Nov. 18, 1918
May 29, 1919	Maine, . . . . .	653 70	June 3, 1919
	Total, . . . . .	\$2,865 18	

NOTE. — The remainder of this cost, namely, \$2,844.29, was borne by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

STATEMENT OF COLLECTIONS FROM MUNICIPALITIES FOR SUPPLIES FURNISHED DURING EPIDEMIC OF SPANISH INFLUENZA.

Date of Collection.	CITY OR TOWN.	Amount collected.	Date sent to State Treasurer.
Nov. 13, 1918	Arlington, . . . . .	\$132 51	Jan. 8, 1919
Nov. 13, 1918	Bridgewater, . . . . .	349 59	Jan. 8, 1919
Dec. 5, 1918	Newton (American Red Cross), . . . . .	30 00	Jan. 8, 1919
Nov. 11, 1918	Nantucket, . . . . .	222 30	Jan. 8, 1919
Dec. 20, 1918	Plymouth, . . . . .	128 40	Jan. 8, 1919
Dec. 17, 1918	Salem, . . . . .	139 98	Jan. 8, 1919
Dec. 12, 1918	Somerville, . . . . .	287 00	Jan. 8, 1919
Nov. 29, 1918	Tyngsborough, . . . . .	40	Jan. 8, 1919
Dec. 6, 1918	Dedham, . . . . .	20 00	Jan. 15, 1919
Dec. 31, 1918	Whitman, . . . . .	87 85	Jan. 15, 1919
Dec. 31, 1918	Lawrence, . . . . .	3,419 04	Jan. 15, 1919
Jan. 16, 1919	Fall River, . . . . .	1,297 72	Jan. 23, 1919
Jan. 28, 1919	Brockton, . . . . .	435 25	Jan. 28, 1919
Feb. 19, 1919	Taunton, . . . . .	3,167 48	Feb. 19, 1919
Mar. 15, 1919	Lowell, . . . . .	1,581 02	Mar. 25, 1919
Feb. 20, 1919	Amesbury, . . . . .	1,503 10	Mar. 25, 1919
Mar. 10, 1919	Cambridge, . . . . .	467 03	Mar. 25, 1919
Apr. 4, 1919	Mansfield, . . . . .	3 60	Apr. 11, 1919
	Total, . . . . .	\$13,272 27	

NOTE. — Nine municipalities to whom bills for supplies amounting to \$9,891.04 have been sent have not made remittances.



**EXPENDITURES MADE FROM GENERAL FUND OF THE MASSACHUSETTS  
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY FEBRUARY 18, 1917, TO JUNE 18, 1919.**

Account Number.		Total Payments.	Cash collected.	Net Payments from General Fund.
B-20	Contributions to cost of fitting out New England Sawmill Units for England, . . . . .	\$12,017 47	—	\$12,017 47
B-20	Cost of printing report, . . . . .	273 25	—	273 25
B-46	Massachusetts Auxiliary Committee of the Department of Justice, . . . . .	10,330 98	\$330 98	10,000 00
B-48	Volunteer Radio School at Mechanics Building, . . . . .	1,056 31	15 00	1,041 31
B-52	Patriotic food meeting at Boston Opera House, . . . . .	1,104 32	—	1,104 32
B-54	Intelligence Bureau, Massachusetts Department of Justice, Adjutant-General, . . . . .	16,553 89	115 80	16,438 09
B-55	Worcester recruiting campaign, . . . . .	222 77	227 00	4 23 <sup>1</sup>
B-56	Miscellaneous expenses, . . . . .	4,208 11	43 44	4,164 67
B-57	Part pay of special officer at Ayer in service of Committee on Prevention of Social Evils Surrounding Military Camps, . . . . .	969 00	—	969 00
B-58	Personal telegram, . . . . .	6 65	6 65	—
B-62	Expenses of Speakers' Bureau, . . . . .	30 11	26 25	3 86
B-63 and B-64	Miscellaneous expenses of the Federal Milk Commission not collectible through Washington, . . . . .	273 06	150 00	123 06
B-65	Advertising — food leaflet to be sent with business mail, . . . . .	350 00	350 00	—
B-66	Food advertising paid by private subscriptions, . . . . .	175 00	175 00	—
B-74	Sick pay of employees during the influenza epidemic, . . . . .	1,278 44	—	1,278 44
B-77	Cost in excess of appropriation of portable house at Ayer, . . . . .	167 79	—	167 79
B-78	Portion of expenses of community service on Boston Common, . . . . .	1,520 98	—	1,520 98
B-79	Clerks, final pay, . . . . .	368 00	—	368 00
B-80	Contribution to the Bureau for Returning Soldiers, Sailors and Marines for payroll purposes, . . . . .	4,999 29	—	4,999 29
B-81	Publication of report of the activities of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, . . . . .	937 74	—	937 74
B-82	Expenses of the Committee on War Efficiency for distribution of labor, . . . . .	4,452 25	—	4,452 25
B-83	Expenses of the Committee on War Resources, . . . . .	771 48	—	771 48
B-84	Printing and mailing final financial reports, . . . . .	79 61	—	79 61
B-85	Certificates for members and employees of Public Safety, Food and Fuel Committees, . . . . .	1,740 41	—	1,740 41

<sup>1</sup> Credit.

# EXPENDITURES MADE FROM GENERAL FUND — *Concluded.*

Account Number.		Total Payments.	Cash collected.	Net Payments from General Fund.
B-86	Consulting architect, Harold F. Kellogg, .	\$168 47	—	\$168 47
B-87	Pay of stenographer and clerk engaged in winding up affairs of Committee, .	475 00	—	475 00
B-88	Bill for board and food, at the Hoosic- Whisick Club, for nurses during in- fluenza epidemic, . . . .	64 85	—	64 85
B-90	Food and sugar pay-roll not collectible from Washington, . . . .	703 07	—	703 07
	Total expenditures from General Fund,	\$65,298 30	\$1,440 12	\$63,858 18

# CASH STATEMENT — HIGH SCHOOL BOYS FOR FARM SERVICE FUND, 1917.

RECEIPTS.		DISBURSEMENTS.	
1917	1917		
<i>North Falmouth Camp.</i>		<i>North Falmouth Camp.</i>	
May 20 Contribution, . . . . .	\$500 00	Returned contribution, . . . . .	\$2,500 00
June 13 Contribution, . . . . .	2,000 00	Equipment and expense, . . . . .	2,545 74
June 25 Contribution, . . . . .	2,500 00		
Oct. 13 Sundry, . . . . .	49 32		
Dec. 29 Sundry, . . . . .	1 25		
<i>Bolton Camp.</i>		<i>Bolton Camp.</i>	
June 6 Contribution, . . . . .	250 00	Equipment and expense, . . . . .	265 76
Sept. 26 Contribution, . . . . .	20 00		
<i>Lenox and Stockbridge Camps.</i>		<i>Lenox and Stockbridge Camps.</i>	
May 25 Contribution, . . . . .	2,500 00	Transferred to Topsfield and Ipswich Camp Fund, . . . . .	204 28
		Transferred to Charlestown, N. H., Camp Fund, . . . . .	275 00
		Equipment and expense, . . . . .	1,517 28
<i>Amount carried forward, . . . . .</i>		<i>Amount carried forward, . . . . .</i>	
	\$7,820 57		\$7,308 06

CASH STATEMENT—HIGH SCHOOL BOYS FOR FARM SERVICE FUND, 1917—*Concluded.*

RECEIPTS.		DISBURSEMENTS.	
	<i>Amount brought forward,</i> . . . . .		<i>Amount brought forward,</i> . . . . .
<b>1917</b>	<i>Lincoln Camp.</i>	<b>1917</b>	<i>Lincoln Camp.</i>
June 13	Contribution, . . . . .	June 20	Equipment and expense, . . . . .
Dec. 31	Sundry, . . . . .		
	<i>Topsfield and Ipswich Camps.</i>		<i>Topsfield and Ipswich Camps.</i>
June 18	Contribution, . . . . .	June 6	Equipment and expense, . . . . .
Oct. 13	Contribution, . . . . .	to	
June 6	Transferred from Lenox and Stockbridge Camp Fund, . . . . .	Nov. 23	
	<i>Charlestown, N. H., Camp.</i>		<i>Charlestown, N. H., Camp.</i>
June 19	Contribution, . . . . .	June 15	Equipment and expense, . . . . .
June 25	Contribution, . . . . .		
June 23	Contribution, . . . . .	<b>1918</b>	
June 15	Transferred from Lenox and Stockbridge Camp Fund, . . . . .	Apr. 18	Balance transferred to funds of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety for school boy farm or other work, . . . . .
July to Dec.	Interest, bank deposits, . . . . .		
	\$7,820 57		\$7,308 06
	200 00		143 87
	19 84		
	500 00		829 28
	125 00		
	204 28		
	200 00		600 00
	25 00		
	100 00		
	275 00		
	21 48		559 66 1
	\$9,490 87		\$9,490 87

Correct.

E. W. LONGLEY,  
*Treasurer.*

<sup>1</sup> Only \$56.22 of the unexpended amount turned over to the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety was expended by that Committee. \$563.44 of the \$569.66 was returned on May 8, 1919, to the contributor to the Lenox and Stockbridge Camp Fund, that amount representing the unexpended balance from that fund.

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES IN CONNECTION WITH EQUIPPING AND DESPATCHING OVER 350 MEN, 120 HORSES AND 10 PORTABLE SAWMILLS FROM NEW ENGLAND TO OLD ENGLAND, JUNE 15, 1917.

RECEIPTS.		DISBURSEMENTS.	
Commonwealth of Connecticut,	\$12,000 00	Portable mills and equipment,	\$45,684 60
Commonwealth of Maine,	12,000 00	Horses and equipment,	43,494 74
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,	12,000 00	Logging camp equipment,	25,245 57
Commonwealth of New Hampshire,	12,000 00	Clothing, shoes, etc., for millmen and woodsmen,	6,768 68
Commonwealth of Rhode Island,	6,200 00	Packing and storage,	1,932 56
Commonwealth of Vermont,	12,000 00	Passport expense,	621 60
Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety (from its funds		Transportation,	1,732 00
raised by public subscriptions),	12,017 47	Express, freight and trucking,	2,011 38
Seventy-seven firms, corporations and individuals,	52,975 00	Miscellaneous,	3,715 84
Interest on bank deposit,	14 50		
	\$131,206 97		\$131,206 97



A copy of report of audit of accounts of H. G. Philbrook, treasurer, by A. R. Patterson, showing contributions and interest received, \$119,189.50, and disbursements, \$129,176.25, follows.

After the accounts were turned over to the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, that Committee contributed \$12,017.47 by taking up a note then due amounting to \$9,986.75, and paying bills presented later amounting to \$2,030.72, making the total receipts for the enterprise \$131,206.97. Disbursements of \$129,176.25 made by Mr. Philbrook and \$2,030.72 made by the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety make total expenditures of \$131,206.97, which equal the amount of total receipts. For details of expenditures see exhibits numbered from 2 to 10.

# MASSACHUSETTS COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY,

EDMUND W. LONGLEY,

*Treasurer.*

## REPORT OF AUDIT OF ACCOUNTS OF H. G. PHILBROOK.

STONE & WEBSTER, 147 MILK STREET,  
BOSTON, September 14, 1917.

E. W. LONGLEY, Esq., *Treasurer, Committee on Public Safety, State House,  
Boston, Mass.*

DEAR MR. LONGLEY:—Mr. Philbrook is arranging to forward to you by special messenger all of his records in connection with his services in the capacity of treasurer of the Committee on Mill Units for England.

From the accounting viewpoint, the principal records included in the schedule which will be presented to you are a combined cash book, journal and ledger, and a file of vouchers, the former including entries dating from June to September, 1917, and the latter being numbered from 1 to 173, inclusive.

In accordance with your request we have audited the cash book and the vouchers and have found them to be satisfactory. The information contained therein is summarized as follows:—

Contributions, . . . . .	\$119,175 00	
Interest on deposit, . . . . .	14 50	
	<hr/>	\$119,189 50
Demand note, June 11, 1917, . . . . .	\$25,000 00	
Less payments indorsed, . . . . .	15,013 25	
	<hr/>	9,986 75
		<hr/>
		\$129,176 25
Disbursements as per vouchers No. 1 to 173, . . . . .	129,176 25	
	<hr/>	
Balance, . . . . .		—

This combined cash book, together with the vouchers, constitutes a simple, clear and, considering the object, adequate record of Mr. Philbrook's transactions as treasurer for this committee.

We presume you will be concerned with the question of contributions yet to be received and possible unpaid bills. This is a subject upon which, we understand, Mr. Philbrook personally will write you. In this connection it would seem desirable to inform you that there will be no charge for our services in making this simple audit.

I shall take pleasure in referring your acknowledgment to this letter to Mr. Philbrook in order that he may be possessed of both your receipt for the records to be sent you and a copy of this letter representing the audit of his accounts.

Yours very truly,

A. R. PATTERSON.

# CASH STATEMENT — FUND FOR INCREASING THE USE OF MILK.

RECEIPTS.		DISBURSEMENTS.	
<b>1919</b>	<b>1918</b>		
May 13	June 12	The Stetson Press, . . . . .	\$3,562 50
to	June 15	Buck Printing Company, . . . . .	31 25
Sept. 28	June 25	Wright & Potter Printing Company, . . . . .	26 50
	June 25	Edith T. Swift, . . . . .	5 51
	June 25	P. F. O'Keefe Agency, . . . . .	1,089 90
	July 9	The Stetson Press, . . . . .	1,062 50
	Aug. 6	The Stetson Press, . . . . .	2,125 00
	Aug. 6	Liberty Milk Shop, . . . . .	5 27
	Aug. 15	P. F. O'Keefe Agency, . . . . .	1,883 20
	Aug. 27	Burnham & Gates, . . . . .	154 52
	Oct. 30	The Stetson Press, . . . . .	450 00
	Oct. 30	Buck Printing Company, . . . . .	26 00
	Oct. 30	P. F. O'Keefe Advertising Agency, . . . . .	1,043 00
	<b>1919</b>		
	Feb. 28	Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety Food Leaflets, . . . . .	140 00
	June 21	Cash on hand, . . . . .	373 52
			\$11,978 67

Correct.

E. W. LONGLEY,  
Treasurer.

REPORT OF EXPENDITURES RECOMMENDED BY THE MASSACHUSETTS  
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, AND MADE BY THE STATE  
TREASURER.

Funds were made available for such war and contingent expenses as the Governor and Executive Council might approve under the following legislative acts:—

Under chapter 202 of the Special Acts of 1917, approved March 19, 1917, the sum of \$1,000,000 was appropriated to be expended in defraying the military, naval and other expenses which the emergency arising out of existing conditions and the exigencies of possible war might render requisite and proper.

Under chapter 324 of the General Acts of 1917, approved May 25, 1917, the sum not exceeding \$1,000,000 was authorized to meet the expenses arising from any emergency during the recess of the General Court by reason of the exigencies of the existing state of war.

Under chapter 63 of the Special Acts of 1918, approved March 1, 1918, the sum not exceeding \$200,000 was authorized for the purpose of promoting and stimulating the production and conservation of food products and for like purposes growing out of the present war emergency.

Under chapter 139 of the Special Acts of 1918, approved April 24, 1918, the further sum of \$100,000 was appropriated for the purpose of promoting and stimulating the production and conservation of food production, etc.

Under chapter 278 of the General Acts of 1918, approved May 31, 1918, expenditures were authorized not exceeding \$1,000,000 to meet any emergency which might arise during the recess of the General Court by reason of the exigencies of the existing state of war.

The total expenditure made by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under these four war appropriations is reported by the Auditor of the Commonwealth to have been \$1,489,653.50.

Expenditures amounting to \$823,126.89, including the erection of a building wherein shipments could be mobilized in connection with the Food Conservation Plan, and preparing the road in front of the Boston Fish Pier Freight House, and for the cost of combating the influenza epidemic, and considerable expenditures in connection with equipping the State Guard, have been made by the State Treasurer on vouchers certified to by State departments other than the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety.

The statement which follows shows expenditures which have been made by the Commonwealth upon recommendation of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, on vouchers presented and certified to by that committee.

STATEMENT OF WAR EXPENSES INCURRED BY THE MASSACHUSETTS  
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, PAID BY THE COMMONWEALTH OF  
MASSACHUSETTS, FROM ORGANIZATION OF COMMITTEE ON FEBRUARY  
15, 1917, TO APRIL 15, 1919 (TWO YEARS AND TWO MONTHS).

Account and Appropriation Numbers.		Amounts appropriated by the Governor and Council.	Amounts expended.
A-1-A-2 A-7-A-16 A-17	Expenses of organizing and of conducting all affairs of the Committee not covered by the following special appropriations, including furniture, fittings and stationery, wages, printing, travel, etc., . . . . .	\$103,937 05	\$103,144 25
A-3	Construction and operation, Naval Training School at Squantum, . . . . .	45,000 00	32,998 24 <sup>1</sup>
	<i>Military Expenditures.</i>		
A-13	Equipment for men of Base Hospital Unit No. 5,	5,000 00	5,000 00
A-21	Additional expense in connection with Base Hospital Unit No. 5, — finger-print outfits, medicine, knives, forks and plates for the 9th Regiment, . . . . .	1,086 49	1,086 49
A-9-5	Advertising in connection with recruiting, . . . . .	2,764 20	2,738 25
A-22	For recruiting men for National Guard, . . . . .	2,500 00	2,230 25
A-9-3	Buttons for recruits, . . . . .	750 00	750 00
A-9-1	Care of and supplies for militia in the field, . . . . .	1,452 06	1,438 02
A-14-A-24	Wooden floors for tents at Watertown Arsenal used by militia, . . . . .	1,149 49	1,149 49
A-38-B	Returning booths used for shelter by militia from Watertown Arsenal to Boston, . . . . .	125 00	125 00
A 4	Dental equipment, medicines, etc., in 1917, . . . . .	9,000 00	6,556 55
A-44-63	Dental supplies used for drafted men by Harvard and Tufts Dental Schools, 1918, and for supplies used on the teeth of drafted men and for necessary expenses of a clerk and records in connection with the same, . . . . .	1,940 00	1,185 31
A-72	For the purchase of 200 hats for the State Guard, replacing hats taken by men sent overseas, . . . . .	350 00	350 00
A-32	Rental of land opposite Commonwealth Armory used by the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry, . . . . .	67 60	67 50
A-19-A-38	Washington expenses of Assistant Executive Manager Donham, securing some \$700,000 worth of clothing and equipment for Massachusetts troops, . . . . .	1,063 75	1,063 75
A-5	Veterinarian supplies, . . . . .	309 45	227 00
A-23	Installing sanitary system at Framingham for State troops, . . . . .	19,750 00	16,933 23
A 25	Cost of military instructions for providing officers and non-commissioned officers of Massachusetts National Guard with military instructions prior to ordering into Federal service, . . . . .	2,430 61	2,430 61

<sup>1</sup> \$20,000 of this amount has been collected from the Bethlehem Steel Corporation for buildings erected, and paid to the Treasurer of the Commonwealth.



STATEMENT OF WAR EXPENSES, ETC. — *Continued.*

Account and Appropriation Numbers.		Amounts appropriated by the Governor and Council.	Amounts expended.
	<i>Military Expenditures — Con.</i>		
A-60	For putting aeroplane belonging to Commonwealth into commission in 1917, . . . . .	\$503 28	\$503 28
A-38-C	Expenses of instruction of medical officers, Coast Defense Course, Class 4, . . . . .	293 00	293 00
	<i>Food Production and Conservation.</i>		
A-6	Food Production and Conservation, General committee expenses, 1917, . . . . .	40,000 00	40,000 00
A-15	Fertilizer for Massachusetts Agricultural School, 1917, . . . . .	1,500 00	—
A-8	Additional help for county agricultural agent, 1917, . . . . .	35,000 00	24,494 51
A-39	Expenses of Department of Mobilization of Schoolboys for Farm Service to April 1, 1918, . . . . .	4,000 00	3,714 99
A-51	For promoting and stimulating the production of food products through establishing schoolboy camps since April 1, 1918, . . . . .	46,000 00	35,764 64
A-50-A	Expense of promoting and stimulating the production and conservation of food products, 1918, general office expenses, . . . . .	41,250 00	23,533 61
A-50-B	License department, . . . . .	15,360 00	3,245 96
A-50-C	Retail merchant representatives, . . . . .	2,788 00	1,299 88
A-50-D	Hotels and restaurants, . . . . .	4,000 00	1,168 02
A-50-E	Committee on Food Production, . . . . .	6,000 00	975 84
A-50-F	Boston produce market service, . . . . .	3,000 00	824 96
A-50-G	State-wide market service, . . . . .	5,800 00	7,386 47
A-50 H	County administrators, . . . . .	15,000 00	24,525 97
A-50-I	County farm bureau, . . . . .	30,000 00	27,479 85
A-50-J	College special service, . . . . .	24,700 00	16,730 11
A-70	Cost of Food Administration Building on Common, . . . . .	1,500 00	1,495 83
	<i>Hospital and Emergency Equipment and Other Costs.</i>		
A-43-B	Commonwealth Emergency Hospital, twenty Ford ambulances, . . . . .	14,000 00	13,385 62
A-43-C	Commonwealth Emergency Hospital, matron nurse, . . . . .	900 00	900 00
A-43-D	Commonwealth Emergency Hospital, assistant matron nurse, . . . . .	750 00	750 00
A-43-E	Commonwealth Emergency Hospital, heating, . . . . .	3,600 00	315 03
A-43-F	Commonwealth Emergency Hospital, fire protection, . . . . .	500 00	249 25
A-43-A	Commonwealth Emergency Hospital, two first-aid dressing stations, . . . . .	10,000 00	10,000 00

STATEMENT OF WAR EXPENSES, ETC. — *Continued.*

Account and Appropriation Numbers.		Amounts appropriated by the Governor and Council.	Amounts expended.
	<i>Hospital and Emergency Equipment and Other Costs — Con.</i>		
A-40-A	Emergency Hospital, Commonwealth Avenue, building, . . . . .	\$30,000 00	\$25,598 94
A-40-B	Emergency Hospital, Commonwealth Avenue, equipment, . . . . .	15,000 00	14,778 94
A-40-C	Emergency Hospital, Commonwealth Avenue, X-ray plant, . . . . .	2,000 00	978 44
A-40-D	Emergency Hospital, Commonwealth Avenue, fittings and extras, . . . . .	3,000 00	2,982 24
A-45	For purchase of four hospital units and for medical supplies, . . . . .	10,000 00	4,296 28
A-61	Commonwealth Emergency Hospital, maintenance, messing kitchen and ward equipment, . . . . .	14,000 00	7,706 80
	<i>Activities of Committee on Social Evils surrounding Military Camps.</i>		
A-31	For prevention of social evils surrounding military camps, . . . . .	15,000 00	10,464 53
A-33-A	Construction of a convenience station for men and women at Ayer, . . . . .	10,000 00	7,324 68
A-33-B	Convenience station for men and women at Ayer, maintenance and operation of same, . . . . .	2,000 00	791 00
A-50	To cover the cost of purchasing a portable house, and to cover expenses in connection therewith for the use of the special officer or officers of the Massachusetts District Police stationed in the town of Ayer, and for other use in connection with the work in combating social evils arising out of the establishing of a camp at Ayer, Mass., . . . . .	1,400 00	1,400 00
	<i>Miscellaneous.</i>		
A-6-15	Women's enrollment campaign, . . . . .	1,500 00	1,500 00
A-9-2	Cataloging physicians in Massachusetts, . . . . .	600 00	—
A-9-4	Industrial survey, . . . . .	560 91	560 91
A-9-6	Pennants for automobiles volunteered for service, . . . . .	65 00	65 00
A-20	Equipment of Sawmill Units, <sup>1</sup> . . . . .	12,000 00	12,000 00
A-26	For cost of securing adequate supply of coal for Massachusetts in connection with the work of the New England Coal Committee, <sup>2</sup> . . . . .	5,709 47	5,709 47

<sup>1</sup> The total cost of this enterprise was \$131,206.97, the remainder of the cost being met by contributions of other New England States and by private contributions.

<sup>2</sup> In connection with this work Maine paid \$653.70, Connecticut, \$926.07, New Hampshire, \$354.09, Rhode Island, \$381.32 and Vermont, \$550.

# STATEMENT OF WAR EXPENSES, ETC. — *Concluded.*

Account and Appropriation Numbers.		Amounts appropriated by the Governor and Council.	Amounts expended.
	<i>Miscellaneous — Con.</i>		
A-37	Clerical work, selective draft, office of Director of Statistics, Mr. Gettemy, . . . . .	\$626 94	\$626 94
A-41	Committee on War Labor Efficiency, . . . . .	5,824 84	5,824 84
A-68	10 typewriting machines, . . . . .	900 00	900 00
A-73	Work of Women's Division, Council of National Defense, . . . . .	2,000 00	1,168 24
A-74	Committee on Americanization, . . . . .	7,000 00	1,923 31
	<i>Influenza Epidemic.</i>		
A-71	Emergency Health Committee expenses (to date of this report), . . . . .	500,000 00	141,416 29 <sup>1</sup>
	Totals, . . . . .	\$1,144,307 14	\$666,527 61

Correct.

MASSACHUSETTS COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY,

E. W. LONGLEY,

*Treasurer.*

<sup>1</sup> Other expenditures, which make the total cost of combating the epidemic of Spanish influenza \$354,219.20, have been made by the State on vouchers approved by departments other than the Committee on Public Safety.

## Report of Public Auditor

BOSTON, MASS.. June 25, 1919.

We hereby certify that the books of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety show payments received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts aggregating \$234,704.88, which, according to the books of the Committee, represent reimbursements of cash paid for pay rolls and emergency payments which had been advanced out of the General Fund of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety.

We also certify that we have seen the pay rolls for sums advanced to Federal employees, amounting to \$142,747.44, on which cash amounting to \$140,524.04 has been credited, leaving a remainder of \$2,223.40, which mainly represents payments for overtime. The books of record show in account No. B-90 that \$703.07 of this amount has been paid out of the General Fund of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety. The remaining \$1,520.33 has been paid from another source.

We also certify that we have seen receipted vouchers for amounts reported as paid from the High School Boys Fund and the Milk Fund, and that the cash on hand in the Milk Fund has been verified.

We further certify that we have seen receipted vouchers for amounts paid out of the General Fund of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety amounting to \$63,858.88, and that the cash on hand appearing in the accompanying statement of the Treasurer in three items, namely, \$32,343.31, \$5,562.26 and \$490.07, a total of \$38,395.64, is represented by a deposit at the National Shawmut Bank in Boston, and we have verified the amount with that bank.

HARVEY S. CHASE & COMPANY.

## DISSOLUTION OF THE COMMITTEE

On November 20, 1918, nine days after the armistice was declared, a meeting of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety was called at the State House, and presided over by Governor McCall. His Excellency, after complimenting the Committee's work, said in part: —

The Commonwealth contributed her share to a fitting victory; the victory has been won, and, as this was essentially a war Committee, it has been suggested that the time has come for it to terminate its existence.

Alluding to the appointment at his initiative of Mr. Storrow as chairman of the Committee on Public Safety, he spoke of the latter's high capacity for organizing just such work as the Committee had to do, and his ability to establish it upon broad and patriotic lines, and said that the result obtained richly vindicated his selection. He also gave the greatest commendation to Mr. Endicott, speaking of his quick and unerring judgment, his prompt and just decisions which commanded the approbation of everybody, and, "because of the way in which he has performed his duty here, he rightly takes his place among the great patriots of Massachusetts."

Continuing, he said: —

I am not going to attempt to review the work of this Committee. I appointed it in order that it might be an arm of the Executive Department, and it has proven a mighty arm on which I could very confidently lean. It has helped to marshal the young men of the Commonwealth, operating, of course, with very many men outside, with the members of our different advisory boards and draft boards, who gave up their whole time; it has helped also to marshal the industries of the State. It has settled by the hundred industrial disputes between employers and employees, so that the wheels of our factories have been kept turning, and I think I can say without boasting that there has been no State that has made a nobler or a prompter response to the calls of the President of the United States than has the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. . . .



The history of the part that Massachusetts has played in the Great War would be imperfectly written if it did not have very much in it about the work of this Commonwealth, and therefore I thank you from the bottom of my heart, both on my own account and for all the citizens of the Commonwealth, for what you have done to help keep the Commonwealth, in time of national danger, abreast with its noblest traditions.

The Governor likewise suggested the advisability of selecting a few members of the Committee especially familiar with its activities to attend to its unfinished business and to wind up and liquidate its affairs, and for that purpose appointed the following to act as a Termination Committee:—

James J. Storrow, *Chairman.*

Charles F. Choate, Jr.  
B. Preston Clark.  
Henry B. Endicott.  
Edmund W. Longley.  
George H. Lyman.

W. Rodman Peabody.  
James J. Phelan.  
A. C. Ratshesky.  
John F. Stevens.  
Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer.

Remarks were also made by different members present, Mr. Endicott saying:—

You were the first Governor in the United States to appoint a Public Safety Committee, and it seems particularly fitting that Massachusetts should be the first State to take steps towards getting back to peace conditions. . . .

At this time, Your Excellency, I would like, if I may, to refer to the women of Massachusetts. From the very start they have been working shoulder to shoulder with us, and Massachusetts may well be proud and pleased with her women and with their leader, Mrs. Thayer.

Mr. Storrow, addressing the meeting, said in part:—

Once in a while somebody says he thinks we have borne something of a burden here, but I do not think any of us for one minute ever looked at it in that way. In this great war and great crisis, if the men who have been working here had not had a chance to do something for the public weal, we certainly would have been miserable. We have escaped that misery, I am thankful to say, and I feel, and I know that the rest of us feel, great gratitude that we have had the confidence of the Governor

and were selected by him. We are perfectly aware that the State has many other men who could have done just as well, and perhaps better, but the lightning happened to hit us, for which we are very, very grateful, and have been every day.

We are the Committee on Public Safety created by the Governor of this Commonwealth, but we ought not to adjourn without remembering that our work has only been made possible by the fact that in every town and city throughout the Commonwealth of Massachusetts there has also been a Committee on Public Safety, not directly appointed by the Governor, but generally through the Committee of One Hundred; there has been this organization of the State, which was the thought the Governor had in mind when the idea was first formulated. It has not made any difference what the problem was, what the task was, what kind of help we wanted, those committees have jumped to the front, given us a boost, worked with utmost patriotism and met every test.

When we first began, I think we all felt that our task was to organize not legal machinery but voluntary co-operation. That is what we stood for. The Governor and Legislature in their discretion gave us certain powers. Mr. Endicott as Food Administrator received certain Federal powers, and similar powers were given to me as Fuel Administrator. But our thought all the time was that our work would not amount to anything if it came to a question of compelling this man to do this, or that man to do that. That form of procedure has been entirely absent from our thought, and I think I may say with accuracy that practically no power of any sort or kind has ever been used or needed in dealing with the people of Massachusetts in this great emergency. We only had to ask this man, that man, or all the men and women in the State, for their help, and the response was always instantaneous.

Mrs. Thayer, when called upon, spoke as follows:—

Your Excellency, I feel that this is perhaps a rather unfair advantage to take of the weaker sex, because I had no idea that I was to have so honorable a part in these proceedings. But the only word I have to leave behind me is to thank you from my heart, because I think the women of Massachusetts, whom I had to represent as well as possible, have been given a very extraordinary chance and opportunity. That fact I discovered in Washington last spring, when it was reported that only two States in the Union had come forward and taken the women in on an equal footing with the men in their war work; those two States being South Carolina and Massachusetts. It gave the women an opportunity which, I saw after a few months, was so remarkable that our work would have amounted to but little without it. It was not only the present

backing, but it was the absolute day by day support, advice and help, and last, but not least, the financial backing. I think the work as it has gone on has proved, as we have stood up and fought this big fight, that the civilian army was worth while, and that it should be made up of men and women together.

But I have at this time simply the word of gratitude that the women were given the chance in Massachusetts, so that there was this splendid co-operation of our organizations and of the women individually. There was not one woman who did not want to fall into line, and there is not one in the State, I am sure, who does not appreciate the fact that her work has been made possible by the Committee on Public Safety here in the State House, with the splendid backing and help you have given from the very beginning.

His Excellency then declared the Massachusetts Public Safety Committee to be dissolved.

Thus, after twenty-one months and ten days of patriotic service, the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety ceased its activities as a unit of the great home army, which, gathered from every State of the Union, had been the backbone of our combat army, — a part fighting on foreign soil, a part straining at the leash and eager to cross the seas.

America entered the lists at a crucial time. She stayed to play the game, to do her duty, to do her utmost, to win. She poured out her wealth on the altar of her country's flag, mobilized her vast industries from sea to sea, and backed with all her latent strength the cause for which she fought. For us it was a people's war. It was the people's cry which finally forced the issue, — that people, American men and American women, whose teachings from infancy were founded on the right to "Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."

We can therefore look back to that far-off time when under the thirteen stars our sires won for us a glorious liberty, and say that it was only right to expect that Massachusetts should again rally foremost at the front when the cause of Freedom, of Humanity, of Civilization was at stake!





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## APPENDICES

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## APPENDICES

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### Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety

#### EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

James J. Storrow, <i>Chairman</i> .	Robert F. Herrick.
Charles F. Weed, <i>Vice-Chairman</i> .	Benjamin Joy.
Edmund W. Longley, <i>Treasurer</i> .	George H. Lyman.
Guy Murchie, <i>Secretary</i> .	J. Frank O'Hare.
Henry B. Endicott, <i>Executive Manager</i> .	W. Rodman Peabody.
E. Bowditch, Jr., <i>Assistant Secretary</i> .	Gen. Gardner W. Pearson ( <i>ex officio</i> ).
John B. Pierce, <i>Assistant Secretary</i> .	James J. Phelan.
Charles S. Baxter.	A. C. Ratshesky.
W. A. L. Bazeley.	Joseph B. Russell.
B. Preston Clark.	Col. Jesse F. Stevens ( <i>ex officio</i> ).
Walton A. Green.	John F. Stevens.
Levi H. Greenwood.	Gen. E. Leroy Sweetser ( <i>ex officio</i> ).
	Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer.

#### *Assistant Executive Managers*

W. A. L. Bazeley.	A. A. Kidder.
B. Preston Clark.	E. W. Longley.
Wallace B. Donham.	James J. Phelan.
Levi H. Greenwood.	A. C. Ratshesky.

#### COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

Col. William A. Gaston, <i>Chairman</i> .	Joseph H. O'Neil.
Junius Beebe.	Samuel D. Parker.
C. S. Bird, Jr.	J. M. Prendergast.
Spencer Borden, Jr.	Jos. B. Russell.
Charles L. Burrill.	A. Shuman.
W. Murray Crane.	Philip Stockton.
Francis H. Dewey.	E. V. R. Thayer.
Allan Forbes.	Geo. R. Wallace.
Thomas B. Gannett.	F. G. Webster.
W. G. Garritt.	John E. White.
W. E. Gilbert.	Daniel G. Wing.

## COMMITTEE ON CO-ORDINATION OF AID SOCIETIES

B. Preston Clark, <i>Chairman</i> .	John F. Moors.
Henry Abrahams.	John L. Saltonstall.
Henry V. Cunningham.	Alexander Whiteside.
Hon. Grafton D. Cushing.	Capt. Porter B. Chase, <i>Military</i>
David A. Ellis.	<i>Representative.</i>

## COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL SURVEY

Charles G. Bancroft, <i>Chairman</i> .	Walter C. Fish.
Howard L. Rogers, <i>Vice-Chairman</i> .	Edwin F. Gay.
Charles F. Gettemy, <i>Secretary</i> .	Edwin Farnham Greene.
Chas. L. Allen.	John S. Kent.
Edwin P. Brown.	Chas. T. Main.
Leonard B. Buchanan.	F. H. Payne.
Charles Chase.	Harry G. Stoddard.
Howard Coonley.	John F. Tobin.
H. C. Dodge.	F. E. Wing.
C. L. Edgar.	Capt. Robt. M. Magee, <i>Military</i>
Adolph Ehrlich.	<i>Representative.</i>

## COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION

James H. Hustis, <i>Chairman</i> .	E. J. Pearson.
H. M. Biscoe.	P. F. Sullivan.
Mat. C. Brush.	C. V. Wood.
C. D. Emmons.	C. Q. Richmond.
Chas. P. Hall.	Maj. Henry B. Knowles, <i>Military</i>
Walter L. McMenimen.	<i>Representative.</i>

## COMMITTEE ON HYGIENE, MEDICINE AND SANITATION

Dr. Richard P. Strong, <i>Chairman</i> .	Dr. Chas. E. Simpson, <i>Vice-Chairman</i> .
Dr. Allan J. McLaughlin, <i>Chairman</i> (later).	Dr. Howard A. Streeter, <i>Vice-Chairman</i> .
Dr. Arthur A. Brown, <i>Vice-Chairman</i> .	Dr. William W. Walcott, <i>Vice-Chairman</i> .
Dr. Merrill E. Champion, <i>Vice-Chairman</i> .	Dr. John Bapst Blake.
Dr. Francis A. Finnegan, <i>Vice-Chairman</i> .	Dr. John T. Bottomley.
Dr. John S. Hitchcock, <i>Vice-Chairman</i> .	Dr. Walter P. Bowers.
Dr. Adam S. MacKnight, <i>Vice-Chairman</i> .	Dr. Harvey Cushing.
	Dr. David L. Edsall.
	Dr. Henry Ehrlich.
	Dr. C. W. Elliott.

# COMMITTEE ON HYGIENE, ETC. — *Continued*

Dr. Homer Gage.	Prof. Wm. T. Sedgwick.
Dr. Reid Hunt.	Dr. Ralph Seelye.
Dr. George M. Klein.	Dr. Paul Thorndike.
Louis K. Liggett.	Prof. George C. Whipple.
Dr. Francis X. Mahoney.	Dr. Frank P. Williams.
Edwin Mulready.	Dr. Frank A. Woods.
Dr. Milton J. Rosenau.	Dr. Samuel B. Woodward.

## COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION

W. Rodman Peabody, <i>Chairman</i> .	Donald Gordon.
Edmund K. Arnold.	Prof. Arthur D. Hill.
Charles L. Barlow.	John G. Palfrey.
Malcolm Donald.	Robert L. Raymond.
J. Wells Farley.	James P. Richardson.

## COMMITTEE ON FOOD PRODUCTION AND CONSERVATION

K. L. Butterfield, <i>Chairman</i> .	M. Ernest Moore.
John D. Willard, <i>Secretary</i> .	Evan F. Richardson.
Austin D. Kilham, <i>Secretary</i> (later).	C. D. Richardson.
Philip Allen.	Henry Sterling.
H. F. Arnold.	Glenn C. Sevey.
Reginald W. Bird.	Leslie R. Smith.
Nathaniel I. Bowditch.	Payson Smith.
Joshua L. Brooks.	Marcus L. Urann.
Warren C. Jewett.	Wilfrid Wheeler.

## COMMITTEE ON PUBLICITY

Louis E. Kirstein, <i>Chairman</i> .	Maj. Harry G. Chase, <i>Military Representative</i> .
Louis A. Coolidge.	Chaplain Lyman Rollins, <i>Military Representative</i> .
Thomas J. Feeney.	
John F. O'Connell.	
William S. O'Connor.	

## COMMITTEE ON LAND FORCES

Gen. Charles H. Cole, <i>Chairman</i> .	Hon. W. Cameron Forbes.
J. Franklin McElwain, <i>Chairman</i> (later).	W. B. Donham.
Gen. Butler Ames.	J. Lovell Johnson.
	W. B. Stearns.



# COMMITTEE ON STATE PROTECTION

Edwin U. Curtis, *Chairman*.  
 Gen. Butler Ames.  
 Chas. W. Bosworth.  
 John S. Caldwell.  
 John W. Cummings.  
 A. B. Daniels.  
 H. I. Harriman.

James Logan.  
 Dana Malone.  
 Samuel D. Parker.  
 Maj. Holton B. Perkins, *Military Representative*.  
 Lieut. Edwin M. Brush, *Military Representative*.

# COMMITTEE ON NAVAL FORCES

Rob't W. Emmons, 2d, *Chairman*.  
 Brooks Frothingham, *Vice-Chairman*.  
 Ernest G. Adams.  
 N. F. Ayer.  
 John G. Crowley.  
 Charles K. Cummings.  
 Arthur B. Denny.  
 G. R. Fearing, Jr.

Robert F. Herrick.  
 Charles Hamilton Parker.  
 James Otis Porter.  
 John H. Proctor.  
 Richard S. Russell.  
 William H. Seabury.  
 Clifford L. Webster.  
 Com. James P. Parker, *Military Representative*.

# COMMITTEE ON MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

Elwyn G. Preston, *Chairman*.  
 Thomas P. Beal, Jr.  
 Jacob F. Brown.  
 John Calder.  
 Albert Greene Duncan.  
 Edward J. Frost.

Chas. H. Jones.  
 Louis K. Liggett.  
 Jesse P. Lyman.  
 Michael V. Martin.  
 John Moir.  
 James L. Richards.

# COMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY HELP AND EQUIPMENT

Charles R. Gow, *Chairman*.  
 Harold L. Bond.  
 E. J. Cross.  
 H. P. Cummings.  
 Geo. H. Dresser.  
 Chas. E. Godfrey.  
 Arthur M. Huddell.  
 Leo Ley.  
 Hugh Nawn.

Capt. M. D. Nickerson.  
 Michael S. O'Riorden.  
 John A. Peabody.  
 J. J. Prindeville.  
 James W. Rollins.  
 Jeremiah A. Sullivan.  
 Antonio G. Tomasello.  
 Morton G. Tuttle.  
 George H. Wrenn.

## COMMITTEE ON MOBILIZATION AND CONCENTRATION CAMPS

Gen. Wm. A. Pew, <i>Chairman</i> .	Dr. Allan J. McLaughlin.
Wm. A. L. Bazeley, <i>Acting Chairman</i> .	C. F. Gourley.
Dwight E. Brigham.	Col. Wm. B. Emery, <i>Military Representative</i> .
X. H. Goodenough.	Maj. Christopher Harrison, <i>Military Representative</i> .
Joseph R. Hebblewaite.	Maj. Henry B. Knowles, <i>Military Representative</i> .
E. E. Lockridge.	
L. deB. Lovett.	
Frank H. McCarthy.	

## COMMITTEE ON HORSES

T. G. Frothingham, <i>Chairman</i> .	Harry P. Nawn, Sr.
Arnold Lawson.	John T. Wheelwright.
Dr. Arthur W. May.	

## COMMITTEE ON TRUCKS AND MOTOR CARS

Chester I. Campbell, <i>Chairman</i> .	F. P. Daly.
Roy D. Jones, <i>Chairman</i> (later).	Allan Forbes.
Carl T. Keller, <i>Chairman</i> (later).	Arthur M. Huddell.
Francis Hurtubis, Jr., <i>Vice-Chairman</i> .	Capt. Josiah S. Hathaway.
William T. McCracken, <i>Secretary</i> .	Fred C. Munroe.
Harry D. Carter.	Richard B. Stanley.

## COMMITTEE ON RECRUITING

### *Executive Committee*

P. A. O'Connell, <i>Chairman</i> .	William H. Feiker.
John L. Bates, <i>Vice-Chairman</i> .	John W. Haigis.
W. L. Glidden, <i>Vice-Chairman</i> .	Eugene C. Hultman.
Michael J. Murray, <i>Vice-Chairman</i> .	Herbert E. Jennison.
Edw. J. Sampson, <i>Secretary</i> .	George N. Jeppson.
George E. Adams.	Eben S. S. Keith.
Capt. C. Lawrence Barry.	John P. Meade.
Charles S. Baxter.	Joseph Monette.
Col. Stanhope E. Blunt.	James R. Nicholson.
Chandler Bullock.	John Nicholson.
Abraham K. Cohen.	C. A. Pastene.
Marcus A. Coolidge.	James F. Phelan.
Dr. John W. Coughlin.	George S. Smith.
R. Osborne Dalton.	Harry W. Smith.
R. C. Davis.	Perry D. Thompson.
Col. Jenness K. Dexter.	Charles A. Williamson.

*Note.* — Executive Committee as originally formed. Additional members appointed throughout State from time to time.

# COMMITTEE ON HOME GUARDS

Gen. John J. Sullivan, <i>Chairman.</i>	Fred Knight.
Samuel D. Parker, <i>Vice-Chairman.</i>	Frederick Parks.
Capt. S. W. Sleeper, <i>Vice-Chairman.</i>	Herbert Parker.
Ernest G. Adams.	Robert E. Stone.
Robert T. Allen.	Capt. Porter B. Chase, <i>Military</i>
John T. Burnett.	<i>Representative.</i>

## Chairmen of Public Safety Committees in Cities and Towns in Massachusetts

Abington, . . . . .	Dr. F. G. Wheatley.
Acton, . . . . .	Allen B. Parker.
Acushnet, . . . . .	Emery E. Cushman.
Adams, . . . . .	Dr. A. K. Boom.
Alford, . . . . .	John M. Dellea.
Agawam, . . . . .	James W. Moore.
Amesbury, . . . . .	Col. E. W. N. Bailey.
Amherst, . . . . .	{ E. M. Whitcomb.
	{ S. Paul Jefferson (later)
Andover, . . . . .	Hon. John N. Cole.
Arlington, . . . . .	Horatio A. Phinney.
Ashburnham, . . . . .	C. A. Hubbell.
Ashby, . . . . .	Rev. E. S. Treworgy.
Ashfield, . . . . .	Charles A. Hall.
Ashland, . . . . .	George G. Tidsbury.
Athol, . . . . .	{ F. A. Ball.
	{ W. W. Woodward (later).
Attleboro, . . . . .	George H. Sykes.
Ayer, . . . . .	George H. Brown.
Barnstable, . . . . .	Raymond A. Hopkins.
Barre, . . . . .	John S. Rice.
Bedford, . . . . .	George H. Blinn.
Belchertown, . . . . .	T. D. Walker.
Bellingham and North Bellingham, . . . . .	M. J. Kennedy.
Belmont, . . . . .	Torrance Parker.
Berkley, . . . . .	Joseph Howland.
Beverly, . . . . .	James W. McPherson.
	Prescott L. Pasho.
Billerica, . . . . .	Thomas F. Sheridan (later).
Bolton, . . . . .	Harry W. Butts.
	Admiral Francis T. Bowles.
Boston, . . . . .	Major Patrick F. O'Keefe (later)
	Victor A. Heath (later).

Bourne . . . . .	Eben S. S. Keith.
Boxford, . . . . .	Edward E. Pearl.
Boylston, . . . . .	Peter Stewart.
Braintree, . . . . .	Benjamin H. Woodsum.
Brewster, . . . . .	Dr. L. A. Crocker.
Bridgewater, . . . . .	Robert W. McLean.
Brimfield, . . . . .	Orrin Hicks.
Brockton, . . . . .	{ John S. Kent.
	{ William L. Gleason (later).
Brookfield, . . . . .	A. F. Butterworth.
Brookline, . . . . .	Philip S. Parker.
Burlington, . . . . .	Horace B. Skelton.
Cambridge, . . . . .	{ Walter C. Wardell.
	{ J. Frank Facey (later).
Canton . . . . .	H. Ware Barnum.
Carver, . . . . .	Ellis G. Cornish.
Charlemont, . . . . .	Charles E. Graves.
Charlton, . . . . .	E. A. Lamb.
Chatham, . . . . .	Heman A. Harding.
Chelmsford, . . . . .	Walter Perham.
Chelsea, . . . . .	{ Joseph M. Riley.
	{ Edward E. Willard (later).
Cheshire, . . . . .	George A. Reynolds.
Chester, . . . . .	Charles T. Purse.
Chesterfield, . . . . .	Charles M. Drake.
Chicopee, . . . . .	{ Hon. D. J. Coakley.
	{ N. P. Ames Carter (later).
Chilmark, . . . . .	Henry H. Allen.
Clinton, . . . . .	Edward G. Osgood.
Cohasset, . . . . .	Harry E. Mapes.
Colrain, . . . . .	Rev. Harvey M. Eastman.
Concord, . . . . .	Murray Ballou.
Conway, . . . . .	Edward Affahauser.
Cummington, . . . . .	Milton S. Howes.
Dalton, . . . . .	Thomas H. Mooney.
Dana, . . . . .	{ Anthony Mason.
	{ Moses Nolette (later).
Danvers, . . . . .	Walter T. Creese.
Dartmouth and North Dartmouth, . . . . .	Elmer M. Poole.
Dedham and Westwood, . . . . .	George E. Hall.
Deerfield, . . . . .	Philip Ball.
Dennis, . . . . .	James H. Jenks, Jr.

Dighton, . . . . .	George B. Glidden.
Dover, . . . . .	Augustin H. Parker.
Dracut, . . . . .	George H. Stevens.
Dudley, . . . . .	Edgar Hill.
Duxbury, . . . . .	Alfred E. Green.
East Bridgewater, . . . . .	Ezra S. Whitmarsh.
Eastham, . . . . .	Nathan P. Clark.
Easthampton, . . . . .	John H. Cullen.
Easton, . . . . .	John S. Ames.
Edgartown, . . . . .	B. T. Hillman.
Egremont, . . . . .	George Peck.
Enfield, . . . . .	Dr. W. B. Segur.
Essex, . . . . .	{ Albion Riggs.
	{ Charles Bruce (later).
Fairhaven, . . . . .	W. Fred Delano.
Fall River, . . . . .	Robert C. Davis.
Falmouth, . . . . .	George W. Jones.
Fitchburg, . . . . .	George R. Wallace.
Florida, . . . . .	Fred R. Whitcomb.
Foxborough, . . . . .	Orlando C. McKenzie.
Framingham, . . . . .	Theo. F. Rice.
Franklin, . . . . .	H. W. Hosie.
Freetown, . . . . .	Harris E. Chace.
Gardner, . . . . .	Fred L. Butler.
Gay Head, . . . . .	L. L. Vanderhoop.
Georgetown, . . . . .	William Bray.
Gill, . . . . .	Charles O. Bruce.
Gloucester, . . . . .	T. J. Carroll.
Goshen, . . . . .	George L. Barrus.
Grafton, . . . . .	Francis Prescott.
Granby, . . . . .	George F. Eastman.
Great Barrington, . . . . .	Harry Douglas.
Greenfield, . . . . .	Joseph W. Stevens.
Greenwich, . . . . .	George B. Loux.
Groton, . . . . .	{ Walter S. Hinchman.
	{ Frank L. Blood (later).
Groveland, . . . . .	George Mitchell.
Hadley, . . . . .	Frank H. Smith.
Halifax, . . . . .	William B. Wood.



Hamilton, South Hamilton and Wen-	E. R. Anderson.
ham, . . . . .	{ John Q. Adams.
Hampden, . . . . .	{ Rev. R. B. Lisle (later).
Hancock, . . . . .	D. L. Whitman.
Hanover, . . . . .	C. J. Ellis.
Hanson and South Hanson, . . . .	F. W. Howland.
Hardwick, . . . . .	R. D. Lull.
Harvard, . . . . .	{ Henry H. Putnam.
	{ Lyman M. Morse (later).
Harwich, . . . . .	Thomas H. Nickerson.
Haverhill, . . . . .	Hon. Leslie K. Morse.
Hawley, . . . . .	H. C. Dodge.
Hingham, . . . . .	William L. Foster.
Hinsdale, . . . . .	{ Dr. W. L. Tucker.
	{ G. T. Plunkett (later).
Holbrook, . . . . .	A. T. Southworth.
Holden, . . . . .	Jefferson W. Coe.
Holliston, . . . . .	W. P. Kingsbury.
Holyoke, . . . . .	John J. White.
Hopkinton, . . . . .	Edward Carr.
Hudson, . . . . .	E. W. Dunbar.
Hull, . . . . .	Dr. W. H. Sturgis.
Hyannis, . . . . .	C. W. Megathlin.
Ipswich, . . . . .	Frank W. Keyes.
Kingston, . . . . .	Walter H. Faunce.
Lancaster, . . . . .	John E. Thayer.
Lawrence, . . . . .	John J. Hurley.
Lee, . . . . .	Wellington Smith.
Leicester, . . . . .	F. Lincoln Powers.
Lenox, . . . . .	George W. Ferguson.
Leominster, . . . . .	Frank S. Farnsworth.
Lexington, . . . . .	Alfred Pierce.
Littleton, . . . . .	F. B. Priest.
Longmeadow, . . . . .	William K. Davis.
Lowell, . . . . .	{ James E. O'Donnell.
	{ Perry D. Thompson (later).
Ludlow, . . . . .	M. T. Kane.
Lunenburg, . . . . .	Edwin C. Smith.
Lynn, . . . . .	Ralph W. Reeve.
Lynnfield, . . . . .	William Walden.

Malden, . . . . .	Charles M. Blodgett.
Manchester, . . . . .	{ Rev. A. G. Warner.
	{ Raymond C. Allen (later).
Mansfield, . . . . .	Daniel C. Richardson.
Marblehead, . . . . .	{ Greeley C. Allen.
	{ Herbert C. Humphrey (later).
Marion, . . . . .	George B. Crapo.
Marlborough, . . . . .	Charles W. Curtis.
Marshfield, . . . . .	William L. Sprague.
Mashpee, . . . . .	Edmund B. Amos.
Mattapoisett, . . . . .	L. W. Jenney.
Maynard, . . . . .	{ Arthur J. Coughlin.
	{ Horace F. Bates (later).
	{ William G. Perry.
Medfield, . . . . .	{ Granville C. Mitchell (later).
Medford, . . . . .	Irwin O. Wright.
Medway, . . . . .	W. W. Ollendorf.
Melrose, . . . . .	John C. F. Slayton.
Merrimac, . . . . .	James W. Bailey.
Methuen, . . . . .	{ W. L. Stedman.
	{ Samuel Rushton (later).
Middleborough, . . . . .	Bourne Wood.
Middleton, . . . . .	Maurice E. Tyler.
Milford, . . . . .	John C. Lynch.
Millbury, . . . . .	Fred W. Moore.
Millis, . . . . .	R. W. Mann.
Milton, . . . . .	James S. Russell.
Monson, . . . . .	F. K. Gamble.
Montague, . . . . .	A. J. Nims.
Monterey, . . . . .	George L. Keyes.
Mount Washington, . . . . .	A. I. Spurr.
Nahant, . . . . .	H. C. Wilson.
Nantucket, . . . . .	Stillman C. Cash.
Natick, . . . . .	George C. Fairbanks.
Needham, . . . . .	{ Judge Emery Grover.
	{ James M. McCracken (later).
New Bedford, . . . . .	Thomas S. Hathaway.
New Braintree, . . . . .	W. E. Loftus.
New Marlborough, . . . . .	Dr. R. C. Sellow.
Newburyport, . . . . .	Fred E. Smith.
Newton, . . . . .	William F. Garcelon.
Norfolk, . . . . .	William M. Gallagher.
North Adams, . . . . .	E. D. Whitaker.

North Andover, . . . . .	Samuel D. Stevens.
North Attleborough, . . . . .	{ Charles D. Paye.
	{ Dr. Joseph B. Gerould (later).
North Brookfield, . . . . .	E. D. Corbin.
North Reading, . . . . .	Herbert D. Wilson.
Northampton, . . . . .	John J. Kennedy (Secretary).
Northborough, . . . . .	Dr. J. L. Coffin.
Northbridge, . . . . .	J. M. Lassell.
Northfield, . . . . .	Dr. N. P. Wood.
Norton, . . . . .	George C. Haskell.
Norwell, . . . . .	Frank W. Jones.
Norwood, . . . . .	Herbert M. Plimpton.
Oak Bluffs, . . . . .	Fred W. Smith.
Oakham, . . . . .	John P. Day.
Orange, . . . . .	Hon. E. S. Hall.
Orleans, . . . . .	Edgar H. Upham.
Osterville, . . . . .	G. W. Hallett.
Oxford, . . . . .	Charles N. Turner.
Palmer, . . . . .	Harold W. Brainerd.
Paxton, . . . . .	Henry H. Pike.
Peabody, . . . . .	Louis P. P. Osborne.
Pembroke, . . . . .	Edgar C. Thayer.
Pepperell, . . . . .	Charles H. Miller.
Petersham, . . . . .	W. S. McNutt.
Phillipston, . . . . .	James H. Hutchings.
Pittsfield, . . . . .	Arthur W. Eaton.
Plainville, . . . . .	{ Rufus King.
	{ Millard S. Rines (later).
Plymouth, . . . . .	Arthur Lord.
Plympton, . . . . .	Fred W. Dennett.
Prescott, . . . . .	W. M. Waugh.
Princeton, . . . . .	Fred W. Bryant.
Provincetown, . . . . .	W. H. Young.
Quincy, . . . . .	{ Joseph L. Whiton.
	{ H. L. Kincaide (later).
Randolph, . . . . .	Joseph Belcher.
Raynham, . . . . .	{ Sinare Beaulieu.
	{ Fred Rogers (later).
Reading, . . . . .	Captain Frank Gray.
Rehoboth, . . . . .	Ellery L. Goff.
Revere, . . . . .	Alfred S. Hall.

Richmond, . . . . .	William H. Sherrill.
Rochester, . . . . .	L. C. Humphrey.
Rockland, . . . . .	Elvin T. Wright.
Rockport, . . . . .	Frederick H. Tarr.
Rowe, . . . . .	Henry D. Wright.
Rowley, . . . . .	Joseph N. Dummer.
Royalston, . . . . .	Charles H. Brown.
Russell (Woronoco), . . . . .	E. D. Parks.
Rutland, . . . . .	Walter A. Wheeler.
Salem, . . . . .	Arthur H. Phippen.
Salisbury, . . . . .	John Q. Evans.
Sandisfield, . . . . .	Thomas Fox.
Sandwich, . . . . .	Charles E. Brady.
Saugus, . . . . .	William O. Bursch.
Savoy, . . . . .	William E. Cain.
Scituate, . . . . .	Walter Haynes.
Seekonk, . . . . .	George F. Carpenter.
Sharon, . . . . .	Robert G. Morse.
Sheffield, . . . . .	Rev. Stanley Cummings.
Shelburne, . . . . .	{ J. W. Thurber.
	{ C. L. Upton (later).
Sherborn, . . . . .	{ Henry M. Channing.
	{ Arron C. Dowse (later).
Shrewsbury, . . . . .	{ W. H. Chamberlain.
	{ Henry H. Ham (later).
Somerset, . . . . .	Adam W. Gifford.
Somerville, . . . . .	Hon. Charles V. Blanchard.
South Hadley, . . . . .	Fred M. Smith.
Southbridge, . . . . .	John E. Paige.
Southborough, . . . . .	R. H. Overson, Jr.
Southwick, . . . . .	H. L. Miller.
Spencer, . . . . .	N. C. Bryant.
Sterling, . . . . .	John P. Mitchell.
Stockbridge, . . . . .	William Lynch.
Stoneham, . . . . .	George R. Barnstead.
Stoughton, . . . . .	{ Ira F. Burnham.
	{ William Curtis (later).
Stow, . . . . .	Charles A. Hearsey.
Sturbridge, . . . . .	William H. Hinman, Jr.
Sudbury, . . . . .	{ Courtenay Crocker.
	{ Charles H. W. Way (later).
	{ W. H. Fairbanks (later).
Sutton, . . . . .	S. Martin Shaw.

Swampscott, . . . . .	Henry S. Baldwin.
Swansea, . . . . .	A. W. Weaver.
Taunton, . . . . .	William J. Flood.
Templeton, . . . . .	Harvey O. Winch.
Tewksbury, . . . . .	Irving F. French.
Tisbury, . . . . .	William J. Look.
Tolland, . . . . .	J. R. Rogers.
Topsfield, . . . . .	James D. Phillips.
Townsend, . . . . .	F. B. Higgins.
Truro, . . . . .	{ Thomas H. Peters.
	{ Manuel Corey (later).
Tyringham, . . . . .	Charles H. Hale.
Upton, . . . . .	I. Plummer Taft.
Uxbridge, . . . . .	{ Harry B. Stearns.
	{ D. H. Reese (later).
	{ Charles A. Root (later).
Wakefield, . . . . .	Charles E. Walton.
Wales, . . . . .	Harry B. Weaver.
Walpole, . . . . .	{ Louis R. Vose.
	{ Waldo R. Pratt (later).
Waltham, . . . . .	John M. Gibbs.
Ware, . . . . .	Henry C. Davis.
Wareham, . . . . .	Lewis H. Bullard.
Warren, . . . . .	E. D. Sullivan.
Warwick, . . . . .	O. W. Cole.
Watertown, . . . . .	William P. McGuire (Executive Manager).
Webster, . . . . .	George J. Brunnell.
Wellesley, . . . . .	John W. Edmunds.
Wellfleet, . . . . .	Dr. Clarence J. Bell.
Wenham, . . . . .	D. R. Anderson.
West Boylston, . . . . .	Charles E. Burbank.
West Bridgewater, . . . . .	Charles P. Kendall.
West Brookfield, . . . . .	Dwight Fairbanks.
West Hanover, . . . . .	C. J. Ellis.
West Medway, . . . . .	W. W. Ollendorf.
West Newbury, . . . . .	Robert L. Brown.
West Springfield, . . . . .	Walter S. Barr.
West Tisbury, . . . . .	Ulysses E. Mayhew.



Westborough, . . . . .	John W. Slattery.
Westford, . . . . .	Oscar R. Spaulding.
Westhampton, . . . . .	Francis A. Loud.
Westminster, . . . . .	Hobart Raymond.
Weston, . . . . .	Dr. Fresnius Van Nuys.
Westport, . . . . .	Rev. H. H. Crawford.
Weymouth, . . . . .	Arthur C. Heald.
Whately, . . . . .	Montville L. Crafts.
Whitman, . . . . .	James P. Kirby.
Wilbraham, . . . . .	F. A. Warren.
Williamsburg, . . . . .	Wilbur M. Purrington.
Williamstown, . . . . .	S. P. Blagden.
Wilmington, . . . . .	Charles C. Alden.
Winchendon, . . . . .	William M. Whitney.
Winchester, . . . . .	Lewis Parkhurst.
Winthrop, . . . . .	Elmer E. Dawson.
Woburn, . . . . .	Leonard B. Buchanan.
Worcester, . . . . .	Dr. Ira N. Hollis.
Worthington, . . . . .	H. S. Cole.
Wrentham, . . . . .	George L. Dodd.
Yarmouth, . . . . .	Thatcher T. Hallett.

## New England Sawmill Units

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES IN CONNECTION WITH  
EQUIPPING AND DESPATCHING OVER 350 MEN, 122 HORSES AND  
10 PORTABLE SAWMILLS FROM NEW ENGLAND TO OLD ENGLAND,  
JUNE 15, 1917

### *Receipts*

Commonwealth of Connecticut, . . . . .	\$12,000 00
Commonwealth of Maine, . . . . .	12,000 00
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, . . . . .	12,000 00
Commonwealth of New Hampshire, . . . . .	12,000 00
Commonwealth of Rhode Island, . . . . .	6,200 00
Commonwealth of Vermont, . . . . .	12,000 00
Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety (from its funds raised by public subscriptions), . . . . .	12,017 47
Seventy-seven firms, corporations and individuals, . . . . .	52,975 00
Interest on bank deposit, . . . . .	14 50
	\$131,206 97

# Expenditures

Portable mills and equipment, . . . . .	\$45,684 60
Horses and equipment, . . . . .	43,494 74
Logging camp equipment, . . . . .	25,245 57
Clothing, shoes, etc., for millmen and woodsmen, . . . . .	6,768 68
Packing and storage, . . . . .	1,932 56
Passport expenses, . . . . .	621 60
Transportation, . . . . .	1,732 00
Express, freight and trucking, . . . . .	2,011 38
Miscellaneous, . . . . .	3,715 84
	<hr/>
	\$131,206 97

## LIST OF EQUIPMENT

10 portable sawmills.	10 units of horse medicine.
2 sawmills.	Tents, blankets, spreads, flags, etc.
Spare parts.	10 first-aid cabinets, etc.
1 power plant.	Tools.
10 sides lace leather.	Axes and cant dogs.
200 sheets galvanized.	150 bars.
Belting and lacing.	36 farm handy trucks.
1 model T runabout.	Chains, yokes, trees and hooks.
3 blowers and 1 fan.	Extinguishers, pumps, etc.
Steam boiler, steam engine, tools and equipment.	50 stoves, cooking utensils, etc.
43 saws, points, tools, etc.	Gears, boxes, seats and brakes.
5 2-horsepower engines and parts.	4 log trucks, rebuilt and ironed.
Engine, boiler and spare parts.	200 saws, files, etc.
Oil and grease.	32 swages.
1,404 shanks.	5 houses, special truck.
Packing cement, etc.	200 fire-extinguisher charges.
Belting.	Remodeled lumber wagon.
Boxes.	180 mats, 45 bales.
Boiler and engine.	Horseshoes, chains, tools, neck yokes, tool chests, etc.
Pipe, tools, etc.	360 pairs men's shoes and lacings.
Blocks, jacks, tools, etc.	90 dozen shirts, 22½ dozen sweaters, drawers.
2 coils 3-inch Manila rope.	60 dozen socks, hats, handkerchiefs.
Nails, wire netting, tools, etc.	15 dozen oil coats, etc.
Smokestack, grates, etc.	28⅙ dozen duck pants.
Horse housings, poles, tents, etc.	13½ dozen oil coats, and other clothing and miscellany.
122 horses.	Twine.
Harnesses, etc.	Flag bows.
20 dozen halter ropes.	Stationery.
2 sets express harness.	
Collars, blankets, harnesses, etc.	
Currycombs, measures, lanterns, etc.	

# Recreational Equipment and Library Privilege

## RECREATION EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN THE FARM CAMPS FOR HIGH SCHOOL BOYS

*September 1, 1917*

Phonographs, . . . . .	16
Records (20 in a box), . . . . .	17
Phonograph needles, . . . . .	7,500
Checker games, . . . . .	48
Chess games, . . . . .	21
Checker boards, . . . . .	67
Dominoes, . . . . .	25
Quoits, . . . . .	21
Playground bats, . . . . .	22
Playground balls, . . . . .	19
Flags (5 x 7), . . . . .	10
Baseball bats, . . . . .	22
Baseballs, . . . . .	44
Baseball gloves, . . . . .	22
Basket balls, . . . . .	1
Additional games, . . . . .	3
Pathscope, . . . . .	\$175 00
Screens, . . . . .	\$12 50
Exchange service on reels, . . . . .	\$50 00

*September 1, 1918*

Baseballs, . . . . .	160
Baseball bats, . . . . .	85
Catchers' gloves, masks and protectors, . . . . .	38
Volley ball and net, . . . . .	1
Footballs, . . . . .	3
Tennis balls, . . . . .	6
Phonographs, . . . . .	19
Records, . . . . .	749
Phonograph needles, . . . . .	5,200
Checker sets, . . . . .	61
Checker boards, . . . . .	58
Sets of dominoes, . . . . .	62
American flags, . . . . .	18
Envelopes, . . . . .	16,500
Sheets of writing paper, . . . . .	32,500
Moving-picture machines and accessories, . . . . .	5
Batteries, . . . . .	2
Feet of film, . . . . .	360,000

NOTE.—The first fourteen items were supplied by the National War Work Council; the last four, by the State Executive Committee, Y. M. C. A.

## CAMP ACTIVITIES

Ball games, . . . . .	119
Athletic contests, . . . . .	33
Number of camp social events, . . . . .	56
Boys participating in community social events, . . . . .	638
Number of addresses, . . . . .	73
Number of visits to Y. M. C. A. buildings and swimming pools, . . . . .	1,145
Number of moving-picture shows, . . . . .	161
Number of farmers, helpers and neighbors attending camp movies, . . . . .	3,500
Number of visits by supervisors to boys on individual farms, . . . . .	389
Number of visits by welfare director to camps, . . . . .	210
Number of visits by welfare director to farmers, . . . . .	52
Mileage covered by auto, . . . . .	9,923
Mileage covered by rail, . . . . .	2,635
Fourth of July celebration and parade, . . . . .	1
Memorial Day celebration and parade, . . . . .	1
Camp minstrel shows, . . . . .	3
Attended minstrel shows, . . . . .	900

## LIBRARY PRIVILEGES EXTENDED TO CAMPS FOR MOBILIZING SCHOOL BOYS FOR FARM SERVICE

The Free Public Library Commission of the State has furnished nine loan libraries in units of 30 books for camps which could not be supplied locally. The camps have been provided with library privileges in the following manner: —

- Bolton, Camp Me-L-Ev: Boys borrow books on cards from Public Library, Bolton.
- Concord, Camp Thomas: Library of 30 books, Free Public Library Commission.
- Egypt, Camp Lawson: Boys have use of library on estate.
- Essex, Camp Storrow: Library of 30 books, Free Public Library Commission.
- Groton, Camp Groton: Boys borrow books on cards from Public Library, Groton.
- Ipswich, Turner Hill Camp: Library supplied by Public Library, Ipswich.
- Lenox, Camp Crane: Library supplied by Public Library, Lenox.
- Marblehead, Camp Davis: Two libraries of 30 books, Free Public Library Commission.
- Plymouth, Camp Chilton: Doubtful.
- South Acton, Camp Huntington: Library of 30 books, Free Public Library Commission.
- Stockbridge, Camp Riggs: Library supplied by Public Library, Lenox.

Topsfield, Camp Topsfield: Library of 30 books, Free Public Library Commission.

Walpole, N. H., Camp Newton: Library supplied by Newton Public Library.

## **Massachusetts Halifax Health Commission**

### **AN ACT TO INCORPORATE THE MASSACHUSETTS HALIFAX HEALTH COMMISSION**

*Whereas*, The explosion in Halifax Harbor on the sixth day of December, 1917, not only caused heavy loss of life and personal injury, but also produced conditions which seriously menaced the general public health of the city of Halifax and the town of Dartmouth; and

*Whereas*, The people of the State of Massachusetts have generously contributed in services, money and materials to the relief and rehabilitation of Halifax and Dartmouth, and in addition to the gifts already made have expressed through their agents, the Massachusetts Halifax Relief Committee, a desire to give further assistance in the restoration and improvement of the sanitary conditions of Halifax and Dartmouth and other districts affected by the explosion, and the health of the inhabitants; and

*Whereas*, As a result of careful investigation and expert advice it has been determined by the said Massachusetts Halifax Relief Committee to carry out a definite program for the said purposes in co-operation with the Halifax Relief Commission, the Province of Nova Scotia and the city of Halifax, which shall involve the expenditure of large sums of money, and it is considered advisable to incorporate a Commission with proper power and authority for said purposes to work in conjunction with the provincial department of health, the boards of health of the city of Halifax and the town of Dartmouth, the Halifax Relief Commission and other constituted authorities; and

*Whereas*, The proposed program and contributions have been heartily appreciated and endorsed by various public bodies representing the people of Halifax and Dartmouth;

*Be it enacted by the Governor, Council and Assembly as follows:—*

1. In this act, unless the context otherwise requires:—

(a) The term "Commission" means the Massachusetts Halifax Health Commission.



(b) The word "person" shall include persons, firms or private, public or municipal corporations.

2. There shall be constituted the Massachusetts Halifax Health Commission, composed of the provincial health officer for the time being; the chairman of the board of health of the city of Halifax for the time being; the medical health officer of the town of Dartmouth for the time being; two members appointed by the Halifax Relief Commission; and four members appointed by the Massachusetts Halifax Relief Committee, each for a term of two years. Such Commission shall be a body corporate under the name of the Massachusetts Halifax Health Commission, and by that name shall have perpetual succession and a common seal.

3. The Provincial Health Officer for the time being, the chairman of the board of health of the city of Halifax for the time being, and the medical health officer of the town of Dartmouth for the time being, shall be members of the Commission by virtue of their respective offices.

If a vacancy occurs in the Commission by the death, resignation or removal of any of the other members of the Commission, the successor of such member shall be appointed by the body which appointed him.

4. The Commission shall elect a chairman from among its members and also a vice-chairman, who, in the absence of the chairman, shall exercise all the functions of the chairman.

5. The Commission may appoint a secretary who shall undertake the correspondence of the Commission and keep its records, minutes, orders and accounts. He shall hold office during the pleasure of the Commission, and the Commission may prescribe the duties and powers of such secretary.

6. Any four members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of any business or for the exercise of all or any of the powers exercisable by the Commission.

7. The objects and powers of the Commission shall be the rehabilitation of the city of Halifax and the town of Dartmouth from the effects of said explosion of December 6, 1917, and to this end it shall have power —

(a) To undertake and carry into effect whatever in its opinion may make for the restoration and improvement of the sanitary conditions of the city of Halifax and the town of Dartmouth, and the health of the inhabitants of said city and town.

(b) To collaborate with and assist the constituted authorities in the said city and town, including the city board of health, the Halifax Relief Commission or any other public body who may exercise any powers of jurisdiction with respect to the purpose of the Commission.

(c) To receive, hold and invest from time to time all moneys and property paid, voted or contributed by any person or government to the Commission for the purposes of the Commission.

(d) To expend, distribute and appropriate all such moneys and property in such manner as the Commission shall in its discretion deem proper: *provided, however*, that in case any money or property has been contributed or voted for any particular purpose or purposes, the Commission shall expend, distribute or appropriate the same in accordance with the expressed intention of the donor.

(e) To aid any institution, association or public body which undertakes or has heretofore undertaken any work which in the opinion of the Commission conduces to the improvement or the restoration of the health of the inhabitants of the city of Halifax and the town of Dartmouth, or for any other purposes of the Commission.

(f) To collect, publish and distribute information to promote good health and improved sanitation.

(g) To appoint and hire such officials, servants, agents and workmen as the Commission may think proper for the purpose of the proper exercise of the powers exercisable by the Commission, and in particular the Commission may employ experts in municipal sanitation and public hygiene, or otherwise.

(h) To enter into agreements and contracts for the purpose of carrying out the powers exercisable by the Commission.

(i) To acquire, hold and dispose of real and personal property of every kind and description, and to deal with the same in any way the Commission may think fit.

(j) To effect from time to time temporary loans with any chartered bank, if for any reason funds to be supplied to the Commission are not presently available.

(k) To make reports and recommendations to the city board of health, the city council or board of control of the city of Halifax, the town council of the town of Dartmouth, and the Halifax Relief Commission on any matter which in the opinion of the Commission may conduce to the improvement of public health.

(1) To do all such other things as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objects and powers, or any of them.

8. For the purpose of more effectually carrying out the above objects and powers, or any of them, the Commission may make all such by-laws, and from time to time alter, amend or repeal such by-laws as to it may seem proper.

9. The Commission may appoint an executive officer who may be a physician, not necessarily registered in the medical registry of the Province of Nova Scotia, but a graduate of a medical school approved by the provincial medical board.

MAY 9, 1919.

Then passed in the House of Assembly.

ROBERT IRWIN,  
*Speaker.*

MAY 17, 1919.

Then passed in Council.

M. H. GOUDGE,  
*President.*

I, William A. Dickson, Clerk of the House of Assembly, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of an act passed at the last session of the Legislature and assented to by the Lieutenant-Governor on the seventeenth day of May, A.D. 1919.

Dated at Halifax this twenty-second day of May, A.D. 1919.

W. A. DICKSON,  
*Clerk.*

### **Chairmen of Woman's Committees, Council of National Defense, in Cities and Towns in Massachusetts**

Abington, . . . . .	Mrs. S. E. Eastman.
Acton, . . . . .	Miss Charlotte Conant.
West Acton, . . . . .	Miss Laura A. Brown.
Acushnet, . . . . .	Mrs. W. A. White.
Adams, . . . . .	Mrs. Frank Hanlon.
North Adams, . . . . .	Mrs. C. W. Dibble.
Agawam, . . . . .	Mrs. Henry E. Bodurtha.
Alford, . . . . .	Mrs. Robert McLaren.
Amesbury, . . . . .	Mrs. C. A. Smith.

Amherst, . . . . .	Mrs. W. R. Hart.
Andover, . . . . .	Mrs. B. H. Hayes.
North Andover and West Box-	
ford, . . . . .	Mrs. Wm. Sutton.
Arlington, . . . . .	Mrs. H. W. Reed.
Ashburnham, . . . . .	Mrs. Jas. T. Wheelan.
Ashby, . . . . .	Mrs. G. H. Joyce.
Ashfield, . . . . .	Mrs. Wm. S. Hunter.
Ashland, . . . . .	Mrs. H. E. Warren.
Athol, . . . . .	Mrs. Geo. H. Dodge.
Attleboro, . . . . .	Mrs. H. M. Daggett.
North Attleborough, . . . . .	Mrs. Geo. Cotton.
Avon, . . . . .	Mrs. E. C. Glover.
Ayer, . . . . .	Mrs. S. B. Dickerman.
Baldwinsville and Templeton, . . . . .	Mrs. I. M. Coleman.
Barnstable and Osterville, . . . . .	Mrs. Edward A. Handy.
Barre, . . . . .	Mrs. Harold Wilder.
Becket, . . . . .	{ Mrs. Fred Bullard } Joint chairmen.
	{ Mrs. Bertha Shaw }
Bedford, . . . . .	Mrs. Geo. R. Blinn.
Belchertown, . . . . .	Mrs. E. E. Sargent.
Bellingham, . . . . .	Mrs. Walter E. Cooke.
Belmont, . . . . .	Mrs. E. F. Atkins.
Berkley, . . . . .	Mrs. Chas. H. Macomber.
Berlin, . . . . .	Mrs. Geo. Sawyer.
Bernardston, . . . . .	Miss M. B. Barnard.
Beverly, . . . . .	Mrs. Edgar Rideout.
Billerica, . . . . .	Mrs. Wm. H. Sexton.
Blackstone, . . . . .	Mrs. A. F. Thayer.
Blandford, . . . . .	Miss Susan E. Tiffany.
Bolton, . . . . .	Mrs. O. A. Everett.
Boston, . . . . .	Mrs. H. J. Gurney.
Bourne, . . . . .	Mrs. Eben S. S. Keith.
Boxborough, . . . . .	Mrs. George W. Burroughs.
Boxford, . . . . .	Mrs. E. L. Bradford.
Boylston, . . . . .	Mrs. Wm. S. Garfield.
West Boylston, . . . . .	Mrs. C. E. Burbank.
Braintree, . . . . .	Mrs. Pamela G. Webber.
Brewster, . . . . .	Miss Alice E. Sears (Secretary).
Bridgewater, . . . . .	Mrs. R. W. McLean.
East Bridgewater, . . . . .	Miss Maria L. Nutter.
West Bridgewater, . . . . .	Mrs. J. J. Copeland.
Brimfield, . . . . .	Miss Anna Tarbell.

Brockton, . . . . .	Mrs. W. A. Chaplain.
Brookfield, . . . . .	Mrs. John MacLaurin.
North Brookfield, . . . . .	Mrs. Herbert E. Cummings.
West Brookfield, . . . . .	Miss F. E. Gilbert.
Brookline, . . . . .	Mrs. Caroline Perkins.
Buckland, . . . . .	Miss M. B. Brown.
Burlington, . . . . .	Mrs. Geo. B. Perkins.
Cambridge, . . . . .	Mrs. Edmund A. Whitman.
Canton, . . . . .	Miss Mildred M. Dunbar.
Carver, . . . . .	Mrs. Edw. Slugg.
Centerville and Craigville, . . . . .	Miss Mable Phinney.
Charlemont, . . . . .	Mrs. L. W. Sears.
Charlton, . . . . .	Mrs. E. W. Preble.
Chatham, . . . . .	Mrs. Herman A. Harding.
Chelmsford, . . . . .	Miss Maude Perham.
Chelsea, . . . . .	Mrs. Chester N. Cole.
Chester, . . . . .	Mrs. Frank Fay.
Chesterfield, . . . . .	Mrs. F. H. Bryant.
Chicopee, . . . . .	Mrs. W. B. Culver.
Chilmark, . . . . .	Mrs. F. B. Mayhew.
Clarksburg, . . . . .	Mrs. Elizabeth H. Dibble.
Clinton, . . . . .	Mrs. Wm. Bancroft.
Cohasset, . . . . .	Mrs. Oliver H. Howe.
Colrain, . . . . .	Mrs. A. F. Smith.
Concord, . . . . .	Mrs. Geo. M. Baker.
Cotuit and Santuit, . . . . .	Mrs. C. F. Hodges.
Crescent Mills, . . . . .	Mrs. Jas. Walkinshaw.
Cummington, . . . . .	Mrs. Leslie Porter.
Dalton, . . . . .	Mrs. E. L. Brown.
Dana, . . . . .	Mrs. C. C. Richardson.
Danvers, . . . . .	Mrs. Osborne Leach.
Dartmouth, . . . . .	Mrs. E. M. Poole.
Dedham, . . . . .	Miss Margaret Warren.
Deerfield, . . . . .	Miss Edith Root.
Dennis, . . . . .	Mrs. Hayden Richardson.
East Dennis, . . . . .	Mrs. Susan H. Sears.
Dennisport, . . . . .	Mrs. M. F. Young.
South Dennis, . . . . .	Mrs. C. A. Davis.
West Dennis, . . . . .	Mrs. E. S. Osborne.
Dighton, . . . . .	Mrs. Geo. B. Glidden.
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Essex, . . . . .	Miss Evelyn Knowlton.
Everett, . . . . .	Mrs. B. M. Rowand.
Fairhaven, . . . . .	Miss Mabel Potter.
Fall River, . . . . .	Miss Anna H. Borden.
Falmouth, . . . . .	Mrs. J. M. Watson.
Feeding Hills Center and Agawam,	Mrs. F. W. Taylor.
Fitchburg, . . . . .	Mrs. Chas. E. Ware.
Foxborough, . . . . .	Mrs. Arthur W. Owen.
Framingham, . . . . .	Mrs. N. I. Bowditch.
Franklin, . . . . .	Mrs. U. L. Burns.
Freetown, . . . . .	Mrs. Wm. Sherman.
Gardner, . . . . .	Mrs. Selon Wilder.
Gay Head, . . . . .	Miss Nanetta Vanderhoop.
Georgetown, . . . . .	Miss Katharine D. Root.
Gill, . . . . .	Miss Laella Van Valkenburgh.
Goshen, . . . . .	Mrs. George L. Barrus.
Gosnold, . . . . .	Mrs. Roland S. Snow.
Grafton, . . . . .	{ Mrs. J. L. Keith.
	{ Mrs. Frank Warren, Acting Chair-
	{ man.
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Granville, . . . . .	Mrs. Emma L. Stowe.
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Greenwich, . . . . .	Mrs. Wm. H. Walker.
Groton, . . . . .	Mrs. Frank A. Torrey.
Groveland, . . . . .	Mrs. Ernest W. Boner.
Hadley, . . . . .	Mrs. F. H. Lawrence.
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Halifax, . . . . .	Mrs. Abram Bourne.
Hamilton, . . . . .	Mrs. Edward B. Cole.

Hampden, . . . . .	Mrs. C. S. Shute.
Hancock, . . . . .	Mrs. Charles Wells.
Hanover, . . . . .	Mrs. William F. Bates.
Hanover Center, . . . . .	Mrs. Bernard Stetson.
North Hanover, . . . . .	Mrs. John Prosper Merrill.
South Hanover, . . . . .	Mrs. Morrill A. Phillips.
West Hanover, . . . . .	Miss Grace L. Russell.
Hanson, . . . . .	Mrs. Mary Lewis.
Harvard, . . . . .	Miss Clara E. Sears.
Harwich, . . . . .	Mrs. Harriet D. Handy.
Hatfield, . . . . .	Mrs. R. F. Wells.
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Holbrook, . . . . .	Miss Mary L. Holbrook.
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Holland, . . . . .	Mrs. Arthur G. Childs.
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Holyoke, . . . . .	Mrs. Nathan P. Avery.
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Sherborn, . . . . .	Mrs. Francis Bardwell.
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Shutesbury, . . . . .	Mrs. Thomas H. Ingham.
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Southwick, . . . . .	Mrs. A. R. Webb.
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West Stockbridge, . . . . .	Mrs. Francis Day.
Stoneham, . . . . .	Mrs. G. W. Nickerson.
Stoughton, . . . . .	Mrs. Nathaniel W. Faxon.
Stow, . . . . .	Mrs. Charles A. Hearsey.
Sturbridge, . . . . .	Mrs. George S. Ladd.
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Swampscott, . . . . .	Mrs. P. S. Bailey.
Swansea, . . . . .	Mrs. Augusta Barney.
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Topsfield, . . . . .	Miss Katherine Willman.
Truro, . . . . .	Miss Mary M. Rich.
Turners Falls, . . . . .	Mrs. W. L. Salmon.
Tyngsborough, . . . . .	Mrs. Chester H. Queen.
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Upton, . . . . .	Mrs. Samuel R. Capen.
Uxbridge, . . . . .	Mrs. D. H. Reese.
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Wales, . . . . .	Mrs. C. T. Holt.
Walpole, . . . . .	Mrs. Joseph S. Leach.
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Ware, . . . . .	Miss Carolyn V. Tucker.
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Warren, . . . . .	Mrs. H. N. Shepard.
Warwick, . . . . .	Mrs. Frederick W. Bass.
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Westborough, . . . . .	Mrs. Arthur W. Nourse.

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Worthington, . . . . .	Mrs. Frederick Fairman.
Wrentham, . . . . .	Mrs. George L. Wallace.
Wyben, . . . . .	Mrs. S. A. Allen.
Yarmouth, . . . . .	Mrs. Nathan H. Matthews.

DATE.	Price to Producers f. o. b. Boston.	RETAIL PRICE TO CONSUMERS.		WHOLESALE PRICE IN BOTTLES TO STORES.		RETAIL PRICE CHARGED BY STORES.		Wholesale Price in Cans.
		Quarts.	Pints.	Quarts.	Pints.	Quarts.	Pints.	
1918								
January,	\$0 08 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	\$0 14 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	\$0 08	\$0 12 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	\$0 07	\$0 14 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	\$0 07	In 8 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> quart cans: 1-10 cans, \$1.02 (12 cents quart); 11-20 cans, \$1; 21-30 cans, 98 cents; 31-40 cans, 97 cents; over 40 cans, 96 cents. In 40 quart jugs: 1-10 jugs, 11 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub> cents a quart; over 10 jugs, 11 cents a quart.
February,	08 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	14 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	08	12 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	07	14 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	07	
March,	08 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	14 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	08	12 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	07	14 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	07	
April,	08	14 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	08	12 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	07	14 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	07	In 8 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> quart cans: 1-10 cans, \$1.07; 11-20 cans, \$1.06; 21-30 cans, \$1.05; 31-40 cans, \$1.04; over 40 cans, \$1.03 (11 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>4</sub> cents a quart). In 40 quart jugs: 1-10 jugs, 15 cents a quart; over 10 jugs, 14 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> cents a quart.
May,	07 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	14 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	08	12 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	07	14	08	
June,	07 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	14	08	12	07	13	08	
July,	08 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	14 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	08	12 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	07	14	08	In 8 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> quart cans: 1-10 cans, \$1.15; 11-20 cans, \$1.14; 21-30 cans, \$1.13; 31-40 cans, \$1.12; over 40 cans, \$1.11. In 40 quart jugs: 1-10 jugs, \$5.05; over 10 jugs, \$4.95.
August,	08 <sup>5</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	15	08 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	13	07	14	08	
September,	08 <sup>5</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	15	08 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	13	07	14	08	
October,	09 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	15 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	09	13 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	07 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	15	09	8 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> quart cans, same as October. In 8 quart cans: 1-10 cans, \$1.08; 11-20 cans, \$1.07; 21-30 cans, \$1.06; 31-40 cans, \$1.05; over 40 cans, \$1.05.
November,	09 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	16 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	09	14 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	08	{	{	
December, <sup>3</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1919								
January,	09 <sup>5</sup> / <sub>4</sub>	16 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	09 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	14 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	08 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	16 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	09 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	In 8 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub> quart cans: 1-10 cans, \$1.20; 11-20 cans, \$1.19; 21-30 cans, \$1.18; 31-40 cans, \$1.17; over 40 cans, \$1.16. In 8 quart cans: 1-10 cans, \$1.13; 11-20 cans, \$1.12; 21-30 cans, \$1.11; 31-40 cans, \$1.10; over 40 cans, \$1.09. In 40 quart jugs: 1-10 jugs, \$5.25; over 10 jugs, \$5.15.
February,	09 <sup>5</sup> / <sub>8</sub>	16 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	09 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	14 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	08 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	16 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	09 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	
March,	09 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>2</sub>	-	-	-	-	-	-	

<sup>1</sup> Undelivered.

<sup>2</sup> Delivered.

<sup>3</sup> Same as for November.

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Mrs. Malcolm Donald, Chairman, Women's Council of National Defense Food Committee.

Dean Sarah Louise Arnold, Ex-Chairman, Food Committee.

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Z. C. Dickinson.

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Earle Power, Assistant.

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John E. Hannigan, Assistant Counsel.  
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Paul J. Sachs (in service), former  
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C. O. Blood.  
Charles H. Cutting.  
Dr. Walter G. Chase.

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Henry C. Everett, Jr., Chief, Assistant Food Administrator.

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Mrs. W. M. Buckley, Secretary.  
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Price Reporting.

Mrs. E. W. Holst.  
George W. Lakin, Inspector.  
Benjamin Freedman, Inspector.

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C. O. Blood.  
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H. A. Spinney.  
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Administration Grain Corpora-  
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Louis A. Merry.

J. J. Sullivan.

H. C. Thomas.

*Executive Committee Bakers' Service Board*

Alton H. Hathaway, Chairman.

Frank R. Shepard, Treasurer.

D. F. Phelps, Secretary.

George B. Ochsner.

Alexander Renton.

Robert Rausch.

*County Captains of Bakers*

Barnstable, Edward J. Sheehan.	Hampshire, J. A. Maloney.
Berkshire, C. I. Bigley.	Middlesex, Victor A. Friend.
Bristol, H. P. Dion.	Norfolk, William J. Gurley.
Essex, Joseph Dube.	Plymouth, A. C. Hastings.
Franklin, Louis A. Phelps.	Suffolk, C. J. McGovern.
Hampden, Eugene A. Dexter.	Worcester, A. Swanson.

**HOTEL AND RESTAURANT DIVISION**

Frank C. Hall, Chairman.	Mrs. Gertrude E. Simpson, Secretary.
Dr. H. P. Jacques.	
Arthur N. Milliken.	

*Hotels*

Arthur L. Race.	N. A. Eldridge.
Archie Hurlburt.	W. M. Kimball.
Chas. T. Shean.	J. Floyd Russell.
C. S. Averill.	Lester Roberts.
H. L. Teague.	C. M. Hart.

*Restaurants*

H. S. Kelsey.	W. L. Bireley.
Walter Cook.	

*Steamboats*

E. R. Grabow.

*Industrial Restaurants, Schools and Colleges*

E. H. Ansell.

*Clubs*

Llewellyn Howland.

*Transportation and Adjustment Division*

William L. Putnam, Chairman.

O. M. Chandler.	Alfred W. Otis, Adjuster.
George M. Flint.	Anna Griffin, Secretary.
Davenport Brown.	John J. Higgins.

# Town and City Food Administrators

## BARNSTABLE COUNTY

Barnstable and West Barnstable, . . . . .	Howard N. Parker.
Bourne, . . . . .	Robert S. Handy.
Brewster, . . . . .	W. B. Crocker.
Centerville, . . . . .	C. E. Doubtfire.
Chatham, . . . . .	Geo. H. Nickerson, 2d.
Dennis, . . . . .	James H. Jenks.
Falmouth, . . . . .	H. V. Lawrence.
Harwich, . . . . .	L. G. Williams.
Hyannis, . . . . .	L. B. Boston.
Orleans, . . . . .	E. H. Upham.
Provincetown, . . . . .	W. B. Bangs.
Sandwich, . . . . .	George L. McCann.
Truro, . . . . .	M. F. Corey.
Wellfleet, . . . . .	James L. Gordon, Acting Chair- man.
West Dennis, . . . . .	Geo. H. Garfield.
Yarmouth, . . . . .	Edmund W. Eldridge.

## BERKSHIRE COUNTY

Adams, . . . . .	Harry E. Davis.
Alford, . . . . .	A. S. Garrison.
Becket, . . . . .	Ormi S. Willis.
Cheshire, . . . . .	W. A. Benjamin.
Clarksburg, . . . . .	Richard L. Francis.
Dalton, . . . . .	C. H. Church.
Florida, . . . . .	J. A. Newman.
Great Barrington, . . . . .	Thomas H. Maloney.
Hancock, . . . . .	W. K. Hadselle.
Hartsville (New Marlborough), . . . . .	Miss L. A. Doncaster.
Hinsdale, . . . . .	T. J. O'Leary.
Hoosac Tunnel (Florida), . . . . .	J. A. Newman.
Lanesborough, . . . . .	Chas. A. Fowler.
Lee, . . . . .	James B. Pollard.
Lenox, . . . . .	George F. Bourne.
Monterey, . . . . .	Lester S. Miner.
New Ashford, . . . . .	Forest C. White.
North Adams, . . . . .	M. V. N. Braman.
Otis, . . . . .	George P. Carter.
Peru, . . . . .	F. G. Creamer.
Pittsfield, . . . . .	Harry Holden.

Richmond, . . . . .	R. C. Stead.
Savoy, . . . . .	A. J. McCulloch.
Sheffield, . . . . .	W. D. French.
Stockbridge, . . . . .	E. J. Flynn.
South Egremont, . . . . .	J. C. O'Neil.
Tyringham, . . . . .	El. L. Tinker.
West Stockbridge, . . . . .	Fred Toby.
Williamstown, . . . . .	Samuel B. Blagden.
Windsor, . . . . .	J. A. Estes.

#### BRISTOL COUNTY

Attleboro, Rehoboth and Seekonk, .	Joseph Finberg.
Easton, . . . . .	Wm. N. Howard.
Fall River, Somerset, Swansea and Westport, . . . . .	M. A. McClarence.
Mansfield and Norton, . . . . .	Elvin L. Smith.
New Bedford, Acushnet and Dart- mouth, . . . . .	
Fairhaven, Freetown and New Bedford,	Ernest A. Wheaton.
North Attleborough, . . . . .	Rev. H. E. Latham.
Taunton, Raynham, . . . . .	Merle T. Barker.
Somerset, Pottersville and Swansea, .	Adam W. Grifford.

#### DUKES COUNTY

Chilmark, . . . . .	Hartford C. Mayhew.
Edgartown, . . . . .	B. T. Hillman.
Gay Head, . . . . .	L. L. Vanderhoop.
Gosnold, . . . . .	Chas. B. Church.
Oak Bluffs, . . . . .	F. W. Smith.
Tisbury, . . . . .	Wm. A. Robinson.
West Tisbury, . . . . .	W. E. Mayhew.

#### ESSEX COUNTY

Amesbury, . . . . .	John J. Allen.
Andover, . . . . .	Fred H. Jones.
Beverly, . . . . .	J. W. McPherson.
Danvers, . . . . .	Chas. H. Preston.
Essex, . . . . .	Albion Riggs.
Georgetown, . . . . .	William Bray.
Gloucester, . . . . .	T. J. Carroll.
Groveland, . . . . .	Chas. H. Pike.
Hamilton and Wenham, . . . . .	J. D. Barnes.

Haverhill, . . . . .	Geo. L. Martin.
Ipswich, . . . . .	Chas. E. Goodline.
Lawrence, . . . . .	T. A. Welch.
Lynn, . . . . .	H. Herbert Richardson.
Lynnfield, . . . . .	Nelson B. Todd.
Manchester, . . . . .	Geo. Wilmonton.
Marblehead, . . . . .	Joseph W. Coates.
Merrimac, . . . . .	Willis H. Scott.
Methuen, . . . . .	William Taylor.
Middleton, . . . . .	Maurice E. Taylor.
Nahant, . . . . .	H. C. Wilson.
Newbury, . . . . .	Richard P. Noyes.
Newburyport, . . . . .	William G. Fisher.
North Andover, . . . . .	Herbert McQuestion.
Peabody, . . . . .	J. J. Cartten.
Rockport, . . . . .	John Dennis.
Rowley, . . . . .	J. N. Dummer.
Salem, . . . . .	{ Arthur H. Phippen.
	{ Charles Lawson.
Salisbury, . . . . .	John Q. Evens.
Saugus, . . . . .	Wm. O. Bursch.
Swampscott, . . . . .	Ed. H. Kitfield.
Topsfield, . . . . .	I. H. Sawyer.
West Boxford, . . . . .	Leroy E. Colby.
West Newbury, . . . . .	L. G. Dodge.

#### FRANKLIN COUNTY

Ashfield, . . . . .	Abbot L. Howes.
Bernardston, . . . . .	Henry L. Crowell.
Buckland, . . . . .	F. D. Kendrick.
Charlemont, . . . . .	Geo. Frary.
Colrain, . . . . .	Walter Kemp.
Conway, . . . . .	Edward Affhouser.
Deerfield, . . . . .	Lincoln B. Wells.
Erving, . . . . .	C. H. Holmes.
Gill, . . . . .	P. S. Eddy.
Greenfield, . . . . .	Fred W. Burnham.
Hawley, . . . . .	H. C. Hodge.
North Heath, . . . . .	J. G. Thompson.
Leverett, . . . . .	C. Hall Beaman.
Leydon, . . . . .	Rev. A. E. Roberts.
Monroe, . . . . .	E. C. Davis.
Montague, . . . . .	Fred C. Abercrombie.



New Salem,	E. F. Stowell.
Northfield,	F. A. Welch.
Orange,	W. S. Johnson.
Rowe,	Henry D. Wright.
Shelburne,	F. D. Kendrick.
Shutesbury,	S. R. Johnson.
Sunderland,	C. P. Smith.
Warwick,	O. W. Cole.
Wendell,	N. B. Plumb.
Whately,	Montville L. Crafts.

#### HAMPDEN COUNTY

Agawam,	D. J. Collins.
Blandford,	W. V. Bodurtha.
Brimfield,	C. B. Brown.
Chester,	Leon J. Kelso.
Chicopee,	N. P. A. Carter.
East Longmeadow,	H. W. King.
Granville,	O. R. Noble.
Hampden,	C. J. Burleigh.
Holland,	J. F. Hebard.
Holyoke,	J. B. Weis.
Longmeadow,	Fred M. Flagg.
Ludlow,	W. E. Gushen.
Monson,	Rufus P. Cushman.
Montgomery,	Myron Kelso.
Palmer,	R. C. Newell.
Russell,	E. D. Parks.
Southwick,	J. W. Root.
Springfield,	C. B. Potter.
Tolland,	John R. Rogers.
Wales,	L. H. Thompson.
West Springfield,	A. L. Pease.
Westfield,	L. B. Allyn.
Wilbraham,	F. A. Warren.

#### HAMPSHIRE COUNTY

Amherst,	Mason A. Dickinson.
Easthampton,	Archibald Forbes.
Greenwich,	E. H. Walker.
Northampton,	Louis L. Campbell and William Kimball.
Ware,	E. H. Brennan.

# MIDDLESEX COUNTY

Acton Administrator,	Allen S. Porker.
Arlington Administrator,	Charles H. Higgins.
Food Control,	Warren P. Peirce.
Ashby Administrator,	Rev. E. S. Treworgy.
Food Control,	Walter H. Smith.
Ashland Administrator,	George G. Tidsbury.
Ayer Administrator,	George L. Osgood.
Food Control,	George H. Hill.
Bedford Administrator,	George R. Blinn.
Food Control,	W. J. Balfour.
Belmont Administrator,	Dr. L. B. Clark.
Food Control,	F. H. Kendall.
Billerica Administrator,	Charles A. Wright.
Food Control,	Thomas F. Sheridan.
Boxborough Administrator,	Stephen D. Salmon, 3d.
Food Control,	Arthur W. Nelson.
Burlington Administrator,	Fred Kneeland Walker.
Cambridge Administrator,	William W. Davis.
Food Control,	Edwin A. Cutting.
Carlisle Administrator,	Herbert A. Lee.
Food Control,	James F. Anthony.
Chelmsford Administrator,	C. George Armstrong.
Food Control,	Herbert C. Sweetser.
Concord Administrator,	Allen French.
Food Control,	George M. Baker.
Dracut Administrator,	Thomas Varnum.
Food Control,	A. L. Blizzard.
Dunstable Administrator,	James E. Kendall.
Everett Administrator,	H. Heustis Newton.
Food Control,	Henry Duncan.
Framingham Administrator and Food Control,	Theodore F. Rice.
Groton Administrator,	S. Warren Sturgis.
Food Control,	Stephen W. Sabine.
Holliston Administrator,	Louis E. P. Smith.
Hopkinton Administrator and Food Control,	Daniel J. Riley.
Hudson Administrator,	Loriman Brigham.
Food Control,	Thomas Kelly and Edgar P. Larkin.
Lexington Administrator,	George E. Briggs.
Lincoln Administrator,	C. S. Smith.
Food Control,	George L. Chapin.

Littleton Administrator and Food Control, . . . . .	John H. Hardy.
Lowell Administrator, . . . . .	Edward Fisher.
Malden Administrator, . . . . .	George H. Johnson.
Food Control, . . . . .	Daniel McKenzie.
Marlborough Administrator, . . . . .	John A. O'Connell.
Food Control, . . . . .	Winfield Temple.
Maynard Administrator, . . . . .	George Smith.
Food Control, . . . . .	George F. Morse.
Melrose Administrator, . . . . .	Chas. H. Adams.
Food Control, . . . . .	Chas. E. Merrill.
Natick Administrator, . . . . .	John B. Leamy.
Food Control, . . . . .	Chas. H. Hollis.
Newton Administrator, . . . . .	Alfred McDonald.
Food Control, . . . . .	Alfred W. Fuller.
North Reading Administrator and Food Control, . . . . .	Herbert D. Wilson.
Pepperell Administrator, . . . . .	Waldo Spaulding.
Food Control, . . . . .	John L. Boynton.
Reading Administrator, . . . . .	Frank Gray.
Food Control, . . . . .	M. E. Brande.
Sherborn Administrator, . . . . .	Arthur R. Wright.
Shirley Administrator, . . . . .	Mrs. David L. Lindenburg.
Food Control, . . . . .	Frank Lawton.
Somerville Administrator, . . . . .	Chas. V. Blanchard.
Food Control, . . . . .	Irving Taylor.
Stoneham Administrator, . . . . .	George R. Barnstead.
Stow Administrator, . . . . .	Rev. J. Sidney Moulton.
Food Control, . . . . .	R. P. Harriman, Maynard.
Sudbury Administrator, . . . . .	Winthrop H. Fairbank.
Tewksbury Administrator, . . . . .	Irving F. French.
Food Control, . . . . .	Harry L. Shedd.
Townsend Administrator, . . . . .	A. Dudley Bagley.
Food Control, . . . . .	Frank B. Higgins.
Tyngsborough Administrator, . . . . .	H. E. Symonds.
Food Control, . . . . .	Raymond W. Sherbourne.
Wakefield Administrator, . . . . .	Dr. Chas. E. Montague.
Food Control, . . . . .	Joseph L. Gooch.
Waltham Administrator and Food Control, . . . . .	Fred H. Kirwin.
Watertown Administrator, . . . . .	Wesley E. Monk.
Food Control, . . . . .	H. L. Paine.
Wayland Administrator, . . . . .	Chester B. Williams.
Westfield Administrator, . . . . .	James W. Rafter.

Weston Administrator, . . . . .	Mrs. John B. Paine.
Wilmington Administrator, . . . . .	Dr. T. B. Buzzell.
Food Control, . . . . .	Ed. Woodside.
Winchester Administrator, . . . . .	James Hinds.
Food Control, . . . . .	Maurice Deneen.
Woburn Administrator and Food Control, . . . . .	B. G. Fowler.

#### NORFOLK COUNTY

Avon, . . . . .	Carroll A. Capen.
Braintree, . . . . .	Chas. O. Miller.
Brookline, . . . . .	W. E. Ward.
Canton, . . . . .	H. Everett Beal.
Cohasset, . . . . .	Geo. W. Collier.
Dedham and Westwood, . . . . .	Theodore F. March.
Dover, . . . . .	James H. Chickering.
Foxborough, . . . . .	Ernest A. White.
Franklin, . . . . .	Ulysses L. Burne.
Holbrook, . . . . .	Alfred C. Magaw.
Millis, . . . . .	Everett L. Coldwill.
Milton, . . . . .	Joseph Babcock.
Medfield, . . . . .	Henry E. Young.
Medway, . . . . .	Sewell E. Kingsbury.
Needham, . . . . .	Henry L. Thompson.
Norfolk, . . . . .	Clifford L. Hubbard.
Norwood, . . . . .	Frederick E. Brooks.
Plainville, . . . . .	Theodore E. Fuller.
Quincy, . . . . .	Miss Wane.
Randolph, . . . . .	Carroll A. Capen.
Sharon, . . . . .	J. J. Rafter.
Stoughton, . . . . .	Ernest H. Gilbert.
Wellesley, . . . . .	Geo. H. Sweetser.
Wrentham, . . . . .	Geo. L. Dodd.

#### PLYMOUTH COUNTY

##### *Town Captains*

Abington, . . . . .	E. P. Boynton.
Bridgewater, . . . . .	Samuel Norton.
Brockton, . . . . .	Walter T. Packard.

Lieutenants: William Rankin, C. G. Clapp, C. W. O. Lawson, Walter Pratt, Orvis F. Kinney and Miss Annie L. Burke.

Carver, . . . . .	H. S. Griffith.
Duxbury, . . . . .	Sidney G. Soule.
East Bridgewater, . . . . .	Fred E. Fuller.
Halifax, . . . . .	C. F. Tewksbury.

Lieutenants: Frank E. Tyler, *Secretary*, E. Lawrence Grover, Wm. E. Robertson, Geo. W. Sturtevant, Wm. B. Wood and Clarence E. Devitte.

Hanover, . . . . .	John W. Beal.
Hanson, . . . . .	A. B. Sturtevant.
Hingham, . . . . .	Edgar M. Lane.
Hull, . . . . .	John Wheeler.
Kingston, . . . . .	Miss Helen Holmes.
Lakeville, . . . . .	Oscar F. Stetson.
Marion, . . . . .	Arthur E. Griffin.
Marshfield, . . . . .	David F. Strange.

Lieutenant: Oliver Hatch.

Mattapoisett, . . . . .	Henry L. Dunham.
Middleborough, . . . . .	Oscar F. Stetson.
Norwell, . . . . .	Joseph C. Otis.

Lieutenants: Henry D. Smith, Carleton O. Litchfield, Charles Scully, Jesse Reed and Geo. H. Turner.

Pembroke, . . . . .	H. L. Shepard.
Plymouth, . . . . .	W. L. Mayo, Jr.
Plympton, . . . . .	Mrs. Elizabeth Fillebrown.
Rochester, . . . . .	Lawrence Humphrey.
Rockland, . . . . .	Edward H. Williams.
Scituate, . . . . .	H. W. Cole.
Wareham, . . . . .	I. C. Hammond.
West Bridgewater, . . . . .	Geo. Cobb.
Whitman, . . . . .	W. W. Copeland.

## SUFFOLK COUNTY

### *District Deputies*

Wm. J. Randall.	Horace Waite.
Peter F. Conley.	Mrs. R. A. Woods.
Miss Clementina Derocco.	F. W. Dickerman.
Ascanio Dirago.	

### *Advisory Committee*

John B. Drum.	George C. Greener.
James T. O'Brien.	William L. Terhune.
Frank V. Thompson.	F. W. Dickerman.



## WORCESTER COUNTY

Ashburnham, . . . . .	C. A. Hubbell.
Clinton, . . . . .	Edward Osgood.
Fitchburg, . . . . .	James E. Shea.
Hardwick, . . . . .	Fred Crawford.
Leominster, . . . . .	J. A. Jalbert.
Oxford, . . . . .	Joseph L. Brown.
Southbridge, . . . . .	Herman T. Hude.
Spencer, . . . . .	Geo. H. Bemis.
Warren, . . . . .	P. O. Perkins.
Webster, . . . . .	Harry Nado.
Westborough, . . . . .	Fred W. Humphrey.
Worcester, . . . . .	Carmine Zemarro.

## Calendar, Home Economics Committee, March, 1917, to November, 1918

### MARCH, 1917.

Women's food work started. Dean Sarah Louise Arnold appointed chairman of Food Conservation Committee, being a sub-committee of President Butterfield's Committee on Food Production and Conservation of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety.

### JUNE 15, 1917.

Women's food work incorporated with Council of National Defense.

Mrs. Nathaniel Thayer appointed director.

Monthly conference started.

### JULY, 1917.

First Hoover pledge card drive.

### AUGUST, 1917.

"No white bread week" in all public eating places of the State.

### SEPTEMBER, 1917.

White breadless days campaign.

### OCTOBER, 1917.

Wheatless and meatless days campaign.

Announcement of plan of work of merchant representative.

First meeting of Home Economics Committee, held bi-monthly.

### NOVEMBER, 1917.

Plan proposed for lectures on food conservation in retail stores.

Food movies discussed.

Fish campaign.

Lecture bureau started.

Liberty Bread Shop opened (privately financed).

Red Cross Lunch Room opened (privately financed).

Publicity organized.

DECEMBER, 1917.

Conservation menus sent to cantonments.

JANUARY, 1918.

Corn meal campaign.

Porkless days.

209 Food Conservation Committees organized under Council of National Defense.

1918 home card campaign.

Sunday bulletin in newspapers started.

Circular letter sent to unit chairmen containing report of food saved through food conservation in November, 1917.

First weekly Food Bulletin issued.

Retail price reporting started.

FEBRUARY, 1918.

Fats campaign.

Appointment of men and women county food administrators.

Questionnaire on results of distribution of 1918 home card.

APRIL, 1918.

Potato campaign.

Poster campaign —

Food and child welfare.

Campaign for centers: —

Canning centers.

Markets.

Community markets.

Campaign for using up corn meal.

MAY, 1918.

Five conservation cottages on Boston Common opened.

Flour card campaign.

Absolutely wheatless campaign.

Beef conservation campaign.

JUNE, 1918.

Milk campaign.

Canning centers questionnaires sent out.

JULY, 1918.

Distribution of sugar cards.

Wheatless and sugarless food demonstration electric car.

Motor demonstration truck.

426 moving-picture slides circulated, "Sugar Ration."

418 moving-picture slides circulated, "Wheat Ration per Person."

AUGUST, 1918.

Drive for storage of vegetables.

406 moving-picture slides circulated, "Canning and Preserving."

SEPTEMBER, 1918.

Questionnaires sent to canning centers regarding supply of sugar.

Cottage cheese campaign.

Exhibits at county fairs.

Pit and nut campaign for gas masks.

400 moving-picture slides circulated, "Use Fancy Meats."

68 moving-picture slides circulated, "Eat Cottage Cheese."

Emergency canteens established during influenza epidemic.

NOVEMBER, 1918.

400 moving-picture slides circulated, "Save Food to Save Humanity."

## **Circular issued by The New England Coal Committee**

STATE HOUSE, BOSTON, July 24, 1917.

### *To New England Consumers of Coal.*

The New England Coal Committee has been able during the last few weeks to assist in materially increasing the all-rail movement of anthracite to New England. The New England railroads, their officers and employees, have spared no effort to co-operate with the Committee in securing this result. Receivers of coal also have helped to increase the carrying capacity of the scanty supply of cars available for New England needs by making unusual efforts to unload their cars between sunrise and sunset on the day received, though there is still need of better dispatch in unloading on the part of many consignees. We are writing to each consignee who detains cars, asking for his patriotic co-operation in more prompt unloading, and we are glad to say that our letters have been received in the spirit in which they have been written, and we are receiving assurances in every direction of a willingness to make a better showing in future.

The solid trainload movement from the hard coal fields of Pennsylvania direct to the twenty-eight New England distributing points, arranged by this Committee, is also adding to the carrying capacity of the New England equipment. Much credit is due the Reading Coal Company and the Philadelphia and Reading Railway for the inauguration of this solid trainload movement; without their interest and co-operation this most promising innovation could not have been begun. The Committee feels, however, that while hard coal conditions have thus been improved, New England is not yet by any means out of the woods as regards its supply of anthracite for the coming winter, owing to the fact that while

more coal is being carried by rail, less is being brought by water due to lack of sufficient water tonnage, and also to shortage of coal at the loading ports.

The Committee is now addressing its efforts especially to these water conditions.

### COAL RESERVES TOO LOW

As we all know, the New England industries depend chiefly upon bituminous coal, and this is also true of our railroads, trolley lines, electric light and gas companies and many other essential activities. The stock of bituminous coal now on hand in New England is deficient, and bituminous coal is not now moving and has not been moving during the last few months of good weather into New England in sufficient quantities to accumulate the reserves needed to carry our industries through the coming winter. There is a temptation during the summer months for consumers of coal to be lulled into a false sense of security. The use of household coal falls off to a marked extent during the warm weather, and the use of commercial bituminous coal falls off sensibly also, because in summer the large factory burns coal only for power instead of for both power and heat. The consumption by railroads is also less in warm weather, and due to the shorter daylight hours every one of the electric light and gas companies dotted over New England increases materially its coal consumption in winter.

We are likely to forget under the easier railroad operating conditions of the summer months, that in winter the carrying capacity of our New England railroads, which can barely take us through the summer months, suffers a serious reduction in the number of freight cars that can be hauled into and out of New England. It is probably not too much to say that the average carrying capacity of our railroads is reduced during the three months of severest winter weather by 25 per cent. It is certainly within bounds to place this reduction in carrying capacity at 20 per cent. The inclement winter weather, moreover, operates to reduce, probably to a greater extent, the carrying capacity of the vessels and barges bringing coal to the New England ports.

### NEXT NINETY DAYS CRITICAL

*New England has never been able to bring in coal during the winter months as fast as it must be burned.* Our rail and water facilities

have been provided on the theory that they would be kept busy all the year round, and that consumers would take care of the heavy drain on their coal piles in winter by accumulating coal in summer. It is most certainly true that if New England is to pass successfully through next winter, every single car of coal which can possibly be brought into New England during the next thirty, sixty and ninety days should be so brought, and that every ton which can be moved towards New England by barge or steamer should be so moved. New England cannot possibly make up next winter any slackening in the movement of coal during the next ninety days of favorable weather.

### FILL THE BINS NOW

We are not now discussing the question of price, though we fully appreciate the oppressive burden which has been borne by New England in this respect during the last twelve months. We are pointing out that if New England is to get through next winter with the coal it must have, and thus avoid hardships much greater than even the exorbitant prices of last winter, our people must take coal and keep taking coal every day to the limit of the New England carrying capacity.

This duty to keep our carrying capacity working to the full limit during the next ninety days falls especially upon our larger corporate units which have the financial resources and the storage capacity required to accumulate now a large proportion of their next winter's supply. The obligation, however, rests with equal force upon the individual, whether householder or manufacturer, who has the financial resources and storage capacity to take in his next winter's coal at the present time. In our judgment the householder of means should now make sure that his bins are full, so that his competition with the poor man during next winter's crisis shall be at the minimum.

### A NEW CAUSE OF SHORTAGE

There are a number of other unfavorable factors bearing upon the New England fuel problem, several of which it is perhaps as well to mention. The Navy Department and other departments of the government must be kept fully supplied with coal, but several times recently different departments of the Federal gov-



ernment, without notice, have suddenly commandeered at the tidewater ports large quantities of our coal which had left the mines and were actually on the move to New England. Bottoms to a considerable extent during the last thirty days have arrived at Hampton Roads only to find that without notice their coal had been suddenly taken by the government.

If the government had estimated its needs and had given ten days' notice, this shipping could have been diverted to other ports, thus being probably kept employed. Furthermore, if in future the government requirements could be filled by a comparatively steady stream of coal instead of by sudden, peremptory demands for large quantities, it would be of great assistance.

Coal from the mines of Ohio, Illinois, Indiana and other western and southern coal-producing districts is not required to any appreciable extent for governmental purposes, because these smoky coals are not suitable for naval use and because the coal is not accessible from the Atlantic seaboard. This throws practically the whole government demand on to the West Virginia and Maryland fields, which are the chief sources of supply for New England. Before the war South America, the Mediterranean and many other points were fed with coal chiefly from Belgium and England. These sources of supply have gone, and every ton of coal for which shipping can be secured is being taken from these same regions tributary to New England to replace Belgium and British coal.

### A COSTLY COMPETITION

These unusual demands upon the eastern coal fields and the shortage in water transportation have crowded an unusual amount on the all-rail routes, and this has thrown an abnormal New England demand upon the somewhat limited Clearfield coal district of northern Pennsylvania where this all-rail coal is secured. This has forced New England buyers of coal into unusual competition with each other and with others seeking coal in the Clearfield district, thereby forcing up the price of all-rail coal. It has increased New England's coal bill both directly and indirectly, the latter because the high price for all-rail coal has prevented this fuel supply from furnishing the usual competition with waterborne coal coming to us from Maryland and West Virginia. Coal cannot, under ordinary circumstances, be brought successfully

from the West Virginia and Maryland fields by rail, because of the excessive cost of the long railroad haul and the inadequate supply of cars.

#### NEW ENGLAND PURCHASERS SHOULD BROADEN THEIR MARKET

We suggest that New England purchasers of tidewater, who have difficulty in securing coal from the New River and Pocahontas districts, should turn their attention more to the mines producing the higher volatile coals accessible to tidewater in West Virginia, Virginia, Tennessee, Pennsylvania and Kentucky, even though some of these more distant fields involve from 15 to 25 cents higher cost of transportation to seaboard. It seems particularly worth while for New England consumers to investigate the possibilities of these sources of supply. Coal moving from the Virginia fields takes the same rate as Pocahontas and New River.

#### PRICE VERY UNCERTAIN

We are repeatedly asked if the consumer, by waiting, will be able to get his coal at a lower price. We cannot answer this question, because while the government seems to be contemplating the regulation of coal prices, on the other hand, the government itself has felt obliged to take such contrary steps as the sudden seizure of New England's coal for naval purposes. Moreover, the tremendous pressure which the government is putting on industrial establishments for war materials, and the consequent acute competitive labor demand created thereby, tends to deplete further the already insufficient supply of labor at the mines, and besides, conscription, if applied to miners, will also soon aggravate the situation still more.

A fixed government price at which needed coal cannot be secured will not run a factory or keep a house warm next winter. Then, too, there is the transportation difficulty. Our railroads can carry much less coal in the winter months when the needs are much the greatest. Less can move by water, and while railroad rates are stable, control of water rates so far has not been undertaken by the government. Last spring and winter water carriage on coal to Boston went as high as \$5 per ton, and to this must be added the cost of railway transportation from the mines to tidewater, plus a second railroad charge if the coal was to move

from Boston or other New England port back into the interior. A possible saving on the price of coal at the mines may be much more than wiped out by the extra cost of winter transportation. At present, water rates to Boston are about \$2.50 per ton, though few or no time contracts have been placed on this basis, and the market is highly sensitive. To-day's spot price is now much more favorable than last winter, although still much above the price before the war, which was well under \$1 to Boston, with corresponding rates to ports east and west of Boston.

We think the only safe course for New England consumers to pursue is to purchase coal on a considerable scale during the next ninety days, so that before the end of October they may be sure to have on hand a liberal supply. In no other way can we be sure to keep warm and to keep our industries going next winter.

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By JAMES J. STORROW,  
*Chairman.*

Organization of Federal Fuel Administration for New  
 England

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